ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 1653/12
DATE: 20130125

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

JAMES EMERY LAUZON and MICHAEL MITCHELL ROGERS

MICHAEL ROBB, for the Federal Crown
ANIKO COUGHLAN, for the Provincial Crown

TERRY BRANDON, Counsel for James Lauzon

KENNETH MARLEY, Counsel for Michael Rogers

HEARD: January 14 and 15, 2013

DESOTTI, J.

[1] The parties are charged jointly as follows:

Count #1 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to wit: Methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Count #2 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did unlawfully have in their possession a controlled substance, to wit: methadone, contrary to Section 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Count #3 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did unlawfully possess a controlled substance, to wit: Dilaudid for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Count #4 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did without lawful excuse, carry a firearm in a careless manner, contrary to Section 86(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #5 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, not being authorized under the Firearms Act to carry a concealed weapon did carry it concealed, contrary to Section 90 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #6 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did possess a firearm knowing that they were not the holder of a licence, contrary to Section 92(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #7 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did possess a firearm without being the holder of a licence under which they may possess it, contrary to Section 91(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #8 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, were occupants of a motor vehicle in which they knew that there was at the time a prohibited firearm, contrary to Section 94 of the Criminal Code of Canada

[2] In addition, Michael Mitchell Rogers is charged in count # 9 that:

Count #9 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did have in his possession a firearm while he was prohibited from doing so, contrary to Section 117.01(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[3] Further, James Emery Lauzon stands charged in Counts #10 and #11 as follows:

Count #10 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, while operating a motor vehicle and being pursued by a peace officer operating a motor vehicle, did in order to evade the peace officer fail without lawful excuse to stop his vehicle as soon as was reasonable in the circumstances, contrary to Section 249.1(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

Count #11 – That on or about the 5th day of April in the year 2012, at the City of Sarnia, in the Province of Ontario, did operate a motor vehicle in a manner dangerous to the public, contrary to Section 249 of the Criminal Code of Canada.

A. The Facts

[4] I am only briefly highlighting some of the facts before me. There are few disagreements on these facts although there is some disagreement on the interpretation on these facts or whether any or what inference can be appropriately gleaned from them.

[5] The accused parties were travelling north on Cardiff Drive in the city of Sarnia while Officer Shawn Urban was driving south on the same street. Officer Urban noticed that the sticker on the front of the motor vehicle was improper and also recognized the accused, James Lauzon. Mr. Lauzon was stopped four times previously by this same officer and was ticketed for two HTA offences and on one other occasion a passenger in his motor vehicle was arrested for possession of drugs and a concealed weapon.

[6] On the evidence both at the voir dire and during the trial, there is some past history between the officer and the accused. Furthermore, the officer is part of a ‘cop’ patrol that is specifically on the lookout for individuals who have outstanding warrants or perhaps are in breach of probation orders.

[7] Although on the facts before me in this case, with the improper past due date sticker on the front of the motor vehicle, I dismissed the application to exclude the evidence obtained from this detention and concluded that this stop was not a violation of section 7, 8, or 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In short, I found that the Officer had every legitimate authority to stop the motor vehicle under the HTA.

[8] Obviously, after the motor vehicle fled from this HTA stop, the subsequent arrest of the accused, Lauzon for the flight from police and the discovery of methadone, methamphetamine, and dilaudid on the console in the motor vehicle in furtherance of a search for the ownership and insurance by Officer Urban, was not seriously challenged by either accused.

[9] Moreover, even if I was wrong to dismiss the application, I further found that a section 24 (2) analysis would not have excluded the evidence so found in the motor vehicle. I based my conclusion either because the officer was correct to ascertain if the ownership and insurance was present in the motor vehicle after the arrest of the accused, James Lauzon, or more importantly, because he had reasonable and probable grounds to form the opinion that the accused had fled the scene because they were attempting to hide something from the officer potentially in the motor vehicle.

[10] However, my query to counsel was whether an officer could stop a motor vehicle because he was suspicious that an individual that was a passenger may have had an outstanding warrant? In furtherance of this query, the accused, James Lauzon, was also believed to be part of a ‘Johnny Cab’ business that illegally transported individuals around the city without a proper taxi licence. I infer from the evidence, that at least some of these individuals who might avail themselves of this service, may be part of the criminal element of the city.

[11] As indicated, on the narrow facts of this case, I do not need to answer that question or determine whether this illegal taxi service could be the subject of a targeted intervention by any of the Police Services in Lambton County?

[12] At the initial HTA traffic stop, James Lauzon was asked by the officer to produce his driver’s licence, which he did. At about the same time, the officer observed the accused, Michael Rogers, in the passenger seat who was angrily asserting that he should not have been stopped and displayed certain visible and verbal signs that the officer believed were indicative that this accused was under the influence of drugs. The accused, Michael Rogers was also known to the officer and had been arrested by the officer previously.

[13] When the officer asked Mr. Rogers to vacate the car, he refused and told the officer to “fuck off, I am not getting out”. The officer returned to his vehicle to ‘run’ the licence. The officer acknowledges that he may have forgotten, in the emotional intensity of the moment, to ask the accused, Lauzon to also provide him with his ownership and insurance.

[14] Surprisingly, the officer then observed the motor vehicle leave the scene and proceeded to a stop light on Wellington St. The motor vehicle did not stop for the red stop light but proceeded right onto Wellington St. with the officer now in pursuit.

[15] I should indicate that the officer advised dispatch that he was now in pursuit of this motor vehicle with his emergency lights flashing. Moreover, as part of protocol, when any officer advises dispatch of this reality other officers hear this message and immediately drive towards the location of the pursuit. There is no need to request that ‘an officer needs assistance’. The response of other officers to this area of pursuit is done as a matter of course.

[16] The accused’s motor vehicle proceeded down Wellington St. in the curb lane for about a kilometre and then did a loop (moved from the curb lane to the passing lane) around a motor vehicle stopped at the red light on Wellington St. and Finch Dr. and turned right onto Finch Dr. Somewhere short of Finch Dr., the officer also activated his siren. He was pursuing this vehicle at a speed of about 70 kilometres an hour in a 50 kilometre an hour city speed zone.

[17] The officer indicated at this time of the morning (11:30 A.M.) traffic would be moderate, although he does not have any memory of other traffic in the area other than the one motor vehicle that was ‘looped’ by the accused’s motor vehicle. On Wellington St., there are both a municipal arena and fire hall that would exit onto Wellington St., as well as a series of Townhouses that would have pedestrian exits onto Wellington St., although there were no traffic entrances.

[18] The motor vehicle proceeded at a speed of about 70 kilometres an hour on Finch Dr., a 40 kilometre an hour zone, through a stop sign at Cobblestone St., without stopping, and then to Brimwood St. where the vehicle stopped in the intersection.

[19] The accused, Michael Rogers, then ran from the motor vehicle behind some homes on Brimwood St. The accused, James Lauzon was placed under arrest for fleeing from the traffic stop and dangerous driving and placed in the rear of his cruiser. A few moments later, Michael Rogers returned to the area and was told by the officer that he could leave and he then proceeded north on Finch Dr. towards the strip mall at the corner of Finch Dr. and Trudeau St.

[20] Meanwhile, Officer Urban entered the motor vehicle with the intention of obtaining the ownership and insurance from the glove compartment. At this moment in plain view, he observed a large bottle of methadone in the name of Trevor Smith on the console between the driver and the passenger in the front seat and which is now marked as Exhibit 1. Underneath this bottle, which was seized, he discovered a faded green ziplock bag, which contained both methamphetamine and dilaudid (both controlled drugs).

[21] The officer then proceeded north on Finch Dr. to arrest Mr. Rogers who had been detained by other officers who had arrived on the scene and who had been informed of the drugs found in plain view on the console in the car by Officer Urban. Mr Rogers was placed under arrest for three counts of possession of a controlled substance as was Mr. Lauzon.

[22] Meanwhile, a neighbour on Finch Dr., a Mr. Canos, had informed an officer that he had observed the individual who ran from the car and who he identified as the man who was wearing a red and white jacket, run to the rear of one of the houses on Brimwood St. and hurl a plastic bag to the rear of one of the residences into the trees and then this plastic bag fell to the ground. He also indicated that shortly thereafter this same individual wearing this red and white jacket returned to the cruiser.

[23] He was sure that the individual who ran from the cruiser and then returned to the same cruiser was the individual he observed hurl the plastic bag into the tree into the neighbour’s yard across the street from his home.

[24] When the officers searched the area where the neighbour had directed them and where the neighbour had indicated he had observed this individual with the red jacket, they found an empty plastic bag and a silver 22 magnum handgun. The two items were photographed, seized and fingerprinted but without success. There was also an attempt to identify DNA evidence on the firearm but without any success.

[25] The red, white and black trimmed jacket was seized from the accused, Michael Rogers, at the police station. This item of clothing has been described as a jacket, coat, sweat shirt, and hoodie by various parties.

[26] Nevertheless, I find as a fact that this sweat shirt or jacket that the accused was wearing was accurately described by the civilian witness, Mr. Canos and the jacket that he observed on the individual that flung the plastic bag into the trees behind the neighbour’s yard on Brimwood St. was worn by the accused, Michael Rogers. I will have more to say about this factual conclusion in my analysis.

B. Analysis

[27] With respect to the joint firearm offences, namely counts #4, #5, #6, #7, and #8 of the indictment, there is no evidence where the firearm was stored prior to the accused, Mr. Rogers’ exit from the motor vehicle. He is observed subsequently to throw this weapon into the tree in the neighbour’s yard across from the residence of the witness Canos.

[28] Most importantly, there is no evidence that the accused, Lauzon knew that the accused, Rogers possessed this weapon prior to HTA stop or any knowledge that the accused, Rogers possessed this weapon when the accused, Lauzon decided to flee from the police.

[29] The accused, James Lauzon indicated under oath that he fled from the police because he was told to do so by the accused, Rogers in a threatening tone because the accused, Rogers believed a warrant for his arrest was outstanding. The accused, Lauzon stated that Rogers said:

I think I have a warrant, fuck get out of here drive, I got to get out of here, go!

[30] I conclude that the explanation for leaving the area without his licence and before his vehicle was released by Officer Urban is totally devoid of any air of reality. What the accused, Lauzon has indicated is that what the accused, Rogers said to him in the motor vehicle compelled him to flee from a police officer.

[31] Frankly, this rationale for ‘bolting’ is simply a fabrication. The dire consequences that would befall the accused, Lauzon for fleeing from the police under the Criminal Code were outweighed, I conclude, by more than the words that are ascribed to the accused, Michael Rogers. The logical inference is that either the accused, Michael Rogers said something different than what was ascribed to him by the accused, Lauzon or that any criminal concerns on the part of Lauzon for fleeing the scene was of a lesser consequence than what would befall him should he remain in his motor vehicle awaiting the return of Officer Urban.

[32] In this regard, I conclude that the accused, James Lauzon, has manoeuvred carefully his way around a real dilemma. On one hand, he has stated, absent any actual testimony to this effect, that he was not threatened with bodily harm by the accused, Michael Rogers. This, I infer, arises out of the prisoners’ code of silence in not ‘squealing’ on his co-accused.

[33] Yet, on the other hand, he has indicated that he felt threatened by the tone of the words stated by Rogers to leave the area “get out of here, go”. Thus, he could say and did say through his testimony that subjectively he felt threatened, although the words used by the accused, Rogers could be equally consistent with Rogers’ desire to avoid being placed under arrest for an outstanding warrant. Again, I thoroughly and totally reject the explanation for fleeing the scene.

[34] Ultimately, I conclude that there could be four reasons for the accused, Lauzon fleeing from the police. One inference of the actions of the accused, Lauzon was that he in fact was threatened by the accused, Rogers that he would be harmed if he did not flee from the police. Unfortunately, there is no evidence that this was what had transpired in the motor vehicle.

[35] Secondly, an inference is urged on me by the Crown, to conclude that Lauzon had to have been aware of the gun in the vehicle. The eventual apprehension and arrest of the accused for fleeing the police and the eventual certainty of arrest for drug possession (the drugs were clearly present on the console in the motor vehicle) undoubtedly would have led Officer Urban to the discovery of the firearm.

[36] Since the drugs were not concealed or thrown from the motor vehicle, common sense would conclude that the flight from the officer must have been in furtherance of hiding the gun and not the drugs. In effect, the accused, James Lauzon aided the accused, Michael Rogers in finding a more suitable location to flee from the motor vehicle and conceal the gun.

[37] Thirdly, the fact that the accused, Rogers fled with only the firearm and not the drugs makes it clear that the flight from the officer, over at most a potential HTA charge, was firstly and foremost to hide the weapon from the officer. Seemingly, both parties in the vehicle were more concerned with the discovery of the weapon than any flight from police or even the drugs in the motor vehicle and we now know that there never was a warrant for the arrest of the accused, Rogers.

[38] Fourthly, the flight from police could have been over the concern that the drugs were present in the motor vehicle and not the firearm. In other words, the accused, Lauzon might have been concerned with the presence of the drugs in the motor vehicle and could have been fleeing from the police over a concern that the drugs were present in the motor vehicle and unaware of the firearm on the person of the accused, Rogers.

[39] In short, the flight from the point of view of the accused, Lauzon, could have been over his concern that the drugs would be discovered and he believed that his co-accused wanted an opportunity to conceal these drugs and not the firearm. This scenario presumes that the accused, Lauzon was unaware of the weapon in the motor vehicle

[40] This possible rationale and inference for the flight from the police is decidedly of questionable significance. Bluntly put, I want to reject this inference because ultimately the drugs were left in plain view in the motor vehicle and were not disposed of like the firearm.

[41] The net effect of placing any veracity or weight to this inference is that precisely what was intended to be accomplished by the flight from police was never accomplished. Only the firearm was disposed of by the accused, Rogers and the drugs were left in the motor vehicle to be discovered by Officer Urban.

[42] This result must have been intended because the flight from Officer Urban, although dangerous and decidedly disastrous, was not a lengthy pursuit nor at truly excessive speeds. In fact, at the point where the accused, Lauzon stopped his vehicle and where he was then arrested by Officer Urban for his precipitous flight, the end result of the drugs being discovered in the motor vehicle was a foregone conclusion.

[43] The drugs would be discovered either when the officer checked the motor vehicle for ownership or insurance as was actually done on the facts before me or after a warrant was obtained to search the vehicle. There was no possible avoidance of the discovery of the drugs in the motor vehicle.

[44] Nevertheless, after reviewing a number of decisions with respect to concealed firearms in motor vehicles, I have a reasonable doubt with respect to the knowledge that the accused, Lauzon may have had with respect to this firearm. In my view, this specific offence requires something more than the firearms’ presence in the motor vehicle. I have to have some evidence that the accused, Lauzon was aware of its physical presence and was at least aiding and abetting in its’ concealment or the actual attempt to dispose of it.

[45] As stated, there is no direct evidence of the firearm’s location prior to the accused, Rogers’ attempt to hide the firearm at the rear of the residence on Brimwood St. Moreover, while I am tempted to conclude that the entire flight from the traffic stop was effected to provide the accused, Rogers with an opportunity to dispose of the firearm in a more convenient neighbourhood, there is, as counsel has pointed out, an alternate inference that could be made in these circumstances that negates the inference of knowledge or awareness on the part of the accused, Lauzon.

[46] As weak as is this alternate explanation, I conclude that there was an alternate inference for the flight of the accused, Lauzon and in the result, there will be thus a finding of not guilty to counts #4, #5, #6, #7, and #8 with respect to the accused, James Emery Lauzon.

[47] With respect to the accused, Michael Rogers, I am sure beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused, Michael Rogers, possessed this firearm, and attempted to ‘ditch’, hide, ‘get rid of’, dispose of, or avoid detection of this firearm by fleeing from the motor vehicle and then by throwing the weapon that had been placed in a plastic bag into a tree at a backyard of a residence on Brimwood St.

[48] Where this firearm was located before the accused, Rogers attempted to dispose of it, I do not know. However, contrary to the submissions of counsel for the accused, Rogers, the failure of the police to interview the owner of the residence where the firearm was found, is not fatal to a determination that it was the accused, Rogers who possessed the firearm.

[49] In this case, there is no issue that the accused, Rogers was wearing a visible red and white hoodie with a black bottom trim. There is no issue that moments after fleeing from the motor vehicle did the accused, Rogers return to the motor vehicle. There is no issue that the witness Canos observed the flight of an individual from this motor vehicle wearing a red and white jacket who briefly disappeared behind a residence on Brimwood St. only to reemerge at the rear of the residence across the street from his residence.

[50] There is also no issue that Mr. Canos observed the individual wearing the red and white jacket throw a plastic bag into a tree at the rear of this residence. Nor is there any issue that moments later, Mr. Canos observed the same individual wearing the same red and white jacket return to the motor vehicle. Finally, there is no issue that the police found, at the backyard of the residence where Mr. Canos observed an individual throw a plastic bag into a tree, a plastic bag and silver gun that lay on the ground below a tree.

[51] Defence counsel for Mr. Rogers, queries whether I can be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual who wore the red and white jacket and disappeared for a moment behind the residence on Brimwood St. was the same red and white jacketed individual who threw the plastic bag into the tree?

[52] Furthermore, can I be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the search in the backyard of this residence on Brimwood St. below the tree that the witness Canos observed the red and white jacketed individual throw the plastic bag was the same plastic bag containing the firearm that it is alleged that the accused, Rogers is said to have thrown in the same area?

[53] Counsel for the accused, Rogers submits that because the owner of the residence was not interviewed until June of 2011 about whether he had been in his backyard proximate to the time that the gun was found in the backyard, there can be some doubt as to the exact time frame when the gun was actually deposited in the backyard. In short, can I be satisfied in the circumstances that the gun and plastic bag found in the backyard was deposited by the individual in the red and white jacket (hoodie) worn by the accused, Rogers?

[54] While I would be mildly interested in this submission had the accused, Rogers been apprehended later in the day or week after this event, I am satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that, given the description of the eyewitness; given the short time frame that had elapsed between the accused, Rogers disappearance behind the residence on Brimwood St. and then a similar dressed individual throwing a plastic bag into the tree behind the residence; given the then re-emergence of the same red and white hooded individual back at the police cruiser, who we know was Mr. Rogers; and most significantly, given the certainty of the witness Mr. Canos that the individual who ran from the police cruiser, threw the plastic bag behind the residence and then reemerged back at the cruiser, the accused, Rogers, was one and the same individual.

[55] The coincidence of a third party stranger wearing similar apparel; throwing a plastic bag; the discovery of a gun proximate to the area where the plastic bag was thrown; drugs found in the motor vehicle; and money found on the accused, Rogers, lead me to the overwhelming conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual who possessed and tossed the firearm was the accused, Michael Mitchell Rogers.

[56] The accused, Michael Rogers is thus found guilty of counts #4, #5, #6, #7, and #8. There will also be finding of guilt with respect to the accused, Michael Mitchell Rogers with respect to count #9.

[57] Without going into a great deal of analysis, the accused, James Emery Lauzon is found guilty of count #10 in the indictment, which alleges an offence contrary to s. 249.1 (1) of the Criminal Code. His departure from a simple HTA traffic stop on Cardiff Dr., down Wellington St. and onto Finch Dr., with Officer Urban in pursuit with both emergency flashing lights and a siren was an attempt to evade police as the section denotes.

[58] Count #11 against the accused, James Emery Lauzon is an allegation of dangerous driving. Was fleeing from a routine HTA police stop down Wellington St. onto Finch Dr. at 11:30 A.M. at speeds of 70 kilometres an hour through a residential neighbourhood and through red lights and a stop sign, a marked departure of the driving norm?

[59] The answer is an obvious yes. Both the officer and the passenger in the motor vehicle were placed in harm’s way as was potentially other motorists (the motorist in particular who was looped at Wellington and Finch) and pedestrians on these streets. There will be a finding of guilty to count #11 with respect to the accused, James Emery Lauzon.

[60] Counts #1, #2, and #3, are allegations that the accused, James Emery Lauzon and Michael Mitchell Rogers were jointly in possession of drugs, with counts #1 and #3 alleging that their possession of these drugs were for the purpose of trafficking.

[61] Under s. 4(3) of the Criminal Code, possession offences require that the Crown prove three elements: possession, knowledge, consent and a measure of control. These three elements are required for all types of possession whether direct, constructive or joint.

[62] The Crown may prove these elements based on circumstantial evidence provided that the trier of fact is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused is the only reasonable inference.

[63] In some situations, the nature of the substance found and its location, would simply not be the subject of ‘unknowing possession’. In this sense, see R. v. Kinna, R. v. Miller, R. v. Chambers, R. v. Guilbride and R. v. Ho.

[64] There is no difficulty in concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that both parties had jointly the requisite knowledge and control of the drugs in the motor vehicle. The location of the drugs would suggest that their respective knowledge was obvious and apparent.

[65] The factual circumstance found in the decision of Justice Moldaver, then of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Duvivier is similar to the facts before me in this trial. In that case, the drugs, crack cocaine, were situated in a small opaque grocery bag in plain view on the centre console of a motor vehicle. There was other circumstantial evidence such as the physical proximity to the drugs between the driver and the passenger, the shared use of the motor vehicle, the value of the drugs seized, the money found in possession of the appellant in small denominations that suggested drug monies, and the presence of cell phones.

[66] In this case, we also have an even more obvious plain view situation. Here, a large methadone vial (large container) was found on top of the plastic bag containing the methamphetamine and dilaudid and were in close physical proximity and decidedly visible to both the passenger and the driver.

[67] With respect to the issue of possession for the purpose of trafficking, there was a firearm in the motor vehicle, which may or may not have been known to the accused, Lauzon, but was in the possession of the accused, Rogers. There was the large quantity of monies found in the sock of the accused, Rogers in denominations that would suggest drug sale monies. Most importantly, there was a diversity of drugs and a vial of methadone in the name of Trevor Smith. None of the parties in the vehicle had any pseudonyms with the aforementioned name.

[68] I infer that this vial of methadone was present to be sold. I infer that both parties were engaged in the business of the drug trade given the aforementioned indices of same. In addition, I conclude that neither Mr. Lauzon nor Mr Rogers were on their way to obtain groceries at WALMART. Finally, I conclude that the accused, Lauzon may have been providing a transportation service but this service was not for groceries but to sale and dispose of drugs for cash.

[69] In the result, there is a finding of guilty to both accused with respect to counts #1, 2, and 3.

The Honourable Mr. Justice John A. Desotti

Released: January 25, 2013

CASES CONSIDERED

R. v. MacDonald, [2002] O.J. No. 982;
R. v. Cross, [2005] O.J. No. 3295, 2005 ONCJ 350, 73 W.C.B. (2d) 401;
R. v. Provost, [2008] O.J. No. 2010, 2008 ONCJ 241, 77 W.C.B. (2d) 372;
R. v. Anderson-Wilson, [2010] O.J. No. 377, 2010 ONSC 489;
R. v. Duvivier, [2010] O.J. No. 683, 2010 ONCA 136;
R. v. Bacchus, [2011] O.J. No. 4571, 2011 ONSC 6572;
R. v. Martin (1948), 1948 101 (ON CA), 92 C.C.C. 257 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Iser, 2012 BCPC 70, [2012] B.C.J. No. 512;
R. v. Vu, 2004 BCCA 381;
R. v. Cooper, 1977 11 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 860;
R. v. Wong, 2003 ABPC 110, [2003] A.J. No. 840;
R. v. Aiello (1978), 1978 2374 (ON CA), 38 C.C.C. (2d) 485 (Ont. C.A.), 46 C.C.C.(2d) 128 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Balasuntharam, [1999] O.J. No. 486;
R. v. Sparling, [1988] O.H. No. 107 (H.C.);
R. v. McRae, 1967 440 (SK CA), [1967] 3 C.C.C. 122 (Sask C.A.);
R. v. Ho, 2010 ABPC 258, [2010] A.J. No. 1160;
R. v. Caldwell (1972), 1972 ALTASCAD 33, 7 C.C.C. (2d) 285 (Alta. C.A.);
R. v. Marshall, 1968 999 (AB CA), [1969] 3 C.c.C. 149 (Alta. C.A.);
R. v. Pham (1999), 1999 BCCA 571, 139 C.C.C. (3d) 539 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Savory (1996), 1996 2001 (ON CA), 94 O.A.C. 318 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Terrence (1980), 1980 74 (ON CA), 55 C.C.C. (2d) 183 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Chambers (1985), 1985 169 (ON CA), 20 C.C.C. (3d) 440 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. McIntosh, [2003] O.J. No. 1267 (S.C.);
R. v. T.(S.) (2001), 140 O.A.C. 12 (C.A.);
R. v. Williams (1998), 1998 2557 (ON CA), 125 C.C.C. (3d) 552 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Belnavis and Lawrence (1996), 1996 4007 (ON CA), 107 C.C.C. (3d) 195 (Ont. C.A.);
R. v. Kinna (1951), 1951 443 (BC CA), 98 C.C.C. 378 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Miller (1984), 1984 637 (BC CA), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 54 (B.C.C.A.);
R. v. Guilbride, 2004 BCPC 102, [2004] B.C.J. No. 861

COURT FILE NO.: 1653/12

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

JAMES EMERY LAUZON and

MICHAEL MITCHELL ROGERS

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

DESOTTI, J.

Released: January 25, 2013