COURT FILE NO.: 33889/11
DATE: 2013-08-15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
P. D.
Audrey A. Shecter and Sheila Holmes, for the Applicant
Applicant
- and -
D. C.
Linda Joe and Rasmin Misheal, then D.C., acting in person for part of the trial, and Geoffrey Wells, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD: November 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30, 2012 and continued January 21, 22, and 23, 2013
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CORRECTED DECISION: November 14, 2022 - Names of parties and identifying particulars have been anonymized. No changes to content made.
M. J. Donohue J.
Contents
BACKGROUND. 4
ISSUES. 5
CUSTODY. 6
P.D.’S EVIDENCE. 6
OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S LAWYER’S EVIDENCE. 10
D.C.’S EVIDENCE. 11
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE. 13
JOINT CUSTODY. 17
SOLE CUSTODY. 21
ACCESS. 23
IMPUTED INCOME TO P.D. 24
CHILD SUPPORT. 27
SPOUSAL SUPPORT. 27
IMPUTED INCOME TO D.C. 29
SECTION 7 EXPENSES. 31
EQUALIZATION. 32
SUMMARY. 39
VALUATION DAY ASSET. 39
DATE OF MARRIAGE NET VALUE OF PROPERTY. 40
CONCLUSION. 40
RETURN OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS. 40
DAMAGES FOR FAILED MEDIATON-ARBITRATION COSTS. 42
LIFE INSURANCE FOR SUPPORT. 44
LINE OF CREDIT. 44
RESTRAINING ORDER. 45
DIVORCE. 46
ORDERS. 46
CUSTODY. 46
ACCESS. 46
TRAVEL. 50
OTHER PARENTING TERMS. 51
MOBILITY. 51
CHILD SUPPORT. 51
SECTION 7 EXPENSES. 52
DISCLOSURE. 53
SPOUSAL SUPPORT. 56
EQUALIZATION. 56
RETURN OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS. 56
DIVORCE. 56
COSTS. 57
BACKGROUND
[1] The parties met in the spring of 2005. They began to live together in either the spring of 2005, or the spring of 2006. E.P.D., their son, was born September 2006, and is now six years old. G.G.D., their second son, was born February 2008, and is now five years old.
[2] P.D. is a mechanic who runs a trade service business. He is 43 years of age. D.C. had been a support worker before having her children. She is 40 years of age.
[3] The parties married on July 25, 2009. Their time together in cohabitation was rife with argument. They separated on March 1, 2011, after only a year and a half of marriage. The litigation has been highly conflicted. The matter took 12 trial days and each party did lengthy written closing submissions. There was very little common ground.
[4] Their time together has been punctuated by various physical assaults between them. Foul language in their communication has been a common occurrence. At times, they would reconcile and enjoy a comfortable home with a pool, a cottage, and vacations away.
[5] The trial proceeded with each providing testimony and other evidence essentially demonizing the other parent.
ISSUES
[6] Custody and parenting is disputed between the parties:
(a) What access should be in place for the non-custodial parent?;
(b) What Child Support is payable?;
(c) What Spousal Support is payable?;
(d) What section 7 Expenses are payable?;
(e) What Equalization payment is to be made?;
(f) Should personal items be returned to P.D.?;
(g) Should D.C. pay P.D.’s costs for the Failed Mediation-Arbitration?;
(h) What Life Insurance is to be in place?;
(i) Does P.D. owe monies to D.C. on the joint Line of Credit?;
(j) Should a Restraining Order be in place?; and,
(k) Divorce (Agreed).
CUSTODY
[7] D.C. has been a stay-at-home mother with both boys since their birth. Initially she was ill with rheumatoid arthritis and required a nanny’s assistance with her first son’s care. She was in receipt of disability income from her employer’s plan for a time. When that ended, she continued to stay home with the boys to parent them.
[8] Since the parties separated, in March 2011, the children have lived primarily with D.C. and P.D. has exercised regular access with the boys.
[9] Each parent seeks an order from the court for sole custody. In the alternative, P.D. seeks an order for joint custody with parallel parenting. His submission is that D.C. is determined to marginalize his parenting.
P.D.’s EVIDENCE
[10] Contrary to D.C.’s evidence, P.D. states that he did not assault D.C. at any time.
[11] P.D.’s friend, M.G., testified. He has known P.D. for over 20 years. M.G. runs a karate school and has trained P.D. He described the discipline of karate instilling respect, non-violence, and control. He told how much P.D. is liked in the school and how helpful he has been fixing things at the Dojo, doing lighting and plumbing without charge. M.G. said although P.D. is so large and confident that his image can be menacing, he is really the opposite, and is gentle, giving, and not violent.
[12] M.M., P.D.’s first wife, testified that there was no physical violence between them. She described his drinking, when they were together some years ago, to be “normal” in social situations.
[13] K.H., mother to P.D., testified. She described P.D. to be an affectionate father with his boys, but strict. They follow him about the house. He cooks for them. She described a number of arguments she experienced where D.C. was screaming and hysterical. K.H. was critical of D.C.’s housekeeping; she found old food in the fridge and cupboards.
[14] On access visits, K.H. was concerned that the children were not clean, with dirty nails and hair, and socks that had not been changed. She would bathe them when they arrived on access visits, put them in fresh clothes, and then launder their clothes.
[15] K.H. asked her grandson, E.P.D., about his friends. She said E.P.D. said he won’t tell them what goes on as he is “not allowed” to tell them.
[16] K.H. did not feel P.D. drinks to excess.
[17] J.H., step-father to P.D., testified. He described an incident in August 2009, when he heard the parties arguing. He entered the kitchen and heard a smack and saw P.D. holding the left side of his face. He described D.C. hitting a fry pan against P.D.’s shoulder.
[18] A.G. is P.D.’s cousin who resides in England. She testified that she first met him in 2008. She met D.C. in 2009 as well as the two children on a visit to Canada. A.G. observed that the couple argued frequently and did not appear to be very affectionate as expected for newlyweds. She described some of their arguments would escalate to screaming and shouting with D.C. being hysterical.
[19] A.G. thought that D.C. was not providing sufficient structure and discipline for the children’s daily routine. They chatted together about suggestions as to how to get the children into a disciplined routine. D.C. had a book titled, “The Baby Whisperer”. A.G. agreed it had good advice in it. Under cross-examination, A.G. agreed that as D.C. had that book, it indicated that D.C. was trying to learn better parenting skills.
[20] A.G. described D.C. parenting approach to be more unstructured and laid back, whereas P.D.’s approach was to instil discipline. She thought the two needed to find a happy medium. A.G. said that D.C. was late for an African Lion Safari trip and she considered D.C. to be disorganized.
[21] A.G. did not observe any violence displayed by P.D. toward D.C. but she did come to the house one day in August 2009, and observe that P.D. had two black eyes and swelling nose. He explained that D.C. had hit him with a pan. She saw the dented pan.
[22] A.G. described P.D.’s current home to be “homey” with nice furnishings, a Superman throw on one bed and a Batman throw on the other. She admires P.D.’s structure and discipline that he provides the boys when they are with him.
[23] P.D. called B.D., former boyfriend of D.C., to testify. B.D. described arguments they had when they lived together. At the end of the relationship, he testified that she slapped and scratched his face and body. He said she had ripped and torn books apart. He called the police who took her away.
[24] P.D. testified that his business provided skilled tradespeople to the commercial sector. He has approximately 40 employees. He had travelled for business about three times a month, but lately it had been minimal. He testified that his schedule is flexible enough for him to provide care for the two boys.
[25] Although it was submitted that D.C. interrupted his access, the only evidence was one night when E.P.D. was to have his father take him to his dance recital. When P.D. went to pick the boy up, D.C. refused to release him into P.D.’s care.
[26] Since separation in March 2011, D.C. has called the police several times regarding P.D., although very little detail was provided to me. One time involved him rolling a pumpkin toward her.
OFFICE OF THE CHILDREN’S LAWYER’S EVIDENCE
[27] Eileen Spraggart, clinical investigator, for the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (“OCL”) testified and was cross-examined by both parties.
[28] Ms. Spraggart conducted her investigation and recommended sole custody to D.C. and unsupervised access to P.D.
[29] The evidence of the OCL investigation is that the children did not exhibit signs of alienation, that they have a strong relationship with both parents.
[30] Ms. Spraggart did two interviews with the children. She interviewed some collateral witnesses. She had read the extensive Children’s Aid Society (“CAS”) records. She concluded that the children had witnessed domestic violence.
[31] Her concern was the violence that P.D. had shown in front of both boys. G.G.D. had told her that he saw his father throw a remote at his mother.
[32] Ms. Spraggart described P.D. as a “competent and caring parent”. She found that he has a good relationship with his children and appropriately used boundaries.
[33] On her observation visit with D.C. she found both children had a “strong and loving relationship with D.C. who seemed attuned to the children’s needs.”
D.C.’s EVIDENCE
[34] D.C. described, at length, various times when P.D. was angry, violent, and threatening to her. Most of the incidents were in the presence of the crying children. She described bruising on her neck on one occasion and bruising on her leg on another occasion. Another time she testified that he backhanded her face while she was driving the family home from the cottage. Her lip bled and this caused E.P.D. to begin to cry.
[35] Much of the violence described was when P.D. had been drinking.
[36] With respect to B.D.’s evidence, D.C.’s evidence is that, in the argument, it was B.D. who threw the books around, and that he dug his own fingers into his face. The criminal charges against her were, afterward, withdrawn.
[37] A number of these incidents are detailed in the CAS file that was filed with the court, on consent.
[38] Her boyfriend S.D. testified that P.D. called him and made threats over the phone in January 2012.
[39] The family’s nanny, P.B., testified that she observed P.D. have a number of drinks as soon as he came home from work. She said she did not see much parenting by P.D. with his boys. Her description was that he sat with them for about five minutes.
[40] D.C.’s mother, Ds. C., testified. She commented on the foul language that P.D. used around the children. When she was present in their home or at the cottage during the marriage she said he was never without a drink. She testified that P.D. would often call her when he was drunk and chat about his problems. The next day he would email her an apology.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE
[41] P.D.’s evidence and that of his family and friends described a man who was gentle, not a heavy drinker, and the victim of a hysterical wife who constantly called the police and the CAS to create the illusion that he was an abusive husband.
[42] D.C. described, in contrast, a powerful man who used physical aggression against her, in the presence of the children, often under the influence of alcohol.
[43] To discern which description is most likely the most accurate one I look to P.D.’s plea of guilty to facts read into criminal court and admitted on June 29, 2011:
Between January 16, 2011, and January 31, 2011, [P.D.] and complainant were in the master bedroom of their residence at [redacted], watching television with both children lying in bed with them. While they were watching T.V., a person on the show they were watching called another character in the show a “bitch” and upon hearing this, their son stated, “That’s what daddy calls mommy when he’s mad.” [P.D.] began to laugh, which upset his wife and she told [P.D.] it wasn’t funny, and [P.D.] told his wife to “shut up”. The verbal argument escalated and the two argued over who would get out of the bed. [P.D.] then walked around and pushed two fingers into the complainant’s clavicle bone with force, causing her pain. He then raised his fist in a motion that made the complainant believe that he was going-about to punch her. Both the children were crying and asking their father to stop as they were both awake and still in the bed. The wife fled the bedroom and stated that she was going to call the police. [P.D.] followed and took away the phone, and began to plead with her not to call the police. She then attempted to get the phone in their office, and [P.D.] continued to follow, asking her not to call the police. [P.D.] then fell to the floor, claiming that he was having a heart attack, and due to all the drama and how upset the children were, the complainant decided not to call the police. As a result of the assault, the complainant suffered bruising to her arm and leg, and she advised the police that during the incident her husband was intoxicated. [[P.D.] admitted the facts were substantially correct with a “very minor variation”; the children were crying; but not crying for him to stop. They were present in the room at the time].
[44] P.D. admitted in one courtroom these facts were true. In this courtroom he denies them. I do not find him credible particularly as he gave no other presentation to the facts of each of the violent incidents recounted by D.C. other than to say “they did not happen”.
[45] In closing submissions, P.D. correctly points out that there was no medical evidence to support the abuse, even when D.C. claims she was assaulted to the point of bleeding. However, there is corroborating documentation of that incident in the text message by D.C. to P.D. on February 24, 2009.
[46] D.C. - “I will tell u what drama is … you ordering me to drive where u want yelling at me in a car with our children in the back, bad roads and calling me names and then if that’s not bad enough hitting me in the face. Then while I’m bleeding down my face tell me ‘see what you made me do’ keep driving and ‘can’t u talk to this kid to get him to stop crying’ and [E.P.D.] saying ‘daddy don’t hit mommy’ that is Drama.”
[47] P.D. - “I need you to come home. I’m not feeling well.”
[48] M.G.’s description of karate, making P.D. more controlled and disciplined, is not compatible with this behaviour.
[49] A text message between the parties on June 2, 2008, is also illuminating.
[50] P.D. - “Are you coming home tonight?”
[51] D.C. - “No, you strangled me right in front of [E.P.D.]. And by the way u know he pushes me away because of the way you treat me and that’s why I’m not coming home. Because you are calling me names and yelling at me. Not to mention all of the physical violence. You have to recognize you have a problem.”
[52] P.D. - “[D.C.], I realize you push my buttons as I do you. The other night, things got out of hand, again, I am sorry for my party. It takes the two of us to fix this. I need your co-operation as well. There will be no shouting or arguing. We can order in some dinner, I would just like to see you all before I go. Will you please come on? The new bed came, you can sleep in our room and I will sleep in the front room, K?”
[53] D.C. - “No I didn’t want [E.P.D.] around you, badmouthing me like usual. U have anger issues and you have to make changes. No matter what I ask of you, you can’t lay your hands on me. Or for that matter yell at me for calling u or asking you to help me or anything. There is appropriate behaviour and you do not talk like an adult. You are not committed to me or the kids as a responsible adult. I deserve better.”
[54] P.D. - “Your right, we both deserve better. There is a strain with these two kids and we have both acted inappropriately. I usually take the crown though, I am sorry for that, come home with the kids and let’s have a nice night before I leave.”
[55] In this intimate correspondence I see P.D. admitting to bad behaviour within the marriage.
[56] Although P.D. submitted evidence that there was no concern over excessive alcohol, I note the report of Dr. Roman Jovey dated September 15, 2011. He saw P.D. at the Addiction and Concurrent Disorders Program on three occasions. Two appointments were before separation and one appointment was after. The appointments were regarding, “his concerns over his alcohol consumption and anxiety issues.” They discussed the impact of:
“[H]is anxiety issues and his own concerns over his occasional use of alcohol as a coping strategy to manage his anxiety. He reported that his anxiety became significantly worse in the midst of his recent marital breakdown; however he is currently managing this by taking prescribed medication rather than alcohol.”
[57] Dr. Jovey goes on to state:
“Based on my three assessments, at no time would he have met diagnostic criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence. At most, at his appointment of November 8, 2010, I noted a diagnosis of ‘early problem drinking’”.
The doctor states they discussed disulfiram to discourage drinking during stressful times and gave a prescription to P.D. to try in November 2010. P.D. advised Dr. Jovey by September 15, 2011, that he had managed without having to take any of the disulfiram prescribed.
[58] Those records support D.C.’s evidence of P.D. abusing alcohol.
[59] There was uncontradicted evidence at trial of P.D. calling D.C. a “bitch” and a “fucking retard” on more than one occasion.
[60] I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the history as presented by D.C. to the police, the CAS, and the OCL, is largely correct.
JOINT CUSTODY
[61] Joint custody is encouraged and sought by the courts as much as possible as long as it is consistent with the children’s best interests. Parallel parenting divides up various areas of responsibilities in the children’s lives to allow each parent the final say in a particular area.
[62] P.D. did not suggest what areas should be split up between the two parents. These children do not have unusual health problems. Neither parent testified to special religious, academic or sport goals that they had for the boys.
[63] Joint custody with parallel parenting was ordered in Ursic v. Ursic (2006), 2006 CanLII 18349 (ON CA), 32 R.F.L. (6th) 23 (Ont. CA), where the mother was deliberately cutting the father and his family out of the child’s life.
[64] I do not find D.C. to be doing so. There was evidence of only one access visit being denied and some difficulty with phone access which Inderjit Grewal, the CAS worker, noted had been resolved. The only suggestion of evidence of alienation was K.H.’s evidence that her grandson said he was “not allowed” to tell her about his friends. That one comment is insufficient to support a finding of alienation.
[65] The issue of sole or joint custody was considered by MacKinnon J. in Alden v. Thomas, 2011 ONSC 7003, at para. 39:
The driving consideration in cases where courts have ruled against joint decision making appears to be the imperative to reduce parental conflict and the children’s exposure to it as much as possible. For example in V.K. v. T.S. 2011 ONSC 4305, [2011] O.J. No. 4046 (SCJ) D.L. Chappel J. stated at paragraphs 74 and 76:
74 The existence of conflict and strife between the parties from time to time will not necessarily preclude the court from making an Order for joint custody. The question to be determined is whether the conflict between the parties is impacting or likely to impact on the well-being of the children. If the evidence indicates that the parties, despite their conflict with each other, have been able to communicate, shelter the children from the conflict reasonably well, and put the children’s interests ahead of their own when necessary, an order for joint custody may be appropriate. [Footnote omitted.] The question for the court to determine is “whether a reasonable measure of communication and cooperation is in place, and is achievable in the future, so that the best interests of the child can be ensured on an ongoing basis. [Footnote omitted.]
76 In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. The Ontario Court of Appeal has clearly stated that one parent cannot create conflict and problems with the other parent by unreasonable conduct, impeding access, marginalizing the other parent, or by any other means and then claim sole custody on the basis of lack of cooperation and communication. [Footnote omitted.]
[66] As noted above, I have concluded that D.C. has not created the background of violent confrontations for the police and CAS.
[67] I find that D.C. has not alienated the children from their father, nor did the OCL.
[68] P.D. and D.C. have not been able to shelter the children from the conflict.
[69] A reading of this couple’s text messages while they were together demonstrates an inability to communicate respectfully between them. It is not simply a function of this litigation and the separation.
[70] Mulligan J. reviewed the case law on joint custody with parallel parenting and sole custody in Lynn v. Lynn, 2012 ONSC 1224 at paras. 91-92, and cited Pazaratz J. in Izyuk v. Bilousov, 2011 ONSC 6451, at para. 504:
But joint custody will only work if the parents have the desire and the capacity to make it work. It is not a risk-free option. In the wrong family circumstances, a joint custody order can perpetuate hostilities, indecision, and power struggles. Children-particularly children already exposed to the upset of family breakdown-look to their parents for love, guidance, stability, protection, and consistency. They need to have confidence that adult decisions will be made quickly, properly and uneventfully. [Emphasis in original.]
[71] At para. 518, Pazaratz J. stated that, “Courts have declined to order parallel parenting where parents were unable to agree on important decisions and their lack of cooperation meant that parallel parenting would cause conflict for the children.”
[72] In light of my findings of the violence and conflict between these parents the proposal for joint custody with parallel parenting is not appropriate. Such a custody order is likely to bring these two parents back into more conflict.
[73] I consider only the clearest and cleanest decision from the court will bring back at least an uneasy peace between these parties and for these children.
[74] Sole custody will serve the children’s best interests. These children need an end to the bickering that has marked their early years.
SOLE CUSTODY
[75] Since separation in March 2011, the children have resided with D.C. P.D. has exercised access on alternate weekends.
[76] The evidence of Ms. Grewal, the CAS worker, was that, by September 2012, the parents still had conflict of access and exchange, but phone issues had diminished.
[77] The children were reporting a stable environment, there was no more abusive language, and they were not afraid of their dad.
[78] Neither the CAS nor the OCL noted any issue with the children being unwashed as mentioned by K.H., P.D.’s mother.
[79] D.C. criticized P.D. for not taking their son, E.P.D. to the doctor after a fall. P.D. criticized D.C. for not following a doctor’s advice to have G.G.D.’s tonsils removed after several infections. I found these faults not determinative of whom is best for sole custody.
[80] Neither the CAS nor the OCL suggested the children were unsafe with either party.
[81] However, P.D. has demonstrated domestic violence in the past under family stress. His relationship with his sons will thrive best if he were not the parent with the children in his care for the bulk of the time.
[82] The OCL recommended the sole custody to D.C. That has been the status quo.
[83] D.C. shall have sole custody of the two boys with liberal access to P.D.
[84] P.D. struck me as a dynamic, and purposeful man. He is no pushover. I anticipate that as long as he retains the steady contact with his sons that he will not be alienated from their lives.
[85] In Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CanLII 191 (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the best interests of the children are the ultimate and only relevant issue in determining custody.
[86] I consider the best interests of the children to be best served by granting sole custody to D.C. but taking measures to ensure ample access with their father.
[87] With generous access time, P.D. will have the opportunity to schedule extra-curricular activities and be in involved in their lives to their benefit.
ACCESS
[88] The principal that the children should have as much contact with each parent as possible is consistent with the best interest of the child: see the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 16 (10).
[89] Each party proposed final orders for restricting mobility for the children’s residence. P.D. proposed 20 kilometers from [redacted]. D.C. proposed 30 kilometers from Milton. I find the restriction of 30 kilometers from Milton will ensure the children remain in reasonable contact with their community and their father and so adopt that restriction.
[90] Each party in their submissions gave suggested parenting and access wording for the court order. I consider the wording for parenting issues, as proposed by D.C., to be the most generous and helpful in the children’s lives and have adopted most of her proposals for parenting orders. They are also largely consistent with the recommendations by the OCL.
[91] To ensure that both children profit from as much time as possible with their father I find it appropriate to make an order for access as proposed by P.D. which will generally provide five overnights and one evening, in a two-week period, for the children to spend with their father.
IMPUTED INCOME TO P.D.
[92] P.D. did not commission an income report, although he did retain Melanie Russell of Kalex Evaluations to give expert testimony on the value of his business. In closing submissions, it was raised that there had been an endorsement by Justice Hourigan on September 20, 2011, at a case conference, for P.D. to obtain an income report. D.C. seeks to have me draw an adverse inference against P.D. for failing to produce such a report. This court order was never mentioned at trial. There was no evidence on the issue. It would be unfair to consider it now.
[93] D.C. obtained an income report by Michael Carnegie and had him testify.
[94] P.D.’s business was growing through the years when the family was young. It peaked in 2008. He described changes in the economy that affected his construction division and caused it to begin to lose money. He had to close down the construction division in April 2011.
[95] He described other financial challenges he has had with the business, and his goal to take a salary of approximately $200,000 per annum. He expected his 2012 salary would be about $180,000. He recognized there would be an entertainment add-back and an add-back for his vehicle for personal use.
[96] Ms. Russell was sent an email on his past income levels dated April 26, 2010. When dividends were included, P.D.’s income was as follows:
• 2004: $84,463.
• 2005: $69,087.
• 2006: $92,307.
• 2007: $164,759.
• 2008: $369,668.
• 2009: $330,076.
[97] P.D.’s tax returns showing T4 income plus dividends show income levels somewhat consistent with those noted above:
• 2006: $92,308.
• 2007:$164,616.
• 2008--$402,139.
• 2009--$366,827.
• 2010--$158,503.
• 2011--$160,842.
[98] D.C.’s witness, Mr. Carnegie, testified that the income should be a three or four year weighted average income using weights of 1, 2, and 3 on the income shown from 2008 to 2010. He concluded that the income was in the range of $308,700 to $361,020.
[99] Mr. Carnegie’s averages included a portion of Mr. P.D.’s business that is no longer generating income. I do not see that that approach will reflect the reality of what P.D. is reasonably able to earn at this time.
[100] I prefer to use the income levels as set out by submissions for P.D. His 2011 income line 150 income was $160,000. In 2012 he anticipated his income would be $180,000.
[101] Both parties relied on the evidence that add-backs of $18,000 for personal expenses would apply. Gross-up for tax of $8,700 on those expenses would bring his 2012 income to $206,700. This is the amount I find is most appropriate to consider for child and spousal support purposes.
[102] In the event the company does better and dividends are paid then continued disclosure of P.D.’s personal and business tax returns will allow adjustments to be made for support purposes.
CHILD SUPPORT
[103] Although P.D. sought joint custody, he reassured the court that he would not seek to reduce the child support table amount if the children were in his care 50 percent of the time or less.
[104] I order P.D. to pay the table amount of child support under the Child Support Guidelines, O. Reg 391/97, of $2,658 on income of $206,700.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
[105] The court may make a support order under s. 15 of the Divorce Act. I note that such an order must take into consideration the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse, including the length of time the spouses lived together, and any arrangement relating to support of either.
[106] A support order should recognize any economic disadvantages to the spouses arising from the marriage or its breakdown; apportion between the spouses any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and above any obligation for child support; relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage; and, in so far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of time: see s. 15.2(6) of the Divorce Act.
[107] In closing submissions P.D. conceded a co-habitation of five and a half years. D.C. submitted it was six years co-habitation from the spring of 2005. I am satisfied that in the fall of 2005, D.C. had evidence that she was renting her house, which is a strong indication that her residence was officially moved to P.D.’s residence. I find five and a half years cohabitation to be a realistic time-frame.
[108] D.C. has been at home with children since early maternity leave in July 2006. She took the role of traditional wife and mother in part due to her illness, which left her incapacitated for a period of time.
[109] Both parties recognize an entitlement to spousal support. P.D.’s closing position is that a period of four years support be payable, less the two years he has already paid.
[110] D.C.’s position is that support be paid a further three years to January 1, 2016, and then be subject to review on her efforts to become self-sufficient given her physical circumstances and financial consequences of the breakdown of the marriage.
[111] In closing, D.C. raised an issue of physical limitations for employment, however, there was no evidence of her illness other than in 2006. She demonstrated stamina and focus in handling much of the trial on her own and I am not persuaded that she is in any way impaired from full time employment.
[112] This was a brief marriage and short period of co-habitation.
[113] Accordingly, I find it appropriate to make the period of spousal support to be to a date certain.
[114] The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines indicate the spousal support range to be between 3 to 15 years.
[115] Neither party presented evidence nor argument directed at assessing the means and needs for each party, but rather relied on the mid-range spousal support guideline amounts.
[116] I am satisfied that a period of five years to January 1, 2016, is appropriate. I order mid-range spousal support in accordance with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.
IMPUTED INCOME TO D.C.
[117] D.C. has been out of the workforce since 2006.
[118] She is not without education and experience. She has a high school education and nearly completed a three-year creative arts program at Georgian College. She has held a number of jobs and rose to be supervisor in a traffic control position for the Ministry of Transportation. She has done graphic design and receptionist work. Before the children were born, she was employed as a support worker in autism services for Kerrie’s Place.
[119] She was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis in October 2006. As noted above there was no medical evidence at trial of any current limitations she has. She presented herself with vigour at trial, while representing herself. She is an attractive and articulate young woman with a long work life ahead of her.
[120] D.C.’s position is that she be attributed with either $0 or $10,000 in income.
[121] Before the children were born D.C. demonstrated the ability to earn in the area of $40,000, when she was employed with autistic children. P.D. urges me to attribute that income to her for the purposes of support.
[122] I anticipate that it may take her time, on re-entry to the work force, to meet and or surpass her prior income level. Reasonably I see her with the strengths and abilities to garner an hourly wage of $15 for a 36-hour work week over 50 weeks for an annual income of $27,000.
[123] Accordingly, I impute income to D.C. of $27,000 for the purposes of support.
SECTION 7 EXPENSES
[124] In light of the imputed incomes above, each parent shall share the costs of extraordinary expenses. P.D.’s share is 69.2 per cent based on his imputed income of $206,700. D.C.’s share is 30.8 per cent based on her imputed income of $27,000.
[125] Neither party appears to have contemplated a child care cost. As P.D. seeks to impute full time employment income to D.C., then this is a likely expense that will be incurred, should D.C. enter schooling or the work force.
[126] The parties agree that medical and health expenses not covered by insurance are proper extraordinary expenses.
[127] D.C. argued a number of other special and extraordinary expenses:
• Kumon tutoring for E.P.D. of $1,200 ($100 per month);
• Swimming - $525;
• Basketball - $400;
• Baseball - $300; and,
• Gymnastics - $300, for a total of $2,725 per annum.
[128] P.D.’s position is that such expenses are normal activities and do not qualify as extraordinary expenses pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines. He argues that I should find such expenses are ordinary expenses.
[129] However, at trial, there was no evidence led as to why the expense was necessary and whether it was reasonable as set out in s. 7 and the definition of “extraordinary” under s. 7(1)(1.1) of the Child Support Guidelines.
[130] This claim for swimming, basketball, baseball, and gymnastics is dismissed.
EQUALIZATION
[131] D.C.’s Net Family Property (“NFP”) Statement was a moving target. It was filed late, then corrected, and in closing submissions, a different NFP statement was provided. Ultimately, she agreed with a number of the values as set out in P.D.’s NFP. The court will accept her concessions to the values agreed upon.
[132] Part 4a: Land values are agreed at $269,632.93 for each party. The matrimonial home has been sold and divided. I have no particulars.
[133] Part 4b: General Household items and vehicles were disputed.
[134] P.D. valued the furniture acquired during the marriage at $70,000 to be split $35,000 between them. In evidence, D.C. placed values of $20,000 to be split $10,000 between them. In closing D.C. gave no value and simply stated that all contents were divided on sale of the house. P.D. insured the contents of the house for a replacement value of $454,425. A photo binder of the house contents certainly showed a wealth of new and elegant furnishings. I am satisfied that a value of $35,000 for both parties is reasonable to ascribe to these assets.
[135] The cottage contents were agreed to be valued at $11,000 for each party.
[136] The Bayliner was agreed to be valued for P.D. at $20,000.
[137] P.D. claims to have owned $15,000 in jewellery; $4,000 in art; and, $5,000 in sports and hobby items. He ascribed $2,000, for jewellery owned by D.C.
[138] D.C.’s position is that each party is to retain their own items. She does not put a value on any of these items claimed by her husband and argues that P.D. did not provide evidence of these values.
[139] Although there was insurance for $454,425 on the contents, there was no special riders insuring $15,000 in jewellery, or $4,000 in art, or $5,000 in sports and hobby items. There was no evidence of value given by P.D. apart from the statement of the value in the NFP Statement. There was also no evidence or particulars of the $2,000 of jewellery assigned to D.C.
[140] Without such evidence, I will not place a value on these items.
[141] Part 4(c): Bank accounts, savings, securities and pensions are now agreed. P.D. had $109,863.09 and D.C. had $9,646.16.
[142] Part 4(e): Business interests are disputed. P.D. relies on the reports and evidence of Ms. Russell for the mid-range value of the business he owned to be $439,944. In her evidence, D.C. took the high range value of the business in Ms. Russell’s reports and said it would be $525,000. In closing D.C. assigns a value to his business of $515,944. No reason or argument is given for the alteration.
[143] D.C. criticizes Ms. Russell’s preparation of her report at the lowest form of assurance. The valuation report is not disputed, except in closing submissions without the opportunity for the witness to respond. Ms. Russell gave sensible answers in cross-examination as to how she prepared her valuations and what amendments she made to make them as fair and accurate as possible. Choosing arbitrarily the highest value in the valuation report is not reasonable.
[144] I find the business, [redacted], value at the date of separation to be $439,944.
[145] In addition, D.C. claims that at valuation date the business owed P.D. $17,944, and so adds that as an asset for him. P.D. argues that it does not belong in the business valuation.
[146] This figure comes from P.D.’s financial evidence and is noted by the valuator, Ms. Russell, as a debt owed to P.D. at valuation date.
[147] I find it appropriate for debt owed by the business to P.D., to be shown as an asset for him. Part 5: Debts and Liabilities are agreed. P.D. owes $162,825.49 at valuation date and D.C. owes $135,051.34.
[148] There is an issue as to net values of property held by both parties on the date of marriage.
[149] P.D. claims to have general household items and vehicles at the date of marriage of $180,000. The party seeking to establish the value of contents owned at the date of marriage has the onus of proving their value and must adduce reliable evidence: see Stefanou v. Stefanou, 2012 ONSC 7265, at para. 48.
[150] His evidence is that he fully furnished the home with the help of his first wife, M.M. This witness reviewed photos of the house furnishings. She did not recognize much of anything that was in the home at the end of the marriage in 2011. I conclude that the current lovely furnishings were purchased during the marriage with D.C.
[151] D.C. argues that P.D. had no proof of the value of the house contents. She originally claimed that he owned contents of $45,000 and in closing submissions reduced it to $25,000. No reason was given for the change.
[152] During the trial, D.C.’s NFP evidence acknowledged $45,000 in contents. I am not satisfied that P.D. has established the value of the contents beyond that amount which D.C. conceded in trial.
[153] I find that at the date of marriage P.D. had household contents of $45,000.
[154] P.D. argues that D.C. owned no general household items and vehicles at the date of marriage. D.C. claims she owned $17,000. No evidence was adduced by D.C. and P.D.’s evidence is that she owned no general household goods. Without evidence by D.C. or concession by P.D., I am not persuaded that she brought this amount of household contents into the marriage. I find this amount to be zero on the evidence.
[155] The parties agree that at the date of marriage the Bank Accounts and Savings amounted to $117,099.94 for P.D. and $10,799.44 for D.C.
[156] The value of the business at the date of marriage is disputed. P.D. relies on the valuation done by Melanie Russell that the value of the business was $644,000. At trial, D.C. agreed with this value. In closing submissions, D.C. changed her position to argue that the business was valued at $515,944. (The same value she argued, in closing, for the value of the business at valuation date).
[157] I am satisfied that the careful analysis by Ms. Russell, an experienced expert valuator, is reliable. Her valuation was uncontradicted at trial. Choosing the mid-range values for both the date of marriage valuation and the date of separation is conservative and consistent. Ms. Russell originally had valued the business when a trust was being set up for P.D.’s two sons as of March 1, 2009. This is four months before the date of marriage. Ms. Russell testified what adjustments she made to conclude what the value would be in July 2009.
[158] D.C. critiques Ms. Russell’s report and makes a number of queries and challenges that were not put to the witness in cross-examination, and urges the court to find it unusual for the business to have such fundamentally differing values.
[159] D.C. argues that the business should be valued at $515,944 both at the date of marriage and at the date of separation. On review of the income that the family derived from the business it is clear that it peaked in 2008, and then began to decline. This is consistent with P.D.’s evidence of his having to close the construction division of the business in 2011. I am satisfied that the value of the business did decline in value from the date of marriage to the date of separation.
[160] I find the value of the business on the date of marriage to be $644,000, which is the mid-range of Ms. Russell’s valuation report.
[161] Some debts were agreed for the date of marriage as being $9,060.41 owed by P.D. and $2,683.90 owed by D.C.
[162] D.C. in closing submissions argues an additional debt owed by P.D., as being 25 per cent disposition costs on some RRSPs, of notional taxes in the amount of $29,969.15.
[163] Although this was a late consideration, in closing only, it is consistent with the handling of RRSPs at the date of separation. P.D., in reply submissions, did not argue that it was wrong in principal. I am prepared therefore to attribute the tax that ultimately would apply on this deferred income to be deducted on the Date of Marriage RRSPs owned by P.D.
SUMMARY
VALUATION DAY ASSET
| P.D. | D.C. | |
|---|---|---|
| Land (Agreed) | $269,632.93 | $269,632.93 |
| House Contents | $35,000 | $35,000 |
| Cottage Contents (Agreed) | $11,000 | $11,000 |
| Bayliner (Agreed) | $20,000 | $--0-- |
| Jewellery | $--0-- | $--0-- |
| Art | $--0-- | $--0-- |
| Hobbies Equipment | $--0-- | $--0-- |
| Bank Accounts (Agreed) | $109,863.29 | $9,646.16 |
| [Redacted] Business | $439,944 | $--0-- |
| Monies Owed to P.D. | $17,944 | $--0-- |
| Total Assets Valuation Day | $903,384.22 | $325,279.09 |
| Debts Valuation Day (Agreed) | $162,825.49 | $135,051.34 |
DATE OF MARRIAGE NET VALUE OF PROPERTY
| P.D. | D.C. | |
|---|---|---|
| Household Items | $45,000 | $--0-- |
| Bank Accounts(Agreed) | $117,099.94 | $10,799.44 |
| [Redacted] Business | $644,000 | $--0-- |
| Total Assets Date of Marriage | $806,099.94 | $10,799.44 |
| Debts Date of Marriage (Agreed) | $9,060.41 | $2,683.90 |
| Notional Tax on RRSPs | $29,969.15 | |
| Net Value on Date Marriage | $767,070.38 | $8,115.54 |
CONCLUSION
| P.D. | D.C. | |
|---|---|---|
| Property at Valuation Date | $903,384.22 | $325,279.09 |
| Debts and Liabilities | $162,825.49 | $135,051.34 |
| Date of Marriage Net Value | $767,070.38 | $8,115.54 |
| Total Net Family Property | $--0-- | $182,112.21 |
[164] The Equalization Payment owed by D.C. to P.D. is $91,056.10.
RETURN OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS
[165] P.D. gave evidence that a number of his personal possessions should be returned to him as follows:
(i) All Sports Equipment owned by P.D.;
(ii) All tools;
(iii) All artwork, including stone statue;
(iv) All Beatles memorabilia;
(v) All Sports memorabilia;
(vi) All items previously owned by P.D.’s father;
(vii) All items owned by P.D. with his former spouse including crystal and glass collection;
(viii) 250 CD music collection;
(ix) P.D.’s jewellery and watch collection;
(x) Red chair;
(xi) Armoire that had stood outside the laundry room; and,
(xii) Cast iron patio set and barbeque owned by P.D.
[166] D.C. made no submissions on this issue. As noted by Bielby J. in Truong v. Truong, 2012 ONSC 3455, at para. 82, “This is the most problematic of all the property issues.”
[167] I require brief submissions from D.C. within 14 days of the date of this judgment.
DAMAGES FOR FAILED MEDIATON-ARBITRATION COSTS
[168] P.D. claims his costs thrown away for the aborted Mediation-Arbitration with Lee Ferrier of approximately $92,000.
[169] The original Mediation-Arbitration agreement with Mr. Ferrier was signed by D.C. on March 6, 2012.
[170] There was a certificate of Independent Legal Advice signed by her lawyer, Lisa Kadoory, on the same date which states: “My client will be separately screened for power imbalances and domestic violence and I am satisfied that my client is fully able to participate in this this mediation-arbitration and is doing so voluntarily” (italics added).
[171] The certificate of Independent Legal Advice for P.D.’s lawyer, Sheila Holmes, signed March 12, 2012, is slightly different and states: “My client has been separately screened for power imbalances and domestic violence...” (italics added).
[172] On March 14, 2012, Mr. Ferrier signed a Certificate of Arbitrator confirming that, “The parties were separately screened for power imbalances and domestic violence and I have considered the results of the screening and will do so throughout the arbitration, if I conduct one” (italics added).
[173] The document signed by D.C.’s lawyer contemplated that a screening was going to be done. Mr. Ferrier was stating that he reviewed the screening and he would keep the screening and power imbalances in mind throughout the arbitration.
[174] Ultimately the screening was done in June 2012 and recommended against arbitration. Mr. Ferrier therefore resigned as arbitrator. This occurred just three weeks before the scheduled arbitration.
[175] No reason was given why she did not take steps to arrange the screening earlier. D.C.’s behaviour may have contributed to P.D.’s increased costs to some extent.
[176] The court was not given a bill of costs with respect to this claim.
[177] I find it more appropriate to consider this claim in the context of any claim for costs arising out of this trial proceeding as a whole.
LIFE INSURANCE FOR SUPPORT
[178] There was no evidence at trial as to whether P.D. had life insurance during the marriage. There was no evidence or discussion of whether P.D. was eligible for life insurance and in what amount.
[179] I dismiss this claim.
LINE OF CREDIT
[180] D.C. made a claim that P.D. forged her name on an application for the Royal Bank of Canada Homeline line of credit to be secured against the matrimonial home.
[181] Her evidence was that at the date of marriage, July 25, 2009, the line of credit was at $69,736.06. Four months later, on November 26, 2009, it rose to $233,943.22. She produced a letter she wrote to the bank dated November 26, 2009, demanding the bank freeze the account and no further funds be withdrawn.
[182] She produced a letter dated December 11, 2009, that P.D. acknowledged the line of credit was for the purpose of lending the business working capital to keep it running and he would be personally responsible for this line until the business repaid the debt. It is typed at the bottom, “[P.D.]-electronic Signature.”
[183] P.D.’s evidence is that the business repaid the debt in February 2010.
[184] The valuation by Ms. Russell and evidence of the business debt owed to P.D. at valuation date was only $17,944. D.C. relied on that figure in her NFP Statement.
[185] Therefore, the evidence supports P.D.’s testimony that the debt had been earlier discharged.
[186] I decline to order P.D. to pay D.C. damages of one half of the value of the line of credit at the date of separation, March 1, 2011.
RESTRAINING ORDER
[187] There was evidence in the past of P.D.’s violent behaviour. There was insufficient evidence led as to any current need for a restraining order.
[188] I dismiss this claim.
DIVORCE
[189] Both claimed a divorce. I am satisfied that they have resided apart for more than one year and that there is no possibility of reconciliation. It is appropriate to grant a divorce.
[190] On filing of the clearance certificate, and the marriage certificate, a divorce may issue.
ORDERS
CUSTODY
[191] The Respondent, D.C. (“D.C.”) shall have sole custody of the children of the marriage, namely, E.P.D., born September 2006, and G.G.D., born February 2008, (the “children”).
ACCESS
[192] The parent with whom the children reside shall make day-to-day decisions regarding their care.
[193] P.D. shall have access on the following schedule:
(a) Week 1: Tuesday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to 7:30 p.m.; and Thursday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to Monday morning drop-off at school, daycare, or camp;
(b) Week 2: Thursday from after school (3:00 p.m.) to Friday morning drop off at school, daycare or camp;
(c) All mid-week pick-ups at school, daycare or mutually arranged location.
(d) All weekend drop-offs shall take place at D.C.’s residence on the condition that P.D. remain curbside when dropping off the children;
(e) The children shall spend Father’s Day from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. with P.D. and Mother’s Day 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. with D.C.;
(f) Christmas: In even numbered years, D.C. shall have the children in her care for the first half of the Christmas holidays including Christmas Day until 4:00 p.m. P.D. shall have the children in his care for the second half of the holidays including New Year’s Day until 4:00 p.m. In odd numbered years, P.D. shall have the children in his care for the first half of the Christmas holidays including Christmas Day until 4:00 p.m. D.C. shall have the children in her care for the second half of the holidays including New Year’s Day;
(g) Summer holidays: Each parent shall have three non-consecutive weeks during the summer. In odd numbered years, D.C. shall have the first choice of weeks. In even numbered years, P.D. shall have the first choice of the weeks. The person with the first choice shall provide the dates by no later than March 30th of each year;
(h) Easter: In even numbered years P.D. shall have the children in his care from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on Easter Sunday and in odd numbered years, D.C. shall have the children in her care from 10:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m.;
(i) March Break: P.D. and D.C. shall share the March Break evenly by adding on two and a half days to their weekend with the children, with the transfer occurring at 1:00 p.m. on the Wednesday of March Break;
(j) Family Day: In even numbered years P.D. shall have Family Day from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and in odd numbered years D.C. shall have Family Day from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.;
(k) Thanksgiving Weekend: Shall be shared, such that the parent whose weekend it is, shall have the Sunday evening until 8:00 p.m. and the other parent shall have the children from Sunday at 8:00 p.m. to return to school Tuesday morning; and,
(l) Other Holidays: For other holidays, including statutory holidays, and school professional development days on Monday, the children shall remain with the parent they were with on the preceding weekend until Tuesday morning.
[194] There shall be no make-up time for either parent in the event of missed visits or holiday time.
[195] The children shall speak by phone with P.D. sometime between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. when they are in D.C.’s care and shall speak by phone with D.C. sometime between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. when they are in P.D.’s care. P.D. and D.C. shall not telephone, text, email or otherwise contact the children during their time with the other parent. The children may communicate with either parent as desired.
[196] P.D. and D.C. may make inquiries and be given information by the children’s teachers, school officials, doctors, dentists, health care providers, summer camp counsellors or others involved with the children. D.C. shall sign and provide each other with any information and/or documentation necessary to enable this, including providing notice of all appointments at the time of scheduling.
[197] In the event of an emergency, D.C. or P.D., as the case may be, shall notify the other parent immediately.
TRAVEL
[198] P.D. and D.C. may take the children on vacations within or outside of Canada. The non-travelling party shall execute a travel consent letter upon being provided with a copy of the itinerary, including dates and mode of travel, and contact information at the destination. The non-travelling party shall not unreasonably deny such a request.
[199] The parties shall arrange the appropriate medical travel insurance and provide proof to the other parent prior to travelling.
[200] D.C. will re-apply for Canadian passports for the children. P.D. will sign the passport applications. D.C. will keep the passports and give them to P.D. when he needs it for travel. P.D. will return the passports promptly with the return of the children.
OTHER PARENTING TERMS
[201] In the event of illness, D.C. and P.D. shall take the children to their regular physician, if an appointment is available. If no appointment is available, D.C. and P.D. shall use the services of a medical centre known to the children and both parents if in Milton.
[202] E.P.D. and G.G.D.’s names will not be changed without the prior written consent of the other parent.
[203] D.C. and P.D. will not harass or speak ill of each other in the presence of the children.
MOBILITY
[204] The children’s primary residence shall not be more than 30 kilometres from Milton.
CHILD SUPPORT
[205] P.D. shall pay to D.C. the table amount of child support under the Child Support Guidelines for E.P.D., born September 2006, and G.G.D., born February 2008, the monthly sum of $2,658 based upon an estimated annual income of $206,700 commencing January 1, 2013, and on the first of every month thereafter.
SECTION 7 EXPENSES
[206] P.D. and D.C. shall share the costs of the children’s special and extraordinary expenses as set out in s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines, on a basis proportionate to their incomes. P.D.’s proportionate share shall be 69.2 per cent and D.C.’s share shall be 30.8 per cent, based on P.D.’s imputed income of $206,700 and D.C.’s imputed income of $27,000.
[207] P.D. and D.C. shall each pay everyday expenses for the children when in his or her care.
[208] P.D. shall maintain any medical and dental benefits for the children for as long as they are available to him. D.C. shall maintain the children on any medical and dental benefits from any employment obtained by her. P.D. shall maintain D.C. on his medical/dental benefits for as long as the policy permits. P.D. shall provide D.C. with medical/dental benefit cards forthwith. In the event that no medical/dental benefits are available to either party, such expenses incurred with respect to the children shall be paid proportionate to the parties’ incomes.
DISCLOSURE
[209] Both parties will provide the following information to the other within 30 days of the request:
(a) The documents required in s. 21(1) of the Child Support Guidelines that have not previously been provided, which includes:
i. a copy of every personal income tax return filed by the party for each of the three most recent taxation years;
ii. a copy of every notice of assessment and reassessment issued to the party for each of the three most recent taxation years;
iii. where the party is an employee, the most recent statement of earnings indicating the total earnings paid in the year to date, including overtime or, where such a statement is not provided by the employer, a letter from the party’s employer setting out that information including the party’s rate of annual salary or remuneration; and,
iv. where the party is self-employed, for the three most recent taxation years:
the financial statements of the party’s business or professional practice, other than a partnership; and,
a statement showing a breakdown of all salaries, wages management fees or other payments or benefits paid to, or on behalf of, persons or corporations with whom the party does not deal at arm’s length.
v. where the party controls a corporation, for its three most recent taxation years:
the financial statements of the corporation and its subsidiaries; and,
a statement showing a breakdown of all salaries, wages, management fees or other payments or benefits paid to, or on behalf of, persons or corporations with whom the corporation, and every related corporation, does not deal at arm’s length.
vi. where the party is a beneficiary under a trust, a copy of the trust settlement agreement and copies of the trust’s three most recent financial statements; and,
vii. in addition to any income information that must be included above, where the party receives income from employment insurance, social assistance, a pension, workers compensation, disability payments or any other source, the most recent statement of income indicating the total amount from the applicable source during the current year, or if such a statement is not provided a letter from the appropriate authority stating the required information.
(b) current information about the children’s special or extraordinary expenses;
(c) details of Canada Child Tax Benefit or other child benefits received in the previous year and anticipated in the coming year; and,
(d) any other information needed to review the child support.
[210] The parties will adjust the table amount of child support paid each calendar year based on the parties’ incomes for that calendar year in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines as of June 1.
SPOUSAL SUPPORT
[211] I order P.D. to pay D.C. mid-range spousal support in the fixed and non-variable amount of $3,686 per month commencing January 1, 2013, and up to and including January 1, 2016, based on income of $206,700 for P.D. and $27,000 for D.C.
EQUALIZATION
[212] D.C. is to pay an equalization payment to P.D. of $91,056.10.
RETURN OF PERSONAL BELONGINGS
[213] D.C. is to serve and file brief submissions on this issue within 14 days of this judgment.
DIVORCE
[214] Divorce order to issue upon proof of a clearance certificate and marriage certificate.
COSTS
[215] P.D. is to serve his submissions on costs to D.C. within 30 days of this judgment. D.C. is to serve her submissions on costs to P.D. within 21 days thereafter. P.D. may serve reply submissions within seven days thereafter.
M. J. Donohue J.
Released: August 15, 2013
COURT FILE NO.: 33889/11
DATE: 2013-08-15
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
P.D.
Applicant
- and –
D.C.
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M. J. Donohue J.
Released: August 15, 2013