ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COURT FILE NO.: 13-50000/99-00BR
DATE: 20130722

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Kerry Hughes, for the Crown/Applicant

Applicant

• and -

AHMED MOHAMED ABDULLAHI

Patrick Metzler, for the Defendant/Respondent

Defendant/Respondent

HEARD: July 11, 2013,
at Toronto, Ontario

Michael G. Quigley J.

Reasons For Ruling

Re: Bail Review under s. 521 of the Criminal Code

[1] The applicant, Ahmed Mohamed Abdullahi, is charged with nine firearms related offences. These include two charges of participation in a criminal organization contrary to section 467.11 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, one involving trafficking in weapons and the other trafficking in drugs. The charges also include a charge of conspiracy to traffic in weapons, five firearms possession charges, and possession of property obtained by crime, namely, a Smith & Wesson .40 caliber handgun reported stolen from the Detroit Police Service. These are very serious charges, at least two of which engage mandatory minimum sentences. Two are reverse onus offences for the purposes of judicial interim release.

[2] Mr. Abdullahi was arrested on June 13, 2013, along with numerous other individuals identified in Project Traveller, an investigative initiative of the Guns and Gangs Unit of the Toronto Police Service that had been ongoing for some months. On June 20, 2013, Her Worship Justice of the Peace Ross‑Hendricks released Mr. Abdullahi from custody.

[3] On this application, brought under section 521 of the Code, the Crown asks the court to revoke that bail order and to require that Mr. Abdullahi be detained in custody pending his trial on these charges. The Crown claims that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the learned Justice, the detention of Mr. Abdullahi in custody is justified under section 515(10)(b) or (c) of the Code – the so‑called secondary and tertiary grounds.

[4] The secondary ground addresses circumstances where the continued detention of the accused is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, having regard to all of the circumstances, including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice. Even though Mr. Abdullahi does not have a record of prior offences, the Crown claims that the detention of Mr. Abdullahi is justified on this ground because of the gravity of the charges he faces.

[5] If the Court concludes, as the learned Justice of the Peace did, that detention is not merited on the secondary ground, the Crown seeks to have Mr. Abdullahi detained on the tertiary ground. A person will be kept in custody on the tertiary ground in circumstances where that detention is necessary in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice having regard to all the circumstances.

[6] In addition to a consideration of all the circumstances, the tertiary ground analysis requires that the court consider four specific factors: (1) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case; (2) the gravity of the offence; (3) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and, (4) the fact that the accused could be liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment.

[7] Although there is no evidence of a firearm having been used in these circumstances, in the sense of being discharged, the charges are all firearms related with one exception. This case is entirely about the use of illegal firearms, about possessing them, about arranging for their purchase, about selling them, and, ultimately and necessarily, about their potential use to injure or kill people. As a result, I find that the seriousness that is added to the third factor by the use of firearms is necessarily relevant and aggravating to the tertiary ground factors in this case as a whole. The fact that the accused has no criminal record cannot overcome those considerations under the tertiary ground: see R. v. Karamatakis, [2004] O.J. No. 5884 (S.C.J.), R. v. Smikle, 2010 ONSC 5311, [2010] O.J. No. 4514 (S.C.J.), R. v. Fetterly, 2013 ONSC 2517 (April 18, 2013)(unreported) at para. 18, R. v. Baba, [2006] O.J. No. 5387 (O.C.J.), and R. v. Harutyunan, 2009 ONCJ 116, [2009] O.J. No. 1117 (O.C.J.).

Principles of Review

[8] It is important to note the role that I play here as the reviewing judge. The language of the Code clearly establishes the nature and extent of my jurisdiction in reviewing the decision of the Justice. The role is partially appellate and partially that of the initial adjudicator. I am permitted to consider the transcript of the proceedings heard by the Justice, the exhibits filed in the proceedings before her, and such additional evidence or exhibits as may be tendered by the accused or the prosecutor on this proceeding.

[9] To the extent that I serve in an appellate capacity, as the Supreme Court observed in R. v. Harper, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 2, my duty requires that I review the record of the proceedings before the Justice of the Peace in order to determine whether she properly directed herself to all the evidence bearing on the issues of relevance. If that record or the reasons given by the Justice for her ruling disclose a lack of appreciation of relevant evidence or more importantly, a complete disregard of such evidence, then it will fall to me as the reviewing court to intervene.

[10] In R. v. McCue, [1998] O.J. No. 4384 (Gen. Div.), Salhany J. set out the nature of this hearing at paragraph 5:

This section indicates to me that the review procedure contemplated by section 520 (and by 521 where the application is by the prosecutor) is really a hybrid one in the nature of a fresh hearing as well as a review of the record before the justice. Since there is an obligation on the accused to “show cause”, the reviewing judge must give due consideration to the discretion of the justice and not substitute his discretion for that have the justice unless it appears that he exceeded his jurisdiction, made an error in law or erred in his appreciation of the facts or the proper inferences to be drawn from the proven facts. However, because the reviewing judge is entitled to hear “such additional evidence or exhibits as may be tendered” by the accused or the prosecutor, it would appear that the decision of the justice should be examined in the light of any new evidence, and in this sense becomes a hearing de novo. [Citations omitted. Emphasis added.]

See also Hill J.’s decision in R. v. Cariaga, [2010] O.J. No. 5880 (S.C.J.), at para. 12.

[11] In McCue, Salhany J. made it plain that the words “may consider” do not give a discretion to the reviewing judge to refuse to hear new evidence on the review which either the accused or the Crown may wish to tender. Its impact relative to the initial decision of the Justice who granted bail must be taken into account.

[12] The focus of the tertiary ground is on whether members of the community would be satisfied that the denial or revocation of bail is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. However, it is of equal importance when considering the application of that ground to remember that the person whose viewpoint is being considered is a reasonable member of the community, not someone who is overly excitable, or hysterical or clamorous: see R. v. A.B., [2006] O.J. No. 394 (S.C.J.) per T. Ducharme J., at para. 18 and cases and texts referred to there.

[13] Rather, as McEachern C.J.B.C. observed in R. v. Nguyen, [1997] B.C.J. No. 2121 (C.A.), the reasonable person who is making that assessment must be a person who is properly informed, not only about the philosophy of the legislative provisions relative to bail, but also Charter values, and the actual circumstances of the case. Put differently, as Nolan J. did in R. v. Byrd, [2009] O.J. No. 3092 (S.C.J.), the fundamental rights to the presumption of innocence and the right to bail which are enshrined in our Charter are not to be undermined and eroded by our fear. It cannot automatically become “necessary” for accused persons to be detained on the tertiary grounds in all cases in which firearms and drugs are involved.

Analysis

[14] The Crown argued on this application that the Honourable Justice of the Peace (i) erred by completely disregarding relevant evidence and misdirecting herself with respect to evidence that was relevant to both the secondary and the tertiary grounds for detention, and (ii) fell into a material legal error by not applying the four specific factors set out in s. 515(10)(c) in her very brief consideration of the application of the tertiary ground of detention. Further, the Crown calls into issue whether the proposed sureties were sufficient to assist Mr. Abdullahi to meet his onus to show cause why he ought to be released on bail. I will deal with each of these submissions in turn but given the decision I have reached, as will be plain from the reasons that follow, the emphasis here is on the first and second issues of the three issues raised.

(i) Did the Justice of the Peace disregard relevant evidence or misdirect herself with respect to evidence that was relevant to the grounds for detention?

[15] In her ruling, the Justice of the Peace focused extensively on the fact that Mr. Abdullahi had no criminal record and no outstanding charges. She mentioned it several times in her ruling. She also placed significant emphasis on her belief that an appropriate plan of 24‑hour supervision had been proposed with his sister and his mother acting as his sureties. The Crown claimed that these repeat references reflected an overemphasis on only two factors that clouded the Justice’s vision on other aspects of the analysis.

[16] I disagree on that particular aspect of the Crown’s complaints about the Justice’s decision; a lack of criminal record, a lack of outstanding charges, and a 24‑hour supervision plan are relevant factors, particularly to the secondary ground analysis: see, for example R. v. Barber, 2013 ONSC 652, [2013] O.J. No. 378, at para. 22, Byrd, at para. 15. But it is true that the consideration of those factors alone could not alone give rise to a bail order.

[17] The Crown argues that the Justice did not make any coherent or complete reference to the whole of the evidentiary record that was before her, including the extensive and revealing wiretap evidence and the evidence provided by the accused himself as well as by his friends and other members of the organization known as the Dixon City Bloods. That evidence plainly raises the circumstantial inference, if not being direct evidence, that Mr. Abdullahi is involved in a criminal organization, as defined in the Code. The Crown submits that it raises the circumstantial inference that Mr. Abdullahi facilitates and arranges the purchase and sale of illegal firearms and that he participates in the trafficking of guns and drugs for the Dixon City Bloods organization.

[18] It is obvious from her analysis of the evidence, commencing at the bottom of page 186 of the transcript and extending to the middle of page 188, that the Justice of the Peace found deficiencies in the strength of the evidence that the Crown put before her. She acknowledged that there were photographs of the damaged rental car that fled from the police and the smashed garage door of 340 Dixon Road., and she acknowledged that the wiretap evidence revealed that Mr. Abdullahi called the rental agency to discuss the car and that he lied about what happened to that car. Nonetheless, she expressed concern in her ruling that the Crown had not provided her with “a contract from the rental car agency”, evidently to tie him to the vehicle, or evidence as to “why the car has Québec plates on it”. She said there were a number of gaps in the evidence. There were allegations that Mr. Abdullahi had been captured in the wiretap evidence discussing the sale of firearms, but nevertheless, she said there were no fingerprints linking him to the firearms, even though she acknowledged that his fingerprints do appear on the car itself.

[19] Since the bail review in late June, however, at least one of those gaps, and a significant one, was remedied on this hearing by the production by the Crown of the car rental contract with Hertz Rent‑a‑Car. In light of the production of that contract, it seems evident that Mr. Abdullahi was indeed the person who rented that vehicle at Toronto Pearson Airport on March 30, 2013 and who agreed to return it the next day. The contract also clearly establishes that the white Chrysler 200 vehicle that was referred to in that contract was rented by Mr. Abdullahi on March 30, 2013, had Québec licence plates, was the same vehicle that was photographed, and was the same vehicle that crashed through the partially opened garage door of the apartment building at 340 Dixon Road after a pursuit by the police, in which three of the five firearms were later found.

[20] The Justice of the Peace acknowledged that the wiretap evidence appeared to show Mr. Abdullahi discussing the sale of firearms, but focused on the lack of fingerprint evidence. She stated that there were no fingerprints linking Mr. Abdullahi to the firearms, and there were no fingerprints linking Mr. Abdullahi to the bag that had guns and that was recovered later from the rented vehicle that was abandoned. This lack of fingerprint evidence should not be surprising, however, because illegal firearms would be handled carefully by those purchasing and selling them, specifically to avoid leaving fingerprints and identification. The Justice went on to conclude as follows:

Your fingerprints do appear on the car but there are issues here. There are hurdles here that the Crown has yet to clear, and, in the fullness of time, they may clear them, but it's not the overwhelming Crown case, with the greatest of respect, that the Crown believes it to be.

[21] I accept and acknowledge that with any wiretap evidence, including this evidence, there are admissibility issues that will need to be addressed. These admissibility issues include confirming the identification of the speakers and confirming that certain words and expressions spoken in the wiretap evidence in the Somali language have the meaning contended by the Crown. These issues will require expert linguistics evidence, but that evidence will only likely be produced at trial. The fact that there are aspects of admissibility to be addressed later in this proceeding, does not, to my mind, alter the fact that at a bail hearing, the wiretap evidence must simply be accepted as it is for what it evidently says and for the inferences it reasonably permits to be drawn when it is being considered. It ought not to be discounted on the basis that it will be found to be inadmissible in the absence of evidence on that hearing that seriously calls its admissibility into question, evidence that was not advanced at this hearing.

[22] At page 188 of the transcript, the Justice acknowledged that there was some powerful circumstantial evidence. But the Justice felt that the evidence rested so much on the wiretap evidence without any direct corroboration that she concluded it was not appropriate to detain Mr. Abdullahi on the secondary ground or on the tertiary ground.

[23] I must confess that it surprised me that she lumped all of the wiretap evidence together and that there was no specific mention or recognition by the Justice of the following particular pieces of inculpatory wiretap evidence set out in detail in the Crown’s show cause brief. Plainly, if believed and admissible, this wiretap evidence associates the accused with the rental car and the firearms and shows his involvement with firearms, with the supplying of firearms to others, and with the illegal drug trade:

(i) Calls between Ayanle Omar and the accused on March 24, 2013 speaking about arrangements to pick up four firearms;

(ii) Calls between Abdulkadir Bihi and the accused on March 29, 2013 at 12:16 pm, 12:26 pm, 12:48 pm, relating to the numbers of firearms being obtained in Windsor, the number available, the prices of those firearms, whether an additional two can be obtained bringing the total to five, and at what price;

(iii) Calls exchanged between the accused and Awali Hassan in the late afternoon of March 31, 2013, around 4:40 pm, when the accused tells Hasan he believes he is being followed by police, and they discuss the movements of a police cruiser. Then, only four minutes later, the accused receives another call from Hassan but this time on the 647‑832‑8535 number. Mr. Abdullahi is out of breath, evidently from running, and Hasan frantically wants to know where he is, to which he responds “40”, which is claimed to refer to 340 Dixon Road. This call was certainly made immediately after they fled the abandoned Chrysler 200 rental vehicle.

(iv) Wiretap intercept of a phone belonging to Mohammed Salim but that was claimed to have been used by Mr. Abdullahi to call the Hertz Rental Agency on March 31, 2013 at 5:38 pm reporting that the white Chrysler 200 rental vehicle that Mr. Abdullahi had rented the day before had been stolen, and claiming that his wallet and the rental papers were still in the car.

(v) A call received by Ayanle Omar from Mr. Abdullahi on April 4, 2013 at 1:27 pm confirming the chase, that the accused put the car through a door and ran, and very important for corroboration, an acknowledgement from Mr. Abdullahi to Omar that one of the firearms has the markings on it of the Detroit police. That wiretap also confirms that Daud Hussein was driving the Chrysler vehicle and that Khadra Omer was with them on the trip to Windsor, and that they had planned to drop her at a bus station but could not because it was Easter, so she came with them and also fled when they abandoned the white rental car.

(vi) Calls between Ayanle Omar and Abdullahi on April 20 and 22, 2013, relating to illegal drug trafficking transactions.

(vii) Finally, a call received by the accused on May 1, 2013 from Khadra Omer acknowledging that she had taken two of the five guns with her, the two that were in the back seat with her when she fled the car after they abandoned it in the garage at 340 Dixon Road on March 31, 2013.

[24] There was also surveillance evidence that was particularly relevant to the association of this accused to the rental car and to the gun trafficking trip to Windsor. On March 31, 2013, the accused is observed by officers conducting surveillance in the passenger seat of the white Chrysler 200 sedan with the Québec licence plates FGY1261 as it travelled east from Toronto to Windsor, Ontario, on Hwy. 401. That is also the same day that the vehicle was surveilled and pursued by uniformed OPP officers as it returned to Toronto, leading to a high speed pursuit that ends with the vehicle tearing into the garage at 340 Dixon Road, damaging the door as it enters, and then being abandoned with the three handguns left behind on the front seat of the vehicle. One of those handguns was stolen from the Detroit Police Service, and was easily identifiable by the crest and insignia of the DPS embossed into the metal barrel of that Smith & Wesson, Serial # DTS0478.

[25] That same day, the police search of the abandoned rented Chrysler vehicle also yields a cell phone in the door pocket of the vehicle, with the number 226‑246‑1231, the same number that Mr. Abdullahi used to talk to Bihi on March 29. Importantly, the accused never again speaks on that phone number after March 29, which is not surprising since the cell phone was recovered by police when they found and searched the vehicle.

[26] The evidence of: Mr. Abdullahi’s fingerprints on the rental vehicle; the personal observation of the officer that he was in the front passenger seat of that vehicle; the location of a cell phone in that rented vehicle that, as other evidence establishes, was used by him before March 31 but that is never used thereafter; the presence of the three guns found in the vehicle; and, the wiretap evidence of the other two guns having been taken by one of his colleagues and sold by the driver of the car – is all further corroborated by the wiretap evidence and closely tied to Mr. Abdullahi by the presence of the rental contract.

[27] In my view, the Justice did not attribute the level of significance or corroboration that she ought to have to the wiretap evidence as confirmatory of other circumstantial and direct evidence. I find myself forced to conclude that she may not have appreciated all of the connecting inferences that lead to Mr. Abdullahi from this accumulation of evidence, and in that way misapprehended the evidence or misdirected herself, relative to its import. However, in fairness to the Justice of the Peace, she did not have the rental contract in evidence in front of her at the time of the initial bail review hearing and that is a significant piece of corroborating evidence that serves as a connecting thread that increases the significance of the other items of surveillance and wiretap evidence relative to the central role that Mr. Abdullahi evidently appears to have played in the project to import guns from Windsor to Toronto.

[28] When I consider the whole of that accumulated evidence, including the rental contract that ties Mr. Abdullahi to the white Chrysler rental car, I find the evidential support for the Crown’s case to be quite strong. Admittedly it is circumstantial evidence, but circumstantial evidence can have the same value as direct evidence, particularly where its accumulation, as in this case, leads to reasonable inferences relative to the involvement of the accused. They need not be the only inferences. That is the test at trial. At this stage they need only be reasonable inferences that could be drawn.

(ii) Did the Justice err in her legal consideration of the tertiary ground?

[29] Dealing first, briefly, with the secondary ground, I would not interfere with the learned Justice’s decision on the secondary ground, even though I impute a stronger case to the Crown. That differing view would not lead me to conclude that Mr. Abdullahi’s bail should be revoked on the secondary ground because it was open to the Justice considering the whole of the evidence to conclude that his clean background and absence of criminal antecedents, combined with a 24‑hour plan of supervision that she found to be acceptable, should inure to his benefit on that question.

[30] In my view, it is only the tertiary ground that is reasonably in play on this bail review. On this issue the Crown argues that the learned Justice erred in law because she is alleged to have failed to consider each of the four factors enumerated in s. 515(10)(c) in reaching her assessment on that ground. Unfortunately, the analysis of the learned Justice focused on the tertiary ground is very brief, consisting of a single paragraph. She stated as follows:

In terms of the tertiary ground, would a reasonable member of the public who understands the right to a fair bail hearing under the Charter, lose confidence in the administration of justice? If they understood the Charter and they understood the nature of the evidence before me, and they understood that the plan put to the court was a 24‑hour plan of supervision, for what for your family members is a significant amount of money, I don't believe they would lose confidence in the administration of justice. In fact, I think if I were to detain you only on the tertiary ground, frankly, they might think I was a little bit detention happy. [Emphasis added.]

[31] In the result, the Justice named Mr. Abdullahi’s eldest sister, Shukri, in the amount of $10,000, his mother, Amina Ali, in the amount of $2,000, and his sister, Khadra Abdullahi, in the amount of $500, as his sureties. In my view, however, these reasons are inadequate to meet the analytical requirements stipulated in s. 515(10)(c).

[32] In fairness to the learned Justice and consistent with the arguments made by counsel for the defence, I wish to emphasize that it may well be that the learned Justice did consider all four of the factors stipulated in that provision in reaching her determination whether or not a reasonable member of the public of the kind previously described would lose confidence in the administration of justice if Mr. Abdullahi were to be granted bail. The difficulty is that I cannot discern from her reasons what consideration she gave to each of those four factors, yet it seems plain to me on the language of the Code that all four of those factors must be considered specifically in the course of a tertiary ground analysis.

[33] I understand that the context in which Justice of the Peace Ross‑Hendricks gave her oral reasons at the end of this case matters, and indeed the impact of that context on the extent of oral reasons given has been acknowledged by the Court of Appeal. In R. v. Richardson (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 194, the court stated:

In moving under pressure from case to case it is expected that oral judgments will contain much less than the complete line of reasoning leading to the result.

[34] Frankly, it was clear from what was said at the end of the transcript and the thanks that were expressed by Justice of the Peace Ross‑Hendricks to all members of the court staff and the participants that her oral reasons were given very late at the end of a very long day in court. Against that background, her omission to specifically address all four of the factors set out in s. 515(10)(c) or show that she had considered them is perhaps understandable. Regardless, however, it was an error that requires that I intervene because I find myself unable to discern from those reasons what consideration of those factors caused her to conclude as she did. Even if she did consider all four factors in reaching her determination that detention was not required on the tertiary ground, the reasons do not permit me to understand how she reached that conclusion, and thus do not permit meaningful review: see R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at para. 28.

[35] Moreover, the curious language used by the learned Justice evidencing concern that she not be regarded as being “detention happy” is uncalled for in the analysis and yet it appears to be a rationale for her conclusion in the preceding sentences that the reasonable member of the public who she was considering would not lose confidence in the administration of justice just because Mr. Abdullahi might not be detained.

[36] Respectfully, on this analysis, when I take specific account of each of the four factors enumerated in s. 515(10)(c), I am unable to reach the same conclusion reached by the learned Justice. As I noted above, the tertiary ground analysis requires that the court consider: (1) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case; (2) the gravity of the offence; (3) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used; and, (4) the fact that the accused could be liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment. When these four factors are considered against the circumstances of this case, as they are known to this point, I find that the detention of Mr. Abdullahi is required in order to maintain confidence in the administration of justice in the eyes of reasonable members of the community.

[37] Looking at the first factor, as I have noted above, I regard the Crown’s case as strong. In my view, the inferences that are available to be drawn from the following evidence amounts to a strong case against the accused: the wiretap evidence, which I have accepted for nothing more than what it is as it was presented to me in court; the corroborative effect of the wiretap evidence relative to the facts established by the direct evidence derived from surveillance; the forensic search of the vehicle after it was abandoned in the garage at 340 Dixon Road; and, the implicating inferences that inescapably arise out of the Hertz Rent‑a‑Car rental contract. The guilt of the accused is not the only inference that could be drawn, but it is certainly a reasonable one.

[38] Secondly, as I have indicated above, the offences charged are very grave indeed. My colleagues and I continue to write about the scourge of guns and gun related crime in this metropolitan area. And yet, the increasing sentences for gun‑related crime will not likely have the deterrent effect hoped for as long as we fail to thwart the channelling of seemingly uncountable numbers of handguns into the Metropolitan Toronto area on an annual basis. That is what this case is about. It is about the supply lines.

[39] The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether firearms were used, also favours continuing detention of Mr. Abdullahi on the basis that a reasonable member of the public, considering the trafficking circumstances that seem to be evident in the factual matrix that underlies these charges, would regard those offences as very grave.

[40] Handguns serve no purpose other than to injure and kill people. Given that obvious fact, it strikes me as equally obvious that members of the public might well lose confidence in the administration of justice if this court were to release into the public, not just perpetrators who use guns in drug‑related or other criminal circumstances, but even more sinister, those whose daily occupational efforts appear dedicated to ensuring a continuing supply of those illegal handguns to those in Toronto who would possess them.

[41] Finally, I am required to consider the prospect of penalty to which the accused may be subjected if found guilty of the charges alleged. In this case, at least two of the charges command mandatory minimum sentences of penitentiary imprisonment.

[42] As a result, considering these factors and the evidence as a whole, I conclude that the learned Justice erred in reaching the conclusion that she did on the tertiary ground, and find that it is appropriate in this case that Mr. Abdullahi be detained in custody until his trial.

(iii) The plan of the sureties

[43] I will conclude this analysis with a brief reference to the sureties who stood forward for their brother and son, this accused, and addressed my concern about the plan of supervision that was proposed.

[44] While the learned Justice may have been satisfied that the plan of supervision they put forward was adequate to ensure that the purposes of bail would be met, I am less confident of the prospect of that result.

Conclusion

[45] In summary, I acknowledge that Mr. Abdullah he has no prior record, no outstanding charges, and the plan that has been put forward by his sureties for 24‑hour surveillance.

[46] However, I believe that the learned Justice of the Peace failed to fully appreciate the extent of the evidence, particularly with the addition of the car rental contract which the Justice of the Peace did not have before her.

[47] When the evidentiary import of the car rental contract is combined with the following factors, there emerges a strong circumstantial connection to the accused: (i) the accused’s fingerprint on the abandoned white rental vehicle; (ii) a cell phone he has used being found in the front passenger side door pocket; (iii) having been seen by police in the front seat of that vehicle as it travelled to Windsor on March 31, 2013 on Highway 401; (iv) the damage to the vehicle and the garage door of the apartment building at 340 Dixon Road caused when it crashed into that garage seconds before it was abandoned by its occupants; and, (v) the presence of three handguns in the front seat of the rental car once it was found.

[48] I have also found that the learned Justice of the Peace erred, either by failing to give full and specific consideration to the factors identified in section 515(10)(c) of the Code, or by showing in her reasons that she erred in her conclusion as to whether a member of the community would lose confidence in the administration of justice if the accused were to be released on bail.

[49] This is a very serious gun case. It includes very serious allegations of criminality. In the minds of reasonable members of the community, considering the seriousness of those alleged crimes, permitting people who supply firearms to be free on bail pending trial may more seriously undermine confidence in the administration of justice than to release individuals who have purchased those guns, or who possess them, or who use them. If the suppliers were not present, neither would there be a supply of guns. In my view, those factors combine to require the detention of the accused. The Crown will succeed on this application. Mr. Abdullahi’s bail is revoked.

Michael G. Quigley J.

Released: July 22, 2013