COURT FILE NO.: FC-05-739-02
DATE: 20121107
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Kevin Robert Gallagher, Applicant
AND:
Brenda Lee Gallagher, Respondent
BEFORE: McDermot J.
COUNSEL: Both parties unrepresented.
HEARD: November 1, 2012
ENDORSEMENT
Background
[1] The Applicant, Kevin Gallagher, and the Respondent, Brenda Gallagher, married on October 15, 1994. They had two children, Ryan and Liam; they are presently 17 and 14 years of age, and they live with their father. The parties separated on November 1, 2006 and they divorced in 2008.
[2] After separation, the parties litigated custody and support issues. On July 9, 2008, by way of a final consent order made by Olah J., the parties settled all of their outstanding issues. That order provided that Liam and Ryan would live with the Applicant subject to access to the Respondent; it also provided that the Applicant was to pay spousal support net of child support of $712 per month. That support was to be paid directly to the Applicant’s landlord. The spousal support was to be reviewed after July 1, 2010; the order also provided that in any event the spousal support was to come to an end on October 1, 2014. The order contained a number of clauses intended to clarify what changes in circumstances would not allow for a change in the spousal support; these changes included the Respondent making up to $20,000 per annum or the Respondent’s income increasing by less than $10,000 per annum. The Respondent was further permitted to reside with another man for less than three months without this resulting in a decrease of support. Finally, the order imposed a positive requirement on the Respondent attending a 30 day residential alcohol treatment program; in the event that the Respondent failed to comply with this term of the order, the spousal support was to then terminate.
[3] This was a motion to change which was brought by the Applicant, and which was argued on a final basis on November 1, 2012. The Applicant requested that spousal support payable under the final order made by Olah J. on July 9, 2008 come to an end retroactive to July 10, 2010; he also requests retroactive child support and a contribution to the children’s s. 7 expenses, including football and post secondary educational expenses. The Respondent has responded, and filed her reply to the Applicant’s Motion to Change late; this was permitted by McCarthy J.’s endorsement dated October 2, 2012. The Reply to Motion to Change requests a small change in child support and an increase in spousal support from the present amount to $1,200 per month.
[4] It is to be noted that the Applicant stopped paying spousal support to the Respondent effective May 1, 2012. As a result, the Respondent says that she is now homeless and has been forced to live with her mother. There was no evidence that the Applicant was unable to pay the support; in fact the sole grounds for this motion surrounded the present circumstances of the Respondent. No motion was brought by the Respondent to stay the Applicant’s proceedings on the basis of his default under the Olah J. order; had such a motion been brought, I would have seriously considered it as it is not up to the Applicant to pre-judge the result of this matter and follow that assumed result by ceasing to pay spousal support as required under the Olah J. order.
[5] Prior to the filing of the Respondent’s Reply, Wildman J. considered this matter on September 18, 2012, presumably on the basis of a default hearing due to the Respondent’s failure to file a response on a timely basis. Wildman J. ruled on certain aspects of this matter, including the date that any change of support would be retroactive, as well as the quantum of child support. She adjourned the default proceedings due to a defect in the Applicant’s Affidavit of Service. Although her rulings were completed on a default basis, I see no fault in her reasoning, specifically on the issue of when this variation would be retroactive to. She stated that any order could only be retroactive to the date of service of the Motion to Change (July 18, 2012) and I see no reason to disagree with that determination. However, based upon the result below, there is no need to deal with issues of retroactivity at present.
[6] Subsequent to this and as noted above, McCarthy J. permitted the Respondent to file her material late. Accordingly, the default proceedings are set aside by reason of that order.
[7] Both parties appeared for argument of the Motion to Change and neither party wished a trial or a lengthy motion date further down the line. I advised both parties that the matter might not be dealt with adequately through a one hour argument and notwithstanding this, both parties agreed that they wished to proceed. Pursuant to the fact that this was on an open motions list, both parties completed their arguments within the allotted hour.
[8] During argument, it came to the attention of both the court and the Respondent that the Applicant had prepared a comprehensive reply affidavit which was sworn on October 24, 2012; that affidavit contained much of the evidence he relied upon in argument. He purported to serve this affidavit by mail on October 24, 2012; Ms. Gallagher says she did not receive that affidavit as she was forced to move in the last three weeks because the Applicant has not paid support since May, 2012. She failed to file or serve a notice that she had changed her address for service as required by Rule 6(6) of the Family Law Rules;[^1] she stated, however, that the Applicant was well aware that she had moved as he had dropped one of the children off for an access visit at her mother’s residence. I advised that I would give her the opportunity to request an adjournment of the motion so that she could reply to that affidavit, which contained new material and to which the Respondent would have a right of reply; she declined that opportunity as she wished the matter resolved immediately. Argument accordingly proceeded based upon all the material filed and served by the Applicant notwithstanding the fact that the Respondent did not have all of that material in hand or had properly replied to that material.
[9] During argument, the Applicant abandoned his claim for section 7 expenses; he stated that his main goal was to deal with the ongoing spousal support which he felt should have come to an end some time ago. He stated that, so long as spousal support came to an end, he did not wish to pursue the football, medical or post secondary expenses. He further stated that he was not particularly interested in increasing child support payable by the Respondent. Likewise, Ms. Gallagher did not seriously pursue her claims raised in her Response to Motion to Change for an increase in spousal support or to reduce the child support; she essentially argued the issue of the decrease or cessation of spousal support which was claimed by the Respondent; she did not speak to the other claims made by her in this proceeding.
[10] Accordingly, the only real issue which was placed before me for consideration was the Applicant’s claim for a reduction in spousal support. For the reasons set out below, I am dismissing the Applicant’s Motion to Change, without prejudice to the Applicant bringing this matter back before the court once the oldest child, Ryan has been accepted into college or university, and once the costs for his post-secondary expenses can be estimated. I am treating the remaining issues raised in the Applicant’s Motion to Change and in the Respondent’s Response to Motion to Change as having been abandoned.
Analysis
[11] As noted above, the spousal support provisions placed in issue by the Applicant’s Motion to Change are contained in the Consent Order of Olah J. dated July 8, 2009. That was a consent order based upon the primary residence of the children being with the Applicant. In that consent, the Respondent acknowledged income imputed to her in the amount of $16,000 per annum; she accordingly agreed to pay child support in the amount of $253 per month (para. 18 of the order). The Applicant agreed to pay the Respondent time limited spousal support in the amount of $965 per month; taking into account the child support payable by Ms. Gallagher, the set off amount of support payable by the Applicant to the Respondent was $712, which was to be payable to Ms. Gallagher’s landlord rather than Ms. Gallagher directly. The order provides that the net payment is a third party payment under the Income Tax Act,[^2] which allows it to be deducted from the Applicant’s income, and taxable in the Respondent’s hands (para. 14).
[12] There were several clauses in the order which were crucial to the Applicant’s claims as argued. They read as follows:
Spousal support will be reviewable in two years at July 1, 2010. In the event that the Respondent has not attended either a minimum 30 day inpatient alcohol treatment program or a minimum of 30 days of an outpatient program, then spousal support shall terminate. The Respondent shall provide proof of attendance. Alternatively, the Respondent may attend for alcohol testing for a period of no less then (sic.) three months, three times per week, spaced two days apart (or three if the testing centre is closed on the second day).
Either party may bring a Motion to vary/change/terminate spousal support if there is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances shall not include:
i. The Respondent’s actual income being below $20,000;
ii. The Applicant’s income increasing by less than $10,000 (his current income being $80,000 less WSIB at 8.9% for $72,500;
iii. Cohabitation by the Respondent in a relationship similar to marriage for less than three months (with the Respondent having a positive obligation to advise the Applicant the date upon which she commences cohabitation).
[13] It is common ground that the Applicant did not attend a 30 day residential treatment program as required by para. 15 of the Olah J. Order. She did attend a 21 day program at Renascent Centre and proof of her attendance was provided to the Applicant in 2009 through correspondence from Renascent dated September 17, 2009. The Applicant relies upon this in arguing that the spousal support should come to an end as of the review date set out in the Final Order, being July 1, 2010.
[14] If this part of the argument fails, the Applicant argues that there has been a change in circumstances warranting a termination or reduction in spousal support; he argues that there is evidence that the Applicant makes substantially more than $20,000 per annum which he says is the threshold set out in para. 16 of the Final Order. Alternatively he argues that Ms. Gallagher has cohabited with another individual for a period in excess of three months, another factor mentioned in para. 16 of the order.
[15] I will consider each of those arguments in turn.
(a) Is the Applicant entitled to a termination of spousal support by reason of the Respondent’s failure to attend at a 30 day residential alcohol treatment program as provided in para. 15 of the Final Order of Olah J?
[16] As noted above, the Final Order of Olah J. imposes a positive obligation on the Respondent to attend a 30 day residential treatment program. There is no time limit for attendance at the program other than the review date for spousal support which was July 1, 2010.
[17] Ms. Gallagher did attend a program at Renascent, but the program was only 21 days in duration. The letter states that Ms. Gallagher “completed the 21 Day Primary Care Program for the commencement of her rehabilitation from the disease of alcoholism and/or drug addiction.” It appears from the correspondence from Carolyn Greer, Addictions Counsellor, that Ms. Gallagher successfully completed that program.
[18] Mr. Gallagher confirms that he has had this letter in hand since shortly after it was dated, which was September 17, 2009. He also admits that he took no steps to advise the Respondent that he did not consider this to be compliance with para. 15 of Olah J.’s order. When asked why he took no immediate steps to terminate spousal support because of the Respondent’s breach of s. 15, he stated that the issue was only recently brought to his attention when he consulted with counsel prior to the commencement of this Motion to Change. He states, however, that this is not his problem, and that as Ms. Gallagher did not complete a 30 day program prior to the July 1, 2010 review date, she is not entitled to any further spousal support and in fact, should repay to him any spousal support which was paid subsequent to that review date; he states that the clause is unequivocal in its effect and he should not have paid spousal support subsequent to that date. Presumably he relied upon this clause when he elected to stop paying spousal support in May, 2012.
[19] Unfortunately, Mr. Gallagher does not properly understand where the onus lies in this proceeding. It is up to Mr. Gallagher to satisfy the court on the balance of probabilities that spousal support should come to an end based upon non-compliance with para. 15 of the Olah J. order. This he has not done.
[20] I assume that when the order was made, alcohol use by Ms. Gallagher was in issue. It is also apparent to me that the intention of the order was that Ms. Gallagher successfully resolve her alcohol problem, presumably for the sake of the children of the marriage who would have been adversely affected by Ms. Gallagher’s alcoholism. The hope, again presumably because Mr. Gallagher did not trust the Respondent to deal with her alcohol issues on her own, was that the consequence of the termination of spousal support would be sufficient to force Ms. Gallagher to attend a program leading to her rehabilitation. Apparently this worked; Ms. Gallagher did attend a program at a respected institution, and successfully completed this program.
[21] To me, the fact that the program was 21 days, rather than 30 days is of little importance. What is important is that the order was intended to force Ms. Gallagher to confront her alcoholism and it succeeded in doing so. No evidence was led by either party as to whether a 30 day program is even available at any institution, and whether that would have made any difference in Ms. Gallagher’s sobriety. It appears to me that there has been substantial compliance with para. 15 of the Order, in spirit with if not exactly within the terms of the order.
[22] This is especially so where Mr. Gallagher received notification in 2009 of Ms. Gallagher’s completion of the Renascent program, and in response to this notification, he said and did nothing. He did not contact Ms. Gallagher and advise her that he found this to be unsatisfactory compliance with the order. Instead, he waited nearly three years, and brought this Motion to Change well after the expiry of the July 1, 2010 review date, when it was too late for Ms. Gallagher to comply with the order. A party cannot wait in the weeds for a number of years after a terminating event occurs and then attempt to use that event as grounds for termination well after the responding party could possibly remedy his or her default. Under the circumstances, it appears to me that by his actions, Mr. Gallagher has waived strict compliance with that term of the order.
[23] Accordingly, I find that there has been substantial compliance with para. 15 of the Final Order of Olah J. dated July 9, 2009, and accordingly the Applicant’s claim for termination of spousal support under that order based upon non-compliance with para. 15 of the order is dismissed.
(b) Has the Applicant proved a change in circumstances sufficient to permit a variation of the spousal support payable under the Final Order of Olah J?
[24] Although the order provides the Applicant with the right to review the spousal support under the final order in this matter, this proceeding in no way can be considered a full review of the spousal support issues. A review of spousal support is a de novo hearing of the spousal support issues, including the basis of spousal support and the respective incomes of the parties. That type of review must involve the leading of evidence and cross examinations of witnesses, a process that the Applicant elected not to follow. He wished to proceed on the basis that this would be argued by way of a one hour motion. Accordingly, I treat this as a motion to vary only.
[25] A motion to vary spousal support must be based upon a material change in circumstances of both or one of the parties; without such a material change, the motion to change must be dismissed: see the Divorce Act,[^3] s. 17(4.1). As the moving party in this motion to change, the onus is on the Applicant to prove a material change of either his or the Respondent’s circumstances on the balance of probabilities. As will be discussed below, I do not find that the Applicant has satisfied that onus.
[26] I firstly must address the effect of para. 16 of Olah J.’s order as there seems to be some misunderstanding of the intention of that provision. Mr. Gallagher has made much of the fact that the Respondent may very well have gone beyond the $20,000 per year threshold contained in that paragraph; he also says that Ms. Gallagher resided with another man for more than three months. He argued this matter as if those factors automatically provided him with grounds for an elimination of spousal support under the order.
[27] Even if Mr. Gallagher proved that those events occurred, para. 16 of the order does not state that these constitute a material change in circumstances warranting a change in the spousal support provisions. The effect of para. 16 of the order is to deem certain provisions not to be a material change in circumstances which would permit a party to move to vary spousal support. The intent of the paragraph is to provide a defence to a motion to change where certain changes in circumstances are alleged; that does not mean that the thresholds contained in that paragraph result in an automatic change in circumstances and support variation. For example, if Mr. Gallagher’s income were to increase by more than $10,000 for a given year as set out in subpara. 16(ii), that would not automatically allow Ms. Gallagher to obtain more spousal support without proving that the quantum of the pay increase was a material change in circumstances within the meaning of s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act. Likewise, subparas. 16(i) and (ii) of the Consent Order do not mean that there is an automatic change in circumstances if Ms. Gallagher made more than $20,000 in a given year or cohabited with another man for more than three months; even were that proven, the onus remains with the Applicant to prove that these were, in fact, material changes in circumstances which would allow a variation in spousal support.
[28] That being said, in the event that Mr. Gallagher has not proven a that Ms. Gallagher has exceeded the thresholds set out in para. 16 of the final order, the motion to change must be dismissed.
[29] The first ground submitted was that Ms. Gallagher had made more than $20,000 per annum. He relied upon several pieces of evidence, all of which were attached to his affidavit sworn on October 24, 2012. He firstly noted that the Respondent had filed notices of assessment which indicated incomes of $14,760, $9,748 and $19,278 for 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively; he notes that considering the actual living expenses for those years (he had paid the rent in part or in whole throughout) that Ms. Gallagher could not possibly have lived on her declared income. He also notes that Ms. Gallagher had received past assistance from her past boyfriends to pay both living expenses and for her Renascent treatment; he says that this should be considered income for support purposes. He notes that Ms. Gallagher received OSAP assistance of $25,889 and this should be accounted for as income. Finally, he notes that Ms. Gallagher had declared to her boyfriend’s landlord in 2009 that her income was $40,000 per annum and that this was evidence of income in excess of that declared in her income tax returns noted above.
[30] The real issue for the purposes of this motion to vary is whether I can make a finding that the Respondent’s “actual income” has increased beyond the $20,000 threshold as set out in subpara. 16(i) of the Final Order. If not, the Applicant has no right to bring a motion to change based upon that issue.
[31] For spousal support purposes, the meaning of income has generally been that used under s. 16 of the Child Support Guidelines,[^4] which is “the sources of income set out under the heading of ‘Total Income’ in the T1 General form issued by the Canada Revenue Agency”. This is typically referred to as the Line 150 income in the parties’ respective Income Tax Returns as submitted to the Canada Revenue Agency. It is also to be noted that, under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, social assistance payments are not included as income for spousal support purposes.[^5]
[32] If this is the definition to be used, then, for spousal support purposes, the Respondent’s income did not go beyond the $20,000 figure set out in subpara. 16(i) of the order. The income which was declared, and which included the spousal support which was declared by the Respondent as her income did not go beyond this amount in any given year. In 2011, as social assistance income is not to be included as income for spousal support purposes, the Respondent’s income was only the spousal support paid by the Applicant. Added to this is the fact that the Respondent has declared her present income as being about $14,300 per annum: see the correspondence from her present employer wherein he advises that the Respondent receives $11 per hour for a 25 hour week.
[33] There is no authority for the proposition that the Respondent’s OSAP student assistance is to be added to her income; in fact these funds are loaned to the Respondent and do not appear as taxable income and will eventually have to be repaid by her. Moreover, assistance from a partner is not income within the definition under the Child Support Guidelines; Ms. Gallagher may have been assisted by her boyfriends throughout the year, but this does not bring her beyond the $20,000 per annum threshold set out in subpara. 16(i) of the order. I also find it ironic that the Applicant complains about the fact that the Renascent program being funded by her boyfriend when he is also complaining that the Respondent should lose her spousal support as a result of her failure to attend at a 30 day residential program.
[34] There is, of course, the statement made by the Respondent in late December, 2009 to her boyfriend’s landlord that she made $40,000 per annum as a property manager. In answer to this, the Respondent stated that this is what she thought she would make in the coming year. However, the Respondent had $6,216 in employment income in 2009 and there was no income whatsoever from employment in the Respondent’s hands in 2010; it accordingly appears to me that the Respondent misrepresented her income to the landlord at the time.
[35] I agree, however, with the Respondent when she states that had she made that type of income, it would have appeared in her income tax return. There was no evidence led by either party of any cash or undeclared income received by the Respondent and property management is not typically a “cash income” area of income receipt. Although the Respondent was less than truthful with the landlord in December, 2009, this is not something that would disentitle her to spousal support or which necessarily proves that she had excess income. It is far more likely that she wished her friend to move into the apartment in question, and lied to obtain that result; it eventually became her apartment when Russell Hector did not pay the rent and eventually moved out. I find this to be the case and I do not find that the Applicant has proven on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent’s income has gone beyond the $20,000 per annum threshold set out in the Consent Order of Olah J.
[36] The other issue raised by the Respondent is the issue of whether Ms. Gallagher has cohabited with a partner for more than three months; he states that there is evidence that she has done so, and accordingly spousal support should come to an end.
[37] The evidence relied upon was the fact that the Respondent had received substantial financial assistance from various individuals including the boyfriend that she was with; the Applicant notes that the Respondent could not have subsisted on the declared income from her employment or social assistance. He notes that there is evidence that the Respondent cohabited from time to time with other partners; he notes that the apartment at 10 Wolseley Street, Unit B in Toronto was originally rented to the Respondent’s boyfriend, Russell Hector and that the Respondent also lived there. Mr. Hector continued to use the apartment on Wolseley Street as his address for banking purposes. In 2011, when the Respondent applied for OSAP, she declared that she was “married” and did not explain that in her material; presumably she was “married” to a live-in partner at the time, who would have been Mr. Hector. The Applicant notes as well that there was correspondence dated March 15, 2012 from Victor Tuba, Ms. Gallagher’s former landlord, indicating that Ms. Gallagher was moving in with a new partner in Toronto in March, 2012 in an apartment in Toronto. She apparently lived in that Harbourfront Condominium until recently as that was her address for service in the materials filed. She also entered into a “Monthly Rental Agreement” with Reuben Lynch in respect of the Harbourfront Condominium; the Applicant points out that this property is actually owned by Kevin and Maureen Hurren and he states that Reuban Lynch is the same partner referred to by the Respondent’s landlord in his correspondence dated March 15, 2012.
[38] It appears to me that there is sufficient evidence which confirms that Ms. Gallagher has lived with several different partners since separation and the court order, and that these periods of cohabitation have exceeded three months. Certainly the last period of cohabitation was for a period of about eight months, and has only recently come to an end. Moreover, the evidence is that when Ms. Gallagher applied for her student loan, she considered herself “married” and she apparently was living with Russell Hector when she completed that application. There appear to be a number of clumsy attempts to get around the terms of the court order, including the “tenancy agreement” which the Respondent submitted as part of her material. Ms. Gallagher did not, apparently, comply with the provision which would have required her to declare to the Applicant that she was living with another man. For the purposes of this motion to change, I find that the Applicant has proven, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms. Gallagher has cohabited with another man in a conjugal relationship for periods in excess of three months, and that the Applicant is not barred from bringing this application for that reason.
[39] That being said, I am unable to find that there is a change in circumstances warranting a change in spousal support at this time. It appeared that in each of the cases that we know about, the relationships that the Respondent had were comparatively short-lived; the relationship with Mr. Hector apparently only lasted between January, 2010 to, at the latest, February, 2012 (when she vacated Wolseley Street in Toronto) and possibly earlier as it appears that he did move out after a certain period of time. Certainly, there was evidence that Mr. Hector was paying the rent on the Wolseley Street apartment for a time, after which Ms. Gallagher took over payment of the rent; there is an angry e-mail from Mr. Tuba complaining of the fact that Ms. Gallagher had not paid some of the arrears of rent owed by Mr. Hector. The relationship with Mr. Lynch lasted no more than eight months. There is no evidence of a relationship of dependency between Ms. Gallagher and the individuals with whom she resided sufficient to displace the spousal support obligation of the Applicant; this might have been proven through a cross examination of the Respondent at a trial of the issues, an opportunity that the Applicant declined by insisting upon arguing the matter at a motion. Moreover, to make a claim against one of these gentlemen for spousal support, Ms. Gallagher would have had to reside with that individual for at least three years, and this was not proven: see s. 29 and 30 of the Family Law Act.[^6] If Ms. Gallagher could not seek support against a new partner, then it is difficult to see how this cohabitation would relieve Mr. Gallagher of his spousal support obligation. Accordingly, I find that the cohabitation of the Respondent with both Mr. Hector and Mr. Lynch are not changes in circumstances sufficient to warrant a variation of the spousal support payable under the order. The motion to vary spousal support is accordingly dismissed.
[40] There is one change in circumstances which was not argued but which is apparent to me as something that will affect the finances of the parties substantially in the near future. This arises from the fact raised by the Applicant that the parties’ oldest son, Ryan, is in his final year of high school and is planning to attend university or college in the coming academic year. Although there were estimates of what this might cost, there was no evidence of where Ryan was applying to, or what the actual costs might look like, largely because these are unknowns at this point in time. At this time, a motion to vary based upon Ryan’s post-secondary expenses is premature. By the spring of next year, these may very well be known quantities.
[41] From the material provided to me, it is apparent that the Respondent will be in no position to contribute in a meaningful fashion to the children’s post secondary education expenses. The support of the children and their placement in post secondary educational institutions may very well trump the spousal support obligation of the Applicant to the Respondent. Accordingly, I am giving the Applicant leave to renew this motion to change based upon the post secondary expenses which may accrue to the Applicant, but only when he is in a position to demonstrate that Ryan has been accepted at a post secondary educational institution and when he has an estimate of the costs of that post-secondary institution; that would include addressing the issue of Ryan’s expected contribution to those expenses, including OSAP application and his anticipated summer employment.
[42] Finally, I am directing that arrears of spousal support and ongoing support under the Olah J. order be paid to the Respondent directly until she leases another apartment or dwelling, after which the support is directed to be paid to the landlord as set out in the final order. This is because there is no evidence that there are any rental arrears owing as a result of Mr. Gallagher refusing to pay spousal support after May 1, 2012 and Ms. Gallagher is presently living with her mother.
Order
[43] Accordingly, there will be a final order on the following terms:
a. The Applicant’s motion to change spousal support is dismissed.
b. The arrears accruing under the order of Olah J. and ongoing spousal support are payable directly to the Respondent notwithstanding para. 14(c) of that order until the Respondent obtains her own residence and advises the Applicant of this, when the payments will then be payable to the Respondent’s landlord;
c. The other claims for relief of the Applicant and of the Respondent are deemed to be abandoned.
d. The within motion to change spousal support may be renewed once the Applicant can demonstrate that Ryan has been accepted at a post secondary educational institution and when he has a written estimate of the costs of that post-secondary institution including evidence as to Ryan’s expected contribution to those expenses, including any OSAP applications and his anticipated summer employment.
[44] The parties may address the issue of the costs of this motion to change by providing written submissions as to costs of no more than three pages in length, not including any bills of costs or offers to settle submitted. The Applicant shall file his costs submissions, if any, within ten days of this endorsement, and the Respondent shall have ten days after that date to respond to the Applicant’s costs submissions and make her own costs submissions.
McDERMOT J.
Date: November 7, 2012
[^1]: O. Reg. 114/99 [^2]: R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) [^3]: R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.) [^4]: SOR/86-600. See Rogerson and Thompson, Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (July, 2008), at p. 46 where the authors state that the “starting point point for determination of income under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines is the definition of income under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.” [^5]: See Rogerson and Thompson at p. 47 [^6]: R.S.O. 1990, c. F.1