COURT FILE NO.: 6072/10
DATE: 2012-06-08
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
LISA ANN VAN WYK
Applicant
– and –
GERALD VAN WYK
Respondent
GEORGE McFADYEN, Counsel for the Applicant
JANET WHITEHEAD, Counsel for the Respondent
HEARD: December 15 and 16, 2011 and January 19, 2012
DESOTTI, J.
A. The Facts
[1] The applicant was born on November 29th, 1962 and is 49 years of age and the respondent was born on August 26, 1957 and is 54 years of age. The parties were married on May 23rd, 1981 and had four children. The two remaining dependent children are Jesse Garrett Van Wyk, born October 17th, 1991 and is 20 years of age and Luke Micah Van Wyk, born September 4th, 1993 and is currently age 18. Both children are now residing with their mother.
[2] The parties separated on November 28th, 2001 after a 20 year seven month marriage and were divorced on October 12, 2007. In addition, the parties entered into a Separation Agreement dated July 4, 2002. The applicant had retained counsel to negotiate with the respondent, a Separation Agreement that purported to terminate spousal support when the youngest child turned 18 years of age. Both parties collectively paid this counsel out of the proceeds of the sale of their matrimonial home.
[3] There is no issue that the applicant had at best, a grade 10 education, and married when she was 18 years of age. The applicant and respondent were members of a fundamentalist church and for the most part entered into a traditional marriage.
[4] Until the last three year years of their marriage, excepting some cleaning and painting jobs, the applicant was a ‘stay at home’ mother and was the primary care giver of the children. The cleaning that was pursued by the applicant was also effected at the workplace of the respondent husband, a company known as ‘Patene Brick’.
[5] In December of 2007, Luke went to live with his father until June of 2010 and Jesse went to live with his father in December of 2008 but returned to live with his mother in September of 2009. There is some evidence that between December 2008 and June 2009 Jesse may have been living in both residences. I prefer the evidence of the respondent on this point that Jesse was primarily residing with him during this period.
[6] There is no issue that no child support would be payable to Jesse from October of 2009 until September of 2010 when he returned to school even though he was residing with his mother and undoubtedly she provided him with some financial resources through subsumed shelter expenses.
B. Analysis
[7] Without any hesitation, I would conclude that the applicant is not a very sophisticated litigant. Her education is minimal and she and the children relied on her husband’s income throughout their marriage. Her employment skills are insignificant but she is industrious and is most personable and has acquired and nurtured an excellent cleaning service that provides her with some meaningful income.
[8] However, pretending or advocating that the applicant could somehow parlay this work ethic into a potential educational or new career opportunity is and would be decidedly disingenuous. Where the applicant is now is where the applicant will be for the foreseeable future. I conclude that the respondent, her former spouse, would not be at all surprised with this assertion.
[9] On the other hand, a great deal of concern has been raised by applicant’s counsel that the applicant retained counsel that does not practice in the Family Law field, never has engaged in any Family Law litigation and is, at best, a ‘mediator’ of some sort who has inappropriately negotiated an ‘Agreement’ that does not meet any of the objectives or factors in Miglin.
[10] While I agree with counsel for the respondent, that the applicant retained Mr. Westfall and there is an affidavit from the solicitor that states that he advised the applicant of the full effect of the ‘Agreement’, the absurdity of putting in a clause with respect to spousal support that would provide spousal support until the youngest child turned 18 or September 2011, (Luke was born September 4th 1993), with a 20 year plus marriage, causes me some significant angst.
[11] Why anyone would agree to the termination of spousal support after a little over 9 years is questionable when there was no unequal division of assets to provide for the applicant? Furthermore, the applicant would have qualified for both compensatory and non-compensatory support given her education and the fact that her marriage, up until the last few years, was traditional.
[12] What possible consideration on the part of the applicant could there be in allowing a ‘sunset’ on spousal support, given the length of this marriage, even if this ‘Agreement’ was before Fisher and the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines?
[13] Surely, even in 2002, an engaged family practitioner, at most, might have considered allowing for the possibility of revisiting the issue of spousal support. Equally, I would believe that many family practitioners would vigourously resist even that minimum possibility of a reopener, as an unrealistic consideration, given the length of the marriage and the educational realities of his/her client.
[14] The ‘Agreement’ was negotiated between the applicant’s solicitor and the respondent without the benefit of counsel. The respondent husband did exceedingly well to minimize both the quantum of spousal support and the length of time that spousal support would be paid.
[15] I note that the handwritten note of the solicitor for the applicant (Exhibit 11) states about this issue the following:
I had a quick review of the court file. You may wish to plead that paragraph 13 (the Spousal Support Clause) does not say that spousal support terminates – it says the amount of $700.00 will be paid until one of the following events happen. So the amount is the issue – not necessarily the entitlement.
[16] Paragraph 17 of the ‘Agreement’ is also most curious as it states:
The amount of support in paragraphs 10 and 13 may be varied by a written witnessed agreement or by application to the Court if there is a material change in the circumstances of the parties or the Children.
[17] Paragraph 35 of the ‘Agreement’ is also rather bizarre given Paragraph 17 and reads as follows:
Neither party shall at any time commence or prosecute any action or other proceedings for the recovering of support from the other.
[18] Instead of law suits or actions by the parties they are governed by the “Dispute Resolution” sections of the ‘Agreement’, that is paragraphs 37, 38, and 39, which reads as follows:
The parties will try to resolve any difference between them on any matter in this ‘Agreement’ by negotiations between themselves personally or by their lawyers, and, unless there is an emergency, neither party will initiate any other procedure until negotiations have exhausted all reasonable possibilities of resolution.
Whether the negotiations are conducted by the parties personally or by their lawyers, they may obtain the assistance of a mediator they select.
No evidence of anything said or of any admission or communication made in the course of the negotiations or mediation is admissible in any legal proceeding, except with the consent of both parties.
[19] I infer that the exhaustion of the “Dispute Resolution” sections could mean that an action or application could be brought by either party. One would have thought therefore, that paragraph 35 should have stated that this prohibition of pursuing an action or application is subject to the “Dispute Resolution” paragraphs. Paragraph 35, unfortunately, does not state that at all but seemingly prevents any action to recover support.
[20] Furthermore, paragraph 37 also seems at variance with paragraph 35 as it does seem to allow for some sort of action or application if there is an emergency. What better emergency than the termination of spousal support for some reason other than a reason as reflected in the ‘Agreement’ or the unilateral reduction of child or spousal support?
[21] I conclude that paragraph 38 makes little sense or is so grammatically garbled as to be without any real meaning. This paragraph appears to allow for the parties, with or without a lawyer, to select a mediator but concludes with the superfluous words “they select”. I would anticipate that no one could obtain the assistance of a mediator unless one selects a mediator. Perhaps these latter words mean that the parties have to agree to a specific mediator before they can agree to mediation or if they don’t agree to a particular mediator there can be no mediation. Either way the paragraph is poorly worded.
[22] What I do conclude is that this ‘Agreement’ does not in any way extinguish entitlement to spousal support but only terminates it when the youngest child reached 18 years of age. What happens next is that an application was commenced to vet out whether spousal support should be extinguished and not just terminated.
[23] In short, absent a clear clause that specifically terminated spousal support, I infer that the coming of age of the youngest child merely suspended spousal support until an application was brought to a court and the court determined an appropriate level of spousal support or determined that no further spousal support would be ordered.
[24] Even if I am wrong in my interpretation of the ‘Agreement’, the legal principles and the two stage approach in considering and assessing both the objectives and factors under section 15.2 of the Divorce Act as reflected in the Miglin decision would result in the reinstatement of spousal support under the first stage as reflected in my ongoing analysis.
[25] After the initial separation, I would agree with counsel for the applicant that the applicant was under some pressure to conclude the issues of child and spousal support as she was receiving only $1,300.00 per month from the respondent during the negotiation process. I would also unequivocally indicate that in considering the provisions of section 15.2 of the Divorce Act and more particularly subsection 4 (a) through (c), the ‘Agreement’ does not meet the factors as reflected in these subsections and the first stage of the two stage approach as set out in Miglin.
[26] Most recently, the Supreme Court of Canada revisited Miglin with their decisions in L.M.P. and L.S. and in R.P. and R.C. While they agreed with the majority in Miglin that considerable weight should be placed on any negotiated Agreement, they reaffirmed the following clear principle under section 15.2 of the Divorce Act:
(This section) creates a statutory override in s. 15.2 which authorizes courts to make an initial order which may be at odds with terms of the agreement if those terms to not comply with the objectives of the Act.
[27] Most importantly, they affirmed that while the objectives are the same under both sections 15.2 and 17 of the Divorce Act, the factors are different as reflected in section 15.2 (4) (a) through (c) as opposed to the factors in section 17 (4.1) that reflects a “change in the ... circumstances”. Frankly, as noted, section 17 (4.1) does not refer to the consideration by the Court of the ‘Agreement’, which, as indicated, is one of the factors that must be considered under section 15.2 (4) (c).
[28] The Supreme Court went on to reaffirm at paragraph [24] that:
On an application under section 15.2 the court is expressly concerned with the extent to which the terms of an existing agreement should be incorporated into a first court order for support. On an application under section 17, on the other hand, the court must determine whether to vary or rescind that support order because of a change of circumstances.
[29] Furthermore, the Supreme Court finally ‘explained away’ the obiter in Miglin that seemed to suggest that treatment of support agreements were to be the same under both sections as reflected in paragraph [91] in Miglin. Although at paragraph [27] Justice Abella in L.M.P. and L.S. seems to suggest that paragraph [62] in Miglin explains away this seeming contradiction, I do not see this paragraph as a justification for their later conclusion in Miglin in paragraph [91]. Paragraph [62] is most difficult to understand, and is so filled with twists and turns as to be virtually incomprehensible.
[30] Nevertheless, having come to that conclusion, the Supreme Court’s majority view is now making it quite clear in the continuation of paragraphs {27} and [28] in L.M.P. and L.S. that:
Where the parties entered into a mutually acceptable agreement, the agreement is not ignored under either s. 15.2 or s. 17. However, its treatment will be different because of the different purpose of each provision.
The approach developed in Miglin, then, was responsive to the specific statutory directions of s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act and should not be imported into the analysis under s. 17.
[31] Therefore, even if my interpretation of the ‘Agreement’ is in error, there is no possibility that this ‘Agreement’ can withstand the scrutiny of Miglin and its two stage approach as clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in L.M.P. and L.S.
[32] Having come to the conclusion that the termination of spousal support makes little sense under either the compensatory or non-compensatory model, the only issue is what amount of spousal support is warranted and from what date and what, if any credit or underpayment for child and spousal support, is warranted in favour of the respondent or applicant.
C. Retroactive Child Support
[33] In the applicant’s counsel’s written submissions, he concludes, using the mid-point for the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, that the respondent had underpaid $18,989.00 in child support, and at the end of March 2012 an underpayment of spousal support of $94,648.00.
[34] On the other hand, counsel for the respondent submits that there has been an overpayment of child support to the applicant based on certain imputed income that must be attributed to the applicant based on both the evidence of the applicant at trial and her acknowledged additional income not so declared. I also agree with counsel for the respondent that there is no good reason to consider child support from the inception of the ‘Agreement’ but only back three years from the commencement of the application or from August 13th, 2010.
[35] As Justice Bastarache, of the Supreme Court of Canada, pointed out as the majority view in D.B.S. v. S.R.G.; L.J.W. v/ T.A.R.; Henry v. Henry; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra, the Federal Child Support Guidelines contemplate an increase of child support with an increase of income. Thus, under the Guideline regime at paragraph 45, the Supreme Court concluded “when a payor parent does not increase the amount of his/her support when his/her income increases, it is the child who loses: the child is the one who is entitled to a greater quantum of support in absolute terms.”
[36] Of some note, although the Supreme Court of Canada accepted, as did the litigants and the Alberta Court of Appeal, that the Federal Child Support Guidelines would be the applicable benchmark, the Supreme Court acknowledged that provinces could adopt their own provincial models with respect to child support under provincial legislation that could be different from the Federal Guidelines.
[37] The Supreme Court also noted that under these same Guidelines, there is no automatic disclosure requirement, although, as was the case in Marinangeli v. Marinangeli, a court (Ontario Court of Appeal) could infer such an obligation from the terms of a separation agreement (I do not infer that obligation in the ‘Agreement’ before me).
[38] The analysis of the Supreme Court considered three scenarios where retroactive child support could be considered. One is where there is an existing court order; another is where there is an existing agreement; and the third situation is where there is no court order in place.
[39] The Supreme Court concluded that with respect to existing orders, even if presumptively valid, that they may be varied under section 17 of the Divorce Act “prospectively or retroactively”. Likewise, they concluded that separation agreements may also be varied to reflect a change in incomes as would be the case where there was neither an order nor an agreement.
[40] Some of the factors that the Supreme Court indicated should be considered in all retroactive support awards are as follows:
a) Delay in bringing an application without any justifiable excuse such as fear of the reaction of the payor spouse such as vindictiveness; or, lacking the financial or emotional means to proceed; or, inadequate legal advice; would be unreasonable particularly where the payor spouse was blameless and had adequately disclosed his/her increase in income.
Nevertheless, the court would still have to balance the payor’s interest in certainty and fairness with the right of the child to receive an appropriate level of support. In short, the court would still have some level of discretion after a proper analysis of the factual underpinnings of the claim.
b) The more blameworthy is the conduct of the payor the more likely is it that a court would exercise its discretion and make a retroactive award.
c) The particular circumstances of the child as reflected in his/her lifestyle and whether he/she enjoyed certain advantages or disadvantages because the appropriate level of support was not paid.
d) Whether any retroactive child support award would impact negatively on the payor or create a hardship that could not be minimized by periodic payments or a lump sum or a combination of both.
[41] However, as is the case in this retroactive child support claim, what should be the effective date of the retroactive award? The Supreme Court concluded that there are four choices that a court could determine as the effective date. They are the date of the application; the date when formal notice was given; the date when effective notice was given to the payor parent; and the date when the amount of child support should have been increased.
[42] The Supreme Court concluded that as a usual rule the date of effective notice would normally govern this determination as the date of formal notice or date application already signals a confrontational approach. Most importantly, the Supreme Court indicated in the strongest terms that significant blameworthy conduct would as reflected to “move the presumptive date of retroactivity back to a time when circumstances changed materially” (paragraph 124).
[43] They also indicated at paragraph 125 the following guiding principle:
Payor parents will have their interest in certainty protected up to the point when that interest becomes unreasonable. In the majority of circumstances, that interest will be reasonable up to the point when the recipient parent broaches the subject, up to three years in the past... the payor parent must act responsibly; (s)he must disclose the material change in circumstances to the recipient parent.
[44] In the matter before me as reflected in my succeeding paragraph, both parties failed to disclose their increased incomes and the payor spouse actually, as found in my succeeding paragraphs, paid more than his fair share of support for the three years prior to the date of the application and paid all of one child’s college expenses. While it is true that he would or could have paid additional support for the years 2003 through to 2007, he actually did pay a few dollars more for the first year of the ‘Agreement’ and then, somewhat less for the years 2004 through to 2007.
[45] Regardless, I do not exercise my discretion in these circumstances nor do I attribute any blameworthiness to the conduct or actions of the respondent spouse during this period of time. He relied on the ‘Agreement’ and the indexing provision contained within the document.
[46] Furthermore, I agree with counsel for the respondent’s submission that there is direct and indirect evidence given by the applicant in her testimony to the court in support of a conclusion that there should be imputed income attributed to the applicant, but I assess and cap her income at $30,000.00 effective for the years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 and her other imputed income for earlier years as reflected in the respondent’s ‘Divorce mate’ calculations. Thus, I conclude that in 2007 her income would be $24,000.00 and in 2008, $28,000.00.
[47] Based on my findings that the applicant’s imputed income was $24,000.00 in 2007 and the respondent’s income was $90,562.00 and the uncontested fact that the applicant had both children up until December 1st, 2007 when Luke began to live with the respondent, child support should have been calculated as follows:
The table amount of child support is $1,289.00 per month for 2 children. For December, the respondent would pay the applicant $803.00 and the applicant would pay the respondent $203.00. The set-off is $600.00. Therefore the respondent would owe the applicant 11 x $1,289.00 = $14,779.00 + $600.00 for December = $14,779.00. Since the respondent paid the applicant $11,500.00, the shortfall for 2007 was $3,279.00.
For 2008, the applicant’s imputed income was $28,000.00. The shortfall for 2008 was therefore $204.00 based on the respondent’s income of $92,829.00 and his table amount of child support fixed at $820.00, the applicant’s child support fixed at $246.00 and the set-off equalling $574.00 x 12 or $6,888.00. The respondent actually paid $6,684.00 or as stated, a shortfall of $204.00.
For 2009, the two boys, I conclude based on the evidence, were with the respondent until October of 2009 when Jesse began working at RBC. I find that the imputed income of the applicant was $30,000.00 and her table amount of support for 2 children for 10 months should have been $444.00 per month or $4,440.00. For the months of November and December the applicant should have paid for 1 child $270.00 per month or $540.00. Since the respondent paid the applicant $6,684.00 in child support, the overpayment is $4,440.00 + $6,684.00 + $540.00 = $11,664.00.
For 2010, Luke was with the respondent for ½ the year and with the applicant for the other half of the year. The applicant should have paid the respondent based on her imputed income of $30,000.00, the sum of $270.00 per month x 6 months = $1,620.00. The respondent for the remaining 6 months should have paid the applicant based on an income of $97,077.00, the sum of $854.00 per month = $5,124.00. The respondent actually paid the applicant $5,076.00 (an underpayment of $68.00). The overpayment is thus $1,620.00 - $68.00 = $1,552.00.
For 2011, the evidence would affirm that Luke was with the applicant for the entire year and that Jesse returned to Lambton College in September. Based on the respondent’s income of $96,400.00, the respondent should have paid for one child $848.00 x 8 = $6,784.00 and for 2 children the table amount of $1,360.00 x 4 = $5,440.00 or a total amount of child support of $12,224.00. The actual child support that was paid was $12,240.00 for an overpayment of $16.00.
[48] However, the respondent paid all of Jesse’s tuition of $3,510.57. The applicant’s imputed income plus the adjustment for child support should have been approximately 30% or her proportionate share of tuition of $1,053.00 for which the respondent should receive credit.
[49] The table amount for 2 children for 2012 is $1,360.00 per month based on an income of $96,400.00.
[50] The summary of payments, either a shortfall or over payment, are as follows:
For 2007, a shortfall of $3,279.00; for 2008, a shortfall of $204.00; for 2009, an overpayment of $11,664.00; for 2010, an overpayment of $1,552.00; for 2011, the overpayment was $16.00 plus the proportionate share of tuition or $16.00 + $1,053.00 = $1069.00.
The shortfalls total $3,279.00 + $204.00 = $3,483.00. The overpayments total $11,664.00 + $1,552.00 + $1,069.00 = $13,745.00. The net overpayment is thus $14,285.00 - $3,483.00 = $10,802.00.
[51] The respondent shall thus be credited with an overpayment of $10,802.00 in child support.
D. Retroactive Spousal Support
[51] With respect to the issue of retroactive spousal support although similar considerations to those set out in the context of child support, child support is truly a fiduciary relationship of presumed dependency. Nevertheless, the needs of the recipient, the conduct of the payor, the reasons for delay in seeking support and any hardship that making a retroactive award may occasion on the payor spouse, are all relevant concerns.
[52] In the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Kerr v. Baranow, the court concluded that in considering any retroactive spousal support award a holistic approach was preferred that reflected all the factors in the marriage and the separation. In this case the applicant commenced her claim in August of 2010. Her spousal support of $700.00 per month was terminated in September of 2011 when her youngest child Luke turned 18 in September of 2011.
[53] In these circumstances, I find that spousal support was underpaid from the moment that the separation agreement was executed. Certainly, based on the applicant’s and respondent’s income, spousal support was woefully inadequate. While the mid-point SAGG guidelines, do magnify the inadequacy and were not in effect at the time, the original base line of spousal support requested by the applicant in the amount of $1,000.00 per month would have been at the lower end of any spousal support award had she received that amount.
[54] Furthermore, I consider the actual amount of spousal support ($700.00) as something that would have created an obvious imbalance in incomes. Nevertheless, the question I have to answer is whether this imbalance negotiated between the parties warrants any retroactive spousal support award and most significantly from what point in time, and would it create a hardship on the respondent who now faces this claim, nine months after he thought he would be paying no spousal support at all.
[55] In my view, the sum of $1,000.00 per month should have been the negotiated amount of spousal support with the effective date of August 2010, the date of the application. I am not unaware of the imbalance in the relationship or the need, if only to better reflect a more enhanced life style, during the period of time between 2003 through to September 2011 the date of the suspension of spousal support.
[56] Nevertheless, I am trying to create a balance between what appeared to be the certainty of an ‘Agreement’ with the inadequacy of the same ‘Agreement’ so negotiated. In the result, the respondent spouse shall pay the sum of $300.00 per month effective August 1st 2010 and thereafter until August 31st, 2011 for a sum total of 13 x $300.00 = $3,900.00. From September the 1st, 2011 until June 1st 2012 or 10 months the respondent shall pay the sum of $1,000.00 or $10,000.00. Thereafter, the respondent shall pay on the 1st of every month the sum of $1,000.00 per month to reflect both the applicant’s needs and life style realities.
[57] The total of spousal support arrears I fix at $13,900.00. From this sum I would deduct the respondent husband’s overpayment of child support, leaving a balance awing to the applicant of spousal support of $13,900.00 - $10,802.00 = $3,102.00. I contemplate that the respondent husband may be able to deduct this periodic spousal support payment against income and the applicant spouse may have to bring this amount into her income.
[58] Both parties should be entitled to deduct any legal expenses occurred again their respective incomes as well. Each spouse shall, within 30 days, provide the other spouse with his/her income tax returns and notices’ of assessment within the same 30 day period.
[59] Finally, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the original ‘Agreement’ so negotiated between the parties. Regardless of the actual retainer, solicitors should be reluctant to embark on such an endeavour without fully understanding the legal principles at play. Family Law must be left with those lawyers who hold themselves out as regular and active participants in this complex legal process. Anything short of this effort or expertise allows for precisely the incomprehensible and sorely inadequate ‘Agreement’ and the resulting uncertainty and conflict.
[60] The parties have met with divided success, there is no order as to costs.
“Justice J.A. Desotti”
____________________________________
The Honourable Mr. Justice John A. Desotti
Released: June 11, 2012
CASES CONSIDERED:
Miglin v Miglin, **2003 SCC 24**, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 ; L.M.P. v. L.S., **2011 SCC 64**; Rick V. Brandsema, **2009 SCC 10**, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 295 ; Donnelly v. Descouteaux, **2011 ONSC 5796**; Gammon v. Gammon **[2008] O.J. No. 603**; Hofsteede v. Hofsteede (2006), 2006 2052 (ON SC), 24 R.F.L. (6th) 406 ; Kelly v. Kelly (2004), 2004 4328 (ON CA), 72 O.R. (3d) 108 (C.A.) ; Murray v Murray **(2003),** **66 O.R. (3d) 450**; Reinhardt v. Reinhardt, **[2004] O.J. No. 3318**; Hance v. Carbone, **[2006] O.J. No. 4542**; Simpkins v. Simpkins, **[2004] O.J. No. 2543**; van Rythoven v. van Rythoven, 2009 45844 (ON SC), [2009] O.J. No. 3648 ; R.P. v. R.C., **2011 SCC 65**, 339 D.L.R. (4th) 658 ; D.B.S. v. S.R.G., **2006 SCC 37**, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231 ; Kerr v. Baranow, **2011 SCC 10**, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269 ; Mariangeli v. Mariangeli, (2003), 2003 27673 (ON CA), 66 O.R. (3d) 40 ; D.B.S. v. S.R.G. ; L.J.W. v. T.A.R. ; Henry v. Henry ; Hiemstra v. Hiemstra , 2006 SCC 37, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231; MacKinnon v. MacKinnon (2005), 2005 13191 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 175 (C.A.) ; S.D.Z. v. T.W.Z. **[2011] A.J. No. 891 (Q.B.)**; Rivard v. Rivard, **2011 ONSC 2298**; MacQuarrie v. MacQuarrie **2012 PECA 3**; Bremer v. Bremer 2005 3938 (ON CA), [2005] O.J. No. 608 , 13 R.F.L. (6th) 89 ; Paynter v. Paynter, **[2005] P.E.I.J. No. 87**; Zimmerman v. Shannon, 2006 BCCA 499, 34 R.F.L. (6th) 32 ; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 2006 32899 (ON CA), 32 R.F.L. (6th) 244 (O.C.A.) ; Verkaik v. Verkaik **[2010] O.J. No. 120 (O.C.A.)**; Cherneski v. Cherneski, **2005, 63825 (ON SC)**; S.P. v. R.P., 2011 ONCA 336; Fisher v Fisher, 2008 ONCA II ()
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COURT FILE NO.: 6072/10
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
LISA ANN VAN WYK
Applicant
– and –
GERALD VAN WYK
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
DESOTTI, J.
Released: June 11, 2012