COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9539-00CL
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES’ CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT , R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, AS AMENDED
RE: IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC., Applicants
BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.
COUNSEL:
James C. Orr and N. Mizobuchi, for St. Clair Penneyfeather, Plaintiff in Class Proceeding, Penneyfeather v. Timminco Limited et al (Court File No: CV-09-378701-00CP)
P. O’Kelly and A. Taylor, for the Applicants
P. LeVay, for the Photon Defendants
A. Lockhart, for Wacker Chemie AG
K. D. Kraft, for Chubb Insurance Company of Canada
D. J. Bell, for John P. Walsh
A. Hatnay and James Harnum for Mercer Canada, Administrator of the Timminco Haley Plan
S. Weisz, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc., Monitor
HEARD: March 26, 2012
ENDORSEMENT
1## Background
St. Clair Penneyfeather, the Plaintiff in the Penneyfeather v. Timminco Limited, et al action, Court File No. CV-09-378701-00CP (the “Class Action”), brought this motion for an order lifting the stay of proceedings, as provided by the Initial Order of January 3, 2012 and extended by court order dated January 27, 2012, and permitting Mr. Penneyfeather to continue the Class Action against Timminco Limited (“Timminco”), Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch, Mr. Robert Dietrich, Mr. Rene Boisvert, Mr. Arthur R. Spector, Mr. Jack Messman, Mr. John C. Fox, Mr. Michael D. Winfield, Mr. Mickey M. Yaksich and Mr. John P. Walsh.
2The Class Action was commenced on May 14, 2009 and has been case managed by Perell J. The following steps have taken place in the litigation:
(a) a carriage motion;
(b) a motion to substitute the Representative Plaintiff;
(c) a motion to force disclosure of insurance policies;
(d) a motion for leave to appeal the result of the insurance motion which was heard by the Divisional Court and dismissed;
(e) settlement discussions;
(f) when settlement discussions were terminated, Perell J. declined an expedited leave hearing and instead declared any limitation period to be stayed;
(g) a motion for particulars; and
(h) a motion served but not heard to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.
3On February 16, 2012, the Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the decision of Perell J. declaring that s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act suspended the running of the three-year limitation period under s. 138.14 of the Securities Act .
4The Plaintiffs’ counsel received instructions to seek leave to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada. The leave materials were required to be served and filed by April 16, 2012.
5On April 10, 2012, the following endorsement was released in respect of this motion:
The portion of the motion dealing with lifting the stay for the Plaintiff to seek leave to appeal the recent decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario to the Supreme Court of Canada on the limitation period issue was not opposed. This portion of the motion is granted and an order shall issue to give effect to the foregoing. The balance of the requested relief is under reserve.
6## Submissions of the Plaintiff
Counsel to Mr. Penneyfeather submits that, apart from the leave to appeal issues, there are steps that may occur before Perell J. as a result of the Court of Appeal ruling. Counsel references that the Defendants may bring motions for partial judgment and the Plaintiff could seek to have the court proceed with leave and certification with any order to be granted nunc pro tunc pursuant to s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act .
7Counsel to Mr. Penneyfeather submits that the three principal objectives of the Class Proceedings Act are judicial economy, access to justice and behaviour modification. (See Western Canadian Shopping Centres Inc. v. Dutton , (2001) 2001 SCC 46 , 2 S.C.R. 534 at paras. 27-29 .), and under the Securities Act , the deterrent represented by private plaintiffs armed with a realistic remedy is important in ensuring compliance with continuous disclosure rules.
8Counsel submits that, in this situation, there is only one result that will not do violence to a primary legislative purpose and that is to lift the stay to permit the Class Action to proceed on the condition that any potential execution excludes Timminco’s assets. Counsel further submits that, as a practical result, this would limit recovery in the Class Action to the proceeds of the insurance policies, or in the event that the insurers decline coverage because of fraud, to the personal assets of those officers and directors found responsible for the fraud.
9Counsel to Mr. Penneyfeather takes the position that the requested outcome is consistent with the judicial principal that the CCAA is not meant as a refuge insulating insurers from providing appropriate indemnification. (See Algoma Steel Corp. v. Royal Bank of Canada , (1992) O.J. No. 889 at paras. 13-15 (C.A.) and Re Carey Canada Inc . (2006) O.J. No. 4905 at paras. 7 , 16-17.)
10In this case, counsel contends that, when examining the relative prejudice to the parties, the examination strongly favours lifting the stay in the manner proposed since the insurance proceeds are not available to other creditors and there would be no financial unfairness caused by lifting the stay.
11## The CCAA Restructuring Context
The position put forward by Mr. Penneyfeather must be considered in the context of the CCAA proceedings. As stated in the affidavit of Ms. Konyukhova, the stay of proceedings was put in place in order to allow Timminco and Bécancour Silicon Inc. (“BSI” and, together with Timminco, the “Timminco Entities”) to pursue a restructuring and sales process that is intended to maximize recovery for the stakeholders. The Timminco Entities continue to operate as a going concern, but with a substantially reduced management team. The Timminco Entities currently have only ten active employees, including Mr. Kalins, President, General Counsel and Corporate Secretary and three executive officers (the “Executive Team”).
12Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that, if Mr. Penneyfeather is permitted to pursue further steps in the Class Action, key members of the Executive Team will be required to spend significant amounts of their time dealing with the Class Action in the coming months, which they contend is a key time in the CCAA proceedings. Counsel contends that the executive team is currently focussing on the CCAA proceedings and the sales process.
13Counsel to the Timminco Entities points out that the Executive Team has been required to direct most of their time to restructuring efforts and the sales process. Currently, the “stalking horse” sales process will continue into June 2012 and I am satisfied that it will require intensive time commitments from management of the Timminco Entities.
14It is reasonable to assume that, by late June 2012, all parties will have a much better idea as to when the sales process will be complete.
15## The Law on Lifting a CCAA Stay
The stay of proceedings is one of the main tools available to achieve the purpose of the CCAA. The stay provides the Timminco Entities with a degree of time in which to attempt to arrange an acceptable restructuring plan or sale of assets in order to maximize recovery for stakeholders. The court’s jurisdiction in granting a stay extends to both preserving the status quo and facilitating a restructuring. See Re Stelco Inc ., (2005) O.J. No. 1171 (C.A.) at para. 36 .
16Further, the party seeking to lift a stay bears a heavy onus as the practical effect of lifting a stay is to create a scenario where one stakeholder is placed in a better position than other stakeholders, rather than treating stakeholders equally in accordance with their priorities. See Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re) , 2011 ONSC 2215 , [2011] O.J. No. 1590 (S.C.J.) at para. 27 .
17Courts will consider a number of factors in assessing whether it is appropriate to lift a stay, but those factors can generally be grouped under three headings: (a) the relative prejudice to parties; (b) the balance of convenience; and (c) where relevant, the merits ( i.e. if the matter has little chance of success, there may not be sound reasons for lifting the stay). See Canwest Global Communications (Re), supra , at para. 27.
18Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that the relative prejudice to the parties and the balance of convenience clearly favours keeping the stay in place, rather than to allow the Plaintiff to proceed with the SCC leave application. As noted above, leave has been granted to allow the Plaintiff to proceed with the SCC leave application. Counsel to the Timminco Entities further submits that, while the merits are vigorously disputed by the Defendants in the context of a Class Action, the Timminco Entities will not ask this court to make any determinations based on the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim.
19## Analysis
I can well recognize why Mr. Penneyfeather wishes to proceed. The objective of the Plaintiff in the Class Action is to access insurance proceeds that are not available to other creditors. However, the reality of the situation is that the operating side of Timminco is but a shadow of its former self. I accept the argument put forth by counsel to the Applicant that, if the Executive Team is required to spend significant amounts of time dealing with the Class Action in the coming months, it will detract from the ability of the Executive Team to focus on the sales process in the CCAA proceeding to the potential detriment of the Timminco Entities’ other stakeholders. These are two competing interests. It seems to me, however, that the primary focus has to be on the sales process at this time. It is important that the Executive Team devote its energy to ensuring that the sales process is conducted in accordance with the timelines previously approved. A delay in the sales process may very well have a negative impact on the creditors of Timminco. Conversely, the time sensitivity of the Class Action has been, to a large extent, alleviated by the lifting of the stay so as to permit the leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada.
20It is also significant to recognize the submission of counsel on behalf of Mr. Walsh. Counsel to Mr. Walsh takes the position that Mr. Penneyfeather has nothing more than an “equity claim” as defined in the CCAA and, as such, his claim (both against the company and its directors who, in turn, would have an equity claim based on indemnity rights) would be subordinated to any creditor claims. Counsel further submits that of all the potential claims to require adjudication, presumably, equity claims would be the least pressing to be adjudicated and do not become relevant until all secured and unsecured claims have been paid in full.
21In my view, it is not necessary for me to comment on this submission, other than to observe that to the extent that the claim of Mr. Penneyfeather is intended to access certain insurance proceeds, it seems to me that the prosecution of such claim can be put on hold, for a period of time, so as to permit the Executive Team to concentrate on the sales process.
22Having considered the relative prejudice to the parties and the balance of convenience, I have concluded that it is premature to lift the stay at this time, with respect to the Timminco Entities, other than with respect to the leave application to the Supreme Court of Canada. It also follows, in my view, that the stay should be left in place with respect to the claim as against the directors and officers. Certain members of this group are involved in the Executive Team and, for the reasons stated above, I am satisfied that it is not appropriate to lift the stay as against them.
23With respect to the claim against Photon, as pointed out by their counsel, it makes no sense to lift the stay only as against Photon and leave it in place with respect to the Timminco Entities. As counsel submits, the Timminco Entities have an interest in both the legal issues and the factual issues that may be advanced if Mr. Penneyfeather proceeds as against Photon, as any such issues as are determined in Timminco’s absence may cause unfairness to Timminco, particularly, if Mr. Penneyfeather later seeks to rely on those findings as against Timminco. I am in agreement with counsel’s submission that to make such an order would be prejudicial to Timminco’s business and property. In addition, I accept the submission that it would also be unfair to Photon to require it to answer Mr. Penneyfeather’s allegations in the absence of Timminco as counsel has indicated that Photon will necessarily rely on documents and information produced by Timminco as part of its own defence.
24I am also in agreement with the submission that it would be wasteful of judicial resources to permit the class proceedings to proceed as against Photon but not Timminco as, in addition to the duplicative use of court time, there would be the possibility of inconsistent findings on similar or identical factual issues and legal issues. For these reasons, I have concluded that it is not appropriate to lift the stay as against Photon.
25## Conclusion
In the result, the motion dealing with issues not covered by the April 10, 2012 endorsement is dismissed without prejudice to the rights of the Plaintiff to renew his request no sooner than 75 days after today’s date.
MORAWETZ J.
Date: April 27, 2012