Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCC

The appellant, who had suffered years of severe abuse from her common law husband, shot and killed him.

At trial, she relied primarily on self-defence and led expert evidence that she suffered from battered woman syndrome.

She was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the expert evidence related to the law of self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that while the jury charge was not perfect, it adequately conveyed the principles from R. v. Lavallee and left the jury with a sufficient understanding of how the battered woman syndrome evidence applied to the elements of self-defence.

The appellant appealed her conviction for welfare fraud, which arose from the non-reporting of a change in her marital status.

At trial, the defence presented evidence regarding a traditional African marriage, which was rejected.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding no error in the reasons and conclusion of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, which had allowed the Crown's appeal and overturned her acquittal for being an accessory after the fact.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that it is not necessary to convict a principal in order to convict an accessory.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the jury verdict was unreasonable based on the evidence of an accomplice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave a clear and correct warning to the jury regarding the accomplice's evidence, which was also supported by cogent corroborating evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that reversed a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a majority oral judgment, allowed the appeal and restored the stay.

The majority found that the trial judge carefully considered all relevant factors from Askov and Morin and made no error in exercising his discretion.

The dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in dealing with the period of delay and prejudice.

The appellants, two managerial staff members at a coal mine where an explosion killed 26 miners, were charged with manslaughter.

During the trial, the trial judge made a private phone call to a senior member of the Attorney General's staff, requesting the removal of the lead Crown counsel and threatening to take steps to secure that end.

The trial judge subsequently denied the Crown's motion for recusal and later ordered a stay of proceedings due to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay and ordered a new trial, finding a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias, which retroactively rendered his order staying the proceedings void.

A new trial was ordered, with costs awarded to the appellants due to the systemic problems and the trial judge's conduct.

The appellants appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside their acquittals for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding a key Crown witness on the basis of taint, because the issue went to weight rather than admissibility.

The Court further held that the subsequently released decision in Carosella did not apply, as there was no finding or evidence of deliberate police failure to create records to avoid production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with second degree murder after stabbing his wife to death.

At trial, he pleaded manslaughter, arguing he acted in a state of mental unconsciousness due to the combined effect of alcohol and medication.

The jury convicted him of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on the ground that he was denied the right to make full answer and defence due to ineffective representation of counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the Alberta Court of Appeal that the trial judge properly applied the elements of the offence as set out in R. v. Hundal and did not impose an incorrect standard of care.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder after shooting his stepfather and his stepfather's companion.

At trial, the appellant admitted the actus reus but raised a mental disorder defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code and argued he lacked the requisite intent.

The trial judge extensively reviewed the mental disorder evidence when discussing the s. 16 defence but only briefly referred back to it when instructing the jury on planning and deliberation.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that hiding the murder weapon could indicate consciousness of guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge as a whole sufficiently related the mental disorder evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

While the trial judge erred in failing to limit the consciousness of guilt instruction to the s. 16 issue, the Court applied the curative proviso as the error was minor and would not have affected the verdict.

The appellant appealed his conviction for living on the avails of prostitution, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of 'evidence to the contrary' to rebut the statutory presumption under s. 212(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge adequately instructed the jury to consider all evidence regarding the living and financial arrangements, and was not required to isolate specific items of evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that affirmed the dismissal of his application for certiorari.

The appellant sought to quash his committal to stand trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify the committal.

The accused was convicted of narcotics offences based on the viva voce evidence of a co-accused who had been arrested during an illegal search of a marijuana-growing operation.

The co-accused had pleaded guilty and volunteered to testify.

The Court of Appeal excluded the testimony under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's decision to testify was too remote.

The Court distinguished between the discovery of inanimate objects and live witness testimony, noting that the witness's voluntary decision to cooperate severed the temporal and causal links to the Charter breach.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and threatening, arguing that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly charged the jury with respect to the special need for caution in considering identification evidence and sufficiently alerted the jury to the weaknesses in the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on numerous weapons charges, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the conduct of a search was not unreasonable under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The Crown appealed a decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal that ordered a new trial based on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown counsel's address to the jury exceeded the limits laid down in Boucher v. The Queen, and the trial judge inadequately directed the jury regarding these improprieties.

The Court noted no error in the charge regarding corroborative or alibi evidence, but upheld the order for a new trial.

The appellants were held in custody for 22 months pending their first trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding that a 4.5-month delay caused by the Crown's unjustified request for an adjournment, combined with late disclosure, rendered the total delay unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the stay of proceedings, holding that the Crown's failure to adequately investigate the grounds for the adjournment and respond to defence counsel's inquiries justified the trial judge's conclusion that the delay was unreasonable.

The appellant railway challenged an environmental prosecution arising from controlled burns that released dense smoke onto neighbouring properties, roads, and residences.

The appeal focused on whether Ontario's broad pollution prohibition in s. 13(1)(a) of the Environmental Protection Act was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that, in the environmental regulatory context, broad language may be constitutionally valid where the provision provides sufficient guidance for legal debate and does not capture merely trivial or imaginary impairments.

The Court rejected the vagueness and overbreadth claims, affirmed the constitutional applicability of the provision to the federal undertaking, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was charged with attempted murder as a party after being forced at gunpoint by a drug dealer to lure his friend to the lobby of an apartment building, where the friend was shot.

The appellant was acquitted of attempted murder but convicted of aggravated assault.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that duress could negate the mens rea for party liability under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court clarified that duress operates as an excuse-based defence rather than negating mens rea, and that the common law defence of duress is unavailable if the accused had a safe avenue of escape, determined on an objective standard that considers the accused's personal circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.