Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - SCC

Two sets of appellants — a global air transport association and an Iraqi state entity — challenged a Quebec Superior Court writ of seizure before judgment by garnishment obtained by a Dutch company seeking to enforce international arbitration awards.

The majority dismissed the appeals for the reasons of the Quebec Court of Appeal, upholding the Superior Court's jurisdiction on the basis that the association's obligation to the Iraqi civil aviation authority constituted a debt situated in Quebec at the association's domicile.

In dissent, Côté J. would have allowed the appeals, finding that under Quebec civil law principles of mandate the property — air navigation charges held in a Swiss bank account — remained in the mandator's patrimony and was located in Switzerland, outside the jurisdiction of the Quebec Superior Court.

The appellant, a subway user, was arrested and searched by a police officer after she refused to hold an escalator handrail and declined to identify herself.

The officer, designated as a subway inspector by the transit authority, had been trained that failure to hold the handrail was an offence under a municipal by-law.

The Supreme Court held that the officer committed a civil fault under art. 1457 C.C.Q. because a reasonable police officer would have recognized that the pictogram was merely a safety advisory, not an obligation under the by-law.

The transit authority was found directly liable for providing legally incorrect training and also liable as mandator for the officer's fault.

The victim bore no share of the liability, as she was entitled to refuse to comply with an unlawful order.

Damages of $20,000 were awarded, apportioned equally between the transit authority and the officer.

The appellants, a Canadian shipping conglomerate, purchased reconditioned marine engine parts from the respondent supplier, whose contract contained a six-month warranty and a clause limiting liability to €50,000.

Well after the warranty expired, the ship's main engine suffered a major failure caused by a latent defect in the supplied crankshaft, and the appellants commenced proceedings for $5,661,830.33 in damages and lost profit.

The trial judge held that the Civil Code of Québec governed the dispute and that the limitation clause was unenforceable, but the Court of Appeal majority reversed, finding Canadian maritime law applicable and the clause valid.

A unanimous Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's conclusions, although the six-judge majority and the three-judge concurrence differed as to the constitutional analysis: the majority applied a modified pith and substance test followed by the integral connection test and concluded that while the sale of marine engine parts falls within both federal legislative authority and provincial property and civil rights power (a double aspect scenario), neither interjurisdictional immunity nor federal paramountcy displaces art. 1733 C.C.Q., which prevails over non-statutory Canadian maritime law; the concurrence would have resolved the matter solely through pith and substance, characterizing the dispute as one of sale of goods governed by s. 92(13).

The municipality appealed a judgment ordering restitution of $82,898.63 for event production services provided by a public relations firm through its subcontractor, where no valid municipal contract existed because the mandate was never authorized by council resolution or by an officer with delegated powers.

The Supreme Court held that the rules on restitution of prestations under the Civil Code of Québec apply in the municipal context and are not excluded by the public order provisions of the Cities and Towns Act.

Although no contract existed to be annulled, the conditions for receipt of a payment not due under art. 1491 C.C.Q. were satisfied, as the firm provided services in error believing it had a valid mandate.

The municipality's appeal was dismissed (6-3), with the dissent finding the firm knew at the time of payment that no contract existed and therefore did not pay in error.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that denied leave to appeal a Superior Court authorization of a class action against automobile manufacturers for punitive damages arising from non-compliance with environmental standards.

The Superior Court had authorized the class action with respect to punitive damages only, declining to authorize the compensatory damages claim.

A majority of the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeal judge did not err in exercising her discretion to deny leave.

The minority would have granted leave on the basis that a question of law warranting appellate review had been raised, and would have remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal for a decision on the merits.

The appellant, acting as tutor to an absentee and liquidator of his succession, sought to retain pension payments received on behalf of the absentee during the period he was presumed alive under art. 85 of the Civil Code of Québec.

The absentee's remains were discovered nearly six years after his disappearance, and his true date of death was established as the day after he disappeared.

The majority held that the rebuttal of the presumption of life operates retroactively, extinguishing the absentee's entitlement to pension payments from his true date of death, and that the respondent's claim for receipt of a payment not due under art. 1491 C.C.Q. succeeded when assessed retrospectively.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that the rebuttal of the presumption of life operates only prospectively and that the traditional requirements of art. 1491 C.C.Q. were not satisfied.

The appellant wife and the respondent husband filed parallel divorce proceedings — the husband first in Belgium, the wife three days later in Quebec.

The husband applied to stay the Quebec proceedings on the basis of international lis pendens under art. 3137 C.C.Q., seeking to enforce his revocation of over $33 million in gifts made during marriage under art. 1096 of the Belgian Civil Code.

The Supreme Court held that the burden of proving susceptibility of recognition of the foreign judgment rests on the party seeking the stay, though that burden is not onerous; a prognosis or possibility of recognition suffices.

The majority further held that even where the conditions of art. 3137 C.C.Q. are met, the Quebec court retains discretion to decline to stay its ruling, and that discretion was not unreasonably exercised by the Superior Court.

The Court of Appeal's intervention in the trial judge's exercise of discretion was unwarranted; the criterion of possible recognition of the Quebec judgment in the foreign country is not determinative where the Quebec judgment would be effective in Quebec.

The appellant was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police officers while walking to a counter-protest flag rally, having committed no offence and presenting no threat of violence.

The police relied on a purported common law power to arrest someone acting lawfully in order to prevent an apprehended breach of the peace by others.

Applying the ancillary powers doctrine, the Court held that no such common law power exists: the power is not reasonably necessary because statutory arrest powers already address situations where individuals resist or obstruct officers taking less intrusive measures, and effectiveness of a police action alone cannot justify an arrest if less intrusive means were available.

The Court restored the trial judge's award of damages for battery, wrongful arrest and false imprisonment, and found no new trial was warranted on the issue of excessive force because the arrest itself was unlawful.

A journalist was subpoenaed to testify in support of an accused's motion for a stay of proceedings on the ground of abuse of process, seeking to identify government sources responsible for leaking confidential information.

The Court considered the new federal statutory scheme for the protection of journalistic sources in s. 39.1 of the Canada Evidence Act, enacted by the Journalistic Sources Protection Act, S.C. 2017, c. 22.

The majority held that the new scheme shifts the burden of proof to the party seeking disclosure, establishes reasonable necessity as a threshold requirement, and requires a balancing of the public interest in the administration of justice against the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of journalistic sources.

The appeal against the Quebec Court of Appeal's finding that it lacked jurisdiction was dismissed.

The appeal against the Superior Court's authorization of disclosure was allowed in part due to the Crown's change of position, with the case remanded to the court of original jurisdiction for reconsideration once new evidence from a government investigation is disclosed.

The dissent would have set aside the disclosure authorization outright, finding fundamental legal errors in the Superior Court's application of the new statutory scheme.

Two sets of appellants (manufacturers of optical disc drives) appealed the certification of a price-fixing class proceeding in British Columbia.

The majority held that the discoverability rule applies to extend the two-year limitation period in s. 36(4)(a)(i) of the Competition Act, that fraudulent concealment can toll a limitation period without requiring a special relationship between the parties, that umbrella purchasers (persons who bought from non-defendant manufacturers) have a cause of action under s. 36(1)(a), that s. 36(1) does not bar concurrent common law and equitable claims, and that a plaintiff's expert methodology need only establish that overcharges reached the indirect-purchaser level to certify loss as a common issue.

Côté J. dissented in part, finding that the discoverability rule does not apply to s. 36(4)(a)(i) and that umbrella purchasers have no cause of action under s. 36(1).

Both appeals were dismissed.

Two appellants — a religious congregation and a religious institution managed by its members — sought to overturn authorization of a class action brought by victims of alleged sexual assaults committed by members of the congregation decades ago.

The majority held that the Superior Court had made numerous errors of fact and law in denying authorization under the four conditions of art. 575 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and that the Court of Appeal was entitled to substitute its own assessment on all conditions.

The majority further held that the three-year period under art. 2926.1 para. 2 C.C.Q., which applies upon the death of the victim or the author of the act, does not create a term for forfeiture but remains a prescriptive period, with the starting point continuing to be when the victim becomes aware of the connection between the assault and the injury.

The minority would have allowed the appeal against the religious institution for lack of sufficient factual allegations, while dismissing the appeal as to the congregation.

The appellant, an investor, sought damages from specific-project corporations on the basis of knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty arising from a complex multi-million dollar real estate fraud perpetrated by a married couple.

The couple convinced investors to invest in specific-project corporations to acquire and hold commercial real estate, but instead diverted the funds for personal use.

The application judge dismissed the knowing assistance claim, finding the fraudulent wife's knowledge could not be imputed to the specific-project corporations.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the claim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge below that the knowing assistance claim must fail.

The Court clarified that while Livent permits courts to decline to apply corporate attribution where the public interest so requires, the minimal criteria from Canadian Dredge must always first be satisfied.

The appellant brought a claim under the Independent Assessment Process of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, alleging compensable sexual abuse under category SL1.4 when a nun touched his genitals over his clothing while he was a student at a residential school.

The Hearing Adjudicator denied the claim by erroneously importing a requirement of sexual intent not found in SL1.4.

All internal review levels upheld the denial, and the supervising judge at the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench ordered reconsideration.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal set aside that order, holding the supervising judge had exceeded his jurisdiction.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and reinstated the reconsideration adjudicator's compensation award, finding that supervising courts have an ongoing duty to intervene where an adjudicator makes an unauthorized modification of the IAP, and that a gap in the IRSSA justified judicial intervention to ensure the appellant received the compensation bargained for.

A person with disabilities and long-term tenant of a non-profit housing corporation refused to disclose the value of a Henson trust established for her care and maintenance when applying for annual rent subsidy assistance.

The housing corporation denied the application on the ground that the trust constituted an 'asset' under its Asset Ceiling Policy, making the application incomplete.

The majority of the Court held that a Henson trust — where the beneficiary cannot compel distributions and cannot unilaterally collapse the trust — does not constitute an 'asset' within the ordinary meaning of that term in the rental assistance application, as it is not property the beneficiary can use to discharge debts or liabilities.

The Court further held that the tenancy agreement imposed a contractual obligation on the housing corporation to consider a complete assistance application, which obligation was breached.

The appeal was allowed, declaratory relief was granted, and the issue of monetary remedy was remitted to the court of original jurisdiction.

The appellants, a mother and infant who suffered brain damage during a vaginal birth after caesarean section (VBAC), appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside a trial judgment due to the trial judge's extensive copying of the plaintiffs' submissions.

The Supreme Court held that incorporating the material of others in reasons for judgment does not, without more, require the decision to be set aside; the presumption of judicial integrity is rebutted only where copying would lead a reasonable person to conclude the judge did not independently consider the issues.

On the merits, the Court affirmed liability against the prenatal obstetrician for failure to obtain informed consent to VBAC, but set aside findings of liability against the hospital, nurse, and other physicians for lack of causation.

The appellants, individual members of the Fort Nelson First Nation, blocked a logging company's access to timber sites after the Crown granted logging licences.

Sued in tort, they defended on the basis that the licences were issued in breach of the duty to consult and violated their treaty rights under Treaty No. 8.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty to consult is owed to the Aboriginal group collectively, and absent authorization from the First Nation, individual members cannot assert a breach of that duty on their own.

The Court declined to make a definitive pronouncement on whether individual members could assert treaty rights in these circumstances, but ultimately dismissed the appeal on the basis that raising the defences constituted an abuse of process, as the appellants had failed to challenge the licences when issued and instead resorted to self-help by blockading access.

The appellant filed a police misconduct complaint under the Police Services Act and commenced a parallel civil action for damages arising from the same arrest.

After the disciplinary hearing officer found the officers not guilty, the respondents successfully moved to strike the civil claims on the basis of issue estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a 4-3 decision, allowed the appeal, holding that while no public policy rule should categorically exclude police disciplinary hearings from issue estoppel, the Court of Appeal erred in its discretionary analysis by failing to consider the significant differences in purpose, scope, and stakes between the two proceedings, the parties' reasonable expectations, and the unfairness of permitting the Chief of Police's designate's decision to exonerate the Chief from civil liability.

The appellant, an infant who suffered severe brain damage during a mid-level forceps delivery, appealed from the Court of Appeal's reversal of the trial judge's finding of liability against the respondent obstetrician.

The trial judge found the respondent breached the standard of care by failing to have surgical back-up immediately available before attempting the forceps procedure and by failing to obtain the mother's informed consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the trial judgment, holding the trial judge committed no palpable and overriding error in finding causation on the "but for" test.

The matter was remitted to the Court of Appeal on the damages issue.

The appellants, representing the Metis people of Manitoba, sought declarations that Canada breached fiduciary obligations and failed to act in accordance with the honour of the Crown in implementing land grant provisions under ss. 31 and 32 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.

The majority held that while no fiduciary duty arose, s. 31 constituted a solemn constitutional obligation to the Metis as an Aboriginal people, engaging the honour of the Crown.

The Crown failed to act with diligence in implementing the land grants, exhibiting a persistent pattern of errors and inaction over more than a decade that substantially frustrated the purpose of giving Metis children a head start over incoming settlers.

The claim was not barred by limitations or laches.

The appellant operated a truck stop on Highway 17 that was effectively put out of business when the province constructed a new section of Highway 417, severely restricting access to the property.

The Ontario Municipal Board awarded compensation for injurious affection under the Expropriations Act.

The Court of Appeal set aside the award, finding the Board failed to adequately balance competing rights and to recognize the elevated importance of public utility.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that reasonableness of interference must focus on whether the individual claimant has shouldered a disproportionate share of the burden of construction, not on whether the public benefit outweighs private harm.

The Board's decision was restored.