The creditors brought a motion to lift the automatic stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue a civil lawsuit against the debtor.

The underlying lawsuit involves claims of misrepresentation and breach of trust arising from home renovations.

The creditors also requested to add the proposal trustee as a defendant in the lawsuit.

The Court granted the motion to lift the stay, finding that the creditors would suffer material prejudice otherwise, but denied the request to add the trustee as a defendant.

The appellant investors, who participated in a Ponzi scheme operated by a one-person corporation, sought to have the trustee in bankruptcy's unjust enrichment claims statute-barred under Ontario's Limitations Act, 2002 by attributing the directing mind's knowledge of illegal interest and commission payments to the corporation.

The majority held that the corporate attribution doctrine applies to one-person corporations on the same purposive, contextual, and pragmatic basis as to other corporations, and that courts retain discretion to decline attribution when it would undermine the purposes of the laws engaged — here, the limitations and bankruptcy regimes.

In concurrence, a separate judge held that resort to the common law corporate attribution doctrine was unnecessary because the codified agency rules in s. 12 of the Limitations Act, 2002 provided a complete answer, and that the claims were not discoverable until the trustee was authorized by the court to bring them.

All judges agreed that the investors were disentitled from equitable set-off for lack of clean hands, that the referral agreements were illegal contracts at common law, and that one appellant was not dealing at arm's length with the corporation.

The appellants, including the directing mind of two family-owned construction companies, participated in a false invoicing scheme that drained tens of millions of dollars from the debtor companies prior to insolvency.

The trustee in bankruptcy and monitor applied under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover the false invoice payments as transfers at undervalue on the basis that the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors.

The Supreme Court held that insolvency is not a prerequisite to establishing fraudulent intent under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B), and that the directing mind's fraudulent intent was properly attributed to the debtor corporations.

The Court confirmed that the corporate attribution doctrine must be applied purposively, contextually, and pragmatically, and that the fraud and no benefit exceptions to corporate attribution do not apply in the context of s. 96 of the BIA because applying them would undermine the creditor protection purpose of that provision.

Appeal dismissed.

The Kahu Defendants moved to dismiss Park Lawn Corporation's action for knowing assistance as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), arguing it was an improper attempt to re-litigate issues from a previously settled action against a former CEO.

The court denied the motion, finding that Park Lawn was not aware of the Kahu Defendants' alleged misconduct at the time of the previous settlement, the facts and causes of action were not identical, and the case law allows for several liability in knowing assistance claims, which was consistent with the terms of the prior release.

The court also clarified that a consent dismissal does not automatically lead to an abuse of process finding unless the issues could have been raised in the prior action.

The Plaintiffs sought leave to amend their claim to add new causes of action and parties, including knowing assistance, knowing receipt, misappropriation, conversion, unjust enrichment, and piercing the corporate veil, and to particularize allegations against a non-party and a discontinued defendant.

The GBRSAS Defendants opposed, arguing new causes of action were statute-barred and prejudice would result.

The court granted leave for most proposed amendments, finding they were alternative relief or different legal conclusions based on existing facts, or arose from the core factual matrix.

However, leave was denied for breach of contract claims against individual defendants, as these were new causes of action based on unpleaded facts and were statute-barred.

Leave was also denied to withdraw admissions regarding misrepresentations made by a settling defendant due to lack of reasonable explanation.

The plaintiffs (Securitas) brought a motion seeking a Mareva injunction, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and a Norwich Order against the defendants, alleging fraud related to sham alarm system accounts.

The court dismissed the Mareva injunction against all defendants and the CPL against the Eagle Defendants, finding that Securitas had not established a strong prima facie case of fraud against the Eagle Defendants, nor sufficient evidence of assets or dissipation risk for the other defendants (Rahman and Philip).

However, the court granted a Norwich Order against Rahman and Philip for financial disclosure and, by consent, ordered the Eagle Defendants to provide similar financial information.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion that found the appellants liable for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in a fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by drawing unwarranted inferences of liability based largely on the mere rejection of the appellants' evidence, rather than requiring positive proof.

The motion judge also made speculative and stereotypical findings regarding the appellants' credibility and financial arrangements.

The Court held that the rejection of a witness's evidence does not amount to positive proof of the opposite proposition.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the case remitted to the Superior Court for trial.

A.M. was charged with sexual assault, mischief, assault, and threatening.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction.

The trial centered on the credibility of the complainant (K.J.) and the accused (A.M.).

The court found A.M.'s testimony to be credible and logical, corroborated in part by another witness (C.F.).

K.J.'s testimony, however, was found to have serious difficulties, including repeated claims of inability to recall details, significant inconsistencies between her testimony and prior statements, and embellishments.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and A.M. was found not guilty of all charges.

This appeal concerned a massive fraud perpetrated against a Paraguayan pension fund (Cajubi) by the appellants.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding over $20 million in damages and punitive damages.

On appeal, the appellants raised numerous grounds, including the corporate identification doctrine, limitation periods, unpleaded conspiracy, lack of reliance, and apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, affirming the trial judge's findings, particularly regarding the inapplicability of corporate attribution where it would undermine the integrity of the legal system and allow fraudsters to benefit.