Administrative Law - SCC

Two federal inmates serving indeterminate sentences applied for reclassification from medium- to minimum-security facilities.

Despite recommendations from their case management teams and wardens, administrative decision-makers denied the reclassifications.

The appellants sought habeas corpus ad subjiciendum with certiorari in aid, challenging the denials as unlawful deprivations of their residual liberty.

The majority held that a decision to deny a lower security reclassification constitutes a deprivation of liberty reviewable by way of habeas corpus, as it has the qualitative effect of restricting liberty without requiring proof of a change in status quo or a pre-existing legal entitlement to the less restrictive state.

The dissent maintained that habeas corpus is only available where an inmate has acquired a legal entitlement to the lower security classification, consistent with the framework in Dumas.

As both appellants had been reclassified and transferred by the time the appeal was heard, the Court allowed the appeal on the moot legal question of public importance.

Appeal concerning the scope of corrective powers conferred on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act, which empowers the tribunal to order the correction of a situation where a child's rights have been encroached upon during social intervention.

The Court held that the tribunal's mandate is to render individualized and particularized justice based solely on the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, and that preventive corrective measures are valid only if: the child is at risk of the encroachment recurring; the measure can effectively help prevent recurrence; and the measure is related to protecting the interests and rights of that specific child.

The Court further confirmed that the tribunal also holds a non-binding power of recommendation anchored in the text, scheme, and object of the YPA.

Since the young person had reached the age of majority and was no longer subject to social intervention, no corrective order was made.

Air carriers challenged federal regulations providing standardized compensation to passengers for flight delays, cancellations, denial of boarding, and lost or damaged baggage, arguing the regulations conflicted with the exclusivity principle in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention as implemented by the Carriage by Air Act and were therefore ultra vires the Canadian Transportation Agency's regulation-making authority under the Canada Transportation Act.

The Supreme Court held that the exclusivity principle applies only to 'actions for damages' that share the characteristics of judicial proceedings seeking individualized compensation tied to injury caused by another.

Because the impugned regulations create a consumer protection scheme providing standardized statutory entitlements irrespective of harm actually suffered, they do not constitute 'actions for damages' and do not fall within Article 29's scope.

The Court also clarified that the Mohan framework governs admissibility of expert evidence on questions of international law.

Appeal dismissed.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order for a new Tax Court hearing before a different judge after multiple violations of official language rights of witnesses and counsel, and the related interpretation right of the unilingual party.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld decisions finding that complaints challenging Indian Act registration provisions were bare attacks on legislation, not discrimination in the provision of services under s. 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Tribunal’s dismissal was upheld because legislation itself is not a service under that provision.

A Métis federal inmate challenged correctional authorities’ use of psychological and actuarial risk tools for Indigenous offenders, alleging statutory and Charter breaches.

The Court held that authorities breached their duty under s. 24(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by continuing to rely on the tools without taking reasonable steps to confirm validity for Indigenous persons.

The Court declined to find violations of ss. 7 or 15 of the Charter on the evidentiary record.

Declaratory relief was granted in light of the prolonged and ineffective grievance history, but no broader injunctive remedy was ordered.

A lawyer appealed a professional misconduct finding based on in-court incivility during a securities prosecution.

The majority held that reasonableness review applied and accepted the disciplinary framework, but found its application unreasonable on the record.

The Court concluded the allegations were made in good faith with sufficient factual foundation in context.

The appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed an originating application for judicial review of a religious congregation’s disfellowship decision.

It held that judicial review is generally limited to public decision makers, that there is no free-standing procedural fairness claim without an underlying legal right, and that ecclesiastical issues in this dispute were non-justiciable.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging a workplace safety regulation and an administrative penalty imposed after a fatal forestry incident.

The majority held the regulation was within delegated authority and upheld the tribunal’s interpretation allowing an employer-owner to be penalized under the governing scheme.

Dissenting judges would have found the regulation invalid or the penalty interpretation patently unreasonable.

The Court considered whether Quebec’s workplace injury regime must be interpreted and applied with the employer’s duty to reasonably accommodate disabled workers under the provincial charter.

It held that workers disabled by workplace injury are entitled to accommodation protections when rights to return to work and suitable employment are assessed.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter was remitted to the Administrative Labour Tribunal for reconsideration with accommodation obligations in view.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Barreau du Québec’s appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The majority held the Administrative Tribunal of Québec reasonably interpreted section 102 of the Act respecting administrative justice to permit a non-advocate chosen by the Minister to prepare and file written proceedings before the social affairs division.

It further held this interpretation was consistent with the legislative scheme, including section 129(b) of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec.

The Court dismissed an appeal challenging provincial approval of a ski resort project in Qat’muk on freedom of religion and section 35 consultation grounds.

The majority held section 2(a) protects freedom to hold and manifest beliefs, not protection of the spiritual object itself, and found no Charter infringement.

It further held the Minister reasonably concluded deep consultation and accommodation had occurred over many years, and that section 35 guarantees a process rather than a veto over development outcomes.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed a ministerial referral for an admissibility hearing under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

It held that a conditional sentence is not a 'term of imprisonment' for the serious criminality threshold based on an imposed sentence.

It also held that the 'maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years' must be assessed based on the law at the time the offence was committed, not at the time of the admissibility determination.

The matter was remitted to a different delegate for redetermination on a correct legal interpretation.

This appeal concerned whether records generated under the Independent Assessment Process in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement were subject to federal access, privacy, and archiving legislation, and whether they could be ordered destroyed.

The Court held the supervising judge had authority under the settlement framework to direct disposition of the records and found no palpable and overriding error in concluding the agreement contemplated confidentiality, limited retention, claimant choice, and eventual destruction.

The Court also upheld the modified order requiring a 15-year retention period with a notice program so claimants could elect archival preservation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the Independent Counsel.

This appeal addressed judicial review of surrender orders in extradition proceedings and the reasonableness standard under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held it was reasonable for the Minister to rely on diplomatic assurances and consular access commitments in concluding there was no substantial risk of torture or mistreatment contrary to s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized a contextual assessment of assurance reliability and rejected a requirement to eliminate all possible risk.

It further held the surrender decisions were not otherwise unjust or oppressive in light of the full circumstances, including treaty obligations and offence gravity.

The appeal was allowed and the surrender orders restored.

This appeal considered whether the Crown’s duty to consult Indigenous peoples can be fulfilled through the National Energy Board process for a pipeline modification.

The Court held that the Board’s approval decision was Crown conduct that engaged the duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process where statutory powers and process are sufficient.

On the facts, the Court found meaningful participation, assessment of potential impacts, and accommodation conditions imposed on the proponent.

The consultation obligation was met and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the National Energy Board authorization for offshore seismic testing in Baffin Bay and Davis Strait.

It held that the Board’s approval process triggered the Crown’s duty to consult, and that the Crown may rely on a regulatory process to fulfill consultation obligations where that process is adequate.

On these facts, consultation was inadequate given the significance of Inuit treaty harvesting rights, the potential impacts of testing, limited participation opportunities, and insufficient accommodation.

The Court considered the scope of appellate review of a commercial arbitration award under British Columbia's Arbitration Act in a forestry compensation dispute.

A majority held that courts had jurisdiction only over the legal component of statutory interpretation, not contractual interpretation or statutory application issues characterized as mixed questions, and that reasonableness was the applicable standard.

Applying that framework, the majority found the arbitrator's chosen valuation approach reasonable and restored key parts of the arbitral award.

The appeal was allowed in part with costs throughout.

The appellant challenged Law Society rules making continuing professional development mandatory and authorizing administrative suspension for non-compliance without an express hearing or appeal process.

The majority held law society rules are reviewed for reasonableness and are valid if consistent with the enabling statute’s purpose, wording, and scheme.

It concluded the Law Society’s broad public-interest mandate and rule-making powers authorized mandatory education standards enforced by temporary suspension.

The majority further held the absence of codified hearing and appeal rights in the rules did not render them unreasonable in this declaratory challenge.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent finding automatic suspension manifestly unjust.

In an appeal from Alberta proceedings, the appellant sought Charter damages under s. 24(1) after alleging a regulatory board breached freedom of expression by restricting communications.

The majority held the statutory immunity clause barred the damages claim and concluded the claim should be struck at the pleadings stage.

Concurring reasons emphasized the absence of proper constitutional notice and evidentiary record to decide constitutional invalidity.

Dissenting reasons would have permitted the claim to proceed, finding it not plain and obvious that damages were unavailable or that the immunity clause necessarily applied.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.