SCC 2025

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The appellant sought to strike paragraphs from the respondents' judicial review application challenging the issuance of uranium exploration permits, arguing the paragraphs constituted an abuse of process in light of two prior actions.

The Court confirmed that the abuse of process doctrine, while applicable to Indigenous litigants, must be assessed with regard to the unique context of Aboriginal rights litigation.

The status of a stayed prior action is not dispositive of whether the Crown has knowledge of an asserted Aboriginal claim sufficient to trigger the duty to consult.

Overlap between a general duty-to-consult action and a specific judicial review application does not, without more, threaten the integrity of the adjudicative process.

Case management, rather than striking pleadings, is the appropriate remedy where there is a risk of inconsistent outcomes from parallel proceedings.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder and assault with a weapon following charges of first degree murder and assault with a weapon.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial judge failed to mention the mens rea required for manslaughter in jury instructions and in answering the jury's questions about that offence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's instructions and answer were sufficient, as the accused had conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by inadequately answering the jury's questions about manslaughter, creating a reasonable possibility that jurors misunderstood the mens rea required for second degree murder.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting.

The appellant was involved in a car chase with two men and called his adult son to assist, instructing him to bring a firearm.

The confrontation culminated in the appellant's son fatally shooting both men; the son was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter.

The appellant was convicted by jury of manslaughter as a party to his son's offences, on the basis that he formed a common unlawful purpose with his son to possess a weapon for a dangerous purpose and to commit assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in charging the jury by providing insufficient direction on the elements of the common unlawful purpose offences, misdirecting the jury on party liability, and improperly instructing on the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal for Alberta held that the trial judge's jury instructions contained no prejudicial error and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the majority reasons of the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a sexual assault case, challenging trial rulings on text message evidence and admission of prior sexual history evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed substantially with the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal majority and dismissed the appeal.

Two judges would have allowed the appeal, concluding the trial judge erred in admitting prior sexual history evidence and that the error materially affected the acquittal.