Richard Ogden

The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that approximately 1.4 miles of coastline (the Disputed Beach) forms part of the Saugeen Indian Reserve No. 29 under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The trial judge found that the Crown breached its fiduciary duty and acted dishonourably when a surveyor improperly excluded the beach from the reserve boundaries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of treaty interpretation principles or her assessment of the historical record.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's decision to deny the bona fide purchaser for value defence to private landowners, prioritizing the First Nation's constitutionally protected treaty rights.

A cross-appeal by Canada regarding the allocation of pre-Confederation liability was allowed and referred to the next phase of the trial.

The Chippewas of Saugeen First Nation brought an action seeking a declaration that a 1.4-mile strip of Sauble Beach (the Disputed Beach) is part of their unsurrendered reserve land under Treaty 72 of 1854.

The court found that the Imperial Crown's surveyor, Charles Rankin, improperly marked the northern terminus of the reserve's eastern boundary further south than the Treaty stipulated, depriving the First Nation of the promised coastline.

The court held that the Imperial Crown and the federal Crown breached their sui generis fiduciary duties and acted inconsistently with the honour of the Crown by failing to properly survey, protect, and preserve the reserve.

The court rejected the defendants' arguments that the First Nation's claim was defeated by Crown patents, the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the Limitations Act, laches, dedication, or proprietary estoppel.

The court declared that the Disputed Beach remains unsurrendered reserve land for the sole use and benefit of the First Nation.

The Crown appealed the Stage One and Stage Two decisions regarding the interpretation of the Robinson-Huron and Robinson-Superior Treaties of 1850.

The trial judge found that the Treaties' augmentation clause imposed a mandatory obligation on the Crown to increase the perpetual annuities if the economic circumstances of the ceded territories warranted it, without a hard cap of $4 per person.

The Court of Appeal unanimously upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the Crown has an obligation under the honour of the Crown to diligently implement the augmentation promise and that its discretion is not unfettered.

The Court unanimously set aside the trial judge's finding of an ad hoc fiduciary duty and her specific remedial directives regarding a 'fair share' of net resource revenues.

The Court also unanimously dismissed the Crown's limitations defence.

The Court split on the standard of review for historical treaties and whether the trial judge made extricable errors of law in her interpretation, but the majority upheld her core interpretation of the augmentation clause.

Ontario brought a motion to quash an application by the Thessalon First Nation regarding the size of its reserve under the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850.

Ontario argued the complex historical and treaty issues required a trial rather than an application.

The court agreed that the matter required a proper evidentiary foundation and ordered the application converted to an action under Rule 38.10(1)(b), with a staged litigation process to follow.

The Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) brought two actions against the Crown and several municipalities.

In the Aboriginal Title Claim, SON sought a novel declaration of Aboriginal title to a large portion of the submerged lands in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay.

The court dismissed this claim, finding that while SON had a spiritual connection to the water and relied on fishing, they did not establish sufficient and exclusive physical occupation of the claimed submerged lands at the time of British sovereignty in 1763.

In the Treaty Claim, SON alleged that the Crown breached Treaty 45½ (1836) by failing to protect the Bruce Peninsula from settler encroachments, and breached duties during the negotiation of Treaty 72 (1854).

The court found that the Crown breached the honour of the Crown by failing to diligently fulfill its promise to protect the Peninsula from squatters, and by inappropriate conduct during the August 1854 treaty negotiations.

However, the court dismissed the claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also declared that Treaty 72 did not extinguish SON's harvesting rights, which continue on unsold lands and on sold lands where the use is not incompatible with harvesting.

Property-specific remedies and defences were deferred to a second phase of the trial.

The plaintiff First Nation brought an action against Canada and Ontario for failing to set aside a reserve for them under Treaty No. 9 in 1906.

The parties agreed that a reserve should have been set aside.

The threshold issue at trial was determining the 'crystallization date'—the point in time at which the band's population should be assessed to calculate the size of the reserve.

The plaintiffs argued the population should be determined as of the date the reserve is actually set aside or the date of the court's declaration.

The Crown argued the population should be determined as of the date the treaty was made.

The court held that the common intention of the parties, based on the text of the treaty and its historical context, was that reserves were to be set aside and sized according to the population at the time the treaty was made.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment concerning alleged nondisclosure in a land sale, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had alleged that the vendor Crown breached duties of good faith and honesty by failing to disclose Indigenous land-related claims affecting the property.

The court reviewed the principles governing costs under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act and rejected the argument that the Crown’s costs should be discounted because government counsel are salaried.

The court held the defendants’ claimed fees and disbursements were reasonable given the complexity of responding to allegations of bad faith and the extensive factual investigation required.

Costs of $383,745.81 on a partial indemnity basis were awarded to the defendants.