R. Ellis

The accused, who pleaded guilty to causing bodily harm while operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, brought a motion for directions regarding the sentencing procedure.

The accused has a prior conviction under former s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code and sought to have the court first determine whether, pursuant to R. v. Bundy, 2025 NSSC 325, that prior conviction constitutes a "first offence" for sentencing purposes under s. 320.2(a)(ii), which would trigger a mandatory minimum 30-day imprisonment and preclude a conditional sentence order.

The Crown opposed, arguing judicial economy favoured proceeding to sentencing first.

The court granted the motion, holding that the Bundy issue is not moot and directly impacts the available sentencing range, and directed that arguments on the Bundy interpretation be heard before sentencing submissions.

The applicant, who was convicted of six offences following a judge-alone trial, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was breached.

The total delay from the laying of the Information to the end of the trial was approximately 48.8 months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to raise the issue in a timely manner.

Furthermore, after deducting defence delay and significant periods of delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which constituted exceptional circumstances, the net delay was 23.7 months, well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving causing bodily harm (later upgraded to causing death) following a motor vehicle collision.

While detained in police cells, she was subjected to video surveillance, including while using the toilet.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of her s. 8 rights, arguing she should have been automatically provided a privacy gown rather than merely offered one.

The court dismissed the application, finding no s. 8 breach because the police took reasonable steps to protect her privacy by repeatedly advising her of the video surveillance, pointing out signage, and offering her a privacy gown, which she declined.

The accused brought an application to exclude statements made to police following arrest for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused argued that police violated his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel by questioning him after he had requested to speak with a lawyer and before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found that although the police were justified in delaying access to a telephone until arrival at the station due to safety and logistical concerns, officers nonetheless elicited information from the accused during the hold‑off period.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the Charter breaches were serious and significantly impacted the accused’s right against self‑incrimination.

The accused’s statements made between arrest and arrival at the police station were excluded under s. 24(2).