R. E. Hawkins

The respondents requested reconsideration of a prior Board decision that found their blanket prohibition on the distribution of union literature on store premises to be an unfair labour practice.

The Board declined to reconsider the merits of the case, reaffirming that its reconsideration power is not a forum for re-arguing decided issues.

However, the Board modified the required Notice to Employees to better reflect the employer's stated policy on casual conversation, while finding that the employer's previous letters prohibiting all solicitation violated section 64 of the Labour Relations Act.

In a grievance referral to arbitration, the applicant union requested the Board to direct the respondents' principal to comply with a summons to witness.

The respondents demanded particulars of the alleged violations before complying.

The Board held that the grievance against Penka Carpentry Limited was sufficiently particularized, as it alleged all work performed by Penka violated the collective agreement.

However, for Karl Thier Construction Limited, the union was required to particularize claims outside the specific time and location already identified, as it had a prior bargaining relationship with that entity.

The matter was adjourned.

The respondent insurance company brought preliminary objections to dismiss a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in automobile insurance rates.

The complainant, a father, alleged he was charged higher premiums to insure his 16-year-old son than he would have been for a female child, contrary to the Human Rights Code, 1981.

The respondent argued the Board lacked jurisdiction because the insurance contract predated the Code's proclamation, and that the father lacked standing because the alleged discrimination was based on his son's sex and age, not his own.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the objections, finding that the Code applies prospectively to ongoing discriminatory acts and that its remedial nature rebuts any presumption against retrospectivity.

The Board also held that the father had standing to complain of discrimination based on his 'family status' as the parent of a male child.