Q.C.

The parties reached a settlement on the appeal from the judgments of Justice Susan E. Greer.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the $1.5 million held in trust pursuant to a prior order be transferred forthwith to Goldman Sloan in trust pending further order, and that necessary consents be filed to give effect to the Minutes of Settlement.

The Law Society of Upper Canada maintained a custom photocopy service and self-service photocopiers in the Great Library.

Legal publishers sued for copyright infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the publishers' headnotes, summaries, and compilations were 'original' works protected by copyright, the Law Society's custom photocopy service constituted fair dealing for the purpose of research.

The Court also held that providing self-service photocopiers with a warning notice did not amount to authorizing copyright infringement.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application regarding the respondent keeping a dog in her unit.

The application judge had dismissed the application based on promissory estoppel, finding the respondent relied on assurances from the appellant's manager that keeping a dog was permissible.

The Court of Appeal found no error in this conclusion and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent was wrongfully dismissed and not terminated for cause.

The appellant argued there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge and that the judge erred in assessing credibility and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no error in the credibility assessment, and no reason to interfere with the damages award.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and awarded damages.

The trial judge reduced the management fee award by 50 percent to account for a predicted increased return from investment counselling, and deducted the respondent's legal fees and house purchase from the amount used to calculate management fees and tax gross-up.

The Court of Appeal reversed these deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory discount rate is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by reducing management fees.

Furthermore, damages are assessed as a lump sum, and how a plaintiff chooses to spend the award (e.g., on a house or legal fees) is irrelevant to the calculation of management fees and tax gross-up.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and awarded damages.

The trial judge reduced the management fee award by 50 percent to account for a predicted increased return from investment counselling, and deducted the respondent's legal fees and house purchase from the amount used to calculate management fees and tax gross-up.

The Court of Appeal reversed these deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory discount rate is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by reducing management fees.

Furthermore, damages are assessed as a lump sum, and how a plaintiff chooses to spend the award (e.g., on a house or legal fees) is irrelevant to the calculation of management fees and tax gross-up.

The appellant company appealed an order declaring it in breach of a redemption obligation and entitling the respondent to immediate redemption of his preference shares for $1,600,000.

The appellant had refused to pay quarterly dividends to the respondent despite having the funds, suspecting the respondent of breaching non-compete obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's finding that the failure to pay dividends constituted a default under the Shareholders' Agreement, triggering the respondent's unconditional right to redeem his shares.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that the default provision only applied when the company lacked funds.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial after the trial judge acquitted him of impaired driving.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer results, finding the police officer arbitrarily detained the appellant by approaching his parked vehicle without legal justification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal court that the officer needed no legal authority to approach and speak to the appellant in a public parking area, and no detention occurred.

The appellant insurer issued a comprehensive general liability policy to the respondent insured.

The insured was sued for wrongful dismissal, including allegations of intentional racial and age discrimination.

The insurer sought a declaration that it owed no duty to defend the discrimination claims.

The application judge ruled the insurer was required to provide a defence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the fortuity principle of insurance law dictates that liability policies only cover accidental or fortuitous losses.

Because the underlying claims alleged intentional discrimination, they fell outside the scope of the policy, and the insurer had no duty to defend.

The appellant pension board appealed a Divisional Court decision that a deceased member's former spouse was entitled to a portion of his pre-retirement death benefits pursuant to a separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal held that pension benefits, including pre-retirement death benefits, may be transferred under a domestic contract without the aid of s. 48(13) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The court also determined that the 50 per cent limit on transfers under s. 51(2) applied to the pre-1987 benefits, and that the calculation date for the benefits was the date of the member's death.

The appeal was dismissed and the cross-appeal was allowed in part.

The Crown brought a motion to quash the accused's appeal and strike the notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motions, holding that the dissenting opinion in the court below was on a question of law, which gave the accused an appeal as of right.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability, assessment of damages, and costs awards arising from a tragic apartment fire that caused severe smoke inhalation injuries to the respondents.

The trial judge had apportioned liability 10% to the tenant who started the fire, 20% to the City for failing to enforce building codes regarding self-closing doors, and 70% to the building owners/managers.

The Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 35% for the City, and 45% for the owners, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The Court upheld the general damages and future loss of income awards, as well as the future care costs based on the injured respondent's choice to live independently.

The Court also largely upheld the substantial indemnity costs award and premium against the owners due to their failure to admit liability, but varied the costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability, assessment of damages, and costs awards arising from a tragic apartment fire that caused severe smoke inhalation injuries to the respondents.

The trial judge had apportioned liability 10% to the tenant who started the fire, 20% to the City for failing to enforce building codes regarding self-closing doors, and 70% to the building owners/managers.

The Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 35% for the City, and 45% for the owners, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The Court upheld the general damages and future loss of income awards, as well as the future care costs based on the injured respondent's choice to live independently.

The Court also largely upheld the substantial indemnity costs award and premium against the owners due to their failure to admit liability, but varied the costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The plaintiffs suffered severe injuries from smoke inhalation during an apartment fire.

The trial judge found the tenant who started the fire, the building owner, and the City liable, apportioning fault at 10%, 70%, and 20% respectively.

The trial judge also awarded substantial damages and substantial indemnity costs with a premium.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 45% for the owner, and 35% for the City, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The damage awards were upheld as reasonable.

The costs award was largely upheld, except for costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The plaintiffs suffered severe injuries from smoke inhalation during an apartment fire.

The trial judge found the tenant who started the fire, the building owner, and the City liable, apportioning fault at 10%, 70%, and 20% respectively.

The trial judge also awarded substantial damages and substantial indemnity costs with a premium.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reapportioned liability to 20% for the tenant, 45% for the owner, and 35% for the City, finding the trial judge underestimated the tenant's and City's roles.

The damage awards were upheld as reasonable.

The costs award was largely upheld, except for costs related to a separate medical malpractice action and an inquest.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, and assault with intent to resist arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the driving offences, finding no error by the summary conviction appeal judge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the assault charge, holding that the appellant's act of pulling his arm away to disengage from police officers did not constitute an assault in law, though it likely amounted to an offence under s. 129 of the Criminal Code.

The conviction for assault resisting arrest was set aside.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's decision dismissing its claim against the respondents.

The motions judge found that the Ontario Energy Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute, which centered on whether the respondent breached its license by failing to apply the Distribution System Code.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the fundamental issue—whether an agreement existed prior to November 1, 2000—was within the Board's exclusive jurisdiction under the Ontario Energy Board Act.

The action was deemed an attempt to circumvent the Board's decision, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant purchased the respondent's insurance brokerage business from a trustee in bankruptcy.

The agreement of purchase and sale did not contain a non-solicitation clause.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's declaration that the respondent was entitled to solicit his former clients.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that in an involuntary alienation of assets in a bankruptcy, there is no common law implied obligation on the part of the bankrupt not to compete and solicit former clients.

The appellant appealed the order of the motion judge striking out his pleading and granting a divorce judgment and related relief.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge properly struck the pleading based on the appellant's non-compliance with previous court orders.

The Court also found no palpable and overriding error in the granting of the divorce judgment and related relief.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $3,000.