Q.C.

The appellant landlord appealed a trial judgment that applied a 35 per cent 'betterment' discount to damages awarded for the respondent tenant's breach of repair and restoration covenants in a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal held that while the lease's 'reasonable wear and tear' exception applied, the tenant bore the burden of proving the extent to which the damages fell within this exception.

Because the tenant failed to adduce evidence supporting the 35 per cent discount, the Court removed the discount, increasing the landlord's damages.

The Court also allowed the tenant's cross-appeal in part, reducing the interest rate to the Courts of Justice Act rate and reducing the costs award to reflect the actual rates billed to the landlord.

The respondents hold a patent for genetically modified genes and cells that confer resistance to glyphosate herbicides.

The appellants, commercial canola farmers, saved and planted seed that they knew or ought to have known contained the patented genes and cells, without obtaining a licence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the patent was valid, as it claimed the genes and cells rather than the unpatentable plant itself.

The Court further held that the appellants infringed the patent by 'using' the invention, as their cultivation of the crop deprived the respondents of the full enjoyment of their monopoly.

However, the Court set aside the award for an accounting of profits, finding that the appellants earned no profit causally attributable to the invention.

The respondent challenged federal third party election advertising provisions, including spending limits, anti-circumvention rules, disclosure requirements, and a polling day blackout, as violating ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 3 of the Charter.

The majority held that although several provisions infringed freedom of expression, they were justified under s. 1 because Parliament could adopt an egalitarian electoral model aimed at electoral fairness, informed voting, and confidence in the electoral process.

The Court rejected the argument that s. 3 guarantees unlimited electoral expression, holding instead that meaningful participation includes access to a balanced political discourse.

The appeal was allowed and the impugned provisions were upheld as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the spending limits.

The respondent challenged federal third party election advertising provisions, including spending limits, anti-circumvention rules, disclosure requirements, and a polling day blackout, as violating ss. 2(b), 2(d), and 3 of the Charter.

The majority held that although several provisions infringed freedom of expression, they were justified under s. 1 because Parliament could adopt an egalitarian electoral model aimed at electoral fairness, informed voting, and confidence in the electoral process.

The Court rejected the argument that s. 3 guarantees unlimited electoral expression, holding instead that meaningful participation includes access to a balanced political discourse.

The appeal was allowed and the impugned provisions were upheld as constitutional, with a partial dissent that would have struck down the spending limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal regarding the interpretation of s. 76 of the Canadian Wheat Board Act and the division of powers concerning flour mills.

The Court adopted the reasons given by the Court of Appeal of Quebec and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him jointly and severally liable for over $325,000 wrongfully obtained from an elderly relative's estate.

The trial judge found the appellant knowingly assisted other family members in breaching their fiduciary duties by preparing a power of attorney and commissioning a land transfer tax affidavit while knowing the relative was incompetent.

On appeal, the appellant argued the respondents lacked standing under the Trustee Act and that his actions did not cause the loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, refusing to entertain the standing and limitation arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and upholding the finding of knowing assistance.

A cross-appeal seeking occupation rent from the appellant was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motions judge's finding that the sale of the respondent's business interest was an arm's length transaction and not bogus.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's factual conclusion, which was supported by evidence.

The court upheld the imputed income but amended the effective date of the retroactive order to the date of the application to vary, based on a concession by the respondent.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant employer dismissed the respondent employee for unsatisfactory work performance (non-culpable incompetence).

The arbitration board found the dismissal was without just cause because the employer failed to follow the Re Edith Cavell criteria.

The board awarded damages in lieu of reinstatement under s. 142(2) of the Labour Relations Code, finding reinstatement inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal set aside the board's decision, holding that s. 142(2) did not apply to non-culpable dismissals and ordering reinstatement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for both the board's interpretation of s. 142(2) and its remedial award was reasonableness.

The Court found the board's broad interpretation of s. 142(2) to include non-culpable dismissals was reasonable, and its decision to award damages in lieu of reinstatement due to exceptional circumstances (the breakdown of the employment relationship) was also reasonable.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal, which was successfully resisted by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the motion on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting partition and sale of lands.

They argued there was an existing agreement for the purchase and sale of the lands.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding that the exchange of letters only committed the parties to a process and no binding agreement existed, as several terms had not been agreed upon.

The respondent's prima facie right to partition and sale was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a family law judgment regarding property equalization and expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's treatment of camp and day care expenses, the valuation of tax shelters, the exclusion of a post-valuation date tax instalment as a debt, and the refusal to reimburse post-valuation date mortgage overpayments.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld as a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's apportionment of liability following an accidental shooting where a 13-year-old was severely injured by a 15-year-old friend playing with a firearm at his father's house.

The trial judge had apportioned 50% liability to the 15-year-old, 25% to his father, and 25% to the injured party (conceded), while finding the mother, aunt, and uncle not liable.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of no liability for the mother, aunt, and uncle, as they had no knowledge of the firearms and exercised reasonable supervision.

However, the majority allowed the appeal regarding the father's liability, increasing it to 45% (and reducing the 15-year-old's to 30%) because the father failed to secure the firearms, failed to inform the caregivers about the weapons, and demonstrated a prolonged lack of supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting his explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion that the explanation could not reasonably be true, and that the fresh evidence did not alter this view.

The City of Calgary enacted a bylaw freezing the number of taxi plate licences.

The respondents challenged the bylaw, arguing it was ultra vires the City under the new Municipal Government Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for a municipality delineating its jurisdiction is correctness.

Applying a broad and purposive approach to interpreting municipal legislation, the Court found that the Act granted the City the power to limit the number of taxi plate licences.

The appeal was allowed and the bylaw was upheld.

The appellant episcopal corporation appealed a finding of direct liability for sexual assaults committed by a parish priest over two decades.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the corporation was also vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming the corporation was directly liable because the bishop's failure to properly direct and discipline the priest constituted negligence by the corporation.

The Court also held the corporation vicariously liable, finding a sufficiently close relationship between the diocesan enterprise and the priest, and a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful acts.

The appellant episcopal corporation appealed a finding of direct liability for sexual assaults committed by a parish priest over two decades.

The respondents cross-appealed, arguing the corporation was also vicariously liable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming the corporation was directly liable because the bishop's failure to properly direct and discipline the priest constituted negligence by the corporation.

The Court also held the corporation vicariously liable, finding a sufficiently close relationship between the diocesan enterprise and the priest, and a strong connection between the employer-created risk and the wrongful acts.

The infant plaintiff sustained catastrophic injuries when he rode his bicycle down a ramp at an apartment building owned by the appellant Turret Realties Inc. and into the path of a vehicle driven by the appellant Anne Busk.

The trial judge found Turret 50% liable under the Occupiers' Liability Act and the plaintiff 50% contributorily negligent, while dismissing claims against the driver.

Turret appealed on multiple grounds, including reasonable apprehension of bias, liability, and damages.

The plaintiff cross-appealed regarding contributory negligence, loss of interdependent relationship, and the refusal to award a management fee.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal and allowed the cross-appeal in part, awarding a management fee of $302,989 and adjusting the tax gross-up accordingly.

The appellant father appealed an order requiring him to pay child support in accordance with the Guidelines.

He argued that the separation agreement, which gave the mother a greater share of the matrimonial property and in which he waived spousal support, constituted 'special provisions' benefiting the children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the applications judge that parents cannot contract away a child's right to support and that there was no objective, child-centred evidence of a special benefit to the children from the separation agreement.

The father was ordered to pay costs of $4,500.

The appellant appealed an order committing him for surrender to the United States for conspiracy to launder proceeds of crime.

The primary issue was whether identification evidence gathered in Canada by a foreign officer and included in the record of the case was admissible under section 32(2) of the Extradition Act without requiring viva voce testimony.

The Court of Appeal held that evidence lawfully gathered in Canada and substantively admissible under Canadian law does not need to take the form of viva voce testimony at the extradition hearing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that the appellant DeMarco failed to account for trust funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

The appellant conceded he acted in a fiduciary capacity but argued his failure to account was due to incompetence and negligence, not wrongdoing under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to adequately discharge his onus as a trustee to account for the trust funds was sufficient to trigger s. 178(1)(d).