P. Scrutton

The accused, a police sergeant, was charged with theft over $5,000 and breach of trust after money and jewellery seized during a robbery investigation went missing from a temporary storage locker.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the accused's failure to follow property storage directives and his estranged wife's discovery of a police evidence bag containing cash under his bed.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the accused's guilt was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, noting widespread non-compliance with property directives at the bureau and discrepancies in the cash found by the wife.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with perjury and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged that the accused encouraged a confidential informant to plant a firearm at a suspect's residence and subsequently swore a false Information to Obtain a search warrant that omitted this fact and contained other misleading information.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as improbable and found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed perjury and attempted to obstruct justice.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to limit defence cross‑examination of a non‑accused witness regarding prior discreditable conduct and the underlying facts of home invasion charges for which the witness had been acquitted.

The defence opposed the limitation and sought an order preventing the witness from referring to the acquittal.

The court reviewed the broad right of an accused to cross‑examine ordinary witnesses as part of the right to make full answer and defence.

Distinguishing authorities dealing with cross‑examination of an accused, the court held that limitations applicable to accused persons do not apply to ordinary witnesses.

Balancing probative value against potential prejudice, the court permitted cross‑examination on the underlying facts of the acquitted charges and declined to prohibit the witness from mentioning the acquittal if it arose naturally.

During a criminal proceeding, the defence sought to qualify a forensic odontologist as an expert on the diagnosis, causation, and assessment of oral maxillofacial trauma.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence and concluded the proposed expert possessed sufficient expertise to testify about diagnosis of mandible injuries and the mechanism and pattern of jaw fractures.

However, the court found the expert lacked specialized education, research, and practical experience regarding causation, direction of force, or magnitude of force relating to jaw fractures.

Applying the gatekeeping function for expert evidence, the court also held that permitting opinions on causation would risk intruding on the ultimate issue for the jury and could improperly influence fact‑finding.

The expert was therefore limited to opinion evidence concerning diagnosis and injury patterns.

The Crown sought to qualify an oral maxillofacial surgeon to provide expert opinion evidence on the diagnosis, mechanism, causation, direction of force, and magnitude of force of the complainant's jaw fractures in an aggravated assault trial.

Following a voir dire, the court qualified the doctor to opine on the diagnosis and mechanism of the injuries based on his extensive clinical experience.

However, applying the Mohan and Abbey frameworks, the court held the doctor was not properly qualified to opine on causation, direction, or magnitude of force, as he lacked specialized training, research, or prior qualification in those specific forensic areas.

The applicant sought to re-litigate an abuse of process stay application after the original judge, who had dismissed the application but not yet provided reasons, was elevated to the Court of Appeal.

The applicant argued that only the trial judge has jurisdiction to hear a stay application.

The court held that a judge other than the trial judge has jurisdiction to hear a stay application under s. 24(1) of the Charter and Rule 27 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The court also found that it had jurisdiction to continue the proceedings under s. 669.2(1) of the Criminal Code and that it was not in the interests of justice to re-litigate the identical application on the same record.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused police officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from injuries sustained by an individual during a G20 demonstration at Queen’s Park.

The Crown alleged the officer struck the individual with a shield and baton or used excessive force while moving him.

The court considered three theories of liability based on eyewitness testimony and video evidence.

The judge found significant reliability and credibility issues with the key identification witness and concluded the video evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused struck the individual or used excessive force.

The Crown failed to establish any theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.