P. Quinlan

Adjacent cottage owners disputed ownership of a strip of sandy land between their lots and the plaintiffs claimed title by adverse possession or, alternatively, a prescriptive easement.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim and requiring removal of a shed partially constructed on the disputed land.

The court reviewed the requirements for adverse possession, including actual possession, intention to exclude the true owner, and effective exclusion throughout the statutory period, as well as the principles governing summary judgment.

Although the plaintiffs had used the land for recreational activities and occasional structures, the evidence showed the owners of the registered lot were never excluded and also used the land.

The activities relied upon were not sufficiently proprietary to establish exclusive possession before the expiry of the limitation period, and the shed was constructed after the relevant date.

The court also held the evidence could not satisfy the legal requirements for a prescriptive easement.

The applicant sought declarations that a writ of execution obtained by the respondents did not attach to his real property and requested removal of execution restrictions from title.

The respondents brought a responding application asserting that the writs bound the applicant as the true judgment debtor under a foreign judgment enforcement action.

The court found the applicant had never been properly served with the statement of claim underlying the default judgment relied upon by the respondents.

Without valid service, the judgment was a nullity and could not support the writ of execution against the applicant’s land.

The court granted the applicant’s relief and dismissed the respondents’ application.

Following an application for judgment on a disputed debt, the successful party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a pre‑litigation offer to settle.

The court held that the offer could not trigger Rule 49 cost consequences because it was made before any proceeding had been commenced.

The court also rejected arguments that cross‑examination provisions governing motions applied to the application.

Applying Rule 57 and the principle of proportionality between the amount in dispute and the costs claimed, the court found the requested costs excessive and awarded reduced partial indemnity costs.

The applicant sought possession of six trailers and damages for conversion.

The respondents had previously sold their trucking company but retained a general security agreement.

When the new company went bankrupt, the respondents instructed a receiver to sell the applicant's trailers, despite knowing the applicant had a prior perfected security interest under the Personal Property Security Act.

The court found the respondents personally liable for conversion, as they acted under their personal security agreement.

Damages were assessed at $129,500, and the respondents' claim for a set-off for storage and maintenance was dismissed.

Following a motion in a constructive dismissal action concerning the return of a document claimed to be protected by solicitor-client privilege, the court had ruled in favour of the defendant and ordered the plaintiff to return the document and remove it from the record.

The parties could not agree on costs, requiring a further determination.

The court rejected arguments that the motion produced mixed results or involved a novel legal issue due to the electronic nature of the document.

Substantial indemnity costs were declined as the plaintiff’s conduct did not warrant sanction.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles from Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant in the amount of $3,500 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable at the conclusion of the action.

In an employment constructive dismissal action, the defendant employer brought a motion seeking the return of internal emails and a declaration that they were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The emails had been copied by the plaintiff’s spouse after they appeared on the employer’s computer while he was assisting with a technical task.

The plaintiff argued that privilege had been waived through recklessness, disclosure to a consultant, and fairness considerations.

The court held the emails were privileged communications relating to legal advice and that the consultant acted as an agent of the client, preserving privilege.

The court also found the documents were deliberately taken without authority and ordered their return and deletion, ruling they could not be used in the litigation.