P. Berk Keaney

The accused brought a pretrial application to quash a search warrant for his residence, arguing that after excising evidence obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, the redacted Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient evidence to support the warrant.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, while the direct evidence against the accused was less overwhelming than against his co-accused, the circumstantial evidence, coded text messages, and expert opinions of the affiant provided sufficient credible and reliable evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The application to quash the search warrant was dismissed.

The accused brought a pretrial application alleging multiple breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights during a police investigation into a suspected drug stash house.

The court found that the police's use of a continuously recording, installed video camera directed at the accused's residence without a warrant violated his reasonable expectation of privacy, though video recorded during lawful physical surveillance did not.

The court upheld the police's use of a dynamic entry and the clearing of outbuildings as reasonable for officer safety.

The seizure of gun parts, a crossbow, and a Rolex watch not listed in the warrant was justified under the plain view doctrine and s. 11(8) of the CDSA, but the seizure of other jewelry was found to be unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving 'over 80' following a single-car collision.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding whether hospital staff acted as state agents when taking his blood samples, which would constitute a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

He also argued that the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to obtain a search warrant for the blood samples.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's factual determination that the blood was taken for medical purposes was supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

Consequently, there was no Charter breach.

The court also found ample objective evidence to support the issuance of the warrant and noted the issue was not properly litigated at trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the roadside screening demand was not made forthwith and that police breached his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, that the evidentiary breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, and that deficiencies in breath‑testing procedures undermined the reliability of the results.

The court held the trial judge applied the correct legal tests and made reasonable factual findings regarding the short delay in obtaining an Approved Screening Device, the timing of the breath tests, and the functioning of the approved instrument.

The court found no Charter breach and no evidentiary basis to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy of the breath readings.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal following a conviction for care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The appeal alleged several legal errors, including alleged breaches of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, improper findings regarding the timing and reliability of breath tests, and failure to properly consider Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning breathalyzer evidence.

Applying s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, the court assessed whether the appeal was frivolous, whether the applicant would surrender into custody, and whether detention was necessary in the public interest.

The court concluded that although some grounds appeared weak, they raised arguable issues and therefore satisfied the requirement that the appeal not be frivolous.

Bail pending appeal was granted and the driving prohibition was stayed pending the hearing of the appeal.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 25 months.

The court attributed significant portions of the delay to the Crown, including late disclosure of a 9-1-1 audio recording and failure to expedite scheduling.

Finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the accused suffered real prejudice from restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the applications and stayed the charges.