Natalie Boivin

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

He argued that the roadside screening demand was not made forthwith and that police breached his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, that the evidentiary breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code, and that deficiencies in breath‑testing procedures undermined the reliability of the results.

The court held the trial judge applied the correct legal tests and made reasonable factual findings regarding the short delay in obtaining an Approved Screening Device, the timing of the breath tests, and the functioning of the approved instrument.

The court found no Charter breach and no evidentiary basis to rebut the statutory presumption of accuracy of the breath readings.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing, brought an application to admit evidence of the deceased’s bad character in support of a self-defence theory.

The proposed evidence included the deceased’s criminal record, reputation as a “tough guy”, prior drug use, and police occurrence reports.

The court held that evidence of bad character not known to the accused must still satisfy the requirements of relevance and admissibility, and that its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence lacked sufficient probative value and risked inviting the jury to reason improperly about the deceased’s character.

The application was largely dismissed, though evidence of the deceased’s intention to confront and assault the accused on the night in question was permitted.

The Crown brought a review application under s. 521 of the Criminal Code seeking to overturn a justice of the peace’s order granting the accused judicial interim release.

The accused faced multiple charges including procuring a person for prostitution, administering a noxious substance, human trafficking-related offences, sexual assault, and possession of stolen property.

The court found that the justice of the peace erred in assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds and misapprehended evidence relating to the complainant’s failure to seek help.

The accused had an extensive criminal record and the proposed sureties demonstrated a lack of awareness of his criminal lifestyle and were found unsuitable.

Considering the strength of the Crown’s case, the gravity of the offences, and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground as clarified in R. v. St‑Cloud, the court ordered the accused detained pending trial.

The Crown appealed acquittals on two assault counts arising from incidents at a bar involving an on-duty police officer and two complainants with whom he had prior relationships.

The trial judge found that although some touching occurred, there was no intent to assault and alternatively applied the de minimis doctrine.

The appellate court held that the trial judge erred in law by requiring a specific intent to assault rather than the statutory requirement of intentional application of force without consent under s. 265(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found error in applying the de minimis principle to conduct involving intentional non-consensual touching, particularly given the respondent’s position of authority.

The acquittals on the two counts were set aside and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.