P.A. Douglas

The mother unilaterally relocated with the child from Markham to Orillia to pursue employment, enrolling the child in a new school without notifying the father.

The father brought an urgent motion to have the child returned to Markham and for primary residence, while the mother cross-moved to permit the relocation.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz and Plumley factors for interim mobility, the court found the mother failed to demonstrate that disrupting the status quo before trial was in the child's best interests.

The court ordered the child to resume school in Markham, with primary care remaining with the mother only if she returned to Markham; otherwise, primary care would transfer to the father.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a severe collision.

The accused, while driving with four passengers, accelerated to a speed grossly in excess of the posted limit, aggressively passed another vehicle on the right, and lost control of his vehicle, colliding head-on with an oncoming car.

The court applied the modified objective test for dangerous driving and found that the accused's driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty.

Following reasons granting summary judgment in a reduced amount, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $18,000 plus disbursements and interest.

The court applied Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, considering factors such as the degree of success, proportionality between the amount claimed and recovered, the limited complexity of the proceeding, and the conduct of the responding party which unnecessarily prolonged the litigation.

Although the moving party succeeded, the recovery was less than half the amount claimed.

The court awarded reduced costs and granted prejudgment interest.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and, alternatively, sought security for costs under Rule 56.01(d).

The court held that a pleading need not expressly name a cause of action provided it pleads sufficient material facts to support a recognized legal claim.

While the claim adequately pleaded causes of action including knowing assistance and inducing breach of contract, the allegation of fraud was materially deficient because it failed to provide particularized allegations against each moving party as required by Rule 25.06(8).

The court struck the fraud allegation with leave to amend but dismissed the remainder of the motion.

The request for security for costs was also dismissed because the evidence of a small PPSR registration did not establish good reason to believe the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets to satisfy a potential costs award.