Family and Matrimonial Law - ONSCDC

The appellants filed notices of appeal in the Divisional Court from a Family Court order that granted sole decision-making responsibility, child support, and a $452,000 equalization payment, and declared a fraudulent conveyance.

The respondent moved to dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court held that under section 19 of the Courts of Justice Act, it lacked jurisdiction because the equalization payment exceeded $50,000 and the order was made under both the federal Divorce Act and the provincial Family Law Act.

The appeals were dismissed without prejudice to the appellants proceeding in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant's children were brought to a place of safety by the Children's Aid Society.

The protection application was later withdrawn and the parties reached an agreement.

The appellant subsequently brought a motion for a declaration that the CAS acted unlawfully by not obtaining a warrant, and sought costs.

The motion judge declined to rule on the warrant issue and declined to order costs.

The appellant appealed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's discretionary decision to decline declaratory relief or in her application of costs principles.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking out his negligence claim against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).

The appellant alleged that FRO was negligent in handling his child support payments and reporting him to a credit bureau, arguing FRO owed him a duty to reply to his correspondence.

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that FRO did not owe a duty of care to the appellant, applying the Cooper v. Hobart framework.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

He argued the motion judge erred by refusing to hear his cross-motion for table support, finding one child was not a dependent while taking part-time virtual courses, and awarding costs based on bad faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the dependency finding and upholding the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the cross-motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal costs, noting the bad faith finding was justified by the father's failure to disclose income increases.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding him in contempt of a final parenting order.

The motion judge had temporarily reduced the appellant's parenting time until he complied with the order, which the appellant argued was an impermissible variation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had jurisdiction to make a temporary variation to facilitate compliance.

The court also upheld the contempt findings regarding unilateral medical decisions and withholding the children, and rejected the appellant's claims of procedural unfairness.

The appellant appealed an order for the partition and sale of a home jointly owned with her elderly mother.

The appellant argued the mother had gifted her interest in the home and that the order was interlocutory, requiring leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court held that an order for sale under the Partition Act is a final order, meaning no leave was required.

On the merits, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the mother retained an interest in the property and that the sale was not oppressive.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated April 22, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

In a high-conflict family law dispute, the self-represented moving party sought to challenge several temporary orders made by various judges.

During a case management conference, the court scheduled motions for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal two of the orders (relating to children's schooling and the sale of a rental property).

The court refused to schedule an extension motion for a third order excluding the moving party from a jointly-owned business, noting the request was vexatious as an earlier motion for leave had been abandoned.

The appellant father appealed a case management judge's decision to adjourn a contested motion brought by the Office of the Children's Lawyer until a recusal motion could be heard.

The case management judge had determined the recusal motion was too long to be heard during COVID-19 protocols, resulting in legal paralysis for the family.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the situation inappropriately left the children in limbo, and directed the Regional Senior Judge to appoint a temporary case management judge until the recusal motion is decided.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Superior Court judge's decision regarding the form of an order in a family law proceeding.

The Divisional Court considered whether to dismiss the application under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is not available to review decisions of Superior Court judges and that the applicant's proper recourse was an application for leave to appeal, which had already been dismissed.

The mother brought a motion for a stay of an order varying an interim parenting schedule pending her motion for leave to appeal.

The motion judge had varied the schedule to increase the father's parenting time based on observations from a Section 30 assessment report.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test for a stay and found that the mother failed to demonstrate a serious issue to be tried, as the motion judge's discretionary decision was well-founded and did not conflict with established case law.

The court also found no irreparable harm to the child and that the balance of convenience favoured the new schedule.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision enforcing a settlement between the parties.

He argued the motion judge erred by ignoring an alleged fraud against a third party, a payment issue, and the respondent's early departure from the home.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly exercised her discretion, properly credited the appellant for payments made, and correctly interpreted the settlement terms regarding the home.

The court also found the motion judge's reasons were adequate.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her appeal of a final order that found no material change in circumstances to justify continuing spousal support.

The Divisional Court upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the determination that the appellant failed to prove a material change in circumstances under section 37(2) of the Family Law Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The minor appellant brought an application seeking child support from her biological father.

The motion judge held that the appellant was required to have a litigation guardian under Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the Family Law Rules did not adequately cover the situation.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Family Law Rules do adequately cover the situation, specifically exempting a child in a child support case from the definition of a 'special party'.

The appeal was allowed, and the order requiring a litigation guardian was set aside.

The moving party appealed a joint custody order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, noting that jurisdiction lies with the Court of Appeal under s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 110, finding little apparent merit to the appeal based on the deferential standard of review for custody orders.

Furthermore, the court noted that both parties sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding post-trial events, making a variation application based on a material change in circumstances a more appropriate remedy than an appeal.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to vary a final child support order and rescind arrears.

The original order imputed an income of $30,000, but the appellant provided uncontradicted evidence that he had not held employment since 1998 due to severe depression and was receiving disability benefits.

The Divisional Court found that the motions judge made a palpable and overriding error by ignoring this material change in circumstances and relying on the respondent's unsworn statements.

The appeal was allowed, arrears were reduced to $15,240, and ongoing support was reduced to $161 per month.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal a temporary order requiring him to pay $2,700 per month in child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $60,000.

The husband argued the support amounts significantly exceeded the Child Support Guidelines and Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines for that income level, and that the motion judge improperly relied on previous 'without prejudice' consent orders.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and that the issues were of sufficient importance.

The court also granted a partial stay, reducing the ongoing support obligations pending the appeal, provided the husband paid the arrears.

The husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay $12,000 in lump sum spousal support and to return property to his former wife following a very brief marriage.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge erred by failing to relate the support amount to the wife's actual needs and by ordering the return of property that was not claimed in the pleadings.

The appeal was allowed, the lump sum support was reduced to $4,800, and the order for the return of property was deleted.

The appellant corporation, KPM, appealed an order of the case management judge denying it leave to bring a motion to remove itself as a party to a long-standing family dispute.

KPM argued the order was made summarily without an opportunity to be heard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the case management judge was entirely familiar with the reasons for adding KPM as a party to facilitate property valuation, and was entitled to deal with the request expediently.

The reasons for KPM's inclusion as a party remained extant.

The appellant brought a motion to adjourn the appeal in order to obtain a transcript of a trial management conference.

The Divisional Court denied the motion, noting that a court reporter is only present at such conferences when a litigant is unrepresented, and a transcript cannot be ordered without the conference judge's permission.

The court held that granting an adjournment based on the mere hope of obtaining permission made no sense.

Furthermore, the relevant rule only contemplates transcripts of oral evidence, which was not given at the conference.