Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONSCDC

The appellant, an Aboriginal man who suffered abuse at a training school as a youth, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation.

The Board had weighed the abuse he suffered against his extensive subsequent criminal record and concluded compensation was not reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board made no error of law in considering his criminal record under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, and that Gladue principles do not strictly apply to civil compensation determinations.

The applicants, who recently took over the operation of a convenience store, sought judicial review of a Minister's decision applying a tobacco sales prohibition order to them.

The prohibition was issued under section 16 of the Smoke-Free Ontario Act because employees of the prior, unrelated operator had been twice convicted of selling tobacco to minors.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, holding that on a purposive interpretation of the Act, the prohibition can only be applied to a person who has committed at least one tobacco sales offence.

Since the applicants had never been convicted of such an offence, the Minister lacked jurisdiction to apply the prohibition to them.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation following two assaults by another resident in his apartment building.

The Board denied the claim based on the appellant's credibility, reliability, reckless behaviour, and extensive criminal record, finding he had put himself in harm's way.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's consideration of the appellant's criminal record and behaviour under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act was reasonable.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to indefinitely suspend his driver's licence following his third impaired driving conviction.

The applicant argued that his first conviction, which occurred when he was a youth, could not be used to calculate the suspension under the Highway Traffic Act due to the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He also argued that the Registrar was estopped from imposing the indefinite suspension because he had previously received an erroneous notice of a three-year suspension and a notice of eligibility for reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflict between the provincial and federal legislation, and holding that the doctrines of public estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot override the Registrar's mandatory statutory duty to suspend the licence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation after his housemate set fires in their residence and uttered death threats.

The Divisional Court found that the Board erred in law by requiring the appellant to prove the alleged offender intended to injure him through the arson, contrary to established case law.

The court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Board for a re-hearing before a newly constituted panel.

The applicant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying his claim for compensation for mental and nervous shock following the death of his estranged wife.

The wife died after falling from a vehicle while attempting to sell illicit drugs.

The Board denied the applicant's claim based entirely on the wife's illegal conduct.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board unreasonably failed to distinguish between the applicant's conduct and the wife's conduct, as the applicant was claiming as an independent victim.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted panel for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarding him $1,000 for injuries sustained in a bar fight.

The Board had reduced the compensation under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act due to the appellant's criminal lifestyle, and under s. 17(2) for his failure to cooperate with police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the Board erred in law by applying s. 17(1) without establishing a nexus between the appellant's conduct and his injuries.

The matter was remitted to the Board to reconsider the compensation amount based solely on the s. 17(2) finding.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained in an assault.

The Board found the assault was directly related to his activities as a drug trafficker and his injury was a foreseeable consequence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Board's application of proportionality principles or its admission of hearsay evidence under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed the dismissal of his action for malicious prosecution and Charter damages against a police officer and the Crown.

The appellant had been charged with assault causing bodily harm following a prison fight, but the charge was later withdrawn.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charge and did not act with malice.

The court also confirmed that mala fides is required to establish a breach of section 7 of the Charter in this context, and that the appellant sued the wrong level of government for his transfer to a maximum-security facility.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that $43,120 in Canadian currency was the proceeds or instrument of unlawful activity under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, and ordering its forfeiture to the Crown.

The appellant argued the application judge improperly shifted the onus of proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, which included expert testimony, a NARC test, a drug dog hit, and the bundling of the money.

The applicants sought judicial review and an order in the nature of certiorari to quash a Justice of the Peace's decision dismissing their application for a stay of proceedings based on s. 11(b) Charter delay.

The applicants also sought an extension of time to serve the application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the delay in perfecting the application was not adequately explained and that certiorari for error of law on the face of the record is not available for interlocutory review of a pre-trial ruling in a quasi-criminal matter under the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant, a victim of domestic abuse, appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her compensation for physical therapies and loss of income.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's denial of compensation for physical therapies, finding no error in its conclusion that the assaults did not cause the physical injuries.

However, the Court found the Board may have fettered its discretion by applying a rigid policy that restricted loss of income claims to applicants who were actively employed or had confirmed offers at the time of the injury.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the loss of income issue was remitted to the Board for reconsideration.

The offender pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of child pornography.

He had a lengthy criminal record including sexual assaults on children and a prior conviction for possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender declaration.

The court accepted a joint submission for a two-year penitentiary sentence to allow the offender to participate in an intensive sex offender treatment program.

The court also declared the offender a Long Term Offender and imposed an eight-year long-term supervision order with stringent conditions, including psychiatric treatment and restrictions on internet access.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge had excluded the evidence of the refusal under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by providing an inadequate summary of the right to counsel while waiting 8 to 9 minutes for an Approved Screening Device (ASD) to arrive.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to determine the threshold issue of whether the ASD demand was valid, specifically whether the 'forthwith' requirement was met and if there was a realistic opportunity to consult counsel during the wait.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered, as the essential factual findings regarding the validity of the demand had not been made.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of $9,616.98 seized from an individual arrested for marijuana possession.

The application judge had dismissed the application, finding the Attorney General failed to prove the funds were proceeds of unlawful activity and that forfeiture would not be in the interests of justice due to withdrawn criminal charges and potential Charter breaches.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by disregarding the individual's prior drug record, the lack of an innocent explanation for the funds, and the individual's consent to forfeiture.

The Court further held that withdrawn charges and potential Charter breaches do not render forfeiture clearly not in the interests of justice.

The Attorney General applied for forfeiture of $5,545 seized during a drug investigation under the Civil Remedies Act.

The respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the supporting affidavit that referred to his criminal record and past drug-related activity, arguing it was inadmissible propensity evidence.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

The respondent appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that similar fact evidence of bad character is admissible in civil forfeiture proceedings where its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect, as it is relevant to whether the seized money is proceeds of unlawful activity.

The moving party, Toshiba of Canada Limited, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order denying its motion for production of the Commissioner of Competition's internal inquiry commencement memorandum and for leave to cross-examine the affiant of an ex parte order.

The ex parte order required Toshiba to produce records under section 11 of the Competition Act.

The Divisional Court held that the underlying proceeding was criminal in nature, meaning the Criminal Proceedings Rules applied, which do not provide for an appeal of an interlocutory order.

The court also rejected the argument that the motion could be treated as a civil proceeding for declaratory relief under the Charter.

Consequently, the court found it lacked jurisdiction and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying him compensation for injuries sustained during an assault.

The Board found the appellant contributed to his injuries by participating in illegal drug-related activities.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Board breached procedural fairness by admitting hearsay evidence from a police officer without adequate prior notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board is permitted to admit hearsay evidence and the appellant received sufficient notice of the allegations to satisfy the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

A reporter sought access under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act to records of communications among Ministry of the Attorney General officials regarding an ongoing, high-profile criminal prosecution of police officers.

The Ministry refused, relying on the exclusion in s. 65(5.2) for records relating to an ongoing prosecution.

An adjudicator ordered the records produced for an inquiry, interpreting the exclusion narrowly to require a 'substantial connection' and limiting it to documents in the Crown brief.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the order, holding that the adjudicator erred in law by reading in a substantial connection requirement and that the exclusion applied broadly to protect the integrity of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review challenging the Crown's decision to withdraw criminal charges he had initiated as a private prosecutor.

The matter was transferred to the Divisional Court by a Superior Court judge.

Both parties brought a motion to remit the application back to the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the application was criminal in nature and, pursuant to Rule 43 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules, should be heard by a judge of the Superior Court.