Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - ONSCDC

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Parole Board decision suspending her parole and issuing a Canada-wide arrest warrant.

The applicant had continued to report to her parole officer for months after the suspension, unaware of the warrant, and was even told she had successfully completed her sentence.

The Divisional Court found exceptional circumstances justifying early intervention despite the usual requirement to exhaust administrative remedies.

The Court held that the Board breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to effectively notify the applicant's parole officers of the suspension, and quashed the decision and related warrants.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Parole Board refusing to order a new hearing for her temporary absence permit application.

Prior to the judicial review hearing, the applicant was granted parole, rendering the application moot.

The applicant argued the court should still hear the matter to provide guidance to the Board on the proper framework for assessing temporary absence cases.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the application, applying the doctrine of mootness and emphasizing that the court's role on judicial review is to assess the reasonableness of specific decisions, not to impose analytical frameworks on administrative decision-makers.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought permission from the case management judge to commence proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice for an order in the nature of mandamus regarding a private prosecution he initiated against police officers.

The private prosecution related to a 2006 tasering incident involving his brother.

The court denied the request, finding it frivolous and a continuation of the applicant's efforts to litigate issues already decided.

The court clarified that the prior order restricting the applicant's access to the courts also applied to private prosecutions in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The applicant, a police officer, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding a finding of misconduct for the unlawful arrest of a videographer during the G20 summit.

The applicant argued the Commission erred in its standard of review and that the Hearing Officer's reasons were inadequate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably concluded the reasons were adequate for appellate review and that the finding of misconduct was reasonable given the lack of good and sufficient cause for the arrest.

The moving party Justice of the Peace brought a motion to quash the responding party's Notice of Application for Judicial Review.

The responding party sought an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to lay an information against a municipal prosecutor under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.

Under s. 142(4) of the Provincial Offences Act, the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not apply, and s. 140(1) provides that such relief must be sought in the Superior Court of Justice.

The College of Veterinarians appealed a decision of its Discipline Committee excluding evidence against a veterinarian accused of possessing child pornography.

The evidence was obtained by police during a criminal investigation that was later withdrawn due to a conceded s. 8 Charter breach.

The Discipline Committee excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, relying on a case (Viscomi) to find the police search warrant application was materially misleading.

The Divisional Court held that the Committee's reliance on Viscomi was wrong in law, rendering its s. 24(2) Grant analysis unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant sought compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board for physical and sexual abuse suffered at a training school as a youth.

The Board denied compensation, taking into account the appellant's subsequent criminal behaviour, including a conviction for rape.

The appellant appealed, arguing that subsequent conduct should not be considered under section 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's broad discretion to consider 'all relevant circumstances' includes the claimant's subsequent criminal conduct.

The appellant, who was severely assaulted in his home, appealed the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board's decision denying him compensation.

The Board had found that the appellant's involvement in drug dealing inherently risked violence and thus barred his claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board erred in law by failing to properly apply the proportionality principle under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act.

The Board was required to weigh the severity of the injuries against the contributory conduct and consider a reduced award rather than an automatic complete denial.

The applicant professional regulatory body issued a summons to the respondent police chief for the production of a Crown brief related to criminal charges against a physician.

The respondent refused to comply, arguing that the screening process from D.P. v. Wagg applied.

On a stated case, the Divisional Court held that the public interest principles identified in Wagg apply to a summons issued by the regulatory body.

While the specific civil screening process is not strictly required, the lack of notice to the Attorney General and an opportunity to raise public interest concerns constitutes a lawful excuse for refusing to comply with the summons.

The Ministry of the Attorney General sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner decisions ordering the disclosure of police records.

The Ministry argued the records were exempt under s. 19(b) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act because copies of the records were contained in the Crown brief.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that s. 19(b) does not exempt records in the possession of the police that were created during an investigation merely because copies later became part of the Crown brief.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claims for funeral expenses and nervous shock following the murder of her son.

The Board had denied the claims under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, finding the son's death was a direct result of his involvement in illegal drug transactions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board erred in law by failing to undertake a proportionality analysis between the victim's alleged conduct and the offenders' criminal conduct.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Board for rehearing.

The respondent was previously found guilty of civil and criminal contempt for his open, continuous, and flagrant refusal to obey a court order to testify at the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

Having served a six-month sentence for civil contempt, the court convened to determine the sentence for criminal contempt.

Applying the totality principle and considering mitigating factors such as pre-sentence custody and harsh incarceration conditions, the court sentenced the respondent to a further 30 days of incarceration, to be served consecutively without remission or parole.

The defendant, Ontario, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and refusing to strike the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff's claim alleged that detaining individuals in jail while awaiting a psychiatric hospital bed under a Criminal Code assessment order violated Charter rights and breached fiduciary duties, relying on the decision in R. v. Hussein.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification decision because the motion judge accepted the plaintiff's legal interpretation of Hussein as a pleaded fact, and because individual issues regarding the separate purposes of detention and assessment could overwhelm common issues.

Two police officers appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which had revoked a Hearing Officer's decision exonerating them of unlawfully exercising authority.

The officers had arrested a disruptive individual in a courtroom during a trial.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Commission erred by ignoring the Hearing Officer's credibility findings and by incorrectly concluding that a Justice of the Peace's contempt power superseded a police officer's power to arrest for a criminal offence in the courtroom.

The Hearing Officer's decision was restored.

The appellant, who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity, applied for a declaration restricting the interpretation of the victim notification requirements under s. 672.5(13.2) of the Criminal Code and challenging their constitutional validity.

The Ontario Review Board had previously adjourned his hearings to notify potential victims, but eventually granted him an absolute discharge when no victims were found.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for mootness, declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case because the appellant had already been discharged and there was no factual record involving actual victims to properly determine the statutory and constitutional issues.

The plaintiff sued the defendant doctor for sexual assault.

Criminal charges against the defendant were stayed, but during the criminal proceedings, the defendant received a Crown Disclosure Brief, which included a statement he made to police that was ruled inadmissible due to a s. 10(b) Charter violation.

In the civil action, the plaintiff sought production of the Crown Brief.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced until the Attorney General and relevant police service are notified and either consent or a court orders production.

Furthermore, the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

The plaintiff brought a civil action for damages for sexual assault against the defendant, whose criminal charges for the same allegations were stayed.

The plaintiff sought production of the Crown Disclosure Brief from the criminal proceedings, which included a statement the defendant made to police that was ruled inadmissible in criminal court due to a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The Divisional Court held that while the existence of the Crown Brief must be disclosed, its contents should not be produced without a screening mechanism involving the Attorney General and police to protect public interest.

Furthermore, the court ruled that the defendant's Charter-infringing statement to police was protected from production in the civil proceeding.

The applicant sought an order of mandamus to compel the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to reinstate his driver's licence following a suspension for impaired driving.

He argued that the six-month follow-up interview required by the Remedial Measures Program was not authorized by law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that a purposive interpretation of the Highway Traffic Act and its regulations authorized the three-component program, including the follow-up interview.

Furthermore, the application was moot as the applicant's licence had expired and been suspended for other infractions.

The plaintiffs, police officers, brought an action against two Assistant Crown Attorneys and the Crown for negligence, malicious prosecution, and other claims arising from assault charges laid against them.

The defendants moved to strike the negligence claims and the vicarious liability claims against the Crown.

The motions judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that Crown Attorneys are absolutely immune from suits for negligence, and the Crown is immune from liability for the actions of Crown Attorneys under s. 5(6) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The negligence claims and the action against the Crown (except for Charter claims) were struck out.

The applicants, inmates awaiting trial at the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, brought an application for judicial review challenging the implementation of a new telephone system that imposed an automatic twenty-minute time limit on outgoing calls.

They argued this restriction violated their freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter and section 5 of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no statutory or Charter breach, and held that any such breach would be saved by section 1 of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the application for pre-trial inmates, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.