Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law - ONSCDC

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision that stayed his eviction and rental arrears application against three joint tenants after one tenant filed for bankruptcy.

The Divisional Court found the LTB adjudicator made an error of law and breached procedural fairness by incorrectly advising the landlord that the bankruptcy stayed the entire proceeding against all tenants, rather than just the bankrupt tenant.

The court allowed the appeal, converted the application to seek arrears only, and ordered the two non-bankrupt tenants to pay $35,000 in rental arrears.

The Trustee sought court approval of an amended bankruptcy proposal, supported by the debtor and a major creditor, which would provide a 12.42% dividend to unsecured creditors funded primarily by the debtor's family.

The Office of the Superintendent in Bankruptcy opposed the approval, citing the debtor's lack of disclosure, failure to answer questions regarding the use of loan proceeds, and potential involvement in fraud.

The court refused to approve the proposal, finding that the debtor had not acted in good faith and that approving the proposal would compromise the integrity of the bankruptcy system.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that jurisdiction over the proposed appeal lies with the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the responding party.

The moving party, Juan Guillermo Gutierrez, brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of McEwen J. dated December 1, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party, the Receiver, fixed at $5,000.

The moving parties' motion for leave to appeal and for a stay of various orders was dismissed as abandoned.

The court ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the Receiver.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Minister's Designee decision upholding a plugging order that required him to plug 11 inactive oil and gas wells.

The applicant argued he was not an 'operator' under the Oil, Gas and Salt Resources Act, that the corporate veil should not have been pierced, and that the regulatory obligations were extinguished by bankruptcy proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable for the Designee to conclude the applicant had management and control of the wells, to pierce the corporate veil to enforce environmental remediation, and to determine the non-monetary regulatory order was not a provable claim in bankruptcy.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment but failed to perfect the appeal for over a year.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The appellant subsequently filed a consumer proposal and argued that the appeal and motion were stayed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Divisional Court held that the stay of proceedings under s. 69.2(1) of the BIA does not apply to an appeal initiated by the debtor.

Applying the Paulsson factors, the court dismissed the appeal for delay, noting the excessive delay, prejudice to the respondents, and the lack of merit in the appellant's arguments regarding language rights and the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of the lower court judge dated March 25, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding receiver in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The applicant Receiver sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision declaring it a successor employer under the Labour Relations Act.

The Receiver had been operating an insolvent debtor's retirement home business for several years.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable that the Receiver met the test for a successor employer.

The Court also agreed that section 14.06(1.2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act does not immunize a receiver from prospective collective bargaining obligations, but only from pre-appointment liabilities.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $25,000 to his former common-law partner for unpaid loans and living expenses.

He argued the trial judge failed to credit him for certain payments and that his debt should be reduced because the respondent had entered into a consumer proposal with her creditors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings.

The court also held that the respondent's consumer proposal did not reduce the value of the debt the appellant owed to her.

The moving parties, Project Spokane, LLC and Sean Walsh, brought a motion for leave to appeal an October 8, 2020 order of Conway J. in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award finding the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to order termination and severance pay against a related company and corporate directors following the employer's bankruptcy.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review.

The Court upheld the arbitrator's conclusion that he lacked jurisdiction to make orders against entities and individuals who were not parties to the collective agreement, noting that the related company was not a party and the Business Corporations Act requires a civil action to hold directors liable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

Case management endorsement scheduling a motion to determine whether a motion for leave to appeal a carriage decision in a proposed securities class action is stayed by an initial order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

The court directed the responding party to bring a motion to stay the leave application, to be heard by a single judge of the Divisional Court.

Two applications for judicial review were brought regarding preliminary awards by a labour arbitrator.

Solidwear sought to review the arbitrator's decision denying it party standing as a potential related employer.

Valleycroft, a bankrupt employer, sought to review the arbitrator's decision refusing to allow it to argue that the union's grievance was untimely.

The Divisional Court dismissed a preliminary motion to quash Solidwear's application for delay.

The Court dismissed Solidwear's application, finding the arbitrator's decision on standing was not patently unreasonable.

However, the Court granted Valleycroft's application, holding that the arbitrator's refusal to hear arguments on the timeliness of the grievance was a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted board of arbitration.

The appellants, members of a housing co-operative, appealed a judgment terminating their occupancy rights and ordering payment of post-bankruptcy arrears.

They argued the judgment violated the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act by identifying pre-bankruptcy arrears, and that they were denied procedural fairness when the application judge refused an adjournment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judgment did not violate the BIA as it explicitly stayed collection of pre-bankruptcy arrears, and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing the adjournment given the mounting arrears and prejudice to the co-operative.

The moving party union sought to quash the responding party employer's application for judicial review of a preliminary arbitration award on the basis of undue delay.

The employer had delayed 16 months in commencing the application and 21 months in perfecting it.

Applying the test for undue delay, the court found that while the delay was substantial, there was no actual prejudice to the union because the underlying employment relationship had ceased years prior due to bankruptcy, and the issue was a pure question of law regarding related employer status.

The motion to quash was dismissed, and the employer's cross-motion to have its application heard together with a related application was granted.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an order requiring them to post security for costs.

The plaintiffs had made a proposal to creditors under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, meaning the proceeds of the action would benefit the creditors.

The motions judge ordered security for costs, finding the plaintiffs were nominal and the creditors who stood to benefit had not shown an inability to post security.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance.

The appellant mortgagee appealed a trial judgment that declared its mortgage void and granted priority to construction lien claimants.

The trial judge found the mortgage contravened the financial assistance provisions of the OBCA, the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, and the Assignments and Preferences Act, as the mortgagor was insolvent and the mortgagee failed to conduct due diligence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or application of legal principles.

A cross-appeal by a lien claimant regarding trial costs was allowed, and its costs were increased.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of Wilkins J., which had set aside a Master's order requiring production of communications between a creditor and the bankruptcy trustee.

Wilkins J. had found that while strict common interest privilege did not apply, the communications were privileged on public policy grounds because the parties had a common intent agreement and the trustee's solicitor was acting as the solicitor for the creditor.

MacFarland J. dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of Wilkins J.'s decision and noting that the issues did not transcend the interests of the parties.