CITATION: McLaughlin v. Law Society of Ontario, 2026 ONSC 263

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 751/24 DATE: 20260114

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT

SACHS, FAIETA, MCSWEENEY JJ.

BETWEEN:

JOHN PAUL MCLAUGHLIN

John Paul McLaughlin, on his own behalf

Appellant

– and –

LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO

Rhoda Cookhorn, for the Respondent

Respondent

HEARD: June 16, 2025

REASONS FOR DECISION

FAIETA J.

[1] The appellant appeals from the decision of the Law Society Tribunal, Appeal Division, dated October 22, 2024 (the “Appeal Decision”), which dismissed the appellant’s appeal from a decision of the Hearing Division dated September 1, 2023 (the “Hearing Decision”) that: (1) dismissed the appellant’s request for a 45-60 day adjournment of the hearing; (2) found that the appellant had engaged in professional misconduct for having failed to cooperate with the investigation of the respondent Law Society of Ontario (“LSO”); (3) ordered a one-month suspension and an indefinite suspension pending compliance with the Investigator’s requests; and (4) ordered that costs of $1,500.00 be paid within one year.

[2] The Appeal Division dismissed the appeal. It found that: (1) the appellant was not denied procedural fairness when the Chair dismissed his request for an adjournment; (2) the Chair did not err in concluding that the appellant had failed to cooperate with the LSO’s investigation; (3) the Chair did not err in imposing the penalty. On January 13, 2025, the Appeal Division ordered that the appellant pay costs of $18,000.00 to the respondent LSO.

[3] For the reasons set out below, the appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Investigation

[4] Between January 2022 and March 2023, the LSO investigated a complaint made by a client against the appellant. An investigator for the LSO sent many communications to the appellant asking for his response to the complaint and requested that he provide the investigator with certain information and documents. The appellant provided partial responses. He repeatedly sought, and was granted, extensions to deliver the required information and documents. On January 31, 2023, the LSO investigator warned the appellant that she would pursue a regulatory proceeding against him if he did not provide the requested documents by the end of the week. Given that it appeared that the appellant had not provided a complete copy of the client file, on March 13, 2023, the LSO investigator asked for the appellant’s availability for an interview by March 20, 2023. The appellant did not respond. On March 27, 2023, the LSO investigator sent a letter requesting a response by April 6, 2023. The LSO investigator did not receive a response.

Application

[5] On June 9, 2023, the LSO commenced an application under s. 34 of the Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8 (the “Act”), for a determination that the appellant had contravened s. 33 of the Act by engaging in professional misconduct and for a conduct order under s. 35 of the Act. The LSO alleged that the appellant had contravened s. 49.3(2) of the Act and Rule 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, by failing to promptly and completely provide information and documents requested by the LSO’s investigator in communications made between January 2022 and March 2023. On that same day, the Law Society Tribunal notified the parties by email that the hearing had been scheduled for August 25, 2023.

[6] On June 26, 2023, the Hearing Division notified the parties that the hearing would proceed in writing, that the LSO’s materials were due on August 18, 2023, and that the appellant’s materials, including an affidavit, were due on August 23, 2023.

[7] On July 10, 2023, counsel for the LSO emailed the appellant to remind him that, amongst other things, the hearing would be heard in writing on August 25, 2023 and that his materials were due on August 23, 2023.

[8] On August 8, 2023, counsel for the LSO called the appellant on his business telephone number and left a voicemail message requesting that he return her call.

[9] On August 18, 2023, the LSO served its hearing materials on the appellant.

A detailed review of the steps in this proceeding is set out below as the appellant’s foundational concern is that he was not given an opportunity to address the LSO’s concerns.

Request for Adjournment

[10] On August 23, 2023, the appellant sent an email message to counsel for the LSO in respect of her email dated July 10, 2023. This email reads in part as follows:

I have just retrieved this E-Mail and would like to participate in any regulatory proceeding affecting me. I am canvassing legal counsel to represent me in this matter and should do so shortly. If the matter is to be heard in writing -- I can't properly respond with submissions & affidavits by today (August 23, 2023). An extension of time to properly respond and be heard so that a proper record is available is requested and natural justice afforded.

[11] On August 23, 2023, counsel for the LSO responded as follows:

In addition to my email of July 10, 2023 below, I attempted to telephone you on August 8, 2023 and left you a voicemail message requesting a call back. The Law Society’s evidence and materials were also served on you last week on Friday. Can you please confirm you have received them?

Adjournments are not automatic, even if the parties consent. You may wish to schedule a Proceedings Management Conference (“PMC”) to ask the Tribunal to grant you an adjournment of the deadline for submitting your responding materials. You may wish to review Rule 6 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, and/or the Law Society Tribunal’s practice direction on adjournment motions, which I have attached to this email.

You may also wish to access the Tribunal’s duty counsel program … Please advise me if you do obtain their assistance, or retain other counsel, and provide me with your representative’s contact information

[12] On August 24, 2023, the appellant asked the Hearing Division for a proceedings management conference for the purpose of requesting an adjournment of the hearing. His email states:

I request the scheduling of a Proceedings Management Conference (PMC) in order to seek an adjournment of a hearing (in writing) scheduled for August 25, 2023. Alternatively, I seek a short adjournment of between 45 to 60 days, before a hearing on the merits.

The purpose of the adjournment would be to review and respond to the existing record by E-Mail in this matter, including cross-examination of any affiants and adjournment to file a responding record -- to ensure the Tribunal has a proper record before it and natural justice.

Further, I am seeking legal counsel as a representative in this matter -- including contact under the duty counsel program -- to ensure the right to be heard, fairness and that the interests at stake can be fully addressed.

I am not currently in a position to proceed tomorrow August 25, 2023 and request the adjournment is in the interests of justice, is warranted and does not cause any prejudice -- but a complete record and the right to respond fully. [Emphasis in original.]

[13] Counsel for the LSO objected to the request. Her email dated August 24, 2023 states:

Considering the factors set out in the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Adjournment Requests (the “Practice Direction”) and in Rule 6 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”), the Law Society’s position is that an adjournment is not warranted in this case.

The Respondent has or ought to have had knowledge of this proceeding since the Notice of Application was issued on June 9, 2023, yet the request is being sought last minute. The Respondent has not provided any reasons that could be considered exceptional circumstances, pursuant to the Rules and Practice Direction. Summary hearings are designed to proceed in an expeditious manner, particularly because licensees in such cases remain out of compliance with their obligations (Law Society of Upper Canada v. Taskiran, 2016 ONLSTH 94, para 4). In this case, the alleged misconduct has been ongoing for approximately 18 months. Due to the considerable length of delay already caused by the Respondent’s misconduct, there is need for an expeditious hearing in this case.

Nonetheless, I am widely available to attend a special PMC tomorrow, if the Tribunal deems it necessary

[14] On the evening of August 24, 2023, the Hearing Panel issued the following Endorsement which concluded:

Mr. McLaughlin has not shown exceptional circumstances justifying an adjournment. His last-minute request makes scheduling an oral PMC prior to tomorrow’s hearing impossible.

On the evidence filed by the Law Society, the investigation of Mr. McLaughlin’s conduct, commenced over two years ago, is currently stalled because requests for Mr. McLaughlin’s availability for, and attendance at, an interview remain outstanding.

I conclude that Mr. McLaughlin has not shown that an adjournment is at all appropriate or necessary, let alone that exceptional circumstances exist justifying an adjournment.

Nevertheless, I will hold tomorrow’s written hearing down to the end of the day to permit Mr. McLaughlin to file a proper responding summary affidavit and to provide evidence explaining why he has not previously engaged with this application.

If Mr. McLaughlin does so by the end of tomorrow, I will consider allowing a short adjournment of the written hearing to permit Mr. McLaughlin to file written submissions and affidavit evidence on finding and penalty. If he does not, I will conduct the written hearing.

[15] On Friday, August 25, 2023, at 1:12 pm, the appellant advised the Tribunal that his affidavit should be ready and commissioned by 8:00 pm that evening:

Following the endorsement -- I am presently compiling the Affidavit & Attachments which should be ready (and commissioned) by 8:00 p.m. My understanding is that will substantively comply -- though not perfectly suffice on short notice. If the material should be ready sooner, I will advise. I request no decision be made until the materials are in fact provided.

[16] At 8:37 pm, the appellant sent the following email to the Tribunal:

Attached, find my unsworn affidavit & exhibits -- which I indicated earlier today I would endeavour to provide by 800 p.m. on short notice. As I couldn't meet the 800 p.m. timeframe and both have the affidavit sworn -- it is provided on the basis that it was. I can have it sworn tomorrow -- and provide a sworn version tomorrow with the same exhibits. Consider this limited response -- within the context of the limited timeframe accordingly. [Emphasis in original.]

[17] The appellant’s unsworn affidavit, which he sent to the Tribunal sent on August 25, 2023, describes problems that he had with receiving email in April 2023 and May 2023. The unsworn affidavit states;

10. In or about this time [March 2023], Bell had sent me an E-Mail as “Exhibit F” dated April 24, 2023 that it had “returned 18 incoming E Mails” amid some type of update requirement to my older E Mail system. I in fact had an older Bell E Mail system and believed this to be true. I could not know -what if anything had been returned.

11. I learned on at least 6 occasions during and before this period that E-Mails sent to me by 3rd parties, were not received by me or that certain E Mails seemed not to have been received. I knew this because I was asked if I received an E-Mail from “X” and I could discern that I did not receive it at that time.

12. On May 22, 2023 I received a Bell E-Mail as “Exhibit G” informing me my mailbox was “full” and I called Bell service to inquire as to what “messages” were referred to and was my E-Mail “full”.

13. At this time and in early 2023, my Bell E-Mail would abruptly not send any new E-Mail messages, ostensibly due to memory limitations. A message to that effect “popped up” after each attempt to send an E-Mail. Bell referred me to Microsoft, where I immediately purchased additional memory and a software package on a monthly plan, upon their advice, to ensure E-Mail worked properly – which it appeared to do so. However, for reasons I don’t understand or know that Bell or Microsoft E-Mail wouldn’t receive E-Mails, only send them. I had that service since the early 2000’s.

14. In addition, E Mail service was subject to some disruption when work was completed on what Bell technicians described as an underground line outside, due to new building or service construction and then subsequently on a new router or internal E Mail service or syncing. This transpired over the 2021 to early 2023 period -- involving several site technical, diagnostic and service visits. What happened is that occasionally E-Mails would appear much later, though not on the day they were apparently sent or in other cases, E-Mails sent wouldn’t always appear as sent. This appeared to be a technical or transitory “glitch”. I asked Bell these questions and more – but they didn’t explain logically why these things transpired.

15. To date, I retrieved an E-Mail from Ms. Farmer of the LSO attached as “Exhibit H” – on August 23, 2023 and immediately wrote to her explaining that if there was a regulatory hearing, I wished to participate in it and that I was trying to retain counsel – and fairness considerations applied. …

[18] The email dated April 24, 2023, from Bell states in part:

Dear Customer,

We noticed that your email account failed to sync and returned (18) incoming emails due to a conflict between the version of your email. According to our records, we cannot find your username & password in our system.

We urge you to verify your account below to avoid losing it forever. We have stopped (18) incoming emails now, if you don't upgrade to our latest version within 48 hours from receiving this email. Confirm your account below.

[19] The email dated May 22, 2023, from Bell states in part:

Dear customer, We want to suspend your mailbox because we notice you have been ignoring our messages and you are still using an old email security settings. Your mailbox is now full and you already have 99 important pending messages. We can no longer hold the messages so please click on the button below and fill in the details with the necessary information to verify your account to avoid email shutdown permanently.

[20] On Monday, August 28, 2023, at 8:30 am, the Tribunal sent the following message to the applicant:

I have reviewed your unsworn affidavit sent by email on Friday at 8:35 pm. In your email, you say that you could have your affidavit sworn on Saturday. If you intend to file a sworn affidavit, please do so. Please also respond to the following:

1. Having reviewed your draft affidavit, I am uncertain as to your position with respect to notice of this application. Accordingly, please advise when and how you first became aware of each of the following. I note that Ms. Rego’s affidavit describes the following emails and voice message:

· this conduct application

· the hearing of this application scheduled for August 25, 2023

· the Law Society’s email to you dated June 9, 2023 attaching the Notice of Application, an information letter and the summary affidavit of Ms. Roche

· the Tribunal’s email to you dated June 9, 2023 attaching the filed Notice of Application and an introductory letter

· the email from Tribunal counsel to you dated June 9, 2023

· the Tribunal’s email dated June 26, 2023 attaching the Notice of Application to which my endorsement made June 24, 2023 was annexed

· Ms. Farmer’s voice message left August 8, 2023

2. In Law Society of Ontario v. Diamond, [2021 ONCA 255, 458 D.L.R. (4th) 603] at paras. 50 and 67, the Court of Appeal articulated the following test for failure to cooperate:

Did the licensee act responsibility and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries, where good faith requires the licensee to be honest, open, and helpful to the Law Society and is not simply the absence of bad faith.

Based on your draft affidavit, there appears to be no dispute as to the inquiries that were made by the Law Society and your responses to those inquiries. I understand your draft affidavit to set out your explanation for the time taken for you to respond.

However, if there are other material facts that you consider should be taken in account, please state them now.

3. In your email of March 13, 2023 to Ms. Roche, you state that “I have more documents I am providing”. It does not appear from the evidence filed or from your unsworn affidavit that you provided those further documents to the Law Society. If you did provide those documents, please state how and when you did so and provide a copy of what you sent including any cover email or letter.

I will continue to hold the hearing of this application down until 9:00 am tomorrow morning.

[21] On August 29, 2023, at 11:31 am, the appellant responded as follows:

I am providing further clarification and responses today. This requires the checking certain records to inform the answers.

[22] On August 30, 2023, at 5:39 pm, the Tribunal emailed the appellant stating that it had not received anything from him following his last message.

[23] On August 30, 2023, at 8:45 pm, the appellant sent the following message to the Tribunal:

I have now accessed the relevant records and fact checked -- to address the questions posed by the Tribunal on short notice. That also required review of the LSO document portal. It took an extra day to do.

1. The "further documents" provided to the LSO by me comprised a September 2, 2022 mailing to the LSO-- enclosing a (i) 2 sided copy of the July 8, 2010 Tribunal decision, and (ii) a copy of the Don Drury Meeting/telephone record of Nov 20, 2013 which apparently could not be read from the PDF previously provided to the LSO document portal or to Ms. Roche. Each is in the attached PDF. This was mailed to Ester Roche of the LSO.

2. The LSO document portal received 4 separate PDF document tranches from me on the following dates between May 2022 to February 2023 -- (i) May 27, 2022 (ii) May 31, 2022 (iii) August 11, 2022 (iv) February 7, 2023 (v) February 8, 2023. When I examined the document portal, I noticed for example that the medical documents were not showing, sent previously. I resent those to the portal yesterday using a slightly modified description to test the portal. I am not a portal expert. My E-Mails (i.e. exhibits to my unsworn Aug 25 affidavit) to Esther Roche indicated I would need time to compile, review and provide the records, paper and electronic. In fact, my February 22, 2022 E-Mail to Ms. Roche set out the basic factual matrix and explanations and indicated more time would be necessary -- to ensure a fair process. Ms. Roche struck me as already forming a cognitive bias and wouldn't disclose her dealings with or fact finding of the complainant. That is very basic as part of fairness or fundamental justice. My initial response made it clear that I was participating or co-operating with the LSO, but also that an informed response required more time.

During our May 11, 2022 telephone conversation I explained to Ms. Roche that sole proprietors have challenges as they take on many matters and at certain times have to manage seemingly conflicting dates, matters or priorities. I told her there were boxes of records, which I have to review to determine if she needed them, or not. I also told her I would like to respond and asked for her patience in order to provide me the ability to provide an informed response, including any submissions.

3. What was Ms. Farmer's voice message of August 8, 2023? I don't recall any such voice message. I have never spoken to Ms. Farmer directly. I have called her on at least 3 such occasions and left at least 2 voice messages for her. As I understand it, Ms. Farmer is counsel for the LSO tribunal and is opposing my initial adjournment request (the reasons for the adjournment and request to be represented by counsel were set out by me previously to the Tribunal). Her role is now clearly adversarial. My understanding is the LSO alleged that I either didn't co-operate with the complaint investigation (which isn't true or factually correct given the brief factual responses on numerous occasions I have set out in the limited time below detailing each occasion of contact and co-operation. Not replying at all to the LSO would be an example of a failure to co-operate. It also isn't factually correct that I didn't respond to Ms. Farmer (although I have not had previous dealings with her as part of any LSO "investigation"). I didn't understand Ms. Farmer's activities to form part of the gravamen of the investigation or co-operative aspects of it or that form any part of these proceedings. Again, I don't ever recall to speaking on any occasion to Ms. Farmer -- only with Ms. Roche. If that is incorrect, advise me otherwise with particulars.

4. I am going to request again -- disclosure of all documents or records of all dealings with the LSO "investigative" aspect of this complaint, including analysis, recommendations or decision making within the LSO investigative unit -- and with the complainant. I have co-operated with the LSO for decades from annual filings, fee payments and CPD course participation. I did so in this factual matrix. When exactly did this complaint process transform from an "investigation" into what appears to be a "prosecution" -- devoid of a proper factual record and natural justice and fundamental justice principles. I want to cross-examine both Ms. Roche and Farmer before any factual findings or decisions are made by the Tribunal. I would do this in any matter where the conduct and dealings involving Ms. Roche and Ms. Farmer, appears to form a part of the alleged non-co-operation matrix underlying this matter. I am not familiar with this particular Tribunal, its decision-making process, [its] procedure or its outcomes. But it too is subject to a process and decision-making that must be reasonable, fair and in the interests of justice. I haven't been afforded that fully, or sufficiently. That was one of the reasons I wish to consult duty counsel -- experienced in these type of proceedings.

5. As indicated in my unsworn affidavit (and exhibits) of August 25, 2023 to which a single (1) day was provided to compile -- when Ms. Farmer's E-Mail dated July 10, 2023 was retrieved by me on August 23, 2023 -- I immediately wrote and called her, as set out in greater detail in my August 23, 2023 E-Mail. I was not aware of any timetable or the Tribunal’s email dated June 26, 2023, nor was it received by me. As stated in my August 25, 2023 affidavit, Bell informed me of E-Mail disruptions. I attached those Bell E-Mail notice exhibits. I attach these again. I have experienced those such Bell service disruptions, as set out in part in my August 25, 2023 affidavit. I know for a fact they occurred. My E-Mail of August 24, 2023 to the Tribunal again stated the reasons for an adjournment request and to consult counsel (which I unsuccessfully tried that day the LSO contact number not taking a voice mail message for duty counsel).

6. I would like the proper factual record before the Tribunal in this matter. Then the matter of the complaint can be substantively dealt with. [Emphasis in original.]

[24] The appellant never served or filed a sworn affidavit. Further, the appellant did not respond to the Hearing Panel’s question about whether he provided the LSO’s investigator with further documents following his message dated March 13, 2023.

Request for Adjournment – Hearing Decision

[25] For reasons dated August 31, 2023, the Hearing Panel dismissed the appellant’s request for an adjournment for the following reasons:

In his e-mail to Law Society counsel on August 24, 2023, Mr. McLaughlin stated:

The purpose of the adjournment would be to review and respond to the existing record by E-Mail in this matter, including cross-examination of any affiants and adjournment to file a responding record -- to ensure the Tribunal has a proper record before it and natural justice.

Mr. McLaughlin’s stated rationale in his affidavit is that (emphasis added) “ultimately, I want to see a just resolution on the merits, on a full record only after full argument.”

The instructed investigation that was being conducted by Ms. Roche arose from a client complaint and prior communications from the Law Society.

According to the Request for Powers to Investigate:

The Law Society received a complaint from [redacted] dated January 8, 2021. [redacted] raised concerns that the Lawyer delayed working on her file for six years. [redacted] also raised concerns that the Lawyer did not discuss the results of an appeal with her and did not respond to her phone messages and e-mails in a timely manner, or at all. The Law Society requested [redacted] provide additional documents in support of her allegations, which she did on March 10, 2021.

Without assuming that the client complaint of failure to respond is well-founded, it is of concern that Mr. McLaughlin is now subject to a conduct application for failure to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s investigative inquiries in respect of a complaint of failures to respond to a client.

Also of concern is that this conduct application is in respect of Mr. McLaughlin’s alleged failure to cooperate with an investigation of a prior alleged failure to cooperate with the Law Society.

Having concluded that Mr. McLaughlin has had an opportunity to respond to the allegations against him, I now also conclude that there is no need for an adjournment for further fact finding or for further submissions.

In Diamond, the Associate Chief Justice wrote at paras. 66 and 67 that:

The reputation of the legal profession rests on the public’s confidence that self-regulation is taken seriously by the legal profession. This can only occur where the legal profession has at hand effective and efficient tools by which to achieve accountability among its members. This is fundamental to the health and vibrancy of the legal profession.

Returning to the duty to cooperate, r. 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is designed to ensure that there is a complete response and no inordinate delays in investigations by the self-regulated authority. It requires nothing more than prompt and complete responses when requested, which are essential to moving investigations forward. Delays in doing so can only serve to shake the public’s confidence in the Law Society’s self-regulatory authority.

As Justice Rowe wrote for the majority in Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29; [2022 SCC 29](https://www.minicounsel.ca/scc/2022/29), [2022] 2 S.C.R. 220, at para. [32]]:

Legislatures delegate authority to administrative decision makers because of their proximity and responsiveness to stakeholders, their ability to render decisions promptly, flexibly and efficiently, and their ability to provide simplified and streamlined proceedings that can promote access to justice.

Taking into account that (i) this is a summary hearing intended to proceed expeditiously, (ii) the evidence is that a conduct investigation is stalled, (iii) Mr. McLaughlin has had the opportunity to identify issues in dispute, (iv) there does not appear to be a need for an adjournment in order to resolve relevant issues of fact or issues of law, I conclude that the written hearing should now proceed. [Citations omitted by me.]

Merits and Penalty – Hearing Decision

[26] The Hearing Panel found that the appellant had engaged in professional misconduct contrary to s. 33 of the Act as alleged.

[27] The Hearing Decision states:

[Mr. McLaughlin] states:

My understanding is the LSO alleged that I either didn't co-operate with the complaint investigation (which isn't true or factually correct given the brief factual responses on numerous occasions I have set out in the limited time below detailing each occasion of contact and co-operation. Not replying at all to the LSO would be an example of a failure to co-operate.

However, Mr. McLaughlin’s statement does not reflect the applicable law which is well established and was recently articulated by the Associate Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal in [Diamond].

Prior to his e-mail of August 30, 2023, Mr. McLaughlin was referred to the Diamond test in the email of August 28, 2023 (Exhibit 11).

At para. 50 of her reasons, the Associate Chief Justice also wrote:

In the end, the test for determining a failure to cooperate with the Law Society’s requests, as espoused by the Hearing Division, the Appeal Division, and the Divisional Court, focusses on the determination of a licensee’s good faith efforts to cooperate with the Law Society. While articulated slightly differently by the Hearing Division, the Appeal Division, and the Divisional Court, the following considerations emerge from these decisions: (a) all of the circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether a licensee has acted responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries; (b) good faith requires the licensee to be honest, open, and helpful to the Law Society; (c) good faith is more than an absence of bad faith; and (d) a licensee’s uninformed ignorance of their record-keeping obligations cannot constitute a “good faith explanation” of the basis for the delay.

What the Associate Chief Justice describes as acting responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries is described in Tribunal proceedings as cooperation. A failure to cooperate is a failure to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries. …

Mr. McLaughlin was asked to provide representations and materials on January 13, 2022.

Mr. McLaughlin is required to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries. Good faith required Mr. McLaughlin to be honest, open, and helpful to the Law Society. Good faith is more than the absence of bad faith.

I find that Mr. McLaughlin has yet to respond completely. There is no reason why he could not have done so long ago. On that basis alone, I find that he has failed to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly and completely to the Law Society’s inquiries.

While it is arguable that Mr. McLaughlin’s responses by May 2022 may have been prompt, his responses of February 2023 were not prompt. Nothing has been shown that could justify taking over one year to provide these responses. In respect of these responses, I find that Mr. McLaughlin failed to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly to the Law Society’s inquiries.

After one year of trying to get complete responses from Mr. McLaughlin, the Law Society decided that it would be more expeditious to interview Mr. McLaughlin. Rather than provide his availability, Mr. McLaughlin asked whether he was required to attend and the purpose of the interview and what procedural rights would be afforded to him. The Law Society provided a helpful response and arranged for Mr. McLaughlin to be assisted by duty counsel. Mr. McLaughlin says that he does not know if he received the Law Society’s response as he was busy. I find that Mr McLaughlin received a response to his e-mail of March 13, 2023 and did not then respond the Law Society’s request for his availability as he should have done.

Mr. McLaughlin now says, subject to conditions, that he has “no problem participating in the requested ‘interview’”. His conditions are that purpose, boundaries and function of the interview be explained to him. As the record shows, Ms. Roche responded to essentially the same point last spring saying that Mr. McLaughlin should get legal advice as he may require. In any event, the purpose of the interview is stated in the affidavit of Ms. Roche.

In her response to Mr. McLaughlin on March 14, 2023 and in her letter of March 27, 2023, Ms. Roche explained that:

The interview request is made pursuant to Section 49.3 of the Law Society Act, in particular s. 49.3(2)(c)). I have determined that an interview is necessary in order to gather further information about your representation of the client in this matter and to ask questions arising out of the materials you have already provided. Given the time it has taken to obtain documentary evidence from you, an interview is the most expedient manner in which to proceed with the investigation.

Subsection 49.3(2)(c) provides that a person conducting an instructed investigation may “require the licensee and people who work or worked with the licensee to provide information that relates to the matters under investigation”. Having concluded that requiring the provision of information by exchange of correspondence was not expeditious and as she was entitled to do, Ms. Roche required that information be provided by Mr. McLaughlin in an interview.

Mr. McLaughlin did not provide his availability for an interview as requested in March 2023. He has not done so since. The questions that he asked in March 2023 were promptly and reasonably responded to by Ms. Roche. I find that Mr. McLaughlin failed to act responsibly and in good faith to respond promptly to the Law Society’s request for his availability for and participation in an interview.

I accordingly find that Mr. McLaughlin has engaged in professional misconduct contrary to section 33 of the Law Society Act as alleged in the Notice of Application.

ISSUES

[28] The Appellant raises the following issues on this appeal:

(a) Did the Appeal Division apply the correct standard of review in deciding whether the Hearing Division denied the appellant procedural fairness?

(b) Did the Appeal Division err in concluding that the Hearing Division did not deny the appellant procedural fairness?

(c) Did the Appeal Division err in upholding the decisions of the Hearing Division on the findings of professional misconduct and penalty ?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[29] The standard of review on appeal from an Order of the Law Society Tribunal was described in Barnwell v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 1825 at paras. 35-38 as follows:

[35] The appellate standard of review applies, as set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; per Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 at para. 37. The standard of review is correctness for questions of law and palpable and overriding error for questions of fact and of mixed fact and law. For issues of fact and law where there is an extricable legal issue, that issue is reviewed on the correctness standard. …

[36] The decision under appeal is the Appeal Panel Decision. This appeal is therefore the second appeal, and it is particularly important to note the caution of the Supreme Court of Canada that this appeal is not a re-hearing and re-weighing of the evidence that was before the Hearing Panel.

[37] On matters of penalty, courts should give considerable deference to penalties imposed by the disciplinary bodies of self-governing professions. The court should not interfere unless the Panel made an error in principle or the penalty is clearly unfit.

[38] For issues of procedural fairness, the standard of review is correctness. [Citations omitted.]

ANALYSIS

Did the Appeal Division apply the correct standard of review in deciding whether the Hearing Division denied the Appellant procedural fairness?

[30] The appellant submits that the Appeal Panel erred in applying a reasonableness test, rather than a correctness test, in determining whether he was entitled to a short adjournment to present his case.

[31] The Appeal Division did not apply a reasonableness test. It stated:

An administrative tribunal is required to adhere to principles of natural justice and procedural fairness and a failure to do so will result in the decisions being set aside. Issues of deference do not arise when determining the issue. What the reviewing court must decide is whether there was an appropriate level of procedural fairness having regard to the principles established in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817]. However, there may be findings of fact underlying the assessment of what happened and, therefore whether there was a breach of fairness. If those facts are extricable issues from the law to be applied, the standard of review would be palpable and overriding error.

However, the Divisional Court has acknowledged the discretionary nature of decisions involving adjournment requests. [Footnotes omitted.]

[32] The appellate standard of review for an adjournment was described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ontario Securities Commission v. Go-To Developments Holdings Inc., 2022 ONCA 328, at para. 11, as follows:

The decision whether to grant an adjournment will be set aside only where the judge misdirected him or herself or was so clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice. [Citations omitted.]

[33] The Appellate Division did not apply a reasonableness standard to the procedural decisions of the Hearing Division that were challenged by the appellant. I find that the Appeal Division applied the correct appellate standard of review in respect of procedural fairness decisions and adjournment decisions.

Did the Appeal Division err in finding that the Appellant was not denied procedural fairness?

[34] The appellant submits that the Appeal Division erred in finding that he was not denied procedural fairness by the Hearing Division as a result of its refusal to: (a) grant his request for an adjournment; (b) permit him to retain counsel, cross-examine the LSO affiant and provide a full response to the claim of professional misconduct.

[35] The LSO’s failure to cooperate application is a summary hearing intended to proceed expeditiously as reflected by the summary process under Rule 21 of the Law Society Tribunal Rules of Practice and Procedure. Rule 6.3 provides that “… [o]nce an appearance before the assigned hearing panel is scheduled, that date is firm and adjournments will be granted only in exceptional circumstances, as set out in the Tribunal’s Practice Direction on Adjournments. …”.

[36] The Hearing Division’s conclusion that there was no need for an adjournment in order to decide the failure to cooperate application was based on the following facts: (i) the conduct investigation was stalled, (ii) the applicant had the opportunity to respond to the allegations against him and provided the requested documents: (iii) it did not appear that there was a reasonable prospect that the evidentiary record would be enhanced by an adjournment.

[37] The Appeal Division found that that the Hearing Division made no palpable and overriding error in findingthe above facts. The Appeal Division made no error in coming to this conclusion.

[38] In particular, the Appeal Division made no error in finding that the Hearing Division did not err in concluding that the appellant had not established that correspondence from the LSO dated March 14, 2023, March 27, 2023, and April 27, 2023 did not come to his attention notwithstanding the alleged emails from Bell dated April 24, 2023 and May 22, 2023 regarding a service disruption. It was open to the Hearing Division to refuse to draw any such inference particularly as the appellant had the opportunity to advise the Hearing Division that he had not received these emails but did not do so. Further, the Appeal Division made no error in finding that the Hearing Division did not err in concluding that the issues to be addressed on cross-examination did not address the issues raised on this Rule 21 application.

[39] In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant submits that the decision of the Hearing Division and the Appeal Division did not consider and balance Charter rights and values in making their decisions, particularly in relation to the LSO’s request for an interview. The appellant submits that Appeal Division erred in “… not recognizing or considering the Charter rights or values as set out by the Supreme Court in [Doré v. Barreau du Québec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395] in any tribunal discretionary decision – here the deprivation of the right to security – and the being deprived not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice”. This assertion is being raised for the first time on this appeal and was not raised in his Factum before the Appeal Division and may be dismissed on that basis alone. Further, the appellant has not explained how the Hearing Division’s decision in respect of his request for an adjournment and in respect of its finding that he failed to cooperate with an LSO investigation engaged Charter protections.

[40] The Appeal Division applied the correct legal principles and made no error in concluding that the Hearing Division did not err in refusing the appellant’s request for an adjournment.

Did the Appeal Division err in upholding the decisions of the Hearing Division on the findings of professional misconduct, penalty and costs?

[41] The Hearing Division relied on Diamond for the principle that whether the appellant had failed to cooperate with an investigation turns on whether he had provided prompt and complete responses when requested. The Appellate Division did not err in finding that the Hearing Division set out the correct test.

[42] Further, the Appellate Division did not err in finding that the Hearing Division had not erred in finding that the appellant had not responded promptly and completely to the LSO’s investigator, given that some of his responses took more than one year without any reasonable justification for such delay and that as of the date of the Hearing Division decision he still had not responded completely to the LSO’s requests.

[43] The Appellate Division did not err in finding that the indefinite suspension imposed by the Hearing Panel was proportionate. That penalty is prescribed by Rule 21.6(4)(c) of the LSO’s Rules of Practice and Procedure. The appellant has not demonstrated that this penalty is clearly unfit.

CONCLUSIONS

[44] The appeal is dismissed. As agreed by the parties, the LSO, being the successful party, is entitled to their costs fixed in the amount of $2,500.00.

Faieta J.

I agree:

___________________________ Sachs J.

I agree:

McSweeney J.

Released: January 14, 2026

Okafor v. Ontario College of Teachers, 2026 ONSC 263 DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 751/24 DATE: 20260114

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

SACHS, FAIETA, MCSWEENEY JJ.

BETWEEN:

JOHN PAUL MCLAUGHLIN

Appellant

– and –

LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

FAIETA J.

Released: January 14, 2026