CITATION: Air Canada v. Landry, 2026 ONSC 222
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-2954
DATE: 2026/01/12
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
AIR CANADA
Appellant
– and –
REJEAN LANDRY, SEBASTIEN MACDOUGALL-LANDRY, and EMALI MACDOUGALL-LANDRY
Respondents
Jiwan Son, for the Appellant
Simon Pak Hei Lin, for the Respondents
HEARD: September 3, 2025
JUSTICE I. CARTER
[1] The Appellant Air Canada appeals from the decision of Deputy Judge Stauffer of the Ottawa Small Claims Court, awarding damages to each of the Respondents as a result of delayed flights and denial of boarding.
[2] Rejean Landry booked flights for himself and two adult children, Sebastien MacDougall- Landry and Emali MacDougall-Landry, from Montreal to Portugal via Toronto on July 2, 2022. Mr. Landry also purchased return tickets for his two children to depart from Lisbon to Toronto on July 16, 2022, and a return ticket for himself, departing from Lisbon to Montreal on August 2, 2022. The flight from Montreal to Toronto on July 2nd was delayed and the connection to Lisbon would have been missed. As a result, Mr. Landry purchased three new higher fare tickets from Toronto to Lisbon. He brought a claim seeking the difference in the cost of the tickets, meal expenses and loss of one night’s hotel in Lisbon, as well as standardized compensation. In addition, the return tickets for the children were automatically cancelled and they were booked onto a new flight. Standard compensation for denial of boarding was also brought.
[3] The Deputy Judge allowed these claims but rejected claims for loss of income and compensation for frustration as a result of the conduct of the Appellant. In so doing, he made the following findings of fact:
a. Mr. Landry made the alternative bookings three hours after it was certain that the Respondents would not make the Toronto to Lisbon flight on July 2, 2022.
b. On July 2, 2022, Air Canada sent Mr. Landry four emails between 8:25p.m.- 11:43p.m. about their delay into Toronto. Those emails did not advise that the Respondents would be rebooked, nor advise them not to re-book on their own.
c. There was no evidence led that Air Canada ever re-booked the Respondents or took any steps to rebook them.
d. The Respondents arrived in Lisbon one day after their originally scheduled arrival.
e. Mr. Landry incurred out-of-pocket expenses of $5,026.65 for alternative booking, $95.82 for food at the Toronto airport while stranded, and $166.37 for a one-night missed hotel stay in Lisbon.
f. With respect to the return flight for the children, on July 16th, at the Air Canada check-in desk in Lisbon, they were advised that there were no available seats for that flight. Their return tickets had been cancelled because they had not used the first portion. They were not notified of the cancellation by Air Canda. They ultimately arrived at their destination more than six hours late.
[4] Air Canada alleges the following:
a. error in law and/or mixed fact and law in the trial judge’s interpretation and application of Schedule VI of the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1984, Chapter C- 26, as amended (the “Montreal Convention”) in finding and awarding damages for breach of contract or, “delay” within the meaning of Article 19 of the Montreal Convention;
b. error in law and/or mixed fact and law in the trial judge’s interpretation and application of Sections 12, 17 and 19 of the Air Passenger Protection Regulations, SOR/2019-150 (the “APPR”) in finding entitlement to standardized compensation for “delay” instead of “in case of refund”; and
c. error in law and/or mixed fact and law in his interpretation and application of Sections 1 and 20 of the APPR in finding entitlement to standardized compensation for “denial of boarding”.
[5] There is a preliminary issue with respect to the jurisdiction to bring an appeal as it relates to Sebastien MacDougall-Landry and Emali MacDougall-Landry. I will deal with this jurisdictional issue first. I will then deal with the alleged errors as they relate to Mr. Landry (the third alleged error has no application to him).
The Jurisdictional Issue
[6] The Deputy Judge awarded compensation in the amount of $2,800 for Sebastien MacDougall-Landry and Emali MacDougall-Landry each. Section 31(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43 states that an appeal lies to the Divisional Court from a final order of the Small Claims Court in an action for the payment of money in excess of the prescribed amount, excluding costs. The current prescribed amount for an appealable order is $3,500. Sebastien MacDougall-Landry and Emali MacDougall-Landry submit that, as a result, s. 31(a) does not permit Air Canada to appeal the judgment granted in favour of them, as their claims were each below the statutory monetary limit.
[7] In Action Auto Leasing and Gallery Inc. v. Robillard et al., 2011 ONSC 3264, the Court extensively reviewed the jurisprudence with respect to s. 31(a) and concluded that the section should be interpreted to mean that where a plaintiff seeks recovery above the prescribed amount, there is a right of appeal [see also Ajamal v. Bell Canada, 2013 ONSC 5225]. In Action Auto, the Court did not directly address the applicability of s.31(a) to the situation of multiple plaintiffs with distinct claims. The question here is whether the monetary limit in s. 31(a) should be the amount claimed by a particular plaintiff, or the aggregate of all plaintiffs.
[8] I agree with the Respondents that there are compelling reasons that the prescribed limit should be for the amount claimed by an individual plaintiff.
[9] First, the monetary limits for small claims actions should be interpreted uniformly. In s. 23(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act, there is a monetary limit for the maximum claim in each small claims case. The limit in s. 23(1)(a) has been interpreted to apply to each plaintiff, rather than the aggregate of all plaintiffs: Lock v. Waterloo (Regional Municipality), 2011 CarswellOnt 15974.
[10] Second, the Deputy Judge made a distinct monetary order for each Respondent, based on their distinct individual claims, each one independently enforceable by the Respondent for whom it was issued.
[11] Third, interpreting the monetary limit under s.31(a) to be the aggregate of the claims of all plaintiffs would produce a result that could undermine the just and efficient resolution of small claims cases. Take for example a situation in which Plaintiff A claims $1,000 and Plaintiff B claims $2,501, and both distinct claims were unsuccessful. Only Plaintiff A wishes to appeal. Plaintiff A could leverage Plaintiff B’s claim amount to meet the monetary threshold in s. 31(a) to appeal. This would be contrary to the intention of the provision, which is to restrict appeals where the monetary amount in issue does not justify the public resources required to conduct an appeal. Similarly, such an interpretation would grant the Defendant a right to appeal against Plaintiff A, even when no appeal is brought against Plaintiff B. Again, this is contrary to the intention of the provision.
[12] Given that Sebastien MacDougall-Landry’s claim was for under the prescribed limited, no appeal lies from the decision awarding him compensation. Similarly, given that Emali MacDougall-Landry’s claim was for under the prescribed limited, no appeal lies from the decision awarding her compensation.
[13] I turn now to the appeal against the claim made by Mr. Landry, who I will refer to as the Respondent for the remainder of these reasons.
The Alleged Montreal Convention Error
[14] Air Canada raises a preliminary issue that the Deputy Judge demonstrated his lack of understanding of the applicable regime when he wrote that each respondent was entitled to $1,000 compensation, “whether the APPR or the Montreal Convention is relied upon.” It is true that this is an incorrect statement of law. The standardized compensation of $1,000 is available only through the APPR. However, the Appellant does not point to how this misstatement effected the Deputy Judge’s analysis with respect to damages that were ordered pursuant to the Montreal Convention. I conclude that it had no effect, as is clear from his reasoning.
[15] The Appellant’s real complaint is two-fold. First, that the Deputy Judge erred in holding that damages for “breach of contract” were available under the Montreal Convention. Second, it is alleged that the Deputy Judge erred in failing to find that the term “delay” in Article 19 of the Montreal Convention means “reasonable delay.”
[16] I do not accept that the Deputy Judge made either of these errors.
[17] Article 19 of the Montreal Convention reads as follows:
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures [emphasis added].
[18] Article 22 of the Montreal Convention limits the amount of damages that can be claimed in relation to any delays that have occurred.
[19] The Deputy Judge found that Air Canada did not prove that it had taken all measures reasonably required to avoid the delay. That finding is entitled to deference on appeal. Indeed, the Appellant does not challenge that finding. As a result, the Respondent was entitled, pursuant to the Montreal Convention, to damages occasioned by the delay. Although the Deputy Judge used the phrase “breach of contract,” he ordered damages that flowed directly from the delay. Not only was he entitled to do so, Article 19 of the Montreal Convention required him to. The amount ordered was below the threshold set out in Article 22. The use of the phrase “breach of contract” does not detract from the Deputy Judge’s analysis of what damages flowed from the delay caused by Air Canada.
[20] The Appellant further argues that because the Respondent pre-emptively booked a new flight, there is no evidence as to what the actual delay would have been if Air Canada had rebooked them. As a result, the Respondent is not entitled to damages. It is submitted that there is a sound policy reason for ensuring that passengers do not “skip the queue” by rebooking before the airline has had an opportunity to do so.
[21] In light of the evidence led at trial and the factual findings made by the Deputy Judge, this argument has no merit.
[22] There was evidence at trial that Air Canada has a re-booking tool that will attempt to automatically re-book the passenger on a later flight(s) to their ultimate destination if there are delays and, if the tool is successful, the passenger will receive a notification of their revised itinerary upon the first flight. When the automated tool does not re-book the passenger, for whatever reason, the passenger must seek assistance from Air Canada and request re-booking from the appropriate agent at the airport or call Air Canada’s call centre, which is open 24 hours a day. However, there was no evidence that the re-booking tool had been activated or that Air Canada made any other attempt to rebook the Respondent. There was no evidence that the Respondent had been informed that he must wait to be rebooked. In fact, there is nothing in the tariff or in the Montreal Convention that states that a passenger must wait to accept a new flight from the airline. On the contrary, there was uncontradicted evidence that an Air Canada employee had told the Respondent that he had made the right decision to rebook.
[23] As noted by the Deputy Judge, this entire claim could have been avoided if Air Canada, in its multitude of emails to its waiting passengers in Montreal, had clearly stated words to the effect that he should not make any attempts to rebook and that Air Canada would do it automatically.
[24] It is not the role of this Court to ignore the evidence led at trial and the findings of fact made by the Deputy Judge in order to fashion a policy that one of the parties believes would be “sound.”
The Alleged Delay vs. Refund Error
[25] The Deputy Judge found that the Respondent arrived in Lisbon on July 4th - 24 hours and 20 minutes after the originally scheduled time.
[26] S. 19 of the APPR reads as follows:
(1) If paragraph 12(2)(d) or (3)(d) applies to a carrier, it must provide the following minimum compensation:
(a) in the case of a large carrier,
(i) $400, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by three hours or more, but less than six hours,
(ii) $700, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by six hours or more, but less than nine hours, or
(iii) $1,000, if the arrival of the passenger’s flight at the destination that is indicated on the original ticket is delayed by nine hours or more;
[27] Section 19(2) of the APPR section limits the delay compensation to $400 in the event the passenger’s ticket is refunded under section 17(2), which states:
If the alternate travel arrangements offered in accordance with subsection (1) do not accommodate the passenger’s travel needs, the carrier must
(a) if the passenger is no longer at the point of origin that is indicated on the original ticket and the travel no longer serves a purpose because of the delay, cancellation or denial of boarding, refund the ticket and provide to the passenger, free of charge, a confirmed reservation for a flight to that point of origin that accommodates the passenger’s travel needs; and
(b) in any other case, refund the unused portion of the ticket [emphasis added].
[28] The Appellant submits that, in the context of Sections 12(2) and 17 of the APPR, section 19 should be interpreted as providing standardized compensation in the case of delay only when the passenger accepts an alternative travel arrangement offered by the carrier under the original contract of carriage pursuant to Section 17 of the APPR. If the passenger is not provided with or rejects an alternative travel arrangement by a carrier, then the carrier is obligated to provide a refund of the unused portion of the ticket pursuant to Section 17 and provide standardized compensation of $400.00 in the case of a large carrier pursuant to Section 19(2) of the APPR.
[29] I do not accept the Appellant’s submission. On a plain reading of the legislation, section 17(2) is only invoked if the airline has offered the passenger alternative travel arrangements. In other words, an offer of alternative travel arrangements is a prerequisite to the application of both sections 17(2) and 19(2). The Deputy Judge found as a fact that no such alternative travel arrangements were offered in this case. While Air Canada eventually provided a refund, it did not do so in accordance with subsection 17(2) because it had not offered alternative travel arrangements. As a result, section 17(2) has no application here. Absent the applicability of section 17(2), the proper compensation provision is that found in section 19(1)(a)(iii). The Deputy Judge was correct to award standard compensation in the amount of $1,000 to the Respondent.
Conclusion and Costs
[30] For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.
[31] The parties are encouraged to agree on the quantum of costs. If they are unable to do so, the Respondents shall deliver costs submissions by January 23, 2026, and the Appellant shall deliver responding costs submissions within 15 days of receipt of the submissions of the Respondents. Reply submissions, if any, are to be delivered within 5 days of receipt of the submissions on behalf of the Applicant. The initial and responding submissions are not to exceed five pages doubled spaced excluding costs outlines and authorities. Any reply submissions are not to exceed four pages. All submissions are to be sent to my attention by email to scj.assistants@ontario.ca.
Justice I. Carter
Released: January 12, 2026
Released: January 12, 2026
CITATION: Air Canada v. Landry, 2026 ONSC 222
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-2954
DATE: 2026/01/12
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
AIR CANADA
Appellant
– and –
REJEAN LANDRY, SEBASTIEN MACDOUGALL- LANDRY, and EMALI MACDOUGALL-LANDRY
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice I. Carter