Court File and Parties

CITATION: Guilbeault v. Williams, 2026 ONSC 1539

COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-3100

DATE: 2026 03 12

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: CHARLES GUILBAULT, Appellant

-and-

KATHARINE WOODLAND, Respondent

BEFORE: Mr. Justice C. MacLeod

APPEARING:

Charles Guilbeault, Appellant (Tenant), in person

Katharine Woodland, Respondent (Landlord), in person

Eli Fellman, Counsel for the LTB

HEARD: March 11, 2026

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is an appeal of the dismissal by the Landlord and Tenant Board of a tenant’s application for refund of rent. The application was dated December 12, 2024. The decision of the LTB was dated September 25, 2025. The reason for the dismissal was the finding by the member that the application was statute barred due to the fact that the rent had been paid for more than 12 months before the application was launched. The presiding Member found that the increased rent had been paid since July of 2023 and was therefore deemed to be lawful by the provisions of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (SO 2006, c. 17 as amended).[^1]

[2] The Applicant appeals to this court on the basis that the presiding Member of the LTB made an error of law in finding that there was a “meeting of the minds” resulting in increased rent in July of 2023. As a subsidiary issue, he argues that a “temporary assessment” can never be categorized as rent.

For the reasons that follow, I am dismissing the appeal.

Background

[3] Briefly, it was the tenant’s evidence at the hearing before the LTB that he and his co-tenant were paying rent of $1650 per month. In mid 2023 the landlord advised the tenants that her costs had increased to more than $2,000 per month including a temporary assessment imposed by the condominium corporation. In an email, the landlord advised that she would have to increase the rent to “at least $2,000 per month”.

[4] According to the tenant, he agreed to contribute $350 per month towards the assessment and began to remit that amount each month along with the rent by way of a separate cheque. The tenant submitted that this was a voluntary contribution towards the increased cost from the assessment levied against the owner of the unit (the landlord) and was not a rental payment. It was his evidence that he and the landlord continued to negotiate. Factually, however, the tenants were paying the landlord $2,000 per month as of July of 2023.

[5] At the end of 2023, it is the tenant’s evidence that he finally agreed with the landlord to fold the $350.00 into the rent and to pay a single monthly cheque of $2,000. He began to pay the single rental payment starting in January of 2024. It is the tenant’s position that it was only in December of 2023 that there was a “meeting of the minds” regarding the increased rent and it was only in January of 2024 that he began paying rent (as opposed to rent plus a voluntary contribution) of $2,000 per month.

[6] In December of 2024 the tenant launched the application to have the increased rent declared unlawful and for a remedial order requiring the landlord to repay the overpayment for the months of January – December 2024.

[7] In her decision, the presiding Member of the LTB concluded that by whatever name the tenant called the extra payment and whether paying by one cheque or two, the tenants had effectively been paying rent of $2,000 per month since July of 2023. She based this finding on the very broad definition of “rent” in s. 2 of the Act and upon the email from the landlord indicating her intention to increase the rent. Although the presiding Member used the phrase “meeting of the minds”, when read in context that simply means that the landlord demanded an increase in rent and the tenant voluntarily agreed to pay what was asked. When the parties agreed to change the two payments to one and agreed it should all be treated as rent in December of 2023, the total amount of the monthly payment remained unchanged.

[8] The presiding Member then found that the rent increase was or would have been unlawful. It was unlawful because the landlord did not give notice in the approved form required by s. 116 of the legislation. The Member found that the rent increase would have been unlawful and void had the application been brought within 12 months of the increase.

[9] The presiding Member then went on to apply s. 136 (1) of the Act. That section provides that “rent charged one or more years earlier shall be deemed to be lawful rent unless an application has been made within one year after the amount was first charged”. As the Member concluded that the increased rent was first charged in July of 2023, an application brought in December of 2024 was out of time and the unlawfulness of the rent increase was cured by s. 136.

Analysis

[10] There is no dispute about the standard of review on an appeal to this court. An appeal is brought pursuant to s. 210 of the Act and is available only on a “question of law”. The appellate standard of review on a question of law is correctness. See Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 SCR 653. A correctness standard means that the court is free to substitute its own interpretation of the law if it finds that the tribunal is in error but it does not mean that the court should be blind to the specialized expertise exercised by a tribunal in interpreting its home statute. The court can be assisted by the analysis conducted by the tribunal when determining if there is an error of law. See Reisher v. Westdale Properties, 2023 ONSC 1817 (Div Ct.).

[11] Arguably, the finding by the Member about a “meeting of the minds” in June of 2023 is not appealable. That conclusion that the parties reached an agreement would be considered a finding of fact. Even if the statute provided for appeals for findings of fact or mixed findings of fact and law, however, the conclusion that the parties had reached an agreement to increase the monthly payment in June of 2023 was a reasonable conclusion open to the Member on the evidence before her. The landlord demanded an increase. The tenant began to pay it, perhaps under protest, or perhaps on an interim basis while the parties continued to negotiate. Recall that the landlord had asked for an increase to “at least” $2000 per month. So, although the tenant is correct that he and the landlord reached a “meeting of the minds” in December of 2023, that does not preclude a finding that there was an earlier agreement in June. That finding of fact would be entitled to deference even if appealable – which it is not.

[12] In any event, the decision by the LTB does not turn on whether there was an agreement or not. Rather, it turns on the question of when the tenant began to pay an increased amount. Clearly, the increased amount started in July of 2023 – albeit by means of a separate cheque and albeit called a voluntary contribution by the tenant.

[13] On the other hand, the ruling that the increased payment starting in July of 2023 was “rent” within the meaning of s. 2 of the Act is appealable because that is a conclusion of law based upon statutory interpretation. Although the Appellant continuously argued before me that the Act excludes a temporary assessment from the definition of rent, it does no such thing. An assessment by the condominium corporation against the unit is like a form of property tax. It is the unit owner or landlord who is liable. The landlord can seek to pass the increased cost on to the tenant by way of a rent increase, but the tenant is not directly liable for the assessment itself. There is nothing in the RTA which deals with assessments under the Condominium Act.[^2]

[14] I understand the argument the Appellant is making. He says it is unfair that a landlord faced with a temporary special assessment can increase the rent permanently by 21% to cover a temporary increase in the landlord’s costs. The landlord, of course, would argue that the special assessment which had to be paid over three years (ending in December of 2025) was only one of her increased costs. More importantly, this argument would only be relevant if the landlord had an application before the LTB to raise the rent by more than the provincial guideline. That is not what was before the board. The tenant’s application was not based on whether the increase was justified but only whether or not it was unlawful. An unlawful increase is void regardless of whether or not it is justified. That was the only issue. The tenant argued that since no proper notice had been given, the rent increase was not lawful and should have been void. On that point, the presiding Member agreed with the tenant.

[15] The member then went on to consider when the increased rent was first paid by the tenant. As found by the Member, the definition of “rent” is broadly inclusive. It includes all “consideration paid or given or required to be paid or given by or on behalf of a tenant to a landlord or the landlord’s agent for the right to occupy a rental unit and for any services and facilities and any privilege, accommodation or thing that the landlord provides for the tenant in respect of the occupancy of the rental unit, whether or not a separate charge is made for services and facilities or for the privilege, accommodation, or thing”. See s. 2 of the LTA. The exceptions to this definition are narrow and apply only to property taxes in relation to “a mobile home or a land lease home” or the provision of care services or meals in a “care home”.

[16] I do not consider the finding that increased rent was paid starting in July of 2023 to proceed from an erroneous interpretation of the LTA. There is no error of law in that finding.

[17] The Member then went on to apply s. 136 (1) of the LTA which, as noted above, deems rent that has been paid for more than a year before an application is commenced to be lawful. On that basis the application was dismissed.

[18] The applicability of s. 136 (1) is also a question of law and subject to appeal. In this case, the interpretation of s. 136 (1) is ultimately correct although the route to that conclusion is slightly more complex than reading the subsection in isolation. As pointed out by the Appellant and explained in helpful submissions by counsel for the Tribunal, there is a decision of the Court of Appeal which interpreted a predecessor to s. 136 narrowly. That decision was Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., 2007 ONCA 408 in which the Court of Appeal held that if the increase was rendered “void” by the statute, it could not be saved by the curative provisions of what was then s. 141 of the Tenant Protection Act, 1997.

[19] Read in isolation, the decision of the presiding Member is contrary to the finding in Price and therefore would be incorrect in law. But there has been subsequent legislative intervention. In 2020, s. 135.1 was added to the LTA. Subsection (1) specifies that “an increase in rent that would otherwise be void under subsection 116 (4) is deemed not to be void if the tenant has paid the increased rent in respect of each rental period for at least 12 consecutive months”. Subsection (2) then states that subsection (1) does not apply if the “tenant has, within one year after the date the increase was first charged, made an application in which the validity of the rent increase is in issue”. As a consequence, the legislature has effectively overruled the finding in Price and in doing so has underscored the legislative intention that tenants may not seek to challenge an increase to their rent after they have paid it for more than a year. See Sapershteyn et al v. 1821317 Ontario Limited et al, 2023 ONSC 5977 (Div Ct.)

[20] In summary, while the reference by the presiding member to s. 136 (1) without reference to the finding in Price might appear to be erroneous, s. 135.1 indicates that the ruling by the presiding Member is correct for applications brought after 2020. S. 135.1 means that an unlawful rent increase is not void unless the application is brought within one year of the tenant first paying the increased rent. That is precisely how the Member summarized the law.

[21] I conclude that the decision by the LTB is substantively correct and there was no appealable error of law.

Summary and Conclusion

[22] In conclusion, I find that there was no error of law on the part of the LTB and the appeal should be dismissed. The landlord was present but was not represented and did not seek costs.

[23] As is customary, counsel for the LTB was present to assist the court concerning the law and the statutory framework but took no position on the appeal. The Board did not seek costs.

[24] This appeal is hereby dismissed without costs.

Justice C. MacLeod

Date: March 12, 2026

[^1]: The appeal to the Divisional Court is pursuant to s. 210 of the RTA. Pursuant to s. 21 (2) (c)of the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c. C.43 as amended, appeals from the LTB are to a single judge.

[^2]: Condominium Act, 1998, S.O. 1998, c. 19, as amended, s. 84