CITATION: Sharpe v. CTS Canadian College, 2026 ONSC 1138
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 222/25-JR DATE: 20260226
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
R. Lococo, S. Nakatsuru, M. Kurz JJ.
BETWEEN:
Laurie Sharpe
Applicant
– and –
CTS Canadian College, Modern College of Hairstyling and Esthetics, Wendy Dussault AND The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Respondents
Shibil Siddiqi, for the Applicant
Taylor Trottier, for the Respondents, CTS Canadian College and Modern College of Hairstyling and Esthetics
Mindy Noble, for the Respondent, Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
HEARD at Toronto: October 29, 2025
Introduction
[1] The Applicant, Laurie Sharpe, applies for judicial review of the decision of Vice Chair Karen Dawson (the “Adjudicator”) of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “Tribunal” or the “HRTO”) dated February 24, 2025 (the “Decision”), reported at 2025 HRTO 463. At that time, the Tribunal dismissed Ms. Sharpe’s application for relief based on alleged disability-based discrimination. Ms. Sharpe contends that she was terminated from her position with the Respondents, CTS Canadian College and Modern College of Hairstyling and Esthetics (together, “CTS”), because she had disclosed to them that she is living with bipolar disorder and had requested accommodations for that disability.
[2] Ms. Sharpe argues that the Decision was both unreasonable and procedurally unfair. She asks this court to set aside the Decision, order that CTS breached its obligations to her under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the “HRC”), and remit the matter back to a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal for a hearing to determine the appropriate remedies for CTS’s discrimination. In the alternative, Ms. Sharpe seeks an order remitting this matter back to a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal for a hearing on the merits.
[3] CTS responds that the Decision is both reasonable and procedurally fair. It requests this court to dismiss this application. In the alternative, if the Decision is set aside, it asks that the matter be remitted back to the Tribunal for a hearing because this court lacks a full evidentiary record to determine the matter on its own.
[4] Because of my determination, discussed in detail below, that the process followed by the Tribunal was procedurally unfair to Ms. Sharpe, it is not necessary to consider whether the Decision was a reasonable one. Rather, I would remit this matter back to the Tribunal for a full hearing, which I would direct be arranged on an expeditious basis due to the extraordinary delays that have already been occasioned in this matter.
Background
[5] Ms. Sharpe is an individual who was employed by CTS for just over seven months as an office assistant/financial accounts administrator in its North Bay campus. Her employment commenced on November 6, 2014. On June 18, 2015, Carlos Carvalho, the CEO and chief decision-maker for CTS, terminated Ms. Sharpe’s employment.
[6] CTS is a private career college, headquartered in North Bay, Ontario. It operates campuses in North Bay and Sudbury. CTS offers vocational training in the hairstyling and esthetics industry.
[7] The respondent, Wendy Dussault was an employee of CTS and the direct supervisor of Ms. Sharpe. She did not participate in the proceedings before the Tribunal. In the Decision, the Adjudicator stated that, on the consent of the parties, Ms. Dussault had been removed as a party to the application before her and from the style of cause before the HRTO. Nonetheless, she is named as a respondent party to this proceeding and no party has asked that she be removed as a party. She did not independently participate in this proceeding.
[8] Ms. Sharpe says that she was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in May 2005, although she provided no evidence to the Tribunal of that diagnosis prior to her termination by CTS. Ms. Sharpe offers a narrative in which her bipolar symptoms were managed until sometime in 2015, when they began to affect her work. She says that in a meeting with her supervisor, Ms. Dussault, she disclosed her disability and requested accommodations. CTS admits in its response to the Tribunal application that Ms. Sharpe disclosed her disability to Ms. Dussault, but only in the context of an incident at work. However, CTS states that Ms. Sharpe did not request any accommodations for her disability.
[9] Ms. Sharpe wrote a lengthy letter to Ms. Dussault on June 12, 2015, setting out suggestions for procedures at work which affected her. That letter, which was placed before the Tribunal, made no reference to Ms. Sharpe’s disability, nor did it describe Ms. Sharpe’s suggestions as accommodations for a disability.
[10] On June 18, 2015, Mr. Carvalho called Ms. Sharpe into a meeting. At that time, he told her that her employment was being terminated. Ms. Sharpe says that they discussed her letter of June 12, 2015, and she disclosed her disability to him. She claims that he told her that “this is a personal matter” and to “keep it to yourself”. Mr. Carvalho does not deny engaging in the meeting with Ms. Sharpe but denies that he told her to keep the “personal matter” to herself.
[11] Ms. Sharpe asserts that her employment termination, combined with CTS’s failure to accommodate her disability, together constitute discrimination under the HRC.
[12] CTS denies that Ms. Sharpe’s employment was terminated because of her disability, or that she suffered any discipline related to it. Rather, it asserts that it terminated her for purely financial reasons. In fact, CTS contends that the employment of the person who held the same position as Ms. Sharpe in its Sudbury location was terminated at about the same time as Ms. Sharpe, for the same financial reasons.
[13] The key issues before the Tribunal were based on credibility: whether Ms. Sharpe was fired because of her disability and whether she had disclosed that disability before her employment was terminated. The Tribunal accepted CTS’s narrative that Ms. Sharpe was fired for purely financial reasons and that Mr. Carvalho was unaware of her disability when he terminated her employment. It did not accept that she ever requested accommodations for her disability.
[14] The unfortunate history of this proceeding is exceedingly prolonged, through no manifest fault of either Ms. Sharpe or CTS. The majority of the delays lay at the feet of the HRTO.
[15] Ms. Sharpe commenced the Tribunal proceedings more than ten years ago, on September 21, 2015. A hearing took place before HRTO Vice-Chair Doyle, commencing in 2018. However, no decision was ever released as Ms. Doyle left the Tribunal sometime in 2021, before releasing a decision in Ms. Sharpe’s case. Ms. Doyle’s departure came more than five years after the case was commenced and three years after the hearing began.
[16] On February 16, 2024, over eight years after the proceeding commenced, the Adjudicator issued directions for a de novo merits hearing. As she ruled, “[t]his means that the merits hearing will start over from the beginning.” Among the Adjudicator’s February 16, 2024, directions were the following, which prohibited new evidence at the de novo hearing:
[4] Accordingly, at the de novo merits hearing, no party may rely on or present any document not included on a document list and provided to the other parties and filed with the Tribunal prior to the previous merits hearing in compliance with Rule 16 of the Tribunal’s Rules.
[5] No party may present a witness at the de novo merits hearing whose name was not disclosed in a witness list and whose witness statement or expert report was not provided to the other parties and filed with the Tribunal prior to the previous merits hearing in compliance with Rule 17 of the Tribunal’s Rules.
[6] No new witness statements that were not properly filed prior to the original merits hearing will be accepted.
[17] On July 4, 2024, the Adjudicator issued a further set of directions. She noted that Ms. Sharpe had only filed one witness statement, her own, but had not filed that of her treating psychiatrist. Since the omission of the psychiatrist’s statement appeared to be an administrative error, the Adjudicator gave Ms. Sharpe a seven-day deadline to re-file her submissions including the missing witness statement. The Adjudicator further noted that she had obtained a seven-person witness list from CTS, but only received two witness statements, those of Wendy Dussault and Vicky Landry-Arbour. The Adjudicator confirmed that:
a. Only witnesses for whom witness statements were filed will be allowed to testify at the de novo merits hearing, and
b. The parties’ hearing documents will be limited to the documents that have already been filed with the Tribunal in accordance with the February 16, 2024, directions.
[18] The HRTO hearing took place over six days, on November 26-28 and December 3-5, 2024. In line with the Tribunal’s procedures, no recording was made of the proceedings. My description of the events cited below comes from the parties. They do not significantly differ regarding the events which took place and rulings made, even absent transcripts of the hearings or endorsements setting out rulings.
[19] Each of the parties filed witness statements for the original hearing, including one for Mr. Carvalho. The February 16, 2024 ruling anticipated those witness statements being the basis of the witnesses’ evidence. Nonetheless, each party was also entitled to provide their witnesses’ viva voce evidence to supplement their statements and to cross-examine the witnesses proffered by the other side.
[20] However, at some point during the course of the hearing, the Adjudicator allowed CTS to file a second witness statement of Carlos Carvalho. Ms. Sharpe asserts that Mr. Carvalho’s second witness statement, which is more than twice as long as his first, offers a new justification for Ms. Sharpe’s termination. Both statements are reproduced later in these reasons.
[21] Furthermore, although each party was allowed to cross-examine the other’s witnesses, Ms. Sharpe was prohibited from cross-examining Mr. Carvalho about any differences between his two witness statements. There is no record or endorsement which explains those rulings. Furthermore, the Decision makes no reference to those rulings.
The Decision
[22] The Adjudicator was willing to accept, without deciding, that Ms. Sharpe was indeed disabled by bipolar disorder during the term of her employment with CTS. Although her supervisor, Ms. Dussault was never called to testify, the Adjudicator rejected Ms. Sharpe’s evidence and found that she had not disclosed her disability to Ms. Dussault. The Adjudicator made that finding despite the fact that CTS admitted in its Response to Ms. Sharpe’s application that:
Laurie Sharpe did identify to Wendy Dussault that she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder however, it was made known to Wendy in an attempt to explain the behaviour of Laurie Sharpe from an incident that took place the previous day at the College between the two. Wendy Dussault was very supportive and understanding in this meeting and offered her support. In no way did Laurie Sharpe ask for any accommodations and she requested that her Bipolar disorder kept in confidence.
[23] In dismissing Ms. Sharpe’s application, the Adjudicator relied in large measure on findings of credibility against Ms. Sharpe and in favour of Mr. Carvalho. The Adjudicator rejected Ms. Sharpe’s evidence in large measure because she found that Ms. Sharpe had not mentioned her bipolar disability or specifically referred to accommodations in her letter to Ms. Dussault.
[24] The Adjudicator further found that Mr. Carvalho was unaware of Ms. Sharpe’s disability and accepted his claim that Ms. Sharpe had been terminated for strictly financial reasons. As set out above, because of my finding regarding procedural fairness, it is not necessary for me to consider the reasonableness of the Adjudicator’s ruling. However, the credibility of the two key witnesses, Ms. Sharpe and Mr. Carvalho, was at the crux of the Adjudicator’s decision.
Legal Authorities on Procedural Fairness
[25] The parties agree that the merits of the Decision are subject to a reasonableness standard of review: see Ontario (Health) v. Association of Ontario Midwives, 2022 ONCA 458, 161 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 47, citing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653.
[26] However, a tribunal is required to conduct its proceedings fairly. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario wrote in Afolabi v. Law Society of Ontario, 2025 ONCA 257[^1], 44 Admin L.R. (7th) 191, at para. 60, leave to appeal refused, 2025 128517 (S.C.C.):
[E]valuating whether the duty of procedural fairness has been adhered to by a tribunal requires an assessment of the procedures and safeguards required in a particular situation. Second, where procedural fairness is at issue, the question is not whether the substance of the decision was correct or reasonable but, rather, whether the decision-making procedure was fair having regard to all of the circumstances....[^2]
[27] In the seminal case of Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 23-27, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a non-exhaustive list of five factors which a court must consider when determining whether the common law duty of fairness has been met in the particular circumstances of a case. They are:
the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it;
the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates;
the importance of the decision to the affected individual(s);
the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and
the choices of procedure made by the decision-maker, particularly where the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedure.
[28] At para. 22 of Baker, L'Heureux-Dubé J., explained the role of those factors, as follows:
I emphasize that underlying all these factors is the notion that the purpose of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have them considered by the decision-maker.
[29] I review the Baker factors below, as they apply to this case.
Factor 1: The Nature of the Decision Being Made and the Process Followed in Making it
[30] The decision in this case was whether Ms. Sharpe had been the victim of discrimination by her former employer, CTS. It came within the context of a quasi-judicial process, which allowed both written and oral evidence as well as the right to cross-examine witnesses.
Factor 2: The Nature of the Statutory Scheme and the Terms of the Statute Pursuant to which the Body Operates
[31] Proceedings before the Tribunal are subject to the procedures set out in s. 10.1(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (the “SPPA”). That provision entitles parties to an administrative proceeding governed by the SPPA to “conduct cross-examinations of witnesses at the hearing reasonably required for a full and fair disclosure of all matters relevant to the issues in the proceeding.”
[32] Under s. 2 of the SPPA, that legislation “shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and cost-effective determination of every proceeding on its merits.”
[33] In Plante (Litigation guardian of) v. Economical Insurance Co., 2024 ONSC 7171, 47 C.C.L.I. (6th) 258 (Div. Ct.), at para. 66, Edwards R.S.J. wrote for this court that “[i]t is now over one hundred years since Wigmore wrote that ‘cross-examination is the greatest known method for detecting the truth’. Those words remain as true today as they did a century ago.” Edwards R.S.J. added at para. 70 that under s. 10.1(b) of the SPPA, “procedural fairness entitles a party to know the case to be met and contradict the evidence submitted by other parties”.
Factor 3: The Importance of the Decision to the Affected Individual(s)
[34] The Decision is very important to Ms. Sharpe as she seeks to vindicate what she claims to be an infringement of her right to work in a discrimination-free employment environment and to have her alleged disability accommodated. It is also important as she seeks remedial relief for her loss of employment. For CTS, it seeks to demonstrate that it did not discriminate against Ms. Sharpe and that her employment was fairly terminated.
Factor 4: The Legitimate Expectations of the Person Challenging the Decision
[35] In light of the Adjudicator’s rulings of February 16 and July 4, 2024, I accept that prior to the commencement of the hearing Ms. Sharpe (and her counsel) legitimately expected that neither party would be able to submit new witness statements. Further, in light of the fact that the parties were entitled to cross-examine the other’s witnesses, once CTS was allowed to file a second witness statement of Mr. Carvalho, Ms. Sharpe legitimately expected that her counsel would be able to explore the differences between Mr. Carvalho’s two statements. Cross-examination on those differences would have been a crucial tool to challenge Mr. Carvalho’s credibility. Ms. Sharpe’s expectation assumes even greater import in a proceeding where credibility is the heart of the Adjudicator’s decision-making process.
Factor 5: The Choices of Procedure Made by the Decision-Maker, Particularly where the Statute Leaves to the Decision-Maker the Ability to Choose its Own Procedure
[36] At para. 27 of Baker, L'Heureux-Dubé J. instructs reviewing courts to take into account the choices of procedure made by the tribunal below, “particularly when the statute leaves to the decision-maker the ability to choose its own procedures, or when the agency has an expertise in determining what procedures are appropriate in the circumstances.” L'Heureux-Dubé J. adds that while “not determinative, important weight must be given to the choice of procedures made by the agency itself and its institutional constraints”.[^3]
[37] To this, counsel for the Tribunal adds that it is not the court’s role in a judicial review application to determine that optimal procedure which the Tribunal should have followed; that deference should be shown to the Tribunal’s choice from among procedurally fair options. I respond to that point below.
Analysis
[38] I agree with counsel for the Tribunal that this court should offer an element of deference to a tribunal with expertise and experience in determining human rights cases. Such tribunals have to balance the rights of the parties with the need for an expeditious determination of the issues before it. Here, I can understand the Tribunal’s intention to deal with this case as promptly and efficiently as possible, particularly in light of the enormous delays that this case had already faced.
[39] However, deference cannot be afforded when a tribunal ignores its own rules and rulings in an ad hoc and one sided manner, one which is prejudicial to the fair hearing rights of one party and then fails to explain why it has done so.
[40] The Tribunal issued two rulings setting out the evidence that would be allowed in the hearing. It was clear that it would allow the parties to file only their original witness statements. However, for some reason, and at the twelfth hour, the adjudicator allowed CTS to file a second, more detailed and somewhat different statement by Mr. Carvalho. As I understand it (because there is no record or endorsement), it did so without advance notice, during the course of the hearing, and without offering any reasons for its decision. Absent those reasons, the Adjudicator’s ruling is not entitled to judicial deference: Law Society of Upper Canada v. Neinstein, 2010 ONCA 193, 99 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 61.[^4]
[41] I add that there was a meaningful difference between the two statements that Mr. Carvalho offered to the Tribunal. I set those two statements, without any edits, below and describe what I see as the differences between them.
[42] Mr. Carvalho’s first witness statement is dated February 16, 2017, and written in the form of a memo to CTS’s counsel. It states:
RE: LAURIE SHARPE MATTER
I met Laurie after she was hired at the Modern College North Bay Campus.
Virtually no interaction other than good morning, how are you and the odd meeting at the Campus but not very many at all.
On the day of her lay off, I offered to meet with Laurie after a discussion with Wendy where she expressed that she was looking forward to meeting with Laurie at all.
Wendy was very nervous to do this and I said not to worry that I would do it. I went on to say that since it was me that decided to cancel the position in both campus (North Bay and Sudbury), that I would offer to meet with Laurie. I also said that creating the position was a mistake to begin with and a bad decision on my part.
I chose the Head Office location in case Laurie would break down for some reason and then having to walk out while staff and students present.
[43] I note that this statement offered no rationale for Ms. Sharpe’s termination, other than a decision to cancel the position which Ms. Sharpe held, in both CTS locations. It does not state why it was necessary to cancel those positions.
[44] Mr. Carvalho’s second witness statement, which was delivered during the course of the hearing, reads as follows:
WITNESS STATEMENT OF CARLOS CARVALHO
Mr. Carlos Carvalho’s testimony will include, but will not be limited to the following;
Mr. Carvalho is the CEO and chief decision-maker for the respondent College, which operates campuses in North Bay, Sudbury and Barrie.
While it was Mr. Carvalho’s idea to create the job of Office Administrator/Financial Aid Administrator (“OA/FAA”) for North Bay and a similar role for the Sudbury campus, he had no role in hiring Ms. Sharpe for the North Bay role or Ms. Renee Bradley, who was hired for the similar Sudbury role.
The purpose for creating these positions was to attempt to increase bookings for the clinic students by allowing them more time spent providing client services (hairstyling, esthetics). In designing the role, the Financial Aid Administrator duties were secondary to office administrator responsibilities, aimed to fill in any extra time available to the employee.
Prior to the creation of the OA/FAA position, the students were responsible for the administrative tasks at the campus.
Mr. Carvalho and Ms. Sharpe had virtually no interactions during the period of her employment, other than occasional, casual interactions at the Campus.
After having reviewed the services revenues for both North Bay and Sudbury Campuses for many months, which are derived from student client bookings, Mr. Carvalho concluded that the new positions were not creating the benefits he had anticipated they would, and decided to eliminate the positions.
The decision to eliminate the positions after a relatively brief period of existence was made solely on the basis of organizational objectives and efficiencies, once Mr. Carvalho determined that the positions had created no value for the organization.
Mr. Carvalho had no knowledge of Laurie’s disability at the time he decided to eliminate the OA/FAA position. Neither the existence of Laurie’s disability, her job performance, nor any personal characteristic of Laurie’s were factors in his decision to eliminate the OA/FAA position.
Once Mr. Carvalho communicated to Wendy that he intended to eliminate the position, Wendy expressed her apprehension about communicating the decision to Laurie. Mr. Carvalho also admitted to Wendy that he acknowledged that it was a mistake creating the positions and a bad decision on his part. Mr. Carvalho therefore offered to communicate his decision to Laurie himself on June 18, 2015 at the main campus.
[45] This witness statement was far more detailed than Mr. Carvalho’s first one. More to the point though, it offered a rationale for the termination which was lacking in the first witness statement: that Ms. Sharpe’s position (as well as the equivalent position in Sudbury) were not generating the revenues anticipated. Thus, Ms. Sharpe was terminated “solely on the basis of organizational objectives and efficiencies, once Mr. Carvalho determined that the positions had created no value for the organization.”
[46] Even the decision to allow the second statement of Mr. Carvalho to be placed into evidence, without offering the same right to Ms. Sharpe, and to do so in the midst of the hearing may not have been fatal had Ms. Sharpe’s counsel been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Carvalho on any discrepancies between the two statements. But for reasons that do not appear on the record (as set out above, there is no transcript or written ruling), or in the Decision itself, Ms. Sharpe’s counsel was not allowed to cross-examine on this point.
[47] In light of the centrality of credibility to the determination of this case, the unjustified restriction on Ms. Sharpe’ statutory right to cross-examine Mr. Carvalho at an oral hearing, and the prejudice that the late filing of the second witness statement visited upon Ms. Sharpe, I can only find that her procedural right to a fair hearing was violated.
[48] As a result, the Decision cannot stand.
Conclusion
[49] In light of my findings above, I would grant Ms. Sharpe’s application. However, I am not in a position to decide the matter on the merits based on the record before me. Reluctantly, in view of the extraordinary delay which has already occurred, I would remit this matter back to a differently constituted panel of the HRTO for a new hearing on the merits. However, I would direct the Tribunal to expedite the hearing of this matter.
[50] Regarding costs, the parties have agreed that the successful party in this application is entitled to costs of $7,500, all inclusive. Thus, I would order that CTS pay Ms. Sharpe costs of $7,500, all inclusive.
___________________________ M. Kurz J.
I agree
R. Lococo J.
I agree
S. Nakatsuru J.
Date of Release: February 26, 2026
CITATION: Sharpe v. CTS Canadian College, 2026 ONSC 1138
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 222/25-JR DATE: 20260226
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
R. Lococo, S. Nakatsuru, M. Kurz JJ.
BETWEEN:
Laurie Sharpe
Applicant
-and-
CTS Canadian College, Modern College of Hairstyling and Esthetics, Wendy Dussault AND The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
M. Kurz J.
Date: February 26, 2026
[^1]: Also cited as Mirza v. Law Society of Ontario.
[^2]: Citing Moreau-Bérubé v. New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 249, and Halsbury's Laws of Canada, "Administrative Law", (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada, 2022 Reissue), at HAD-87.
[^3]: Citing: IWA v. Consolidated-Bathurst Packaging Ltd., 1990 132 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 282, per Gonthier J.
[^4]: Citing (albeit in the criminal context): R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 869, at paras. 25-26; R. v. Braich, 2002 SCC 27, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 903, at para. 31; R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 15-18, 52-53.