Citation and Court Information
CITATION: Knauff v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 786
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 164/24
DATE: 20250205
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Backhouse, Faieta, Ryan Bell JJ.
Parties
BETWEEN:
ADAM KNAUFF Plaintiff
– and –
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO and HIS MAJESTY THE KING AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND FORESTY Defendants
– and –
ANIMAL JUSTICE Intervenor
Counsel and Hearing
Daniel Mulroy, Wade Poziomka and Nick Papageorge, for the Applicant
Mindy Noble, for the Respondent, Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario
S. Zachary Green, and S. Brener, for the Respondent, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario
Mani Kakkar, for the Intervenor, Animal Justice
HEARD at Toronto: February 4, 2025
ENDORSEMENT BY THE COURT
[1] This is a judicial review of the decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “HRTO” or “Tribunal”) dated November 29, 2023 (the “Decision”) and reconsideration dated February 15, 2024 (the “Reconsideration Decision”) dismissing Adam Knauff’s two applications against his previous employer, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry (the “Employer”). In those applications, Mr. Knauff alleged reprisal and that the Employer discriminated against him on the basis of creed because of his ‘ethical veganism’. The HRTO held that Mr. Knauff’s ethical veganism was not a creed and dismissed both applications as outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.
[2] Mr. Knauff asks this Court to quash the Decisions and decide whether his ethical veganism constitutes a creed under the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (the “Code”). Alternatively, Mr. Knauff asks this Court to remit the matter to a differently constituted Tribunal panel for redetermination. The Employer asks that this Court dismiss the application.
[3] Prior to the issuance of the Decision, the parties entered into a settlement of the underlying complaints. The HRTO adjudicator was not aware of this settlement until after she had issued her decision and Mr. Knauff sought reconsideration. The Minutes of Settlement provide in part:
This settlement shall be irrevocable and takes effect following the Tribunal’s Preliminary Hearing with respect to whether ethical veganism constitutes a creed for the purposes of the Ontario Human Rights Code. For clarity, the Applicant seeks a decision from the Tribunal with respect to ethical veganism as a creed however is herein resolving the remainder of the Applications as against the Respondent and is not seeking any further damages against the Respondent. The Applicant and/or Respondent is free to judicially review the decision of the Tribunal with respect to the Preliminary Hearing issue of whether ethical veganism is a creed.
The Applicant agrees that the above noted applications are withdrawn immediately upon signing the MOS, not to be refiled in this or any other forum.
[4] While the right to seek judicial review was explicitly preserved in the Minutes of Settlement, it is open to the court before whom judicial review is sought to decide whether to exercise its discretion to grant relief: Yator v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2024 SCC 8 at para.51. It is well-established that mootness is one ground on which this Court may dismiss an application for judicial review: see e.g. Al-Turki v. R., 2022 ONSC 5771 (Div. Ct.); Work Safe Twerk Safe v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2021 ONSC 6736 (Div. Ct.); Stewart v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2013 ONSC 7907 (Div. Ct.) at paras. 17-19.
[5] A case is moot if “the controversy between the parties that affected their rights has been resolved.” (Al-Turki, at para. 22). The Supreme Court has held that “if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy exists which affects the rights of the parties, the case is said to be moot.” (Borowski v Canada (Attorney General), 1989 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342 at 353).
[6] Even if the impugned Decisions of the Tribunal were set aside, Mr. Knauff’s applications were withdrawn at the HRTO and cannot be refiled according to the terms of the Minutes of Settlement. He has no remaining claim before the Tribunal and may not seek any remedies from the HRTO in relation to his allegations of discrimination. Mr. Knauff wishes to make new law establishing that ethical veganism is a creed under the Code. The Employer takes no position on whether ethical veganism is a creed under the Code consistent with its position on this question before the HRTO. It asks that this Court dismiss the application. The HRTO takes no position as to the application’s outcome. With respect to the merits of the application, the Intervenor, Animal Justice, submits that the HRTO misstates the test for determining if a belief system is a creed under the Code.
[7] Mr. Knauff submits that this application is not moot for the following reasons:
(a) Although a settlement was reached, it was specifically contemplated in the Minutes of Settlement that either party was free to judicially review the decision of the Tribunal with respect to the Preliminary Hearing issue of whether ethical veganism is a creed;
(b) This question being unresolved affects him as he does not have the right to have his ethical veganism accommodated in his future employment, nor in any area to which the Code applies. If the Tribunal’s decisions are allowed to stand, Mr. Knauff will spend the rest of his life unable to avail himself of the Code’s protections with respect to creed, as the Tribunal has ruled that his ethical veganism does not qualify;
(c) Further, he feels unwelcomed, unprotected, and genuinely unwanted in Ontario and a full determination will help him move on;
(d) This issue will impact the Employer’s future dealings with employees, contractors, and volunteers.
[8] We do not find these arguments that this application is not moot persuasive. The parties’ agreement that either is free to judicially review the decision is not binding on this Court’s exercise of its discretion. As the Court of Appeal has held, “Courts exist to resolve real disputes between parties and not to provide opinions in response to hypothetical or academic problems.” (Tamil Co-operative Homes Inc. v. Arulappah, 2000 5726 (ON CA) at para.13). If this Court were to hear this application and find that the Decisions were unreasonable, the matter could not be remitted to the Tribunal for redetermination as there is no longer any outstanding proceeding before it.
[9] Notwithstanding that this case is moot, the Court has discretion to hear it anyway. Under Borowski, supra at 358-361 this discretion is exercised by considering three factors:
a. Whether there is still an adversarial context between the parties;
b. Whether the expenditure of judicial resources on a moot matter is justified; and
c. Whether a decision of the court on a moot matter would be an intrusion into the function of the legislative branch.
[10] Mr. Knauff argues that the application should be heard regardless of mootness. He submits that the above three factors all weigh in his favour. The Intervenor, Animal Justice also argues that, in the event the Court concludes this case is moot, the Court should exercise its discretion to hear it.
a. Whether there is an Adversarial Relationship
[11] Mr. Knauff submits that an adversarial relationship persists between him and the Employer because the question of whether his ethical veganism constitutes a creed under the Code is not settled.
[12] We disagree. There is no adversarial context between the parties. Mr. Knauff’s argument that there is a comprehensive record of the proceedings before the Tribunal has no merit. The Employer took no position on whether ethical veganism is a creed under the Code either before the Tribunal or on this application. Now that the allegations of discrimination have been settled, the Employer has nothing left to contest. If this case proceeds, the Court will hear from debaters on only one side.
[13] Mr. Knauff’s argument that the absence of an adversarial context can be overcome because “the Court has the inherent power to appoint an amicus curiae to argue that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable and ethical veganism is not a creed under the Code”, would turn this case into a private reference in which advocates argue with no legal stake in the outcome.
b. Whether the expenditure of judicial resources on a moot matter is justified
[14] Mr. Knauff emphasizes that judicial economy ensures that “important questions, which might independently evade review, are heard and decided by the court” and “are balanced against the social cost of continued legal uncertainty”. (Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Mosher, 2015 ONCA 722, at paras 34-35.)
[15] Mr. Knauff submits that this application raises novel questions that are “of broad public importance on which the courts have had very limited opportunity to provide guidance”. He submits that this is not the first time that the issue of ethical veganism arose in the context of a human rights application, but it is the first time the Tribunal answered the question. Therefore, he submits that this presents a rare opportunity for judicial interpretation that will likely not arise again anytime soon.
[16] Mr. Knauff argues that any concerns about judicial economy must be weighed against concerns regarding access to justice. He argues that due to the existing access to justice barriers, people with creeds not recognized by Ontario courts may choose not to expend the time and incur the expense of bringing a complaint to the Tribunal or even seeking an accommodation. As such, the Divisional Court should decide the current case to provide up-to-date guidance to employers and employees. Moreover, this Court must not permit the Tribunal’s impermissibly rigid approach to the Code to become entrenched in Ontario’s human rights adjudication.
[17] The Intervenor, Animal Justice, submits that this case presents the first opportunity for an Ontario court to consider whether ethical veganism is a creed under the Code. As such, this Court should exercise its discretion to decide the application. The Intervenor submits that this question is significant for many beyond Mr. Knauff. It submits that the question of whether ethical veganism is a creed under the Code has evaded review in multiple cases. This is the first case where an applicant is represented by counsel, overcoming the disadvantages of being a self-represented litigant. Like Mr. Knauff, the Intervenor submits that it is not clear when another case like the current one will arise.
[18] We find no reason why this Court could not consider the question of whether ethical veganism is a creed in the context of a live controversy between interested and contending parties. There is no evidence that this question is evasive of review. It was not evasive of review before the HRTO where Mr. Knauff received a hearing and a determination of the question first in the Decision and second in the Reconsideration Decision. The fact that he disagrees with the HRTO’s determination does not make this issue evasive of review.
Proper Law-Making Function of the Court
[19] Mr. Knauff submits that the Code does not define creed and the Legislature left its interpretation to the Tribunal, subject to judicial review. Therefore, this Court exercising its discretion to answer the question would give effect to legislative intent.
[20] As noted by Sopinka J. in Borowski, supra, at para. 40, the “… third underlying rationale of the mootness doctrine is the need for the court to demonstrate a measure of awareness of its proper law-making function. The court must be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework. Pronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties may be viewed as intruding into the role of the legislative branch.” In our view, Mr. Knauff is inviting this Court to step outside of its role on an application for judicial review and to reform the statute-book in a way that is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intention that “a decision of the Tribunal is final and not subject to appeal and shall not be altered or set aside in an application for judicial review or in any other proceeding unless the decision is patently unreasonable.”(Code, s. 45.8.) The applicant has no mandate to “develop” human rights law on behalf of others not before the court, now that his own case has been resolved.
[21] Mr. Knauff, as the party seeking to have a moot matter heard, has not met the onus of establishing that this Court should depart from its usual practice of refusing to hear moot matters. (Stewart v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2013 ONSC 7907 (Div. Ct.) at para.28).
[22] For these reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed.
[23] As agreed upon by the parties, the Employer as the successful party is entitled to costs in the amount of $3000.00 all inclusive.
Backhouse J.
Faieta J.
Ryan Bell J.
Released: February 5, 2025
CITATION: Knauff v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, 2025 ONSC 786
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 164/24
DATE: 20250205
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Backhouse, Faieta, Ryan Bell JJ.
BETWEEN:
ADAM KNAUFF Plaintiff
– and –
HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO and HIS MAJESTY THE KING AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND FORESTY Defendants
– and –
ANIMAL JUSTICE Intervenor
ENDORSEMENT
Released: 2025-02-05```