CITATION: M.R. v. A.S., 2025 ONSC 7168
OSHAWA DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-25-1726-00
NEWMARKET SUPERIOR COURT FILE NO.: FC-24-1374-00
DATE: 20251222
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: M.R., Appellant
AND:
A.S., Respondent
BEFORE: The Hon. Justice J. Cameron
COUNSEL: M.R. – Self-Represented
No one appearing for the Respondent
HEARD: December 18, 2025 (by videoconference)
ENDORSEMENT
I. Nature of the Application
[1] The Appellant applies for a stay pending appeal of an Order made December 3, 2025, after a trial before Justice A. Himel, allowing the Respondent to permanently relocate to Croatia with their one-year old child. The Appellant has appealed the decision of Justice Himel to the Divisional Court. He seeks a stay of her Order on an urgent basis as he submits the plan to relocate the child is imminent.
[2] The hearing was initiated by the Appellant who was seeking, amongst other relief, an Order with respect to parenting time. The Respondent also sought an Order seeking the ability to relocate with the child to Croatia.
[3] The Respondent has not filed material on this stay application, nor did she attend the hearing. I note that she was short-served with the material. Given the apparent urgency of the application, I allowed the Appellant to abridge the time for service and heard the application on December 18, 2025.
[4] The crux of the Appellant’s complaint on appeal is that pursuant to an Order made by the Trial Scheduling Conference judge on October 24, 2025, the Appellant was precluded from calling any witnesses at trial. According to the Appellant, he was therefore unable to meaningfully put forward his position through evidence at his trial.
[5] The Appellant alleges that there is a serious issue to be tried regarding the correctness of this October 24, 2025 Order. He further asserts that the trial judge erred in not revisiting this Order by allowing him to call witnesses.
[6] The Appellant submits that he will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted because his young child will be taken away from him and the rest of his family.
[7] Finally, the Appellant submits that the balance of convenience favours a stay.
II. Issue
[8] The single issue on this Application is whether a stay pending appeal should be granted. The test is similar to an interlocutory injunction. It requires that I consider:
a. Whether the appeal raises a serious issue that the decision is wrong;
b. Whether the Appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the stay is not granted; and
c. Whether the balance of convenience favours a stay.
See: RJR-McDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1994 117 (SCC), [1994] 1 SCR 311; Lefebvre v. Lefebvre, 167 OAC 85, [2002] OJ No 4885 (QL), 2002 17966 (ONCA), at para. 6.
[9] The three parts of the test are interrelated. The strength of one can compensate for the weakness of another.
Factual Background:
The Order of Justice Daurio Dated August 27, 2025:
[10] On August 27, 2025 Justice Daurio made an Order permitting the Appellant to amend his Application for parenting time (amongst other relief sought) no later than September 10, 2025. This was not done.
[11] In her Decision, Justice Daurio stated: “It seems as though the Applicant has an insatiable appetite for conflict, litigation, drama and attention. The Court strongly encourages the Applicant to reconsider his approach to litigation and to his parenting plan for M.A. The Applicant is approaching the behaviour of a vexatious litigant and this is not a strategically sound approach to a parenting matter involving a very young child.”
The Order of Justice MacPherson Dated October 24, 2025:
[12] The Appellant appeared before Justice MacPherson October 24, 2025 for a Trial Scheduling Conference. The Appellant had not prepared a Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form as he was required to do. Justice MacPherson did not accept the Appellant’s reasons for not doing so as bona fide.
[13] Justice MacPherson found that the Appellant was unnecessarily difficult during the exchange regarding his completing the form and, ultimately, had the Appellant muted on the Zoom call. Justice MacPherson then stood the matter down for 1.5 hours to allow the Appellant time to complete the form. When court resumed, the Appellant had not completed the form. Therefore, Justice MacPherson proceeded to complete the form with the Respondent. During this process, Justice MacPherson found that the Appellant was disruptive, turning on and off his camera, unmuting himself and, finally, due to his disruptive behaviour, he had to be removed from the conference.
[14] Justice MacPherson invited the Appellant back at the completion of the Respondent’s portion of the form to advise the parties of the dates for the trial blitz. The Appellant, had to be muted again as he was interruptive and disruptive.
[15] Justice MacPherson advised that the Appellant could be a witness to his own case and provided an opportunity for him to file a 20-page affidavit and to testify for 2 hours.
[16] Justice MacPherson did not provide for additional witnesses for the Appellant as he did not cooperate in the completion of the form.
The Trial Readiness Conference Before Justice Himel:
[17] A Trial readiness conference was held before Justice Himel on November 14, 2025. A three day trial was set. The Appellant requested an adjournment. Justice Himel denied the request for an adjournment finding that this was a high-conflict matter that must proceed to trial, noting the concerns with respect to the Appellant’s conduct raised by both Justice Daurio and Justice MacPherson. Justice Himel declined to revisit Justice MacPherson’s October 24, 2025 Order. Justice Himel did delay the start of the trial to allow additional time for the Appellant to prepare. She held that if either party had a witness or new documentary evidence with respect to events that took place after October 24, 2025, they could serve and file that material by November 24, 2025.
Analysis:
[18] I first address the decision below and then consider the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.
A. Decision
The Trial Decision of Justice Himel:
[19] The trial proceeded before Justice Himel on December 1 and 2, 2025. In her Decision reported at 2025 ONSC 6819, Justice Himel made the following factual findings:
The Appellant commenced an Application on August 28, 2024, three weeks after the child's birth, even though the parties signed an agreement in May 2024 that dealt with his parenting time;
The Respondent filed an Answer dated December 9, 2024 and an Amended Answer dated October 8, 2025.
The parties are the parents of one child, M.A. age 16 months. The child resides primarily with the mother and has sporadic supervised parenting time with the father. The father has paid no child support.
This family law case is one of at least four cases started (or threatened) by the Appellant against the Respondent. The Appellant began his campaign of litigation on the night the Respondent gave birth to the child and includes: two civil cases, a Small Claims Court case, a request for a Certificate of Pending Litigation against her home, a complaint to the police which resulted in criminal charges, and threats to try to change matters that were already finalized in this case.
The Appellant, who has paralegal or legal training (but is not licenced as a paralegal), has used the litigation as a way to control the Respondent, and cause her significant financial and emotional distress.
The Appellant’s approach to this litigation and his behaviour since meeting the Respondent in fall 2023, confirmed that these concerns continue today.
The Appellant’s actions are best described as litigation abuse and, amongst other harassing behaviour, meet the test for family violence.
The Appellant’s parenting motion on August 27, 2025, is a recent example of litigation abuse. In her decision dated September 10, 2025 ("Ruling"), Justice Daurio found that the father served more than 200 pages of motion materials, including 13 affidavits. The father blatantly ignored the Central East Practice Directions on page limits and the order of Justice MacPherson made seven days before the motion.
Notwithstanding his own breaches, the Appellant refused to consent to the late filing of the mother's materials, which she required because of the volume of materials. He objected to her request to amend her pleadings. The Appellant wanted Justice Daurio to decide his request for unsupervised and increased parenting on his record alone.
The Appellant lied to Justice Daurio stating that "he did not have any outstanding charges" nor convictions. The father, when using his previous/other name Matthew Riddell, was convicted in 2006, and there are references to other criminal convictions in the Law Society of Ontario decisions.
On August 27, 2025, the Appellant was well aware of an incident that took place on July 26, 2025. He was charged with assault with a weapon (a bat) and mischief over $5,000 (damage to a car) involving a third party.
The parties were repeatedly advised that this matter would proceed to a trial in November 2025, given the high conflict, the mother's request to relocate to Croatia, and the very young child's need for stability. Once the Appellant decided that he did not want the trial to proceed he took step after step to prevent this matter from being heard.
The Appellant repeatedly breached court orders for disclosure and for the service and filing of court materials, and he violated orders setting out page limits and other directions. The Appellant declined to meaningfully participate in this litigation since at least September 10, 2025, when Justice Daurio released her Ruling and declined his request for increased parenting time.
On October 25, 2025, the Appellant refused to cooperate with the completion of the Trial Scheduling Endorsement form, necessitating Justice MacPherson to complete it on his behalf. There is a lengthy endorsement setting out the repeated attempts of the court to have the father complete the form and participate. Justice MacPherson states"the father was disruptive, turning on and off his camera, unmuting himself after being muted by the court, and then he finally needed to be removed from the court attendance."
The Appellant was required to complete the trial record in addition to his affidavits, proposed exhibits and other materials, with a completion date of November 5, 2025. He attended at court for Trial Readiness Court on November 14, 2025, having failed to serve or file any materials and seeking an adjournment. He demanded the opportunity to call 25 witnesses to refute the Respondent’s evidence (which she was forced to prepare without the benefit of his evidence even though she was the Respondent).
After being granted an extension of time to file materials, and a later start date for the trial, the Appellant opted not to serve any trial materials. Instead, on November 28, 2025, he advised the court that he had just filed an urgent motion before the Divisional Court, seeking a stay and leave to appeal the Orders dated October 25 and November 14, 2025. He was informed that the trial would proceed as scheduled on December 1, 2025.
The Appellant sent several emails between November 28 and December 1, 2025, stating that he had a motion before the Divisional Court on December 1. The court checked with the Divisional Court in the morning of December 1, 2025 and was advised that no motion had yet been scheduled, let alone scheduled for that day.
The Respondent emailed later stating he had a motion before the Divisional Court on December 2, 2025. He also said that he would make himself available by Zoom on December 1, 2025 to make submissions before Justice Himel. He was advised that the trial was proceeding as planned, in person at the Newmarket Court at 11:00 a.m.
The Respondent sent a final email stating:
Then, this matter will be the subject of appellate review (as of right) before a full panel of the Divisional Court and likely the Canadian Judicial Council. Not permitting statutory appellate rights to be carried out and heard and determined on its merits is a flagrant disregard of procedural fairness and natural justice. I am simply following the directions of a higher court given to me, protocol, the current Practice Direction and the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Appellant opted not to attend the trial. At 11:30 a.m., when the trial was close to being completed, the Appellant appeared before the court. He interrupted the trial during the Respondent’s examination of the landlord. Once again the Appellant attempted to stop the trial from proceeding. He stated that there was a motion scheduled before the Divisional Court on December 3, 2025. It was unclear (to him) why the trial was moving ahead. He alleged that he was denied the chance to participate on December 1, 2025.
Justice Himel reminded the Appellant that he was repeatedly informed that the trial was proceeding as planned on December 1 at 11:00 a.m. at the Newmarket Court. He was the Applicant. His opportunity to participate in the trial, as the moving party, was on December 1, 2025, at the commencement of the trial. Justice Himel invited him to observe the balance of the trial, which he declined to do and left the courtroom. At approximately 12:00 p.m. he re-entered the court and observed the Respondent making her closing submissions.
At the conclusion of the trial, amongst other relief, Justice Himel granted the Respondent’s request to permanently relocate to Croatia with the child.
After a thorough consideration of the law related to family violence under the CLRA, including a consideration of litigation abuse and the actions of the Appellant in this case, Justice Himel found that as a consequence of the Appellant’s aggressive, intrusive and harassing behaviour, the Respondent feels unsafe. Justice Himel held that but for the Appellant’s conditions prohibiting contact as a result of criminal charges, she would have serious concerns for the Respondent’s safety.
After a thorough consideration of the factors to be considered with respect to parenting issues and the Respondent’s request for relocation, including the best interests of the child, Justice Himel made the following Orders:
The Applicant father ("father") shall have supervised parenting time with the child, M.A.
The father's parenting time shall be at the Respondent mother's ("mother") sole discretion, in respect of level of supervision (fully supervised or semi-supervised or supervised exchanges), location, duration, frequency, form of contact (in-person, virtual and/or in writing), and jurisdiction (in Ontario and/or Croatia).
The mother shall be permitted to relocate with the child to Croatia, effective today.
The father's consent to the mother's travel with the child, and to obtaining and renewing government documents is hereby dispensed with.
The parties shall communicate by Appclose and only about issues affecting the child. The father shall be limited to one communication per week of no more than three sentences, unless he has care of the child (in which case he can communicate as needed by text). The mother shall respond to the communications unless she determines that the communication is abusive or harassment or it exceeds one communication per week. In that case, the mother need not respond. The mother has the discretion to block the father as she deems is appropriate and necessary.
The father shall be prohibited from removing the child from York Region or Peel Region.
This Court Orders that, pursuant to section 36(2) of the Children's Law Reform Act, the York Regional Police, the Peel Police, the Toronto Police the OPP (the police service) and any other police service having jurisdiction where the child may be found are directed to forthwith locate, apprehend and deliver the child to the mother.
This Court Orders that, pursuant to section 36(4) of the Children's Law Reform Act, the police service named herein and any other police service having jurisdiction where the child may be found shall do all things reasonably able to be done to locate, apprehend and deliver the child in accordance with this Order.
This Court Orders that, pursuant to section 36(5) of the Children's Law Reform Act, for the purpose of locating and apprehending the child in accordance with this Order, any member of the police service named herein and any member of any other police service having jurisdiction where the child may be found may enter and search any place where he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing that the child may be, with such assistance and such force as are reasonable in the circumstances
This Court Orders that, pursuant to section 36(6) of the Children's Law Reform Act, an entry or a search referred to in subsection iv) of this Order shall be made only between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. standard time.
This Order shall expire after ten (10) years following the date of this Order.
This Order does not direct or authorize police to locate, apprehend and deliver the child more than three times.
The mother may file this order with any police service willing to accept the order for filing, and with the Canadian Border Services Agency if they are willing to accept the order for filing.
The father shall pay retroactive child support based on an imputed income of $55,000 per year in the table amount of $507 per month for the period from August 7, 2024 through December 31, 2025, inclusive.
The father shall pay the retroactive child support of $8,619, in the minimum amount of $507 per month commencing January 1, 2026, in addition to any tax refunds, government payments such as HST or windfalls such as lottery winnings. The child support shall be garnished from any Ontario Works or ODSP payments, in the amounts provided for in the relevant legislation.
The father shall pay costs in the amount of $7,275, within 30 days. The costs are enforceable by FRO as child support.
The father shall provide his annual income tax return, notices of assessment, and any other disclosure required according to section 24(1) of the Provincial Child Support Guidelines on an ongoing basis, by June 1, annually.
Before the father may proceed with any further family law litigation including but not limited to any motion, an Application, or a Motion to Change, he must seek leave from the Court by 14B (with a request that the 14B be directed Justice MacPherson or to me). It is unlikely that leave will be granted unless the following criteria are met:
(a) The father serves the mother and files his 14B (and the materials set out below) no earlier than December 3, 2027;
(b) The father serves and files a 14A (or no more than three pages double space) with: (a) evidence that he has paid all costs and all retroactive child support that is owing; (b) evidence that the child is habitually resident in Ontario; (c) the factual basis for the relief claimed.
(c) The father includes the Final Order of MacPherson J. dated October 4, 2024, and my order dated today with the materials.
(d) For a Motion to Change the father must include his draft MTC which includes the stated material change, and evidence he has appropriately addressed the mental health issues set out in the Reasons dated today; and
(e) The father includes a new sworn form 35.1 with all criminal charges and convictions in all of his names.
The mother may (but need not) respond to the 14B motion unless directed to do so by the court.
A Support Deduction Order shall issue.
Unless the support Order is withdrawn from the Office of the Director, Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the support Order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.
This order bears interest at the rate of 4.0 percent per annum on any payment or payments in respect of which there is a default from the date of default.
All other claims made in the Application or Amended Answer are hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
[20] I now move to consideration of the three-part test.
B. Is there a serious issue that the Trial Scheduling and Trial Judge were wrong?
[21] The first part of the test is a low threshold. It can be met if the question raised by the appeal is not “frivolous or vexatious”. The Appellant asserts that there is a serious issue that both Justice MacPherson and Justice Himel were wrong not to allow him to call witnesses at the trial.
[22] I disagree. It is clear from the record that the Appellant was given ample opportunity to meaningfully participate in his trial. He was required to comply with the rules of the court and to avoid attempting to derail the proceedings at every juncture. The findings of Justices Daurio, MacPherson and Himel all recognize the demonstrated pattern of the Appellant to frustrate the proceedings and avoid a hearing of the issues on their merits. Although this part of the test is a low threshold, I find that the Appellant has not met it.
C. Will the Appellant suffer irreparable harm?
[23] This part of the test concerns whether the Appellant will suffer irreparable harm if the decision is not stayed pending appeal. Irreparable harm is harm that cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured. See: Ontario v. Shehrazad Non Profit Housing Inc. 2007 ONCA 267, at para. 25.
[24] I find the Appellant has not met this part of the test on a balance of probabilities. I appreciate that the relocation of the Respondent with the child will obviously hamper the ability of the Appellant to participate in his life from a young age. However, the Order of Justice Himel which allows for parenting time in the sole discretion of the Respondent is necessary in the circumstances. The continual harassing and intrusive behaviour of the Appellant including litigation abuse commencing the day the child was born, renders it impossible at this time for the parties to co-parent in a co-operative and meaningful way. If the Appellant were to change his behaviour, the harm that he asserts he will occasion will be mitigated.
[25] I find that the Appellant has failed to establish this ground.
D. Balance of Convenience
[26] The balance of convenience analysis is about the harm suffered by each party.
[27] I find the balance of convenience does not favour a stay.
[28] I find that the Respondent would suffer prejudice by further delay. Justice Himel, after a careful and thorough analysis held that it was in the best interest of the child that the Respondent be able to relocate. Delaying this, even for a time, allows the Appellant to continue his attempts to thwart these family law proceedings through further litigation abuse.
[29] I find that the balance of convenience lies with the Respondent and a denial of a stay.
III. Disposition
[30] The motion for a stay of the trial judge’s Order dated December 3, 2025 pending appeal to this Court is denied.
Justice J. Cameron
Date: December 22, 2025.