Kiani et al v. Rivera et al., 2025 ONSC 6284

CITATION: Kiani et al v. Rivera et al., 2025 ONSC 6284

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: 643/24, 644/24, 645/24, 646/24

DATE: 20251113

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: PARISA KIANI & AMIR CHARMCHI, Appellants (Landlord)

AND

LILLIANA ARROYO RIVERA, IBRAHIM TANRITANIR, KOUROSH ASGARI, AMIN MOKHTARIHAJIYAR, Respondents (Tenants)

BEFORE: M.D. Faieta J.

COUNSEL: Arlene Preddie, for the Appellant Katherine Haist, for the Respondents Lilliana Arroyo Rivera, Amin Mokhtarihajiyar and Ibrahim Tanritanir Kourosh Asgari, on his own behalf

HEARD: November 10, 2025

FAIETA J.

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This is an appeal from the decisions of the Landlord and Tenant Board (“LTB”) which found that the respondents’ tenancy in a rooming house was subject to the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 17 (“RTA”) and awarded damages to each of the tenants are after being locked out from the rooming house.

Background

[2] The respondents lived in a house owned by the appellant Amir Charmchi. On May 30, 2023, following an altercation with one of the respondents, David Anton of Lyons Gate Property Management provided a written notice to the respondents stating that their room rental would be terminated effective June 30, 2023. The notice further stated that “[a]ny room rental that shares a kitchen and bathroom with the owner has the legal right to take over the space”.

[3] On June 14, 2023, Willowdale Community Legal Services notified Mr. Anton that they represented the respondents and would be filing applications with the Landlord and Tenant Board for a determination that the RTA applies to their room rentals as the respondents state that neither Mr. Charmchi nor Parisa Kiani, who was identified as the landlord on several of the leases, resided in the house during their tenancies. Mr. Anton advised that Mr. Charmchi did reside in the house and share a kitchen and bathroom with the tenants.

[4] On July 12, 2023, Mr. Charmchi changed the locks and evicted all of the respondents from the house.

[5] Shortly thereafter the respondents filed an application for a declaration that the RTA applied to their tenancies. The respondents also all commenced T2 applications for interference with their rights.

[6] The LTB heard these applications together by videoconference on March 7, April 22, and July 24, 2024. The tenants were represented by counsel from Willowdale Community Legal Services. The appellants were represented by David Anton, who is not a licensee with the Law Society of Ontario.

[7] The main issue at this hearing was whether s. 5(i) of the RTA applies. That provision states:

This Act does not apply with respect to,

(i) living accommodation whose occupant or occupants are required to share a bathroom or kitchen facility with the owner, the owner’s spouse, child or parent or the spouse’s child or parent, and where the owner, spouse, child or parent lives in the building in which the living accommodation is located. [Emphasis added]

[8] By Orders dated October 7, 2024, the LTB found that the Landlord had not met the burden of proof for either part of the two-part test found in s. 5(i) of the RTA. The LTB found that the Landlord failed to establish that the Tenants agreed to share the kitchen and/or bathroom with the owner when they entered their tenancy agreements. Further, the LTB weighed the contradictory evidence and found the landlords had failed to prove that Mr. Charmchi lived at the house at the relevant time and to what extent, if any, he treated the house as a place where he lived rather than simply a second office.

[9] By Orders dated October 7, 2024, as amended November 26, 2024, the LTB found that the Landlord changed the door locks and did not give a replacement key to the Tenants, substantially interfered with the reasonable enjoyment of the rental unit by the Tenants, and harassed, obstructed, coerced, threatened or interfered with the Tenants. The Landlord was ordered to pay damages of $6,792.65 to Amin Mokhtarihajiyar, $11,789.84 to Lilliana Arroyo Rivera, $15,216.87 in damages to Koroush Asgari, and $8,211.15 to Ibrahim Tanaritanir. Each Order also required the Landlord to pay an administrative fine of $10,000.00 to the Landlord and Tenant Board.

Issues

[10] In its notices of appeal, the Landlord raises many grounds of appeal, most of which were not pursued on this appeal:

1. The LTB erred in law by minimizing the weight given to the testimony of Mr. Charmchi.

2. The LTB erred in giving no weight to affidavits filed by the Landlord after the Landlord’s case was completed.

3. The LTB erred in considering that Mr. Charmchi was not separated or divorced in determining whether he lived in the house.

4. The LTB erred in finding that Mr. Charmchi lived in the residential complex.

5. The LTB erred in considering that it made sense that Mr. Charmchi would make a place with a pull-out couch his permanent place of residence.

6. The LTB erred in determining that Mr. Charmchi did not reside at the house despite not opining on where he did reside.

7. The LTB erred in finding that the tenants did not know of the sharing arrangements.

8. The LTB erred in imposing a fine of $10,000.00.

9. The hearing lacked procedural fairness as the respondent tenants were permitted to listen to the evidence of the appellants and their witnesses before presenting their own evidence.

10. The LTB failed conduct the mandatory review as provided by the RTA, thereby denying natural justice to the appellants.

11. The LTB erred in making a separate award of damages against Parisa Kiani as she is not a landlord.

[11] At the hearing of this appeal, counsel for the Landlord advanced three grounds of appeal:

1. The LTB erred in permitting David Anton to represent the Landlord at the hearing.

2. The LTB erred permitting the Tenants to listen to the evidence of the appellants, their witnesses, and other tenants before presenting their own evidence.

3. The LTB erred in classifying Parisa Kiani as a landlord

Standard of Review

[12] Appeals from LTB decisions are limited to questions of law and the standard of review is correctness. This was described by Shore J. in Jedadiah Drummond v. Ridgeford Charitable Foundation, 2024 ONSC 4658, at paras. 12-17:

[12] An appeal from an order of the [LTB] lies to this court only on a question of law. This court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal on a question of fact, or of mixed fact and law.

[13] The Supreme Court of Canada clarified the difference between questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law, in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., 1997 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748, at para. 35: "Briefly stated, questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is; questions of fact are questions about what actually took place between the parties; and questions of mixed law and fact are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests."

[14] The applicable standard of review on questions of law is correctness.

[15] No assessment of the standard of review is necessary where the requirements of natural justice and procedural fairness are at issue. The court is required to evaluate whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness have been adhered to, by assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and by determining what procedures and safeguards were required in those circumstances in order to comply with the duty to act fairly.

[16] In hearing the appeal, the court must consider that the Board is a specialized tribunal, and the legislature has deliberately limited appeals from its decisions to, inter alia, ensure a process that is streamlined, timely and cost-efficient.

[17] The Board is entitled to control its own process and its procedural choices are entitled to deference. This is because administrative tribunals, including the Board, have experience and expertise balancing the need to ensure fair participation by all parties with the need to ensure that the issues are dealt with in a timely and efficient way. [Citations omitted.]

[13] A finding of fact may give rise to a question of law in certain limited circumstances. In Yatar v. TD Insurance Meloche Monnex, 2021 ONSC 2507, 157 O.R (3d) 337, aff'd 2022 ONCA 446, 25 C.C.L.I (6th) 1, rev’d on other grounds, 2024 SCC 8, 489 D.L.R. (4th) 191, Swinton J. stated, at para. 28, that “[i]t is an error of law to make a finding of fact on a material point where the factual finding is based solely on (a) no evidence, (b) irrelevant evidence, or (c) an irrational inference” (citations omitted).

[14] The main issue in this case was whether the evidence before the LTB satisfied the two-part test found in s. 5(i) of the RTA. The LTB’s finding on this point is a question of mixed fact and law. There is no allegation that the test applied by the LTB was not the correct legal test. There is no basis to find that the LTB’s factual findings on this point amounted to an error of law.

Issue #1: Did the Board err in permitting David Anton to represent the Landlord?

[15] This issue was raised in the Notice of Appeal as follows:

[The LTB] erred in law in the issuance of it October 7th, 2024 Orders … when Member Nikitin incorrectly decided to allow a non-licensee to act as a legal practitioner for the landlords, despite no objections by the parties. By doing so, the landlords received ineffective representation brought on by inadequate direct and cross-examination, resulting a denial of procedural justice.

[16] This issue was not addressed in the Appellants’ Factum.

[17] Each Order addressed the Landlord’s representation as follows:

The Landlord was represented by David Anton, who is not a licensee with the Law Society. He and [Mr. Charmchi] assured the board that his representation complied with the “Practice Direction on Representation before the Landlord and Tenant Board, Unlicensed Representatives”. David Anton appeared as the Landlord’s friend and was not being compensated. Neither the Landlord nor the Applicants objected to David Anton representing the Landlord. I noticed Mr. Anton referred to [Mr. Charmchi] as “Mr. Charmchi” and as “my client” at times during the hearings. These are unusual ways to address one’s friend but I didn’t invite parties submissions on this issue at the hearing and will therefore not address this matter any further.

[18] The transcript also shows that both Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi expressed their agreement when asked by Member Nikitin whether they were content with being represented by Mr. Anton.

[19] A complaint of ineffective representation at the Landlord and Tenant Board was also raised in Ricketts v. Veerisingnam, 2025 ONSC 841. I agree with the views expressed by Corbett J. at paras. 4-7:

[4] I would find that the [Appellant] may not raise the “ineffective assistance” in this court because (i) she failed to raise it at first instance before the LTB when she had about ten weeks to do so between the end of the hearing and the release of the LTB’s decision; and (ii) she failed to raise it before the LTB during Reconsideration proceedings. Had I concluded that the Appellant should be permitted to raise this issue for the first time in this court, I would have dismissed the appeal because “ineffective assistance” is not a basis for interfering with a civil judgment: the Appellant’s remedy for alleged ineffective assistance lies in civil proceedings against her representative and/or a complaint to his professional regulator, and not a setting aside of a decision that discloses no reversible error on the basis of the evidence and arguments made below.

[5] Had I concluded that it was arguable that “ineffective assistance” could be a basis for interfering with the result below, I would not see this court adjudicate the “ineffective assistance” argument at first instance, but rather, I would quash the LTB’s Reconsideration decision and direct that the Reconsideration process be run anew, with the Appellant able to raise the “ineffective assistance” argument there. In my view the LTB, and not this court, should (i) rule on whether ineffective assistance is available in proceedings before the LTB; and (ii) if the answer to (i) is yes, establish the test(s) and process(es) to be followed to raise such arguments before the LTB.

[6] … residential tenancy disputes arise in real time, in a real context, and there are important interests of both landlords and tenants that require a conflict resolution process that is reasonably fast, efficient, and inexpensive. Proceedings before the LTB often involved parties who are represented by non-licensed agents, friends, family members, and many parties who self-represent. Why should these persons have less entitlement than those who have retained licensed professionals to a “do over” when their representatives fail to do a good job, or they themselves fail to approach their own case in the most effective way?

[7] Unlike in the criminal context, in civil proceedings the other side has an important interest in the principles that (i) parties are responsible for the manner in which their own case is presented; and (ii) decisions reached after following the prescribed process should have final effect.

[20] The LTB’s decision to permit David Anton to represent the Landlord is entitled to deference. The LTB is a high-volume tribunal that it is statutorily mandated to adopt the most expeditious method of determining questions arising in a proceeding that all persons directly affected by the proceeding an adequate opportunity to know the issues and be heard on the matter: RTA, at s. 183. The Member raised the issue of Mr. Anton’s representation given that he was not licensed with the Law Society of Ontario. He also addressed the requirements of the LTB’s Procedural Direction on Representation before the Landlord and Tenant Board. Both Mr. Anton and Mr. Charmchi advised the Board Member that Mr. Anton was a friend and that he was not being compensated. Both Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi told the Board Member that they wished for Mr. Anton to represent them. They are now dissatisfied with the outcome of the LTB hearing and Mr. Anton’s representation. However, it was open to them to retain counsel – as the Tenants did – or a paralegal, but instead chose to rely on Mr. Anton’s assistance. Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi bear the responsibility for their choices, not the Member or the Tenants. Further, it appears that they did not raise their concerns about Mr. Anton’s representation with the Member nor did they seek a review of the LTB Orders on this basis or at all. At this point, more than one year after the LTB Orders were issued, it would be contrary to the interests of justice to send this matter back to the LTB for another hearing on the merits.

Issue #2: Was the Landlord denied procedural fairness as the respondent tenants were permitted to listen to the evidence of the appellants and their witnesses prior to presenting their own evidence?

[21] The Tenants, as parties, are entitled to listen to the evidence presented by the Landlord. The Landlord submits that the respondent tenants should not have been present to hear the evidence presented by the other tenants as they could change their evidence based on the testimony they heard from the other tenants. However, there is no evidence that respondent tenants did so and counsel for the Landlord was unable to direct me to such evidence. Accordingly, there is no basis for this ground of appeal.

Issue #3: Did the Board err in classifying Parisa Kiani as a landlord?

[22] This is a question of mixed fact and law as it involves applying the definition of landlord in the RTA to the facts of a particular situation. This appeal is limited to questions of law and accordingly this ground of appeal is dismissed.

[23] In any event, the Landlord did not ask that the LTB find that Ms. Kiani is not a landlord within the meaning of s. 2(1) of the RTA. The Tenants named Ms. Kiani and Mr. Charmchi as the Landlord in the Application that they submitted to the LTB. The evidence before the Board was that Ms. Kiani rented rooms to the tenants, collected rent, and prepared a Notice of Termination. The Landlord submits that Mr. Anton should have objected to Ms. Kiani’s inclusion as a Landlord in the Application, however it was certainly an obvious issue, assuming there was any merit to their position, that either Ms. Kiani or Mr. Charmchi could have raised. I find that there is no merit to this ground of appeal.

Conclusion

[24] This appeal is dismissed.

[25] The Landlord and the Tenants represented by Ms. Haist agreed that there shall be no costs awarded. This is so ordered.

[26] If Mr. Asgari seeks his costs of this appeal, then he shall deliver his submissions to my judicial assistant by November 18, 2025. The Landlord shall deliver their costs submissions by November 25, 2025. Each submission shall be no more than two pages in length not including a bill of costs. My judicial assistant’s email address is kevin.wailoo@ontario.ca.

M.D. Faieta J.

RELEASED: November 13, 2025