CITATION: Ward v. Landmark Inn Leasing Corp. et al., 2025 ONSC 5091
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-0012-00
DATE: 2025-09-05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
George Merritt Ward
Plaintiff (Appellant)
– and –
Landmark Inn Leasing Corporation, Landmark Inn Limited Partnership, Andrea Hygaard and Landmark Inn General Partner Ltd.
Defendants (Respondents)
Jonathan Clark, appearing for the Appellant,
Ryan Bodnar, appearing for the Respondents
HEARD: July 23, 2025
The Honourable Mr. S.J. Wojciechowski
Decision on Appeal
Introduction
[1] The Plaintiff (Appellant), George Merritt Ward (“Ward”), brings this appeal to the Divisional Court seeking an appeal of the decision of Small Claims Court Deputy Judge Jack Jamieson (“Trial Judge”) dated July 18, 2024, which dismissed Ward’s claim as against the Defendants (Respondents), Landmark Inn Leasing Corporation, Landmark Inn Limited Partnership, Andrea Hygaard and Landmark Inn General Partner Ltd.
[2] The Defendants (Respondents), Landmark Inn Leasing Corporation, Landmark Inn Limited Partnership, and Landmark Inn General Partner Ltd. (“the Landmark Defendants”), were treated and considered one and the same insofar as any potential liability for Ward’s claims in this litigation. The Defendant (Respondent), Andrea Hygaard (“the Defendant Hygaard”), was at all material times a manager at Landmark Inn and as such an employee of one or more of the Landmark Defendants.
[3] The main issue in this appeal centers around the interpretation of a document entitled Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of the “Companies” of All Claims, dated January 24, 2012 (“the Memorandum of Settlement”) which was signed by Ward, his father, George Merritt Ward, his mother, Charlotte Grace Ward, and the Landmark Defendants. The Defendant Hygaard was not a party to the Memorandum of Settlement.
Background to Memorandum of Settlement
[4] Ward is the former owner of shares in a numbered company named 681638 Ontario Limited (“681”), which in turn owned a hotel business known as the Landmark Inn Hotel (“the Landmark Inn”). Ward sold his shares of 681 to the Landmark Defendants in 2008, and shortly afterwards 681 was amalgamated into the Defendant (Respondent), Landmark Inn Leasing Corporation (“Landmark Leasing”).
[5] Part of the deal in selling 681 to the Landmark Defendants involved Ward providing financing as well as remaining in an employment position with the Landmark Inn for a period of time. Issues relating to the indebtedness between the Landmark Defendants and Ward arose after the deal was made, which were resolved by the indebtedness being paid and Ward resigning his employment as of February 2, 2012.
[6] In order to evidence the resolution of all remaining issues between the Landmark Defendants and Ward, the Memorandum of Settlement was prepared and executed by the parties. The terms of the Memorandum of Settlement included the following terms:
The Companies remise, release and forever discharge George Merritt Ward and the Lenders (specifically, George Merritt Ward, Charlotte Grace Ward and George Frederick Ward), acting personally or within their corporate capacity, their Insurers, agents, successors, heirs and assigns (hereinafter referred to as “the Releasees”) from all actions, cause of actions, claims or demands of any nature or kind, including but not limited to those claims or demands of any nature or kind, which the Companies may now have, or [sic] in after may have, for any cause, matter or thing, directly or indirectly arising out of, related to, or in any way connected with the operation of the Landmark Inn, the employment and said resignation of George Merritt Ward, effective January ___, 2012.
The Companies further agree not to commence or continue any proceedings in any Provincial or Federal jurisdiction with respect to the same against these said Releasees or against any other person or Corporation, or claim contribution or Indemnity from the Releasees.
The Companies further agreed to indemnify the Releasees and save them harmless from any claims of any nature or kind whatsoever, including but not limited to any claims by the Canadian Revenue Agency or the Employment Insurance Commission.
The Companies further agreed to indemnify the Releasees and save them harmless from any and all liability, including costs, expenses and fees of legal counsel expended in defending any claims or proceedings commenced or continued, by the Companies, in violation of this Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims.
It is understood and agreed this Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims is made without any admission of liability whatsoever on the part of the Releasees by whom any liability to the Companies is expressly denied.
The parties hereto agree to execute such further documents as may be reasonably required in order to carry out the intent of this Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims.
The Companies acknowledge that they understand and agree to the terms of this Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims in its entirety, that they have been advised by their lawyer as to the meaning and effect of this Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims, and that the Memorandum of Settlement and Final Release of All Claims has been fully explained to them, by their lawyer, before signing it.
[7] The term “Companies” in the Memorandum of Settlement refers to the Landmark Defendants.
[8] While the entirety of the Memorandum of Settlement was referenced during submissions of the parties, the breadth of the indemnity language contained in paragraph 3 is the focus of this appeal.
Litigation History with Canadian Energy
[9] Subsequent to the execution of the Memorandum of Settlement, litigation was commenced within two claims by an energy company which involved 681, Ward, and Landmark Leasing.
[10] The first Statement of Claim was issued on December 13, 2009, by Canadian Energy Wholesale Gas & Electric, a division of ONIT Energy Ltd. (“Canadian Energy”), as against 681 for breach of a contract dated September 9, 2014, which provided for the purchase and sale of electricity. This claim was defended on February 14, 2020, by counsel for the Landmark Defendants acting on behalf of 618.
[11] A second Statement of Claim issued on September 9, 2020, in which Canadian Energy sought damages as against Landmark Leasing and Ward arising from an alleged breach of contract between Canadian Energy and 681. This second claim appears to reflect a realization by Canadian Energy that while its 2014 contract was with 618, 618 no longer existed at the time the contract was executed.
[12] In the September 2020 pleading, Canadian Energy alleged that Landmark Leasing held itself out to be 681, and in that capacity, on September 9, 2014, agreed to purchase electricity from Canadian Energy, and damages flowed from the failure to purchase electricity in accordance with the terms of the contract. In addition, Canadian Energy acknowledged in paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim that 681 and Landmark Leasing amalgamated on July 10, 2008. However, Canadian Energy also alleged that if Landmark Leasing did not enter the contract as 681 for the supply of electricity, then Ward, as a sole director and officer of 681, wrongly held himself out to be 681 and Ward should be held liable for the breach of contract.
[13] On January 8, 2021, Ward defended the action of Canadian Energy making it clear that he had ceased to have any relationship, ownership or otherwise, in the Landmark Inn as of February 2, 2012. Ward’s defence included confirmation that 681 ceased to exist when it amalgamated with Landmark Leasing on July 10, 2008, and that he had no involvement whatsoever in the contract with Canadian Energy dated September 9, 2014.
[14] Canadian Energy discontinued its claim against Ward on May 17, 2021, and as a result, Ward sought reimbursement of his legal costs as against Canadian Energy. In the Bill of Costs submitted in support of Ward’s claim for legal costs, he sought costs of $5,552.71 on a partial indemnity basis, $7,089.29 on a substantial indemnity basis, and $8,241.71 on a full indemnity basis.
[15] In a decision of Fregeau J. dated March 16, 2022, a number of factors were considered in addressing costs, including the fact that Ward should not have been named as a party defendant by Canadian Energy. Fregeau J. determined that the costs were properly payable by Canadian Energy. However, the costs sought by Ward for filing a Notice of Intent to Defend and a Statement of Defence were found to be unreasonable. In addition, costs were also sought for the motion which Ward had to bring to assert his costs’ claim, but these were deemed to be excessive. Ultimately, a fair and reasonable costs’ award of $4,500 was determined appropriate and sufficient to compensate Ward for his efforts in defending the action and advancing his motion.
Litigation History between Ward, the Landmark Defendants and the Defendant Hygaard
[16] Relying on the indemnity provisions of the Memorandum of Settlement, Ward sought to be made whole by the Landmark Defendants for his efforts in defending the claims of Canadian Energy. As such, Ward commenced a Small Claims Court claim against the Landmark Defendants and the Defendant Hygaard seeking $30,000.
[17] Ward’s claim sought complete indemnification for all of his legal costs and disbursements associated with his response to Canadian Energy’s claim. He also alleged that the actions of the Landmark Defendants and the Defendant Hygaard amounted to negligence in that the Defendant Hygaard, in her capacity as manager and on behalf of the Landmark Defendants, entered into a contract with Canadian Energy under the name 681 when it was known to the Landmark Defendants that 681 no longer existed and was amalgamated with Landmark Leasing. Finally, Ward sought damages for mental distress and anxiety which he suffered as a result of the litigation with Canadian Energy.
[18] In dismissing Ward’s action as against the Landmark Defendants and the Defendant Hygaard, the Trial Judge considered the three causes of action advanced, namely indemnity, damages for mental distress, and damages for negligence.
[19] In considering the claim for indemnification, the Trial Judge determined that the wording in the Memorandum of Settlement, including the indemnity clause, “can not be construed to entitle Mr. Ward to indemnity for a claim which not only did not exist at the time the indemnity was given, but which is based upon events which did not occur until years later.”
[20] While no damages for indemnity were awarded, the court then considered what damages would have been awarded if the decision of the Trial Judge had been different. This claim for damages consisted of $20,212 plus disbursements and HST, less the costs awarded by Fregeau J. in the amount of $4,500 in response to Ward’s motion for costs advanced against Canadian Energy.
[21] After reviewing the cases of Bossé v. Mastercraft (1995), 123 D.L.R. (4th) 161 (Ont. C.A.) (“Bossé”) and Romspen Investment Corporation v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 3480, 35 C.L.R. (4th) 193 (“Romspen”), Deputy Judge Jack Jamieson recognized a court’s discretion to review and assess costs, even in the face of a contractual obligation to pay legal costs. Accordingly, after reviewing the decision of Fregeau J. which fully considered the costs’ arguments of Ward, and after considering the claim of Ward for an additional $20,212 plus disbursements and HST above what Fregeau J. determined was reasonable, the Trial Judge found that Ward would have been awarded indemnification of $4,700[^1] in costs under the Memorandum of Settlement, had an indemnification entitlement been determined.
[22] In addressing the claim for negligence, the Trial Judge found that this claim was not made out factually, as no documents were introduced into evidence explaining who was responsible to file documents with government agencies to indicate Ward was no longer involved with 681 as an officer or director. In addition, after reviewing the legal basis for a claim in negligence – duty of care, breach of duty of care, and foreseeability and causation – it was determined that none of these elements had been established by Ward. With respect to foreseeability and causation,
. . . the fact that a third party who had no connect with Mr. Ward in any capacity in the course of that [sic] that third party’s dealings with the corporation of which he was once a director might sue him based on his name appearing on an historical government record filed is, in my view, not reasonably foreseeable.
[23] Along the same lines, earlier in his reasons, the Trial Judge had the following to say about the decision of Canadian Energy to sue Ward:
In my view, the claim by [Canadian Energy] against [Ward] is legally incomprehensible and I have struggled to find any basis for the claim in fact or in law for the claim of action. It appears to have ben entirely invented. Given that [Ward] was not associated with the Landmark after February 2012, it is a matter of speculation as to how [Canadian Energy] even knew who he was. [Ward] entered a corporate search indicating that [Ward] was previously director of 681 and speculated that that was how [Canadian Energy] got [Ward’s] name and decided to sue him.
[24] Finally, in dismissing the claim for mental distress damages, the court understood that Ward would have been upset over the fact he was sued when he had done nothing wrong. However, the evidence filed during the trial did not support a finding that Ward suffered anything more than a mere annoyance.
Issues in this Appeal
[25] Ward advances the following positions to support his appeal of the trial decision of the Trial Judge:
The Trial Judge incorrectly applied the principles of contract interpretation when determining the meaning and impact of the Memorandum of Settlement;
The Trial Judge failed to consider the negligent conduct of the Landmark Defendants and failed to recognize a duty of care upon the Landmark Defendants to amend the corporate records of 681; and
Damages were incorrectly assessed without applying the principles of indemnification and the bargain to be held harmless, and further that costs should have been assessed pursuant to the terms of the Memorandum of Settlement instead of on a partial indemnity basis.
Standard of Review
[26] The principles of appellant review are set out in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 (“Housen”).
[27] The standard of review for questions of law is correctness.
[28] On questions of fact, the standard of appellate review is palpable and overriding error.
[29] When the issue on appeal involves questions of mixed fact and law, the standard of review lies on a spectrum: see Covenoho v. HomeLife Response Realty Inc., 2022 ONSC 5877, at para. 26.
[30] Contractual interpretation is aimed at ascertaining the objective intentions of the parties to the contract and as such should be treated as a mixed question of fact and law on appellate review. Mixed questions of fact and law invites a standard of appellate review along the spectrum between correctness and palpable and overriding error: see Kantoor v. City of Hamilton, 2024 ONSC 6991, at para. 8.
[31] In rare cases, there may be an extricable question of law arising from the interpretation of a contract. If this interpretation includes the application of an incorrect principle, the failure to consider a required element of a legal test, or the failure to consider a relevant factor, then the standard of review is correctness: see Corner Brook (City) v. Bailey, 2021 SCC 29, [2021] 2 S.C.R. 540, at para. 44 (“Corner Brook”), and Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 633, at paras. 49-55 (“Sattva”).
[32] With respect to issues involving the determination of negligence, identifying a duty of care and its breach invites a standard of correctness. On the other hand, applying the facts to the arguments of negligence requires a palpable and overriding error before the appeal can succeed. Unless an erroneous finding of negligence rests on an incorrect statement of the legal standard, requiring a standard of palpable and overriding error for findings of negligence reinforces the proper relationship between appellate and trial courts: see Housen, at paras. 30-31.
[33] Finally, issues of damages’ assessment involves palpable and overriding errors: see Saramia Crescent General Partner Inc. v. Delco Wire and Cable Limited, 2018 ONCA 519, at para. 28.
Principles of Contract Interpretation
[34] In the case of Sattva, the Supreme Court of Canada provides some direction with respect to the interpretation of contracts. The court notes that there has been an evolution towards a practical, common-sense approach to contract interpretation which is not focused on technical rules of construction. The primary goal is to determine the intent of the parties and the scope of their understanding, which requires a court to read contracts as a whole, providing an ordinary and grammatical meaning to the words of the contract, consistent with the surrounding circumstances known to the parties when the contract was formed: see Sattva, at para. 47.
[35] In taking this approach, a decision maker is to only consider objective evidence of any background facts which existed at the time the contract was signed. This leaves out any consideration of subjective evidence from the parties as to what each thought the contract language means, and focusses on any knowledge that was or reasonably ought to have been within the knowledge of both parties at the time.
While the surrounding circumstances will be considered in interpreting the terms of a contract, they must never be allowed to overwhelm the words of that agreement. . . . The goal of examining such evidence is to deepen a decision-maker’s understanding of the mutual and objective intentions of the parties as expressed in the words of the contract. The interpretation of a written contractual provision must always be grounded in the text and read in light of the entire contract. . . . While the surrounding circumstances are relied upon in the interpretive process, courts cannot use them to deviate from the text such that the court effectively creates a new agreement.
See Sattva, at paras. 57-58.
[36] The Supreme Court of Canada clarifies its Sattva reasoning in the case of Corner Brook. In doing so, the court recognized the historical approach to contract interpretation as one in which words of a contract were given their “black letter” meaning. This approach did not work well for releases – a type of contract – and the Blackmore Rule was imported from the English House of Lords to allow for contextual and objective considerations in the interpretation of releases. However, Corner Brook determined that reference to the Blackmore Rule was no longer necessary nor appropriate given the decision in Sattva which, from my review, incorporates the principles of the Blackmore Rule into the Canadian approach to contract interpretation.
In Sattva, this Court directed judges to look to the surrounding circumstances known to the parties at the time of contract in interpreting the meaning of the words of a contract. . . . The Blackmore Rule, which allowed courts to consider factual context when that was not the general rule, has been overtaken by a general rule that factual context is considered in interpreting contracts.
See Corner Brook, at para. 23.
[37] Again, my review of Sattva and Corner Brook is that the Supreme Court of Canada pronounced its own approach to contract interpretation, making it no longer necessary for the Blackmore Rule to exist. I do not read these cases to suggest that the principles of Blackmore Rule must now be abandoned, or that the Blackmore Rule has been fundamentally abandoned or reversed. Instead, the Blackmore Rule no longer applies because its principles have been modernized by the court’s decision in Sattva: see Corner Brook, at para. 33.
[38] Corner Brook also references and adopts the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in Biancaniello v. DMCT LLP, 2017 ONCA 386, 138 O.R. (3d) 210 (C.A.) (“Biancaniello”), which specifically applied the Blackmore Rule. Corner Brook does not, on the other hand, state that Biancaniello’s reference to the Blackmore Rule was inappropriate, or rendered its decision in error for relying on the Blackmore Rule instead of Sattva.
[39] I mention all of these cases and the progression of the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada because one of the main arguments of the appellant with respect to the interpretation of the Memorandum of Settlement was that the Trial Decision improperly relied upon Biancaniello and the Blackmore Rule since that principle of law has been overcome by Sattva.
[40] I disagree with the arguments of Ward which suggest the Trial Judge improperly invoked and relied upon the Blackmore Rule in his reliance upon Biancaniello.
[41] To begin, the Trial Judge specifically considered Sattva as authority for the proposition that a contract is to be read as a whole, giving the words contained in the contract their ordinary and grammatical meaning, consistent with the circumstances known at the time the contract was signed. He then moved on to a consideration of Biancaniello since that case involved the interpretation of not just a contract, but a release.
Biancaniello . . . is a case where the court was called on to interpret a release. The court adopted an approach based on five principles, including, with respect to future unknown claims, that while it is possible to release such claims, courts will require clear language to infer that a party intended to release claims of which it was unaware, and that general language in a release will be limited to the thing or things that were specially in the contemplation of the parties when the release was given, and that the court can look at the surrounding circumstances to determine what was specifically in the contemplation of the parties.
[42] As already noted, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Biancaniello in the Corner Brook case. As such, I do not accept Ward’s argument that the Trial Judge improperly relied upon and applied Biancaniello contrary to Corner Brook which reinforced the applicability of Sattva.
[43] The court in Biancaniello simply recognized that the factual nexus of the negligence claim existed at the time the release was signed. As such, the release applied. While the negligent actions were unknown at the time the release was signed, the acts of negligence had occurred before the release was executed. This negligence was therefore caught by the terms of the release, and indemnity had to be provided.
[44] In the present case, none of the facts which gave rise to the claim between Ward and Canadian Energy had occurred. The alleged breach of contract and negligence was based on events which occurred after Ward and the Landmark Defendants signed the Memorandum of Settlement, i.e., the Defendant Hygaard signing a contract with Canadian Energy. Nothing had happened at the time the Memorandum of Settlement was signed to create a risk that the future litigation, which was advanced against Ward, would arise.
[45] Applying Biancaniello, the Trial Judge determined that these future actions were not objectively contemplated by the parties at the time the Memorandum of Settlement was signed, and that any general language in the document could not be interpreted to include the future actions.
[46] In that the Trial Judge correctly applied the law to the interpretation of the Memorandum of Settlement, I find that no error of law was committed.
[47] Insofar as the consideration of the context and surrounding circumstances existing at the time the Memorandum of Settlement was executed, those are factual determinations made by the Trial Judge which are subject to a standard of palpable and overriding error. This court is not to lightly interfere with the Trial Judge’s interpretation of the facts. Whether or not I would have interpreted the Memorandum of Settlement differently than the Trial Judge is irrelevant. The Trial Judge’s interpretation must be so unreasonable that it cannot be sustained.
[48] In this regard, the Trial Judge found that the indemnity provision was broadly worded, but based upon the contextual circumstances, no indemnity was owed to Ward for the cost of his efforts in defending the Canadian Energy litigation.
[49] This interpretation of the Memorandum of Settlement cannot be said to be unreasonable.
[50] Not finding any palpable or overriding error, the appeal cannot succeed on these grounds.
Consideration of Negligence
[51] The Trial Judge recognized that in order for a claim in negligence to succeed, a duty of care must be identified, along with a breach of that duty which foreseeably caused damages to an injured party.
. . . [I]n a claim in negligence, there must be a duty of care to the injured party. If that duty is to update corporate records concerning directorship of the target entity after an acquisition, the existence of such a duty was not established in the evidence. Then there must [be] a finding of a breach of a standard of care. No evidence to establish a standard of care with respect to such filings was led at all, and so there was no evidence as to how such a standard might have been breached. Finally as to foreseeability and causation, the fact that a third party who had no connection with Mr. Ward in any capacity in the course of that [sic] that third parties dealings with the corporation of which he was once a director might sue him based on his name appearing on an historical government record filed is, in my view, not reasonably foreseeable.
[52] The Trial Judge determined the allegations that the Landmark Defendants were negligent in failing to amend or change corporate records to show that Ward was no longer an officer or director of 681, was not made out on the evidence. No documents arising from the sale of 681 were introduced, nor were any of the actual filings submitted as evidence during the trial.
[53] The decision of the Trial Judge also clearly identifies the unreasonableness of the claim which was advanced against Ward by Canadian Energy, as noted earlier in this decision, calling it “legally incomprehensible” and “entirely invented”. This finding also feeds into his decision on foreseeability.
[54] The submissions of Ward are that the Trial Judge failed to consider the actions of the Defendant Hygaard in signing an agreement – on behalf of the Landmark Defendants – with Canadian Energy in the name of 681. However, this consideration is part of the factual matrix which involves the allegations that corporate records were not amended. The fact that the agreement in 681’s name with Canadian Energy existed is allegedly the reason why Ward was named as a party defendant by Canadian Energy. The Defendant Hygaard’s signature on the agreement as 681 is part of the reason why Ward was sued. However, the basis for the lawsuit against Ward was legally incomprehensible and not reasonably foreseeable, according to the Trial Judge. In addition, without evidence supporting the existence of a standard of care requiring corporate records to be amended, the finding that there was no basis for the claims of negligence has not been refuted in this appeal.
[55] Whether or not the Defendant Hygaard was negligent in signing a contract with Canadian Energy, no damages would flow unless there was a standard of care requiring corporate records to be amended, which the Trial Judge determined was not made out on the evidence.
[56] Without any evidence to consider the legal issue of a standard of care, the Trial Judge could not have committed an error of law with respect to his determination of the negligence issues.
[57] Absent any evidence for consideration in this appeal, it further cannot be said that there were any palpable or overriding errors which support this aspect of Ward’s appeal.
Assessment of Damages
[58] The Trial Judge noted the decision of Fregeau J. which assessed Ward’s costs of the litigation involving Canadian Energy in the amount of $4,700 in response to the request of Ward for $7,600. Fregeau J. found the amount sought by Ward to be unreasonable in light of the fact that only a Notice of Intent to Defend and Statement of Defence had been delivered. In addition, Fregeau J. determined that the hourly rates and number of hours spent defending Ward were “simply excessive”.
[59] The issue before the Trial Judge was whether costs claimed by Ward in the amount of $20,212 plus disbursements and HST, less the amount of $4,700 already awarded, was appropriate. While the Trial Judge determined that no indemnity was owed to Ward by the Landmark Defendants, he still proceeded to assess the claim for costs, which he decided was subject to judicial discretion, relying on Romspen and Bossé.
[60] While the argument of Ward was that the Memorandum of Settlement required the Landmark Defendants to fully indemnify and hold Ward harmless for any legal costs incurred, the Trial Judge did not accept that a release document would end any consideration of whether or not the costs being claimed were reasonable. In that an award of costs is in the discretion of the court considering the claim, including the quantum, the Trial Judge agreed with the discretion exercised by Fregeau J. who originally assessed Ward’s claim for costs, and in turn also separately came to his own conclusion that a
reasonable amount of the full indemnity costs to which [Ward] is entitled is $4,700, and, as those costs are already paid, no amount would be awarded as damages for breach of the indemnity agreement had I found that the [Landmark Defendants] were liable on the indemnity.
Even if hold harmless or indemnity language were to apply, resulting in a situation where the legal costs of Ward in defending the Canadian Energy claim were to be paid by the Landmark Defendants, the amount of costs payable are in the discretion of the judge determining the costs’ issues. The Memorandum of Settlement did not oust this discretion, and the Trial Judge exercised his judgment and determined that in light of the work done by Ward’s litigation lawyers, an appropriate amount of costs assessed on a full indemnity basis was $4,700.
[61] There being no error of law nor overriding and palpable error on the part of the Trial Judge in making this determination, the appeal of Ward cannot succeed with respect to the Trial Judge’s assessment of costs.
Conclusion
[62] The appeal of Ward is dismissed.
[63] Costs were agreed in advance by counsel at the outset of this hearing, and the Landmark Defendants shall be entitled to $8,500 in costs, including fees, disbursements and HST, to be payable forthwith by Ward.
Wojciechowski J.
Released: September 5, 2025
CITATION: Ward v. Landmark Inn Leasing Corp. et al., 2025 ONSC 5091
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-0012-00
DATE: 2025-09-05
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
George Merritt Ward, Plaintiff (Appellant)
– and –
Landmark Inn Leasing Corporation, Landmark Inn Limited Partnership, Andrea Hygaard and Landmark Inn General Partner Ltd., Defendants (Respondents)
DECISION ON APPEAL
Wojciechowski J.
Released: September 5, 2025
[^1]: The decision of Deputy Judge Jack Jamieson refers to an assessment of costs by Fregeau J. in the amount of $4,700, when in fact the decision reflected an assessment of costs in the amount of $4,500. I therefore do not read the decision of Deputy Judge Jack Jamieson to suggest he would have awarded another $200 on top of Fregeau J.’s assessment, but instead the same amount.