CITATION: Maguire v. Canada et al., 2025 ONSC 4232
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: DC-25-00000025-0000 and DC-25-00000024-0000
DATE: 20250717
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Hebner, O’Brien and Muszynski JJ.
BETWEEN:
Div. Court File No.: DC-00000025-0000
Lisa Mae Maguire
Plaintiff (Respondent)
– and –
HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, JUSTIN TRUDEAU, Prime Minister of Canada, Dr. THERESA TAM, Chief Medical Officer For Canada, JEAN-YVES DUCLOS, Minister of Health for Canada, Dr. CAROLYN BENNET, Minister of Mental Health and Addictions of Canada, JOHNS and JANES DOE and EMPLOYEES, AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS of the Above-Noted Defendants, HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, DOUG FORD, Premier of Ontario, SYLVIA JONES, Minister of Health for Ontario, MICHAEL TIBOLO, Associate Minister of Mental Health and Addictions for Ontario, JOHNS and JANES DOE and EMPLOYEES, AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS of the Above-Noted Defendants, BAYER INC., BAYER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., BAYER CROPSCIENCE INC., BAYER CROPSCIENCE HOLDINGS INC., JOHNSON & JOHNSON INC., MCNEIL CONSUMER HEALTHCARE (CANADA), CITY OF HAMILTON, FRED EISENBERGER, City of Hamilton Mayor, JASON FARR, City of Hamilton Ward 2 Councillor, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, RANDY STEPHENSON, CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF HALTON, CAROLYN OLIVER, Child Protection Worker, KATIE DRYSDALE, Child Protection Worker, NATASHA COSTELLO, Child Protection Supervisor, CATHOLIC CHILDREN’S AID SOCIETY OF HAMILTON, ST JOSEPH'S HEALTHCARE HAMILTON, SARAH BURTENSHAW, Occupational Therapist, HAMILTON HEALTH SCIENCES, MCMASTER CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL, THE CHILD ADVOCACY AND ASSESSMENT PROGRAM, HARRIET MACMILLAN, MD, FRCPC, Psychiatrist/ Pediatrician, ANGELA MCHOLM, PhD., C. Psych., Registered Psychologist, ANNE NIEC, MD, FRCP(C), Director/Pediatrician, JANINE OWEN, MSW, RSW Social Worker and DEBRA RIGGS, BA, CLS, Child Life Specialist
Defendants (Appellants)
BETWEEN:
Johnson & Johnson Inc., McNeil Consumer Healthcare (Canada)
Appellants (Defendants)
– and –
Lisa Mae Maguire
Respondent (Plaintiff)
No one appearing for the Plaintiff (Respondent), Lisa Mae Maguire
William McNamara and Morag McGreevey, for the Defendants (Appellants), Bayer Inc., Bayer Canadian Holdings Inc., Bayer CropScience Inc. and Bayer CropScience Holdings Inc.
Div. Court File No.: DC-00000024-0000
Robin D. Linley, Jessica Lam, and Leah Kelley, for the Appellants (Defendants), Johnson & Johnson Inc. and McNeil Consumer Healthcare (Canada)
No one appearing for the Respondent (Plaintiff), Lisa Mae Maguire
HEARD at Brampton: June 10, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
Overview
[1] The appellants appeal from the October 4, 2023 order of The Honourable Justice Fowler Byrne whereby she dismissed the claim as against all of the defendants with the exception of the appellants.
[2] On May 12, 2023, the respondent, Ms. Maguire, issued a 468-page Statement of Claim (including three appendices) against 38 defendants, including His Majesty the King, Justin Trudeau, Dr. Theresa Tam, Doug Ford, Johnson & Johnson Inc. (now known as Kenvue Canada Inc.), McNeil Consumer Healthcare (Canada) (a division of Kenvue), Bayer Inc, Bayer Canadian Holdings Inc., Bayer CropScience Inc., and Bayer CropScience Holdings Inc. The claim bears court file number CV-23-1581.
[3] A number of the defendants filed a request under r. 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. That rule allows any party to a proceeding to file with the registrar a request for an order staying or dismissing a proceeding on the grounds that it “appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court”.
[4] The motion judge dismissed the claim as against all of the defendants with the exception of Bayer Inc., Bayer Canadian Holdings Inc., Bayer CropScience Inc., and Bayer CropScience Holdings Inc. (the “Bayer defendants”) and Johnson & Johnson Inc., McNeil Consumer Healthcare (Canada) (the “Johnson defendants”). The Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants assert that the motion judge erred in failing to dismiss the action as against them as well. On appeal, they seek an order dismissing the action as against them.
[5] For reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal.
The Claim
[6] The nature of the claim made by the respondent is succinctly set out in the endorsement of the motion judge at paras. 4-7, as follows:
[4]…At the heart of this claim is Ms. Maguire’s claim that her son, who has been diagnosed with Autistic Disorder, has received inadequate care, and that her efforts to care for him have been met with discriminatory resistance. She claims that her theories of the cause and treatment of autism should be accepted and endorsed, that all those who have in any way opposed her, should be found liable and pay exorbitant amounts in damages. They should also fund research and treatment as she suggests.
[5] The Plaintiff claims autism is not a psychiatric disorder but symptoms of neuro-immune dysfunction syndrome (NIDS), which is treatable, surmountable and preventable. She claims she lives with NIDS, which was labeled as autism. Throughout the Statement of Claim, the Plaintiff relies on a self-published article, outlining her research and conclusions on this issue.
[6] As she states at paragraph 9: “This claim is therefore, in all the circumstances, a reasonable and effective way to bring a most critical public health issue before the courts, that being destruction of the human immune system, which transcends the interests of the Plaintiff and clearly impacts all citizens of Canada and across the globe present and future generations.”
[7] She further states in paragraphs 13 and 14:
This claim, as set out herein, effectively proves that autism, is a set of symptoms of a dysfunctional immune system, or NIDS, caused by an environmental assault from multiple triggers on a genetically susceptible population during a critical period of development.
Ms. Maguire also demonstrates with this claim that most chronic health conditions, across the lifespan, including mental disorders, cancer, addiction disorders, infectious diseases and complications from infection by COVID-19, are also symptoms of a dysregulated immune state, characterized by an impaired ability to detoxify environmental agents of harm and microbiome depletion, which are the driving forces behind this phenomenon.
[7] As against the Bayer defendants, the plaintiff claims that they released herbicides into the Ontario food supply despite a risk to humans. She asserts that the Bayer defendants breached the Pest Control Products Act, S.C. 2002, c. 28, the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 30, Sched. A, and the Competition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-34. She asserts a claim in negligence, alleging a duty of care, a breach of that duty, and direct causation between the actions of the Bayer defendants and the harm suffered by herself and her children. She seeks $5 million in general damages, $3 million in aggravated, exemplary, and punitive damages, and injunctive relief requiring the Bayer defendants to fund a $5 billion Fecal Microbiota Transplant Programme.
[8] As against the Johnson defendants, the plaintiff claims that her children suffered injury caused by the ingestion of acetaminophen, first through breast milk and then directly. She ties their ingestion of acetaminophen to their diagnoses of autism and other food sensitivities and intestinal ailments. She asserts a claim in negligence alleging a duty of care, a breach of that duty and direct causation between the actions of the Johnson defendants and the harm suffered by her children. She seeks $5 million in general damages, $3 million in aggravated, exemplary and punitive damages and injunctive relief requiring the Johnson defendants to fund a $5 billion Fecal Microbiota Transplant Programme.
[9] Prior to the issuance of this claim, on April 14, 2021, the plaintiff commenced a claim in the Federal Court by way of a 450-page Statement of Claim against 41 defendants, including the Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants. The Federal Court claim was substantively identical to the claim issued in this court. The Federal Court claim was dismissed by Aalto F.C.J. on the basis that it was not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and it was “bereft of any chance of success”. He found the claim to be “prolix in the extreme, unfocused, unmanageable” and that it failed to “meet the requirements of pleadings”.
Jurisdiction/Standard of Review
[10] The decision of the motion judge is an interlocutory order that did not finally dispose of the proceeding against the appellants. This court has jurisdiction under s. 19(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, and the February 24, 2025 order granting leave.
[11] A decision made under s. 2.1 is a discretionary decision. As such, the decision is entitled to deference.
[12] The Supreme Court said, in Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Services Board), 2013 SCC 19, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 125, at para. 27:
A discretionary decision of a lower court will be reversible where that court misdirected itself or came to a decision that is so clearly wrong that it amounts to an injustice: Elsom v. Elsom, 1989 100 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1367, at p. 1375. Reversing a lower court’s discretionary decision is also appropriate where the lower court gives no or insufficient weight to relevant considerations: Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 76-77.
[13] If the exercise of discretion is inextricably linked to an error of law, or the motion judge exercised her discretion on the wrong principles such that there is a palpable and overriding error, the standard is one of correctness: Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 8; Bouragba v. Conseil Scolaire de district de l’est de l’Ontario, 2021 ONSC 287 (Div. Ct.).
The Issues
[14] The issues identified on the appeal are:
Did the motion judge make an error of law by dismissing the action against some but not all of the defendants?
Did the motion judge misapply r. 2.1 by failing to consider the hallmarks of vexatious litigation as it pertains to the claims against the Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants?
1. Did the motion judge make an error of law by dismissing the action against some but not all of the defendants?
[15] Rule 2.1.01 reads:
(1) The court may make an order staying or dismissing a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
[16] The appellants assert that the rule allows a court to stay or dismiss an entire proceeding and that the rule does not allow a court to stay or dismiss a proceeding against some but not all of the defendants. I disagree.
[17] The appellants’ argument is grounded in the wording of the rule. The rule specifies that the court may stay or dismiss “a proceeding”.
[18] The appellants rely on this court’s decision in Elguindy v. St. Joseph’s Health Care London, 2017 ONSC 4247, at para. 41:
However, it is clear from language used in rule 2.1.01 that the court has two options when faced with a request to dismiss a proceeding under this rule. It can grant the request and dismiss the proceeding or decline to do so.
[19] In Jenkins v. City of Toronto, 2020 ONSC 1315, a case with multiple defendants, O’Brien J. considered dismissing the action against all of the defendants save one, CUPE Local 79. She concluded that the claim ought to be dismissed against all the defendants, including the union, not because of the wording of the rule but rather because it was the appropriate order on a reading of the statement of claim as a whole.
[20] In Markowa v. Adamson Cosmetic Facial Surgery Inc., 2014 ONSC 6664, at para. 3, Myers J. said the “rule 2.1 is to be approached robustly with the goal of nipping in the bud actions which are frivolous and vexatious in order to protect the parties opposite from inappropriate costs and to protect the court from misallocation of scarce resources.”
[21] In Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. A.M.Y., 2020 ONCA 98, the appellants had commenced an action against individuals and organizations that had played a role in child protection proceedings, the result of which was a finding that the appellants’ four children were in need of protection. The children were made Crown wards. The defendants to the action were individuals or organizations that had played a role in the child protection proceedings, either as counsel, parties, witnesses, experts, or entities that had provided information that was used in the proceedings. The matter came before Wilson J. (as she then was) by way of a request from two of the defendants for a dismissal of the proceedings under r. 2.1.01. Wilson J. originally dismissed the proceedings against the two requesting defendants only. She later, on her own initiative, amended her reasons to dismiss the action against all the defendants. The appeal was allowed only on the amended reasons. The result was that the action was dismissed as against the two requesting defendants but not as against the remaining defendants.
[22] A similar result was had in Brown v. Lloyd’s of London Insurance Market, 2015 ONCA 235. In that case the motion judge, Myers J. dismissed the appellant’s action under r. 2.1 as against all of the defendants except one, A. Esden-Tempski, the appellant’s former landlord. The appeal was dismissed. At para. 6, the Court of Appeal said the following:
We agree with the motion judge’s characterization of the appellant’s action and with his assessment of the appellant’s pleading. With the possible exception of the claims sought to be advanced against Mr. Esden-Tempski, the allegations in the appellant’s pleading, to the extent that they are discernable, and the associated relief claimed are either non-justiciable or fail to disclose a reasonable cause of action within the meaning of the Rules.
[23] The result was that the action was dismissed as against all of the defendants save one.
[24] I take from all of these authorities that a court reviewing a proceeding under r. 2.1 is entitled to consider the proceeding against each defendant in turn. The court may decide to dismiss a proceeding against one or more defendants but not the others. If a court does decide to dismiss a proceeding as against one or more defendants, it must dismiss the entire proceeding against those defendants.
[25] This conclusion is consistent with the clear message from the Court of Appeal in A.M.Y. and Brown that a claim may be dismissed as vexatious as against some but not all of the defendants. It is also consistent with this court’s jurisprudence in Elguindy and Jenkins. More importantly, it is consistent with the purpose of the rule stated in Markowa. If a claim is frivolous and vexatious as against some but not all of many defendants, then a dismissal against those defendants would save those defendants from inappropriate costs and simplify the litigation.
[26] For these reasons, I would not give effect to this argument.
2. Did the motion judge misapply rule 2.1 by failing to consider the hallmarks of vexatious litigation as it pertains to the claims against the Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants?
[27] In Lochner v. Ontario Civilian Police Commission, 2020 ONCA 720, at para. 19, the Court of Appeal sets out the signs of a vexatious litigant. Similar hallmarks are listed in Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6497, 61 C.P.C. (7th) 153. The motion judge identified some of those hallmarks relevant to this case at para. 12 of her endorsement, as follows:
• the litigant is virtually always self-represented
• the litigant’s attitude is characterized by marked obduracy
• persistent reiteration and amplification
• submissions contain much that is not legally relevant to the dispute;
• exhaustion of all rights of review, appeal, or revocation any time there is an adverse judgment;
• bringing proceedings for a purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights; and
• bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought.
[28] The motion judge in her endorsement categorized the many defendants into eight groups. She then embarked on an analysis of the claims made against each of the groups and, in particular, whether there was a viable cause of action against each group. For varying reasons, the motion judge determined that the claim should not proceed against all the groups save the appellants. Specifically, she determined that:
a) As against the Hamilton defendants, the action could not stand as the claim was grounded in the City’s refusal to grant a minor variation. The plaintiff had the right to appeal to the Local Planning Tribunal.
b) As against the CIBC, the claim could not stand due to a limitation period.
c) As against Randy Stephenson, the claim could not stand as the torts alleged were statute barred.
d) As against the CAS defendants, the claim could not stand as the plaintiff could appeal the court’s parenting decision and any negligence claims were out of time.
e) As against the MacMaster defendants, the claim was out of time.
f) As against the St. Joseph defendants, the claim was out of time.
g) As against the Canada and Ontario defendants, the relief the plaintiff sought was not something that could be obtained by a lawsuit.
[29] For all of these defendants, the motion judge concluded that the claims were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court for the following reasons:
a. The issues were raised in the Federal Court; while the claim was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, the court did opine that the claim lacked merit; despite this, it appears that the plaintiff simply tried again in this court;
b. The claim contained persistent reiteration and amplification; the plaintiff relies repeatedly on her own self-published study and claims it is proof of her claims and provides legitimacy to her beliefs;
c. The plaintiff’s claim contains much that is not legally relevant to the dispute and is a collateral attack on her family law proceedings;
d. As indicated, her motivation appears to be to force government funding and acceptance of her research and treatment plan, which is not the role of this court; and
e. Bringing proceedings where no reasonable person would expect to obtain the relief sought, including that these particular defendants would fund her residential facility and fecal transplant programme.
[30] As against the Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants, the motion judge noted that the plaintiff’s claims were grounded in allegations of negligence that were not statute barred on their face. The plaintiff claimed a direct causation between the negligent acts of these two groups and the harm suffered by her children.
[31] The motion judge did not consider the hallmarks of a vexatious claim against the Bayer and Johnson defendants as she did for the other defendants. Instead, she focused on the cause of action alone. In my view, she erred in doing so.
[32] A reading of the Statement of Claim discloses the following issues.
Standing
[33] As against the Johnson defendants, the plaintiff’s claim is encapsulated in para. 239 of her claim:
- The Plaintiff wholly and verily believes that, had she and her children not ingested Tylenol® while breastfeeding and during her children's early years of life, they would have been better equipped to detoxify environmental toxins, such as mycotoxins, chemicals and heavy metals, to name just a few, and would therefore have not been afflicted with the debilitating symptoms that the inability to detoxify induced.
[34] The plaintiff seeks recompense for the damage suffered by her children yet has not requested leave to bring the claim as litigation guardian on behalf of her children.
Relief Sought
[35] The plaintiff seeks damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief against both the Bayer defendants and the Johnson defendants. However, what she really wants is for these defendants to fund her research. In paras. 193 and 311, she pleads the following:
Accordingly, the Plaintiff intends to waive all liability for damages and costs of pursuing this action against Bayer provided Bayer agrees to fund a $5,000,000,000.00 (five billion dollar) Fecal Microbiota Transplant Programme in Canada through provincial health plans and supervised by the Court, for the medical treatment of chronic health disorders, while prioritizing Indigenous and non-Indigenous children with neuro-immune dysfunctions, such as autism.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff intends to waive all liability for damages and costs of pursuing this action against Johnson & Johnson provided Johnson & Johnson agrees to fund a $5,000,000,000.00 (five billion dollar) Fecal Microbiota Transplant Programme in Canada through provincial health plans and supervised by the Court, for the medical treatment of chronic health disorders, while prioritizing Indigenous and non-Indigenous children with neuroimmune dysfunctions, such as autism.
[36] The funding of her research is not a remedy available to this court.
Additional Hallmarks
[37] The claim itself is 1540 paragraphs and 387 pages long. It has attached to it three schedules. Schedule A is a paper written by the plaintiff called “The Cause of Autism, Mental Illness and Chronic Disease States: From Misunderstanding to Treatment, Recovery and Prevention”. Schedule B is a paper written by the plaintiff called “Hamilton Neuro-Immune Treatment Centre of Excellence Business Plan Funding Proposal”. Schedule C is a document called “Emergency Provisional Government and the Indigenous Path to Healing”, the author of which is not identified. With the schedules, the claim is 468 pages long.
[38] Many of the hallmarks of a querulous litigant identified by Myers J. in Gao, at paras. 14, 15, are present in the Statement of Claim. It is many, many pages long. It has odd attachments. It claims relief that no reasonable person could expect to obtain. Moreover, the plaintiff has brought the litigation for a purpose other than the assertion of legitimate rights, that purpose being the funding of her desired research.
Conclusion
[39] Although a judge’s determination under r. 2.1 is discretionary, it is my view that the motion judge erred in three respects requiring the intervention of this court: (1) she did not recognize that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring her claims on behalf of her children against the Johnson defendants; (2) she erred in permitting the claims against the Johnson and Bayer defendants to proceed when the court had no ability to order the ultimate remedy sought against those defendants; and (3) she failed to give sufficient weight to the many hallmarks of querulous litigation that applied equally to these defendants as to the others. Once these factors are considered, the Statement of Claim cannot stand and must be struck against these defendants as well.
Disposition
[40] I would allow the appeal and dismiss the claim as against the appellants.
Costs
[41] The appellants did not make a strong argument for costs, conceding that the costs incurred on the appeal are far greater than the respondent could reasonably pay. I would make no order as to costs.
Hebner J.
O’Brien J.
Muszynski J.
Released: July 17, 2025
CITATION: Maguire v. Canada et al., 2025 ONSC 4232
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: DC-25-00000025-0000 and DC-25-00000024-0000
DATE: 20250717
BETWEEN:
Div. Court File No.: DC-00000025-0000
Lisa Mae Maguire
Plaintiff (Respondent)
– and –
HIS MAJESTY THE KING IN RIGHT OF CANADA, et al.
Defendants (Appellants)
BETWEEN:
Div. Court File No.: DC-00000024-0000
Johnson & Johnson Inc., McNeil Consumer Healthcare (Canada)
Appellants (Defendants)
– and –
Lisa Mae Maguire
Respondent (Plaintiff)
reasons for decision
Released: July 17, 2025