Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency), 2025 ONSC 3504
CITATION: Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency), 2025 ONSC 3504
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 518/24-JR
DATE: 20250702
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Lococo, D.L. Edwards and Shore JJ.
BETWEEN:
andrew david douris
Andrew Douris, Applicant, on his own behalf
Applicant
– and –
Law EnForcement complaints
Joël M. Dubois, for the Respondent
agency
Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: May 27, 2025
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT
I. Introduction
[1] The self-represented applicant Andrew David Douris brings an application for judicial review of the decision dated July 8, 2024 (the “Screening Decision”) of the Complaints Director of the respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (the “LECA”).
[2] In the Screening Decision, the Complaints Director decided to exercise his statutory discretion not to deal with the applicant’s complaint about the conduct of an officer of the Toronto Police Service, thereby “screening out” the complaint from further consideration on a stand-alone basis. In doing so, the Complaints Director decided to consider the complaint as part of the ongoing statutory review that the applicant initiated relating to an earlier complaint that the applicant made to the LECA.
[3] The applicant also seeks to set aside the decision of Justice Shaun O’Brien of the Superior Court of Justice dated March 14, 2025, reported at 2025 ONSC 1668 (the “ROP Decision”). In the ROP Decision, O’Brien J. dismissed the applicant’s motion to compel the LECA to add certain internal LECA documents to the record of proceeding (“ROP”) for the judicial review application. The disputed documents were prepared in connection with another complaint that the applicant made about the conduct of the same police officer.
[4] The applicant submits that O’Brien J. erred in the ROP Decision by refusing to add to the ROP relevant documents that could have a bearing on the outcome of the judicial review. The applicant also submits that the Screening Decision was unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. Among other things, the applicant asks the court to set aside the Review Decision and the Screening Decision and order a new investigation of his complaint by a police service other than the Toronto Police Service.
[5] For the reasons below, the motion to set aside the ROP Decision is dismissed. The application for judicial review of the Screening Decision is also dismissed.
II. Background
A. Introduction
[6] The Screening Decision under judicial review arose from the applicant’s complaint filed with the LECA on May 13, 2024 (the “May 2024 Complaint”). That complaint related to the conduct of Detective Petrie of the Toronto Police Service (the “TPS”), who at the relevant time was TPS’s Unit Commander, Professional Standards.
[7] The applicant had also filed several previous police conduct complaints with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (which became the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency on April 1, 2024, as explained below). While any decisions relating to those prior complaints are not under review in this application, two of the complaints provide relevant background for the May 2024 Complaint. Those complaints are described below, following a review of the statutory authority relating to police conduct complaints that is relevant to this judicial review application.
B. Complaints Director’s statutory authority
[8] At the time of the applicant’s prior complaints, the Independent Police Review Director was responsible for managing complaints by members of the public about the conduct of police officers in Ontario under statutory authority derived from Parts II.1 and V of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (the “PSA”).
[9] On April 1, 2024, the PSA was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1 (the “CSPA”). The Office of the Independent Police Review Director (the “OIPRD”) continued under the name of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency. The Independent Police Review Director became the Complaints Director, who is the LECA’s head: CSPA, ss. 130(1), 130(2).[^1] Under s. 216(3) of the CSPA, the Complaints Director exercises the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director with respect to (a) police conduct complaints made prior to April 1, 2024, and (b) complaints about police conduct occurring prior to (and not continuing after) April 1, 2024. Such complaints (including the applicant’s May 2024 Complaint) continue to be dealt with in accordance with the PSA as it read prior to its repeal: CSPA, ss. 216(1), 216(2). The OIPRD Rules of Procedure (amended February 2024) made under s. 56 the PSA (the “Rules of Procedure”) continue to apply to those complaints.
C. Screening of complaints
[10] The statutory scheme for managing police conduct complaints set out in the PSA provides the Complaints Director with broad authority to determine how to address complaints.
[11] The initial step is a screening process, under which the Complaints Director decides if the complaint should proceed for further action (“screened in”) or should not proceed any further (“screened out”): PSA, s. 60. Complaints are presumptively screened in unless the Complaints Director exercises his legislative discretion not to deal with the complaint, thereby screening it out. The Complaints Director also has the discretion to consolidate two or more complaints “if, in his or her opinion, it is appropriate to do so”: see Rules of Procedure, r. 6.A.1.
[12] The screening process is neither an investigation nor a hearing into the merits of the complaint: see Anwar v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 3150 (Div. Ct.), at para. 15; Endicott v Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2014 ONCA 363, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 149, at para. 28. Rather, the Complaints Director is tasked with determining whether the allegations or issues in the complaint, on their face, fall within his statutory mandate and jurisdiction and whether the complaint reveals a prima facie violation of the PSA.
[13] The Complaints Director has broad authority to screen out complaints: see PSA, s. 60(1), under which the Complaints Director “may, in accordance with this section [60], decide not to deal with a complaint made to him or her by the public under this Part [V]” of the PSA. A complaint may be screened out if the complaint is made more than six months after the facts on which it is based occurred: PSA, s. 60(2). A complaint may also be screened out if (i) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or made in bad faith, (ii) the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with, in whole or in part, under another Act or other law, or (iii) having regard to all the circumstances, dealing with the complaint is not in the public interest: PSA, s. 60(4). It is not in the public interest to screen in a complaint that does not, on its face, disclose a breach of the PSA or the Code of Conduct under the PSA[^2] (the “PSA Code of Conduct”): Rules of Procedure, r. 6.5.
[14] To accord with s. 60(4) of the PSA, the Complaints Director is required to consider the public interest when performing the screening process. Rule 6.4 of the Rules of Procedure provides:
In determining whether or not to deal with a complaint, the [Complaints] Director will have regard to the public interest. Public interest will always involve a balancing of interests and a broad range of considerations. Some of the factors which the Director may consider will include:
(i) the effect of a decision to deal or not to deal with a complaint on public confidence in the accountability and integrity of the complaints system
(ii) the number of complainants involved
(iii) the seriousness of the complaint, including the seriousness of the harm alleged
(iv) whether the complaint relates to an incident or event that has already been the subject of an earlier complaint
(v) whether there are issues of systemic importance or broader public interest at stake
(vi) the likelihood of interfering with or compromising other proceedings
(vii) whether another venue, body or law can more appropriately address the substance of the complaint.
[15] If a police conduct complaint is screened in, the Complaints Director is required by s. 61(5) of the PSA to either (i) refer the complaint to the chief of police of the police force to which the complaint relates (to be dealt with under s. 66), (ii) refer the complaint to the chief of police of a different police force (to be dealt with under s. 67), or (iii) retain the complaint within the LECA (to be dealt with under s. 68). In each instance, the complaint is required “to be investigated and the investigation to be reported in a written report”: PSA, ss. 66(1), 67(1), 68(1).
[16] At the conclusion of an investigation dealt with under s. 66, if the chief of police on review of the investigation report “is of the opinion that the complaint is unsubstantiated, the chief of police shall take no action in response to the complaint” and is required to notify the complainant, the subject police officer and the Complaints Director, in writing: PSA, s. 66(2). In these circumstances, the complainant may, within 30 days of such notification, ask the Complaints Director to review the chief of police’s decision: PSA, s. 71(1). Upon completion of the Complaints Director’s review (without holding a hearing), the Complaints Director may confirm the chief of police’s decision or take other steps that may include (i) directing a further investigation, (ii) directing the conduct of a hearing, or (iii) taking over the investigation of the complaint: PSA, ss. 71(2), 71(3).
III. The applicant’s complaints
A. The 2023 Complaint
[17] On May 23, 2023, the applicant filed a complaint with the OIPRD (the “2023 Complaint”) relating to the conduct of seven TPS officers (that did not include Detective Petrie). The 2023 Complaint related to a police investigation arising from an incident that occurred in 2022. In the Screening Decision currently under review, at p. 1, the Complaints Director described the 2023 Complaint as follows:
On May 23, 2023, you filed a complaint … against TPS officers for failing to investigate an assault and harassment, which purportedly occurred on a University of Toronto campus. The Complaints Director screened in the complaint and referred it to the TPS for investigation. Detective Petrie was the TPS Professional Standards Bureau investigator assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. Ultimately, based on Detective Petrie’s investigative report and findings, the Chief unsubstantiated the alleged misconduct. You then requested a review of the reasonableness of the Chief’s investigation and findings pursuant to s. 71 of the PSA. That review process is currently underway.
[18] The applicant’s request for a s. 71 review of the Chief of Police’s decision referred to above was made on March 15, 2024. The Complaints Director has agreed not to release a decision with respect to the s. 71 review pending the outcome of this judicial review application.
B. The March 2024 Complaint
[19] On March 15, 2024 (the same day as the applicant requested the s. 71 review of the TPS Chief of Police’s decision), the applicant filed a complaint with the OIPRD (the “March 2024 Complaint”) relating to Detective Petrie’s investigation of the 2023 Complaint. The applicant challenged the adequacy of Detective Petrie’s investigation of that complaint, alleging misconduct by Detective Petrie under the PSA Code of Conduct as well as the commission of criminal acts by relying on forged transcripts to support the findings in his investigation report.
[20] By letter dated May 9, 2024 (over the signature of a LECA senior investigator), the Complaints Director “screened out” the March 2024 Complaint. The stated basis for doing so was that it was “not in the public interest to proceed with a misconduct investigation when it could interfere with and/or be delayed by a related parallel proceeding”: see Rules of Procedure, r. 6(4)(vi). At that time, criminal charges were outstanding against the person that the applicant alleged assaulted and harassed him (the “alleged assailant”) in 2022. The covering email to the applicant (dated the same date) stated that “[o]nce those proceedings have concluded with decision then you can resubmit this complaint if you wish for screening.”
C. The May 2024 Complaint and the Screening Decision
[21] On May 13, 2024, the applicant filed the May 2024 Complaint with the LECA relating to Detective Petrie’s investigation of the 2023 Complaint against TPS officers who investigated the alleged assault and harassment of the applicant. It is common ground that by that date, the criminal proceedings against the alleged assailant had concluded. The applicant says that the allegations against Detective Petrie in the May 2024 Complaint were the same as those in the March 2024 complaint.
[22] By letter dated July 8, 2024 (over the signature of the LECA’s Manager of Investigations), the Complaints Director issued the Screening Decision, screening out the May 2024 Complaint.
[23] In the Screening Decision, at p. 2, the Complaints Director described the applicant’s allegations against Detective Petrie as follows:
In the within complaint, you allege that Detective Petrie relied upon two forged documents to support the findings in his investigation of [the 2023 Complaint]. You further suggest that Detective Petrie “failed to address barely any of the numerous specific misconduct allegations”. In support of these claims, you reiterate much of the evidence in relation to the investigation of [the 2023 Complaint]. Finally, you assert that Detective Petrie’s misconduct investigation amounted to discrimination against you and claim it led to the death of your child, though you do not specify how the two events are connected. In your correspondence dated June 4th and July 7th, 2024, you reiterate these same concerns and ask the Complaints Director to take timely remedial action.
[24] In the Screening Decision, at p. 2, the Complaints Director concluded that it was not in the public interest to proceed with an investigation of the May 2024 Complaint. After referring to public interest considerations set out in s. 60(4) of the PSA and r. 6.4 of the Rules of Procedure, the Complaints Director explained:
The issues raised in your complaint involve concerns about the complaint investigation for [the 2023 Complaint]. Therefore, the issues are more properly considered under the s. 71 review process which you have initiated. Although they were submitted well beyond the 30-day statutory timely for s. 71 submissions, the Complaints Director has exercised his discretion to consider them as part of that ongoing review process. For these reasons, this file is now closed.
[25] By Notice of Application for Judicial Review dated September 6, 2024, the applicant seeks judicial review of the Screening Decision. The LECA does not challenge the timeliness of the judicial review application.
IV. Motion to set aside the ROP Decision
[26] In addition to the judicial review application, also before this panel is the applicant’s motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 (the “CJA”) to set aside the ROP Decision of O’Brien J. dated March 14, 2025.
[27] In the ROP Decision, the motion judge refused to add two internal LECA documents to the Record of Proceeding that the LECA provided for the judicial review application. Before the motion judge, the applicant also sought to add other documents to the ROP, but those issues were resolved in case management on the basis that the applicant could add the documents to his own application record: ROP Decision, at para. 5.
[28] The remaining documents in dispute (identified as a “complaint analysis form” and an “alternative process form”) were prepared by LECA personnel with respect to the March 2024 Complaint. That complaint was screened out in the Complaints Director’s separate prior decision dated May 9, 2024. Before the motion judge, the LECA opposed including the disputed documents in the ROP for judicial review of the Screening Decision, which related to the May 2024 Complaint, not the March 2024 Complaint. Corresponding documents prepared in connection with the May 2024 Complaint were included in the ROP for the judicial review application.
[29] The applicant submits that in the ROP Decision, the motion judge erred in law and made palpable and overriding errors of fact: see Guillaume v. Barney Rivers Investments Inc., 2022 ONSC 1123 (Div. Ct.), at para. 4. Among other things, the applicant says that in addressing the “central argument” that the disputed documents ought to have been included in the ROP because they are “directly relevant” to the Screening Decision (as described in Endicott, at para. 42), the motion judge erred in stating that the applicant’s judicial review application “only refers to the March 15, 2024 complaint by way of background and context to Mr. Douris' other allegations” (emphasis added): see ROP Decision, at paras. 10-11. The applicant submits that in advancing the grounds of procedural unfairness and bias upon judicial review, he is relying on the decisions relating to both complaints, rather than referring to the early decision as background only. The applicant also says that the motion judge erred by giving no weight to his submission that he was relying on both complaints in his judicial review application. Among other things, the applicant also submits that the motion judge erred, at para. 13, by dismissing as speculative his belief that the contents of the complaint analysis form for the March 2024 Complaint (as compared to the corresponding form for the May 2024 Complaint) may provide evidence of a reasonable apprehension of bias relating to the May 2024 Complaint.
[30] We see no merit in the applicant’s submissions.
[31] The test for determining whether a decision should be set aside or varied under s. 21(5) of the CJA is well-established and has a high threshold. A moving party is not entitled to a hearing de novo. Rather, the moving party has the onus of demonstrating an error on a question of law, a palpable and overriding error on a question of fact, or an improper exercise of discretion: Guillaume, at para. 4. The applicant has not met that onus in this case.
[32] In Endicott, at paras. 39-46, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered what should be included in the ROP for judicial review of a screening decision relating to a police conduct complaint. The court decided that in that case, a “full and accurate record” did not extend beyond the applicant’s complaint and attachments, the screening decision and the information in the Complaints Director’s file that was directly relevant or part of the screening decision. In the ROP Decision, at paras. 10-11, the motion judge rejected the applicant’s submission that Endicott supported his position about the appropriate scope of the ROP in this case. We see no error in her reaching that conclusion.
[33] Absent narrow exceptions, judicial review applications are decided solely on the record that was before the underlying decision maker for the decision: see Boua v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 2172, 173 O.R. (3d) 165 (Div. Ct.), at para. 8. The narrow exceptions were established in Keeprite Workers' Independent Union and Keeprite Products Ltd. (1980), 1980 1877 (ON CA), 29 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1980] S.C.C.A. No. 16262 (cited by the motion judge in the ROP Decision, at para. 15). The Keeprite exceptions allow an applicant to deliver affidavit evidence to supplement the record in limited circumstances. The applicant provided no such affidavit evidence in this case, instead advancing speculative submissions about the disputed documents’ contents.
[34] In all the circumstances, we see no basis for interfering with the motion judge’s decision not to permit the disputed documents to be added to the ROP in this case.
[35] Accordingly, the applicant’s motion to set aside the ROP Decision is dismissed.
V. Judicial review application
A. The applicant’s position and issues to be determined
[36] Upon judicial review of the Screening Decision, the applicant submits that while investigating his 2023 Complaint against seven TPS officers who investigated the alleged assault and criminal harassment against the applicant, Detective Petrie beached the PSA Code of Conduct and committed forgery offences under the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The accused assailant was subsequently charged with the offences of assault and criminal harassment. The applicant alleges that while Detective Petrie was investigating the 2023 Complaint, he prepared two partial transcripts of bodycam recorded statements that the accused assailant gave to TPS officers. The applicant says these partial transcripts were forgeries, since they misstated or omitted substantial and meaningful evidence relating to the accused assailant’s conduct, to the benefit of the accused assailant.
[37] The applicant states the first forged transcript was used in student code of conduct proceedings at the University of Toronto, arising from a complaint that the accused assailant had made against the applicant. He further states that a second forged transcript was included in the investigation report that was provided to the TPS Chief of Police at the conclusion of Detective Petrie’s investigation of the 2023 Complaint.
[38] As explained further below, the applicant submits that in the Screening Decision, it was unreasonable for the Complaints Director to screen out the May 2024 Complaint and to direct that it be considered in the context of the applicant’s s. 71 request for review relating to his separate 2023 Complaint. The applicant also says that he was denied procedural fairness and further submits that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias in the screening process, including from the involvement of the LECA’s Manager of Investigation, who signed the Screening Decision.
[39] Among other things, the applicant requests that the Screening Decision be set aside, and the May 2024 Complaint against Detective Petrie not be remitted to the Complaints Director for reconsideration but instead be referred for investigation to a police service other than the TPS.
[40] In summary, the applicant raises the following issues:
a. Procedural fairness: Was the applicant denied procedural fairness?
b. Reasonable apprehension of bias: Was there a reasonable apprehension of bias against the applicant?
c. Reasonableness: Was the Screening Decision unreasonable?
d. Remedy: If any of the above is established, what is the appropriate remedy?
[41] Those issues are addressed below, after consideration of jurisdiction and the standard of review.
B. Jurisdiction and standard of review
[42] The Divisional Court has jurisdiction to hear the application for judicial review of the Screening Decision: Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, ss. 2, 6(1).
[43] Upon judicial review of an administrative decision, there is a presumption that the standard of review is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 653, at para. 23.
[44] The standard of review that applies to the Screening Decision is reasonableness. The Divisional Court has consistently reviewed decisions of the Complaints Director on a reasonableness standard: see Engels v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 5104 (Div. Ct.), at paras. 30-31. The Complaints Director’s exercise of legislative discretion not to deal with a complaint is entitled to deference upon judicial review: Wall v. Ontario (Independent Policy Review Director), 2013 ONSC 3312, 362 D.L.R. (4th) 687, at para. 21; aff’d 2014 ONCA 884, 123 O.R. (3d) 574.
[45] Reasonableness review “finds its starting point in the principle of judicial restraint” but remains “a robust form of review” rather than “a ‘rubber-stamping’ process or a means of sheltering administrative decision makers from accountability”: Vavilov, at para. 13. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires a reviewing court to defer to such a decision: Vavilov, at para. 85. The relative expertise of administrative decision makers with respect to the questions before them is a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness review: Vavilov, at paras. 31, 92-93.
[46] The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. Before a decision can be set aside on that basis, “the reviewing court must be satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency”: Vavilov, at para. 100. Two types of errors (referred to as fundamental flaws) that may render an administrative tribunal's decision unreasonable are (a) a failure of rationality internal to the reasoning process, and (b) the untenability of the decision, in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it: Vavilov, at para. 101.
[47] An administrative decision-maker is required to conduct their proceedings fairly. The degree of procedural fairness required is determined by reference to all the circumstances of the case, including those set out in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 21-28; see also Vavilov, at para. 77.
C. Procedural fairness
[48] The applicant submits that the Screening Decision should be set aside because he was denied procedural fairness.
[49] The applicant argues that the contents of the Screening Decision demonstrate that the Complaints Director did not fully, carefully or fairly consider the submissions and evidence that the applicant provided in the May 2024 Complaint. Based on the summary of the complaint against Detective Petrie in the Screening Decision, the applicant says that there was no basis for concluding that he was treated fairly.
[50] An example the applicant cited was that the Screening Decision made “a damaging and demonstrably false claim” relating to the loss of the applicant’s unborn child in August 2022. While the applicant referred to that loss in the May 2024 Complaint, he submits that he in no way suggested that Detective Petrie bore any responsibility.
[51] The applicant also argues that in stating that Detective Petrie “relied on” two forged documents to support his investigative findings, the Complaints Director failed to recognize that Detective Petrie authored and uttered those forgeries. The applicant also notes that the Complaints Director failed to appreciate that allegations relating to providing a forged transcript for the University of Toronto code of conduct proceeding were entirely distinct and independent from Detective Petrie’s task of investigating the 2023 Complaint.
[52] As further evidence of the lack of procedural fairness, the applicant also submits that the Complaints Director contravened s. 60(7) of the PSA, which requires the Complaints Director when screening out a complaint to “give notice of the substance of the complaint” to the chief of police of the relevant police force. The Complaints Director provided the TPS Chief of Police with a full copy of the May 2024 Complaint in purported compliance with s. 60(7). The applicant argues that doing so was not sufficient compliance with that requirement.
[53] Among other things, the applicant also argues that in screening out the May 2024 complaint as not being in the public interest, the Complaints Director unfairly failed to “bear in mind” r. 6.5 of the Rules of Procedure, which relates to whether a complaint contains evidence of misconduct “on its face”: see Poyton v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2023 ONSC 428 (Div. Ct.), at para. 19.
[54] Having considered the applicant’s submissions, we are not persuaded that the applicant has met his onus of establishing a lack of procedural fairness in this case.
[55] As noted in A.Z. v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2023 ONSC 6365 (Div. Ct.), at para. 46, “the threshold for procedural fairness at the screening phase is low”; see also Endicott, at para. 28, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the PSA does not contemplate the need for a hearing or notice, nor does it impose any specific procedural requirement.” As well, in Engels, at para. 90, the Divisional Court made a similar statement about complainants’ procedural rights relating to the investigation of police conduct complaints.
[56] As previously noted, the Complaints Director has the discretion to consolidate two or more complaints if, in the Complaints Director’s opinion, it is appropriate to do so: Rules of Procedure, r. 6.A.1. In the Screening Decision, at p. 2, the Complaints Director exercised that discretion by directing that the applicant’s May 2024 Complaint be considered as part of the “ongoing review process” under s. 71 of the PSA, relating to the TPS Chief of Police’s decision that the applicant’s 2023 Complaint was not substantiated, after reviewing Detective Petrie’s investigation report about that complaint. The May 2024 Complaint also relates to Detective Petrie’s investigation of the 2023 Complaint. The Complaints Director was justified in concluding that those complaints should be consolidated, which did not give rise to unfairness to the applicant.
[57] As previously noted, the applicant submits that one of Detective Petrie’s alleged forgeries (in providing a partial interview transcript for a university code of conduct proceeding) is outside the scope of the conduct that would be considered as part of s. 71 review process. We do not agree. That alleged forgery relates to the same interview that is the subject of the other alleged forgery, which was provided in relation to criminal proceedings against the accused assailant. That person was also a party to the university proceedings.
[58] As well, the other instances of alleged unfairness that the applicant raises do not provide sufficient grounds for concluding that the Screening Decision was procedurally unfair.
[59] We agree with the applicant that the issue of the applicant’s unborn child was not central to the matters in issue in the May 2024 Complaint. Although the matter was mentioned in the May 2024 Complaint, it did not need to be referred to in the Screening Decision. It is unfortunate that its mention in the decision caused the applicant distress, but we do not agree that it was evidence of procedural unfairness that would justify setting aside the Screening Decision. We see no reason to conclude that mentioning the matter was intended to cause the applicant distress or that it was “demonstrably and knowingly false” or “abusive, wildly damaging and defamatory”, as the applicant alleged in his factum.
[60] We also see no merit in the applicant’s submission that the Complaints Director breached s. 60(7) of the PSA by providing a full copy of the May 2024 Complaint to the TPS Chief of Police. It was well within the Complaints Director’s purview to satisfy the requirement to give the Chief of Police “notice of the substance of the complaint” in that way.
[61] As well, we do not agree that there was unfairness arising from the Complaints Director’s failure to “bear in mind” r. 6.5 of the Rules of Procedure when making the Screening Decision. In addition to the public interest screening factors set out in r. 6.4, a further basis for “screening out” a complaint in the public interest is provided in r. 6.5, if the complaint does not disclose “on its face” a breach of the PSA or the PSA Code of Conduct. In Poyton, at para. 32, the court relied on r. 6.5 to support the conclusion that the complaint should be screened out because the complaint did not “on its face” disclose a basis for finding police misconduct. It is still open to the Complaints Director to screen out a complaint in the public interest, without addressing whether the complaint disclosed a breach of the PSA or the PSA Code of Conduct “on its face”. In the Screening Decision, at p. 2, the Complaints Director directed that the issues raised in the May 2024 Complaint are to be addressed in the context of the applicant’s request for review under s. 71 of the PSA, as he was authorized to do under r. 6.1.A. The May 2024 Complaint was not unfairly dismissed out of hand, as the applicant suggests.
[62] We see no basis for concluding the Screening Decision should be set aside because the applicant was denied procedural fairness.
D. Reasonable apprehension of bias
[63] The applicant submits that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias in the screening process. He cites in particular the involvement of the LECA’s Manager of Investigation, who signed the Screening Decision on behalf of the Complaints Director. The Manager of Investigation had been involved with a previous complaint that the applicant filed with the OIPRD.
[64] In support of his bias allegations, the applicant again raises the issue of “damaging knowingly false statements” in the Screening Decision about the loss of the applicant’s unborn child, as well as other submissions that he made in support of his position that he was denied procedural fairness. The applicant also cites the failure of the Complaints Director to consider and give effect to the applicant’s evidence and submissions. As well, he contrasts the Screening Decision with the earlier decision (signed by a LECA senior investigator on behalf of the Complaints Director) that screened out the March 2024 Complaint on different grounds that the applicant does not dispute (that is, based on criminal proceedings against the accused assailant that were still outstanding).
[65] As explained below, we have concluded that the applicant has not met his onus of establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.
[66] A reasonable apprehension of bias is not measured by the subjective feelings of the litigant. It is determined by the perceptions of a reasonably well-informed member of the public having considered the matter practically and realistically: see Committee for Justice and Liberty v Canada (National Energy Board), 1976 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259.
[67] The test for determining whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias was set out in Wewaykum, at para. 60:
In Canadian law, one standard has now emerged as the criterion for disqualification. The criterion, as expressed by de Grandpré J. in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, supra, at p. 394, is the reasonable apprehension of bias:
... the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically -- and having thought the matter through -- conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly."
[68] A party claiming bias bears the onus of proving the existence or apprehension of bias on clear evidence. The threshold is high, since there is a strong presumption of impartiality on the part of the decision-maker. Mere suspicion or speculation is not sufficient. There must be some factual underpinning to the claim of bias: Wewaykum, at para. 59. Previous decisions of this court have determined that the strong presumption of impartiality applies when considering decisions of the Complaints Director: see Andrews v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, 2025 ONSC 792 (Div. Ct), at para. 10.
[69] We have concluded that the applicant has not overcome the strong presumption of impartiality in this case. As noted above, the applicant makes certain of the same submissions to support his claim of reasonable apprehension of bias as he made with respect to his other claims of procedural unfairness, including the statement in the Screening Decision relating to the loss of the applicant’s unborn child. We find his submissions equally unpersuasive in establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.
E. Reasonableness
[70] The applicant submits that the Screening Decision was unreasonable. In doing so, he challenges the reasonableness of the Complaints Director’s decision to screen out the May 2024 Complaint and to direct that it be considered in the context of the applicant’s s. 71 request for review relating to his separate 2023 Complaint.
[71] In his factum, the applicant argues that the Screening Decision is a textbook example of the two types of fundamental flaws that make a decision unreasonable, since it is not “rational and logical” and is entirely “untenable in light of the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on it”: see Vavilov, at para. 101. The applicant submits that the Screening Decision does not reflect the substance and scope of the May 2024 Complaint, indicating that the Complaints Director did not meaningfully grapple with the key issues or central arguments or provide any indication that the applicant was heard or that the Complaints Director listened. Among other things, the applicant repeats his submission that the Complaints Director failed to appreciate that allegations relating to providing a forged transcript for the university code of conduct proceeding was entirely distinct and independent from Detective Petrie’s task of investigating the 2023 Complaint, which was the matter under review in s. 71 request for review process. As well, the applicant again faults the Screening Decision for not including implicit or explicit reference to r. 6.5 of the Rules of Procedure relating to misconduct “on the face” of the complaint.
[72] We have concluded that the applicant has not discharged his burden of establishing that the Screening Decision was unreasonable. To the extent that the applicant repeats the submissions he made with respect to apprehension of bias and procedural fairness, we also find them unpersuasive in establishing that the Screening Decision was unreasonable.
[73] The Complaints Director’s reasons for screening out a complaint need not be lengthy or complex. They simply must answer the question “why?”. A complainant and the reviewing court are entitled to know the rudiments of the explanation for why the complaint has been screened out and will not be investigated: Wall (C.A.), at para. 62. The standard is not perfection and reasons for decision do not necessarily need to include all the arguments or details that were made or to reference every applicable statutory or regulatory provision: see Poyton, at para. 23.
[74] The Screening Decision was reasonable and supported by intelligible reasons that justified the conclusions reached. The Complaints Director noted the similarity of the allegations and evidence between the May 2024 Complaint and the 2023 Complaint that is subject to the s. 71 request for review. He concluded that the outstanding s. 71 review would be the most appropriate process to consider the allegations set out in the May 2024 Complaint. The Complaints Director was entitled to exercise his discretion in a manner that preserved the resources of the LECA in the public interest, while continuing to allow consideration on the merits of the applicant’s allegations in the May 2024 Complaint.
VI. Disposition
[75] Accordingly, the application for judicial review and the motion to set aside the ROP Decision are dismissed.
[76] As the successful party, the LECA seeks costs totalling approximately $7,200 in relation to both matters. That amount is considerably less than the partial indemnity costs set out in the LECA’s bill of costs and is reasonable in the circumstances.
[77] The LECA’s costs are fixed at $7,200 all inclusive, payable by the applicant.
___________________________ Lococo J.
___________________________ D.L. Edwards J.
___________________________ Shore J.
Date: July 2, 2025
CITATION: Douris v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency), 2025 ONSC 3504
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 518/24-JR DATE: 20250702
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Lococo, D.L. Edwards and Shore JJ.
BETWEEN:
Andrew david douris
Applicant
– and –
Law Endorcement complaints agency
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT
Date: July 2, 2025
[^1]: In the description of the statutory scheme that follows, the term “Complaints Director” is generally used instead of “Independent Police Review Director”.
[^2]: O. Reg. 268/10: General, s. 31; Sched.