Fisher v. Michel, 2025 ONSC 3302

CITATION: Fisher v. Michel, 2025 ONSC 3302

COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-4

DATE: 2025/06/03

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: MARK FISHER, Appellant

AND:

MONDA MICHEL, Respondent

BEFORE: Gibson J.

COUNSEL: Mark Fisher, Self-Represented Appellant

Robert Rose, Counsel for Respondent

HEARD: January 24, 2025

DECISION ON APPEAL

Overview

[1] This is an appeal commenced by the Tenant, Mark Fisher (the "Appellant"), from the Order dated April 19, 2024 (the “Final Order”) of Vice-Chair E. Patrick Shea (“Vice-Chair Shea”) of the Landlord and Tenant Board (the "Board") dismissing the Appellant's combined A1/T1 tenant applications (Fisher v Michel, 2024 ONLTB 26721).

[2] The A1 application about whether the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006 (the "Act") applies was dismissed as being res judicata as the Landlord’s own previously adjudicated A1 application regarding the same tenancy had finally determined the issue. The T1 application for a rebate of money the landlord owes was dismissed as a result of the operation of section 135.1 of the Act, which the Hearing Member held resolved the Appellant’s claims concerning illegal rent by acting to render the rent increase imposed by the Landlord, Monda Michel (the “Respondent”) valid, where without the operation of this section, the Landlord’s initial rent increase would have been a nullity.

[3] At the same hearing where the Appellant's A1/T1 applications were considered, the Respondent Landlord's L1 application regarding unpaid rent was also heard. The Hearing Member ordered that post-hearing written submissions be provided with regard to the L1, and to date an order does not appear to have been issued in regard to the Landlord's application.

[4] The Appellant’s expansive Notice of Appeal and Factum raise a number of the Appellant’s concerns regarding not just the A1 and T1 applications that were the subject of the Final Order, but also with regard to two other proceedings before the Board regarding the tenancy. In his oral submissions, the Appellant asserted that the Board was “corrupt” and that the Member was biased. In his Notice of Appeal, the Appellant is seeking the following relief:

(a) an Order directing that the Appellant's rent-refund request be approved; and

(b) in the alternative, an order referring the matter back to the Board for a new hearing before a new member.

[5] The Respondent takes the position that the Board’s dismissal of the T1 application (as well as the A1 application) was correct in law, and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed with costs.

Background

[6] The Respondent, Monda Michel, is a registered owner and was the landlord for the property municipally known as 60 Albion Street in the City of Kitchener, Ontario (the “House”). She lives there with her husband, Emil Michel.

[7] The House is a legal duplex which consisted, at the time the Appellant's tenancy commenced, of 1) a basement dwelling with three self-contained units, each with their own private means of egress, and 2) a main floor and upstairs (second floor) dwelling. The main floor and upstairs (second floor) dwelling had a shared front entrance with a staircase that leads to second floor laundry facilities, a bathroom, and three bedrooms. The Appellant’s rental unit was one of three upstairs (second floor) bedrooms and was described as Unit F (the “Rental Unit”). The Rental Unit had its own door locks and contained a kitchenette with a fridge, sink, microwave, and hotplate.

[8] In November 2013, Ms. Michel entered into a rental agreement with the Appellant with respect to the Rental Unit (the “Rental Agreement”). The Rental Agreement expressly provided that the Appellant's living arrangements were not subject to the Act due to the shared aspects of the accommodation.

[9] The initial monthly rent, as set out in the November 2013 rental agreement, was $490. On November 22, 2018, the Respondent provided the Appellant with a hand-written notice that the rent would be increasing to $540 as of January 1, 2019.

[10] The Appellant paid this amount from January 1, 2019, through to approximately September 2020, whereupon, on his legal representative’s advice, the Appellant reverted to paying $490 a month.

[11] In December 2019, Ms. Michel and her husband decided they wanted to regain possession of the Rental Unit for their own personal use and residential occupation and took steps to terminate the Rental Agreement with the Appellant. At the time, as they believed the Act did not apply, they say that they believed they could terminate the Appellant's occupancy simply by providing reasonable notice.

Procedural history

[12] The procedural history of this matter is protracted and, at times, somewhat convoluted.

[13] The Appellant objected to the effort to terminate his occupancy of the Rental Unit and obtained legal representation. Ms. Michel filed an A1 application on or about February 13, 2020 (as amended on or about March 2, 2020) with the Board.

[14] Shortly thereafter, on or about March 9, 2020, the Appellant caused his legal representative to jointly file his own A1 application about whether the Act applied, and the T1 application seeking return of rent increases alleged to have been improperly charged. As they were filed together, the two applications were assigned a single Board file number, and henceforth would be heard as a single proceeding.

[15] The Landlord/Respondent's A1 application was heard by teleconference on May 13, 2020. It was resolved by a final order of the Board, SWL-42136-20, issued on May 15, 2020, in which Member Nicola Mulima determined that based on the real substance of the tenancy, the Act did in fact apply. The Board's determination of the Respondent's A1 was not reviewed or appealed by the Appellant or any other party.

[16] Subsequent to, and as a result of, receiving the determination of the Board that the Act applied, several Landlord and Tenant applications were filed between the Parties. The Respondent provided the Appellant with a Landlord and Tenant Board N1 notice of rent increase on or about August 31, 2020 for a rent increase beginning December 1, 2020 of $11.88, reflecting the guideline 2.2 percent rent increase limit in effect for 2020, and a subsequent N1 notice of rent increase served on the Appellant on September 27, 2022 for a rent increase effective February 1, 2023 of $13.96, reflecting the 2.5 percent increase set by the Province for 2023.

[17] The Landlord served an N12 notice for the Landlord's own use with a termination date of July 31, 2020, and filed an L2 application on this notice. After the originally-scheduled hearing of this application on January 25, 2021, it was adjourned at the Tenant's request due to his having just recently obtained new legal representation, the application was heard on June 18, 2021, where it was dismissed by the Member who heard that matter due to a technical issue with the naming of the Rental Unit.

[18] The Landlord subsequently served a new N12 with a termination date of August 31, 2021, and filed that notice. The matter was heard by Vice-Chair Egya Sangmuah in September 2021 and the tenancy terminated by order of Vice-Chair Sangmuah issued on November 12, 2021.

[19] The Tenant appealed the termination order to the Divisional Court (Divisional Court File No. DC-21-22), with the appeal being heard on November 25, 2022. A final order of the Court was issued on November 28, 2022, dismissing the appeal and upholding the termination.

[20] The Landlord also served the Appellant with a N4 notice of termination for arrears and filed an L1 application on this notice on July 16, 2021. The first hearing of the L1 was scheduled for November 4, 2021, where the Tenant indicated he again intended to seek an adjournment for once again having changed his legal representation shortly before the Landlord's hearing. The matter ended up being adjourned at the end of the hearing block without having been heard; the Member presiding over that hearing block, Member Di Salle, indicated in his interim order issued November 19, 2021, that due to the amount of evidence presented by the Tenant, there was insufficient time scheduled to hear the matter. The interim order additionally ordered the Appellant to pay the rent claimed by the Landlord in full and on time until the matter could be heard by the Board.

[21] The Landlord's L1 was then scheduled to be heard on August 4, 2022, but was again adjourned at the end of the hearing block for lack of time. Due most likely to the scheduling delays caused as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in a large backlog of cases, the Appellant's A1/T1 proceeding was not initially scheduled to be heard until June 18, 2021. However, the Landlord's first L2/N12 proceeding was scheduled to be heard in a different online hearing room at the same date and time. As a result, the parties mutually agreed to proceed on the Landlord's application for possession of the unit for the Landlord's own use on that day, with the hearing of the Appellant's A1/T1 to be rescheduled to a later date.

[22] The Appellant's A1/T1 proceeding was next scheduled to be heard by the Board on June 16, 2022. On that date, after hearing preliminary issues, Member Brkic adjourned the proceeding to allow the Appellant to amend his T1, and to ensure that his disclosure was before the Board and submitted in a format and size that the Board could accept. At some point, the Board determined that the Appellant's A1/T1 applications and the Landlord's L1 application would be scheduled to be heard together. The Appellant's position, which the Respondent did not disagree with, was that T1 and L1 were in essence “two sides of the same coin”, as both the Tenant's potential entitlement to a return of rent collected by the Landlord, and the Landlord's ability to collect the amount of arrears claimed, turned on the same point of whether the Landlord's rent increase(s) were saved by operation of section 135.1 of the Act.

[23] The A1/T1 proceeding was next scheduled to be heard on September 22, 2022, and proceeded on that day before Member Percy Laryea, who reserved his decision. Member Laryea's term ended, and the Member departed the Board without ever issuing his decision. As a result, by the Endorsement of Member Tan issued on February 5, 2024, it was determined that a new Board Member would review the recording of the September 22, 2022 proceedings and issue an order based on the evidence of the Parties already submitted and the recording of the September 22, 2022 hearing.

[24] However, on or about March 5, 2024, the Board issued a notice for a hearing de novo for the Respondent's L1 hearing for April 5, 2024 and on March 12, the Board issued a notice for a hearing de novo for the Appellant's A1/T1 proceeding, scheduled for the same hearing block, so both proceedings would again be heard together.

[25] As the Appellant had by this time vacated the Rental Unit pursuant to the decision of the Divisional Court in his appeal of the termination of the tenancy for the Landlord's own use, the L1 application would proceed only on the question of arrears owing to the Landlord; termination under this application was no longer relevant.

[26] Alongside the proceedings set out above, there is also a T2 tenant application about tenant's rights before the Board, filed by the Appellant on January 22, 2021, and which, after 13 hearing dates both before and after hearing of the matter actually commenced, is still awaiting issuance of a decision by the Board.

[27] Both the Tenant's A1/T1 application and the Landlord's arrears application proceeded before Vice-Chair Shea as scheduled on April 5, 2024. Vice-Chair Shea adjourned the Landlord's L1 arrears application in order for the parties to submit post-hearing submissions.

[28] On April 19, 2024, the Board issued Vice-Chair Shea's decision in the Appellant's A1/T1 applications, (the “Final Order”), which is the decision being appealed from. With regard to the Appellant's A1 application, Vice-Chair Shea determined that as the Board had already ruled in SWL-42136-20, the Landlord's A1 application, that the Act applied, he was not going to revisit that finding. Regarding the Appellant's T1 application, after engaging in an analysis of the purpose and effect of section 135.1 of the Act, Vice-Chair Shea determined that as the Tenant acknowledged that he paid the initial January 2019 rent increase imposed by the Landlord for more than a year, and the Appellant’s T1 application had not been finally determined prior to the coming into force of section 135.1 of the Act on July 21, 2020, subsection 135.1(5) operated to save the Landlord's rent increase and render it valid.

[29] Despite the Hearing Member's expressed sympathy for the Appellant's argument that a) his T1 was filed before the coming into effect of section 135.1, and b) that it was not his fault that COVID-related delays at the Board resulted in his application not being heard until after the coming into force of that section, Vice-Chair Shea relied upon the decision of the Divisional Court in Sapershteyn v. 1821317 Ontario Limited, 2023 ONSC 5877, an appeal of an earlier Board decision by the same Vice-Chair in an unrelated matter, to determine that based on the facts of the application before him, the effect of subsection 135.1(5) was to render the Landlord’s rent increase valid, resulting in the dismissal of the Appellant's T1.

[30] On April 26, 2024, the Appellant requested a review of the Final Order, alleging that it contains a serious error. Rule 26.1 of the Board’s Rules of Procedure provides that any party may request a review of any Board order which makes a final determination of the party’s rights. The review must explain why the party believes that the order contains a serious error or explain why the requestor was not reasonably able to participate in the hearing.

[31] On April 29, 2024, Vice-Chair Harry Cho ("Vice-Chair Cho") completed a preliminary review of the Appellant's review request without a hearing. As per the Review order, some of the grounds raised by the Appellant included his ability to address all the issues he wished to raise at the A1/T1 hearing, the failure of Vice-Chair Shea to award the Appellant his claimed out-of-pocket costs (which included all his claimed expenses for legal representation and disbursements for every proceeding that took place regarding the tenancy, amounting to some tens of thousands of dollars), and the Appellant’s belief that the Respondent's actions regarding the tenancy, particularly when Ms. Michel believed the Act did not apply, were inherently criminally fraudulent, thereby negating any presumption of retrospective application of legislation to the Appellant's circumstances.

[32] Vice-Chair Cho determined that the Appellant was able to properly participate in the hearing, and that Vice-Chair Shea afforded the Appellant the right to address those issues that were properly before the Board in his applications. As such, the Appellant was afforded procedural fairness. Vice-Chair Cho further determined that Vice-Chair Shea's decision to decline to hear the Tenant's A1 application was consistent with the legal doctrine of res judicata. The reviewing Vice-Chair confirmed the correctness of Vice-Chair Shea's ruling that by virtue of subsection 135.1(5), section 135.1 of the Act applied to the Appellant's T1 application, consistent with the Divisional Court's decision in Sapershteyn. Finally, the reviewing Vice-Chair determined that Vice-Chair Shea correctly explained to the Appellant that he could not claim out-of-pocket costs expenses for other applications not under consideration in the the A1/T1 proceeding, and that the Board does not have jurisdiction over criminal complaints, and thus the Appellant's belief that the Respondent’s actions concerning the tenancy were criminal in nature was not a proper ground for review of the Final Order.

Issues

[33] While the Appellant's Factum alludes to many different issues, variably referring to the Appellant’s T2 application, the Respondent's L2/N12 applications, and the Respondent’s L1 application, as well as the Appellant’s A1/T1, as the Final Order being appealed from only concerns the Appellant's A1 and T1 applications, only those aspects of the Appellant's factum and oral submissions relevant to the A1 and T1 determinations will be addressed. Therefore, the following issues are before the Court:

1. What is the applicable standard of review by the Court?

2. Was the Board correct in dismissing the A1 application, implicitly for being res judicata? and

3. Did the Board correctly apply interpret and apply section 135.1(5) of the Act?

Issue I: Standard of Review

[34] The statutory appeal provisions at s.210(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act limits appeals of Board orders to the Divisional Court to questions of law alone. Only questions of law may be appealed to the Divisional Court. The Divisional Court has affirmed on a number of occasions that it does not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a Board order involving a question of fact or mixed fact and law: Solomon v. Levy, 2015 ONSC 2556 (Div. Ct.), at para. 33.

[35] The distinction between questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law was explained in Canada (Director of Investigation & Research) v. Southam Inc., 1997 385 (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748 at para. 35, as follows: questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is; questions of fact are questions about what actually took place between the parties; and questions of mixed law and fact are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests.

[36] In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada held that appellate standards of review are applicable to administrative decisions that provide for a statutory appeal. Questions of law arising from Board decisions are reviewable on the standard of correctness.

[37] Consistent with the Supreme Court’s direction in Vavilov, in order to respect institutional choices and clear statutory language, the Court must exercise caution in characterizing the nature of the legal question to ensure that the correctness standard of review is not applied to the Board’s assessment of evidence, findings of fact, and determinations of mixed fact and law. The Court of Appeal for Ontario in London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., 2002 3225 (ON CA), [2002] 167 O.A.C. 120 (ONCA), at para. 10, addressed the standard of review for questions of procedural fairness: a court need not engage in an assessment of the appropriate standard of review. Rather, the court is required to evaluate whether the rules of procedural fairness or the duty of fairness have been adhered to. The court does this by assessing the specific circumstances giving rise to the allegation and by determining what procedures and safeguards were required in those circumstances in order to comply with the duty to act fairly.

[38] In summary, this Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order of the Board. The parties have a right of appeal on questions of law alone. There is no right of appeal from findings of fact, or findings of mixed fact and law that do not give rise to an extricable question of law. The standard of review on questions of law is correctness.

Issue II: Dismissal of A1 Application as Res Judicata

[39] Vice-Chair Shea dismissed the Appellant's A1 application on the basis that the Board had previously determined that the Act applied to the tenancy. While not using the exact words, the Hearing Member implicitly found that the A1 was res judicata.

[40] The Hearing Member was correct to determine that the A1 should be dismissed as res jusdicata. An A1 application is an application about whether the Act applies. The outcome of an A1 application is binary in nature: it results in either a determination that the Act applies, or that it doesn't. There is no other relief that can result from the determination of an A1 application. Therefore, a Board decision on an A1 application resolves the issue an A1 application is brought in respect of its entirety.

[41] The doctrine of res judicata applies when: (a) the same question or issue has been decided; (b) the decisions was judicial and final; and, (c) the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised: Mendlowitz v. Chiang (Res Judicata), 2011 ONSC 1989 at para. 5.

[42] The Order of the Board appealed from is final, pursuant to section 209 of the Act. The doctrine of res judicata applies in Canada to administrative tribunals such as the Board: Penner v. Niagara (Regional Police Service Board), 2013 SCC 19, at para. 31; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44, at para. 22. Therefore, the Board's Order in the Respondent Landlord's A1 application completely and definitely resolved the issue about which the A1 was application was brought, without any possibility of ambiguity, precluding the Board hearing the Appellant's A1 application.

[43] There was therefore no error on a question of law.

Issue III: Did the Board Err in the Interpretation and Application of Section 135.1(5) of the Act?

[44] On July 21, 2020, the Protecting Tenants and Strengthening Community Housing Act, 2020 received Royal Assent. That act amended the Residential Tenancies Act by the addition of Section 135.1, meaning Section 135.1 came into force on July 21, 2020. Under subsections 135.1(1) and 135.1(2) of the amended Act, a rent increase that would otherwise be void under subsection 116(4) is deemed valid if the tenant paid the increased rent for at least twelve consecutive months and the tenant did not apply to the LTB regarding the validity of the rent increase within one year of said increase. Subsection 135.1(3) of the Act sets out that, if subsection 135.1(1) applies, section 116 is deemed to have been complied with.

[45] Subsection 135.1(5) of the Residential Tenancies Act states that the provisions of section 135.1, which validate what would otherwise be an illegal and thus void rent increase, apply even if the illegal rent was first charged before the amendment came into force, “…provided the validity of the rent increase was not finally determined by the Board before…” July 21, 2020.

[46] The Appellant conceded at the hearing that he had paid the Landlord's nonconforming January 2019 rent increase for more than 12 consecutive months, before filing the T1 application in March of 2020. Vice-Chair Shea further determined that there had been no final order with regard to the T1 application up to the date of the A1/T1 hearing before him on April 5, 2024.

[47] The Appellant took the position at the April 5, 2024 hearing, that notwithstanding the overall effect of section 135.1, and in particular that of 135.1(5), it should not apply with regard to his application as it was not his fault that his T1 application, filed in March 2020, was not heard due to various Board delays until April 5, 2024 (or at the earliest November 22, 2022, although again that hearing did not result in an order being issued).

[48] The Divisional Court recently considered the correct interpretation and effect of section 135.1(5) of the Act in Sapershteyn v. 1821317 Ontario Limited where it held at paras. 23-24 that:

[...] there is no ambiguity in the meaning of s. 135.1. The purpose of the section is clear, it is a response to [Price v. Turnbull’s Grove Inc., 2007 ONCA 408] and to limit the availability to tenants to seek and obtain payment of illegal rent charged. The legislature, in its wisdom, determined that tenants cannot seek retroactive payment of illegal rent charged after one year and in the cases of an application brought before the legislative change, up to the date the change came into effect, July 21, 2020.

It could be taken that the legislature was well aware that a fixed date will make it difficult if not impossible for some tenants to have their application finally determined by July 21, 2020. With the indication of a fixed date, it can be taken that the legislature intended that fixed date with no exceptions.

[49] Indeed, Member Shea relied on the decision in Sapershteyn in determining the proper application of section 135.1(5) of the Act. The Vice-Chair, having correctly apprehended the effect of section 135.1(5), then applied this subsection to the facts before him and determined that the resulting operation of section 135.1 was therefore to "save" the Respondent's January 1, 2019 rent increase, which otherwise would have been a nullity, and render it valid. This is a finding of mixed fact and law which cannot be appealed.

[50] With regard to any question of procedural fairness, the Appellant’s A1/T1 was filed on March 9, 2020. The COVID-19 Pandemic resulted in the Board at first suspending operations on or about March 18, 2020, under the State of Emergency declared by the Province, and then slowly resuming hearing only select applications by teleconference. In the interim, section 135.1 of the Act came into force on July 21, 2020, four months after the Appellant’s T1 was filed. In addition to the initial delay occasioned by the COVID-19 state of emergency, further delays were caused, in varying degrees, by the Appellant’s switches in legal representation (three legal representatives in succession, before the Appellant began to represent himself), issues with the form and content of the Appellant’s evidentiary submissions requiring adjournments, and the failure of Member Laryea to issue an order from the November 22, 2022 hearing of the Appellant’s applications.

[51] As the first scheduled hearing of the Appellant’s matters was for June 18, 2021, almost a year after the July 21, 2020 “deadline” imposed by subsection 135.1(5), any delays that occurred after this date are of no additional effect in terms of the application of section 135.1(5).

Allegation of bias

[52] I would add one further note. In his oral submissions on the hearing of the appeal, the Appellant complained repeatedly of the “longstanding bias” and “inherent bias” of the Landlord and Tenant Board in favour of landlords, and that the Board was “corrupt.” He also asserted that Vice-Chair Shea’s “mind was made up like a brick wall.”

[53] Regarding Members of the Board, I start with a necessary observation about the presumption of judicial impartiality, which would also apply to members of the Landlord and Tenant Board as a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal. There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality and a heavy burden on a party who seeks to rebut this presumption: Langstaff v. Marson, 2014 ONCA 510.

[54] In R. v. Jaser, 2024 ONCA 448, at paras. 308 - 312, the Court of Appeal for Ontario recently summarized the law in this regard:

[308] The principles relating to bias claims are well-known and have been discussed in many decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and this court.

[309] Impartiality lies at the heart of the judicial process; it is vital to the integrity of our justice system. In Marrone, Zarnett J.A. said, at para. 92: “It is a fundamental right of a party to a judicial proceeding that the judge is, and appears, impartial. Bias is the inverse of impartiality.”

[310] A century ago, this foundational principle was captured in the often-quoted words of Hewart L.C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, at p. 259: “…a long line of cases shows that it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.” See also Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 2021), at p. 33.

[311] The test for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias is whether a reasonable person, properly informed and viewing the matter realistically and practically, would conclude that the decision-maker could not decide the case fairly: Committee for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) (1976), 1976 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 394, per de Grandpré J. (dissenting); Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area No. 23 v. Yukon Territory (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 282, at paras. 20-21; and Marrone, at para. 93.

[312] The test is a stringent one. In R. v. Dowholis, 2016 ONCA 801, 133 O.R. (3d) 1, the court said, at para. 18: “There is a strong presumption of judicial impartiality and a heavy burden on a party who seeks to rebut this presumption.” See also Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 259, at para. 59; R. v. S. (R.D.), 1997 324 (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at para. 117, per Cory J.; R. v. Ruthowsky, 2018 ONCA 552, at para. 21; R. v. Grant, 2016 ONCA 639, 342 C.C.C. (3d) 514, at para. 128; and Marrone, at para. 94. The presumption may only be rebutted by “cogent evidence that demonstrates that something the judge did or said gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias”: R. v. Richards, 2017 ONCA 424, 349 C.C.C. (3d) 284, at para. 45. See also S. (R.D.), at para. 117.

[55] The presumption of impartiality for members of the tribunal is a strong one. In this matter, there is no cogent evidence that demonstrates that anything that Vice-Chair Shea did or said gives rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, or that there is an inherent bias in the Landlord and Tenant Board. The Appellant may well dislike the outcome of the Board’s decision and be frustrated at the protracted process undertaken in this matter, but that does not substantiate any finding of institutional or individual bias.

Order

[56] The appeal is dismissed.

Costs

[57] The parties are encouraged to agree upon appropriate costs. If the parties are not able to agree on costs, they may make brief written submissions to me (maximum three pages double-spaced, plus a bill of costs) by email to my judicial assistant at mona.goodwin@ontario.ca and to Kitchener.SCJJA@ontario.ca. The Respondent may have 14 days from the release of this decision to provide her submissions, with a copy to the Appellant; the Appellant a further 14 days to respond, with a copy to the Respondent; and the Respondent a further 7 days for a reply, if any. If no submissions are received within this timeframe, the parties will be deemed to have settled the issue of costs as between themselves. If I have not received any response or reply submissions within the specified timeframes after the Respondent’s initial submissions, I will consider that the parties do not wish to make any further submissions and will decide on the basis of the material that I have received.

M. Gibson J.

Date: June 3, 2025