CITATION: Watt v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency), 2025 ONSC 324
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 333/24 DATE: 20250122
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Lococo, Davies and Jensen JJ.
BETWEEN:
dr. andrew watt
Dr. Andrew Watt, Applicant, acting in person
Applicant
– and –
Law Endorcement complaints agency
Colin Bourrier, for the Respondent
Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: December 3, 2024
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT
I. Introduction
[1] The self-represented applicant Dr. Andrew Watt brings an application for judicial review of the decision dated April 22, 2024 (the “Decision”) of the Complaints Director (formerly called the Independent Police Review Director) of the respondent Law Enforcement Complaints Agency. In the Decision, the Complaints Director decided to exercise his statutory discretion not to deal with the applicant’s complaint about the conduct of officers of the Toronto Police Service, thereby “screening out” the complaint from further consideration. The complaint also included allegations about the conduct of various other organizations and their personnel or members that the Complaints Director decided were beyond the scope of his authority.
[2] Among other things, the applicant submits that the Complaints Director was unreasonable in concluding that the complaint was frivolous and lacking in an air of reality. The applicant asks the court to set aside the Decision and make other wide-ranging orders, many of which would be beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
[3] For the reasons below, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Background
A. Dr. Watt’s complaint
[4] On February 26, 2024, Dr. Watt filed a complaint with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (the “OIPRD”) with respect to the conduct of officers of the Toronto Police Service (the “TPS”).
[5] Dr. Watt’s complaint related to the alleged misconduct of Detective Ward and other unidentified TPS officers in the period July 2008 to February 2024. Dr. Watt claimed that he was subjected to gross negligence and harassment by Detective Ward and other TPS officers, who he said wrongly suspected him of murder. He also claimed that those officers engaged in witness intimidation in relation to the murder investigation. He alleged that since he arrived in Toronto in 2008 for the purpose of training in orthopedic surgery, he has been subjected to various discreditable acts by unknown TPS officers, including shooting him in the chest, restraining him while they sexually abused his girlfriend, and making a false complaint about him to the College of Physicians and Surgeons. He also alleged that “Nazis of Toronto” were cloning him. He further claimed that corrupt politicians, including the Prime Minister of Canada, were part of the cover up of police corruption in Toronto, including the conspiracy to falsely accuse him of murder. He also alleged that the cover up resulted in a “force majeure” in the regulatory legal community in Ontario, with far reaching consequences that remain a threat to public safety and national security and call into question the validity of the institutions that govern the legal and medical profession.
B. Complaint Director’s statutory authority
[6] At the time of Dr. Watt’s complaint, the Independent Police Review Director was responsible for managing complaints by members of the public about the conduct of police officers in Ontario under statutory authority derived from Parts II.1 and V of the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15 (the “PSA”).
[7] On April 1, 2024, the PSA was repealed and replaced with the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1 (the “CSPA”). The OIPRD continued under the name of the Law Enforcement Review Agency (the “LECA”) and the Independent Police Review Director became the Complaints Director, who is the LECA’s head: CSPA, ss 130(1), 130(2). For complaints made prior to April 1, 2024, the Complaints Director exercises the powers and duties of the Independent Police Review Director: CSPA, s. 216(3). Such complaints (including Dr. Watt’s complaint) continue to be dealt with in accordance with the PSA as it read prior to its repeal: CSPA, s. 216(1). The OIPRD Rules of Procedure (amended February 2024) made under s. 56 the PSA (the “Rules of Procedure”) continue to apply to those complaints.
C. Screening of complaints
[8] The statutory scheme for managing police conduct complaints set out in the PSA provides the Complaints Director with broad authority to determine how to address complaints. The initial step is a screening process, under which the Complaints Director decides if the complaint should proceed for further action (“screened in”) or should not proceed any further (“screened out”): PSA, s. 60. Complaints are presumptively screened in unless the Complaints Director exercises his legislative discretion not to deal with the complaint, thereby screening it out.
[9] If a police conduct complaint is screened in, the Complaints Director is required to either (i) refer the complaint to the chief of police of the police force to which the complaint relates, (ii) refer the complaint to the chief of police of a different police force, or (iii) retain the complaint for investigation and the preparation of a written report: PSA, ss. 61(5), 66-68.
[10] The Complaints Director has broad authority to screen out complaints: see PSA, s. 60(1), under which the Complaints Director “may, in accordance with this section [60], decide not to deal with a complaint made to him or her by the public under this Part [V]” of the PSA. A complaint may be screened out if the complaint is made more than six months after the facts on which it is based occurred: PSA, s. 60(2). A complaint may also be screened out if (i) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or made in bad faith, (ii) the complaint could be more appropriately dealt with, in whole or in part, under another Act or other law, or (iii) having regard to all the circumstances, dealing with the complaint is not in the public interest: PSA, s. 60(4).
[11] The screening process is neither an investigation nor a hearing into the merits of the complaint: see Anwar v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 3150 (Div. Ct.), at para. 15; Endicott v Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2014 ONCA 363, 373 D.L.R. (4th) 149, at para. 28. Rather, the Complaints Director is tasked with determining whether the allegations or issues in the complaint, on their face, fall within his statutory mandate and jurisdiction and whether the complaint reveals a prima facie violation of the PSA. It is not in the public interest to screen in a complaint that does not, on its face, disclose a breach of the PSA or the Code of Conduct under the PSA[^1] (the “Code of Conduct”): Rules of Procedure, r. 6.5.
III. The Decision
[12] On April 22, 2024, the Complaints Director issued the Decision, screening out the complaint and closing the file.
[13] In the Decision, the Complaints Director outlined the allegations in the complaint. He noted that s. 60(4) of the PSA permits the Complaints Director not to deal with a complaint if, having regard to all the circumstances, the complaint is frivolous, and went on to state:
We have reviewed your complaint in its totality and considered the nature of the allegations that you have made. Your complaint does not provide a sufficient basis to support your claims against the police. Rather, in your complaint you make numerous strong assertions about the police without any substantive basis to support those claims. We accept that you are acting in good faith, but an objective assessment of the allegations you have raised suggests that they are overly broad, speculative in nature, and lacking an air of reality. As such, it is the Complaints Director’s view that your complaint is frivolous and therefore, does not warrant an investigation.
[14] The Complaints Director further noted that Dr. Watt had also attempted to report concerns about the conduct of the University of Toronto, the Law Society of Ontario and College of Physicians and Surgeons. The Complaints Director explained that the LECA’s mandate did not extend to the conduct of members of those organizations.
[15] The Complaints Director also noted that the LECA does not have authority over allegations of police misconduct that occurred before October 19, 2009, when the OIPRD was created, advising that such conduct would have to be raised with the police service that was the subject of the complaint.
[16] The Complaints Director advised that for those reasons, Dr. Watt’s file was now closed. He also explained that there was no appeal from a screening decision, but Dr. Watt could bring a judicial review application to the Divisional Court to challenge the Decision.
IV. Judicial review application
A. Preliminary matters
[17] By letter dated May 20, 2020, Dr. Watt sought permission to bring a judicial review application to challenge the Decision. It was necessary for him to seek permission because of Corbett J.’s order dated April 17, 2024, pursuant to r. 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, dismissing Dr. Watt’s application to this court against the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The order provided that Dr. Watt was not permitted to commence or continue legal proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice (including the Divisional Court and the Small Claims Court) without prior written permission of a judge: see Watt v. Ontario (Health Professions Appeal and Review Board), 2024 ONSC 5980 (Div. Ct.).
[18] On June 3, 2024, Matheson J. granted Dr. Watt’s request for permission to serve and file his Notice of Application to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the Decision. On June 10, 2024, Dr. Watt provided his Notice of Application.
[19] At a case conference before O’Brien J. on July 4, 2024, Dr. Watt sought to consolidate his judicial review application with a proceeding that he had unsuccessfully attempted to initiate in Small Claims Court. O’Brien J. had previously declined to grant Dr. Watt the permission required under Corbett J.’s r. 2.1 order to bring the Small Claims Court action. At the case conference, O’Brien J refused to make a consolidation order, noting that there was no consolidation motion and no ability for the court to make such an order. O’Brien J. also declined Dr. Watt’s request that she recuse herself on the ground of bias, noting that Dr. Watt raised numerous concerns that did not have an air of reality, including that O’Brien J. engaged in witchcraft and sorcery.
[20] By letter dated July 19, 2024, Dr. Watt sought permission to bring a motion under r. 59.06 to set aside Corbett J.’s order on the grounds of fraud and to join his claims in that matter with his claims in this judicial review application and a Small Claims Court matter. On August 13, 2024, Matheson J. denied the requested permission, noting (among other things) that (i) the time for appealing or otherwise challenging Corbett J.’s order had long since passed, and (ii) O’Brien J. had already addressed the consolidation of the judicial review application and the Small Claims Court action, which could have been but had not been challenged.
[21] At the beginning of his oral submissions at the application hearing, Dr. Watt raised a “point of order”, asking the court to reconsider the question of consolidation of the judicial review application with the Small Claims Court action, and stated his understanding that there were outstanding issues related to Corbett J.’s order. We declined to consider those matters, since they had been addressed prior to the hearing in case management.
[22] Dr. Watt also sought an order for the release of his health records without redaction, stating that he was unable to effectively advocate before the court without those records. We declined to make that order in the absence of a motion on notice and because such an order was beyond the court’s jurisdiction in these judicial review proceedings.
B. Parties’ positions on judicial review and issues to be determined
[23] In the judicial review application, Dr. Watt challenges the Complaint Director’s finding that his complaint was frivolous, which was the basis provided for deciding not to deal with the complaint. Dr. Watt submits that the finding that the complaint was frivolous and lacked an air of reality raises important issues that attracted a correctness standard of review. He also argues that the Decision was unreasonable, given the detailed information he provided about the misconduct of police officers and members of other regulatory institutions (including those governing medical, legal and judicial officials) from 2008 to the present time. Dr. Watt says that this misconduct has upended his life, including rendering him unable to work in his chosen profession, and raises issues of procedural fairness and abuse of process. Dr. Watt also submits that the “force majeure” arising from that misconduct has wider implications for society that this court needs to address.
[24] In addition to setting aside the Decision, Dr. Watt seeks a broad array of other relief (as set out in his factum), including an apology from the Complaints Director, his dismissal, and an order directing him to conduct a criminal investigation. Dr. Watt also seeks orders against various other entities and individuals, including the Ministry of the Attorney General, the Province of Ontario, the Premier of Ontario, the Minister of Health, Mount Sinai Hospital, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, the Law Society of Ontario, the President of the Ontario Bar Association, the University of Toronto and its Faculty of Medicine, the City of Toronto, the Toronto Mayor, the Lieutenant Governor of Ontario, the Governor General of Canada, and other officials and private individuals. Among other things, he also asks the court to annul his marriage.
[25] The LECA submits that Dr. Watt has not established that the Decision should be set aside or that the other relief requested should be granted. Applying the reasonableness standard of review, the LECA argues that the Decision is reasonable and supported with intelligible reasons that led to the results reached. The LECA submits that other remedies Dr. Watt seeks are beyond the court’s jurisdiction on this application.
[26] Upon judicial review, the issues to be determined are:
a. Standard of review: What is the standard of review for the Decision?
b. Application of standard of review: Did the Decision meet the standard of review?
c. Procedural fairness: Was Dr. Watt afforded procedural fairness?
V. Jurisdiction and standard of review
[27] The Divisional Court has jurisdiction to hear this application for judicial review: Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. J.1, ss. 2, 6(1).
[28] Upon judicial review of an administrative decision, there is a presumption that the standard of review is reasonableness in the absence of clear legislative intent, a constitutional question, a question of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, or a question regarding jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 653, at paras. 23-25, 32-64.
[29] The standard of review that applies to the Decision is reasonableness. The Divisional Court has consistently reviewed decisions of the Complaints Director on a reasonableness standard: see Engels v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2024 ONSC 5104 (Div. Ct.), at para. 30-31. The Complaints Director’s exercise of his legislative discretion not to deal with a complaint is entitled to deference upon judicial review: Wall v. Ontario (Independent Policy Review Director), 2013 ONSC 3312, 362 D.L.R. (4th) 687, at para. 21.
[30] Reasonableness review “finds its starting point in the principle of judicial restraint” but remains “a robust form of review” rather than “a ‘rubber-stamping’ process or a means of sheltering administrative decision makers from accountability”: Vavilov, at para. 13. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires a reviewing court to defer to such a decision: Vavilov, at para. 85. The relative expertise of administrative decision makers with respect to the questions before them is a relevant consideration in conducting reasonableness review: Vavilov, at paras. 31, 92-93.
[31] The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. Before a decision can be set aside on that basis, “the reviewing court must be satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency”: Vavilov, at para. 100.
[32] A tribunal is required to conduct its proceedings fairly. The degree of procedural fairness required is determined by reference to all the circumstances of the case, including those set out in Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, at paras. 21-28.
VI. Application of the reasonableness standard of review
[33] As explained below, we have concluded that Dr. Watt has not discharged his burden of establishing that the Decision was unreasonable. The Decision to screen out Dr. Watt’s complaint was reasonable and supported by intelligible reasons that justified the conclusions reached.
[34] Dr. Watt submits that given the information before the Complaints Director, it was impossible for the complaint to be considered frivolous. This submission has no merit.
[35] The Decision fairly summarized the complaint and demonstrated an understanding of the essence of the complaint. The Decision also fairly sets out the applicable statutory framework in which the complaint was considered, explaining that s. 60(4) of the PSA permits the Complaints Director not to deal with a complaint if, having regard to all the circumstances, the complaint is frivolous.
[36] Reading the Decision as a whole, the Complaints Director provided a coherent and reasonable explanation for screening out the complaint. He reasonably found that the complaint was frivolous in that it lacked substance. He explained that he did not have jurisdiction to address Dr. Watt’s concerns about the conduct of the University of Toronto, the Law Society of Ontario, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, given that his jurisdiction was limited to the conduct of police officers. He also correctly indicated that he did not have jurisdiction over conduct that occurred before October 19, 2009, directing Dr. Watt to the applicable police service if he wished to pursue that aspect of the complaint. In so doing, the Decision met the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency for a screening decision.
[37] Dr. Watt also challenges as unreasonable the Complaint Director’s finding that the complaint was speculative in nature and lacked an air of reality. We disagree. The Complaints Director considered the allegations and reasonably concluded that Dr. Watt did not provide substantial evidence or information to support his serious claims against the police and others. It was reasonable for the Complaints Director to conclude that it would not be in the public interest to dedicate investigative resources to the allegations of this nature. He was not required to investigate further at the screening stage: Anwar, at para. 15.
[38] Accordingly, Dr. Watt has not established that the Decision should be set aside as unreasonable or that the other relief sought should be granted.
VII. Procedural fairness
[39] Dr. Watt submits that the alleged misconduct by police and other regulatory bodies and institutions has profoundly affected his personal and professional life, giving rise to issues of procedural fairness and abuse of process that this court should address. We see no justification for interfering with the Decision on that basis.
[40] In his factum, Dr. Watt alleges several breaches of procedural fairness in his dealings with the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board and the College of Physicians and Surgeons. As previously noted, proceedings involving those bodies are not subject to review in this application, which relates only to the screening decision of the Complaints Director. We have no jurisdiction to address alleged procedural fairness breaches in those proceedings.
[41] With respect to Dr. Watt’s complaint to the Complaints Director, as noted by this court in A.Z. v. Ontario (Office of the Independent Police Review Director), 2023 ONSC 6365 (Div. Ct.), at para. 46, “the threshold for procedural fairness at the screening phase is low”; see also Endicott, at para. 28, where the Court of Appeal noted that “the PSA does not contemplate the need for a hearing or notice, nor does it impose any specific procedural requirement.”
[42] Dr. Watt made detailed submissions to the Complaints Director that were fully considered and addressed in the Decision. In those circumstances, we see no basis for concluding that the Complaints Director breached his duty of procedural fairness.
VIII. Disposition
[43] Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed without costs.
___________________________ Lococo J.
___________________________ Davies J.
___________________________ Jensen J.
Date of Release: January 22, 2025
CITATION: Watt v. Ontario (Law Enforcement Complaints Agency), 2025 ONSC 324
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 333/24 DATE: 20250122
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Lococo. Davies and Jensen JJ.
BETWEEN:
Dr. Andrew watt
Applicant
– and –
Law Endorcement complaints agency
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
BY THE COURT
Date: January 22, 2025
[^1]: O. Reg. 268/10: General, s. 31; Sched.