Schram v. Huron Green Inc., 2025 ONSC 1706
CITATION: Schram v. Huron Green Inc., 2025 ONSC 1706
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000014
DATE: 2025-03-17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Michael Schram
Tenant/Appellant
– and –
Huron Green Inc. c/o Linwood Property Management
Landlord/Respondent
Self-Represented
Kristen Ley, for the Landlord/Respondent
HEARD: February 21, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
JUSTICE E. TEN CATE
Introduction
[1] The Appellant, Michael Schram, rents a home at 3 Columbia Court, Huron Park, Ontario with his spouse, Leslie Mitchell.
[2] The rental unit is a semi-detached single-family home located in a housing complex of approximately 400 rental units on a former Royal Canadian Air Force base near Clinton, Ontario. Huron Green Inc. c/o Linwood Property Management is the landlord.
[3] At the center of the dispute is a canvas shed which was erected by the Appellant in the backyard.
[4] The Appellant appeals from an order made by Landlord and Tenant Board ("LTB") Vice Chair Rebecca Case issued on December 13, 2023[^1], and the subsequent order of Vice Chair Renée Lang on a review request made by the Appellant, issued on March 14, 2024[^2].
[5] The LTB ordered the Appellant to remove the shed and pay the landlord $186.00 for the cost of filing the application. The review order denied the Appellant's request to review and upheld the decision of the LTB.
[6] Initially the LTB was named as a respondent, however, at the Case Conference on June 18, 2024, the appeal against the LTB was discontinued without prejudice to its statutory right to participate. The LTB did not participate in this hearing.
[7] Although Ms. Mitchell is named on the tenancy agreement and as a respondent before the LTB, the Appellant filed the appeal alone.
[8] A civil action was brought by the Appellant and Ms. Michell against the Respondents and the Municipality of South Huron in which the plaintiffs sought a monetary award of over $40,000,000.
[9] The defendants brought a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 21.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure[^3]. The basis of the request was that the action was a duplication of the issues dealt with by the LTB and the subsequent appeal before this court. On February 13, 2025, Perfetto J. found the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB, granted the defendants' motion, and dismissed the civil action.[^4]
Positions of the Parties
[10] The Appellant's position is that the LTB made several errors of law and engaged in an abuse of process. Specifically, he submits that because his rental unit is a single-family residence and is not a "land lease home" as defined in the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006[^5] ("RTA"), land lease community rules do not apply to him.
[11] The Respondent's position is that the Appellant has raised no errors of law and therefore the LTB decision is not reviewable pursuant to s. 210 of the RTA. The Respondent submits that the Appellant failed to raise this issue before the LTB and is therefore precluded from doing so now. Alternatively, the rental unit was part of a "land lease community" giving it the right to make community rules pursuant to s. 154(1) of the RTA.
Factual Background
[12] On February 7, 2015, the Appellant and his spouse entered into a lease agreement with the previous landlord. According to paragraph 13(E) of the lease:
The Tenant shall not permit the painting of any portion of the premises or erect or cause to be erected any structure or thing, including but not limited to satellite dishes, in and or about the premises.[^6]
[13] The Appellant and his wife took possession of the rental unit in April of 2015. The Appellant erected a canvas or canopy shed to house his lawn and snow removal equipment. to meet his obligation under the lease to maintain the property.
[14] In 2018 there was an incident in which a canvas shed (not the Appellant's) blew away in the wind. Subsequently, the landlord demanded the tenants of the complex remove their canvas sheds due to safety and liability concerns. The Appellant was given authorization to erect a more permanent shed should he desire.
[15] In April of 2021, the Respondent enacted rules and regulations that provided in part:
RENOVATIONS/SHEDS/FENCES/POOLS
No renovations, additions or alterations of any kind can be made to any Huron Green home or property.
One storage shed per home is permitted but must be approved by Huron Green's management.
No fabric canopy sheds or garages are allowed.
[16] The lease required the Appellant to follow the rules and regulations for the community pursuant to the following provision:
AMENDMENTS
- V. The Tenant covenants and agrees to comply with each of the rules and regulations herein and, upon notice, and any additions or amendments thereto which may be made on reasonable Notice by the Landlord.
[17] The amended rules regarding sheds were sent to the tenants in April of 2021. The landlord also posted a notice on the management office door. Originally there were 21 tenants with canvas sheds; all were removed except for the Appellant's.
[18] On May 2, 2022, the Respondent served the Appellant with an N5 notice to terminate the tenancy pursuant to s. 64(1) of the RTA in which the Appellant was given seven days to remove the shed.
[19] On May 20, 2022, the Appellant filed the civil action in Superior Court.
[20] On May 24, 2022, the Respondent applied to evict the Appellant from the rental unit.
[21] The hearing before the LTB took place on June 29, 2023. Vice Chair Case found:
a. the Appellant admitted the act alleged in the N5 notice and that he had not voided the notice pursuant to s. 64(3) of the RTA;
b. the Respondent acted within the scope of its authority under the RTA to enact the rule prohibiting canvas sheds, and the rule was not unreasonable;
c. the contravention of the rule may have implications for the liability of the Respondent and therefore substantially interfered with the Respondent's lawful right, privilege, or interest pursuant to s. 64(1); and
d. the requirements for mandatory denial of eviction under s. 83(3) of the RTA had not been met by the Appellant, either with respect to his allegation that (1) the Respondent was in serious breach of its responsibilities under the RTA or of any material covenant in the tenancy agreement, or that (2) the Respondent had commenced the application in retaliation for the Appellant's attempt to secure or enforce his rights.
[22] Vice Chair Case exercised her discretion under s. 83(1) to impose a conditional order that allowed the Appellant to remain in the rental unit provided he remove the canvas shed by February 14, 2024.
[23] On January 8, 2024, the Appellant requested a review of the order which was denied.
Analysis
[24] Section 210(1) of the RTA provides as follows:
Any person affected by an order of the Board may appeal the order to the Divisional Court within 30 days after being given the order, but only on a question of law.
[25] Because LTB decisions can only be appealed on questions of law, the standard is correctness.[^7]
[26] The distinction between questions of law and fact was discussed by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.[^8]:
Briefly stated, questions of law are questions about what the correct legal test is; questions of fact are questions about what actually took place between the parties; and questions of mixed law and fact are questions about whether the facts satisfy the legal tests.[^9]
[27] In my view, the Appellant's characterization of the tribunal's decision as an abuse of process because it found no retaliation is mistaken. Vice Chair Case considered all the facts, including the evidence of the parties regarding the timing of the N5 notice vis-à-vis the issuance of the statement of claim in the Superior Court of Justice, and found no retaliation. Since this was a question about what took place between the parties, her finding was one of fact which is not reviewable under s. 210(1).
[28] Vice-Chair Case exercised her discretion under s. 83(3) to delay the eviction order to allow the Appellant an opportunity to remove the shed. Since the section grants her discretion, her exercise of discretion is not reviewable by this court.
[29] The Appellant's complaint that the LTB attempted to derogate the court's authority also has no merit because Perfetto J. confirmed that the issues at bar were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the LTB. In other words, the LTB made no jurisdictional error.
[30] The only remaining basis for the appeal is the "land lease" issue.
[31] The transcript confirms that the land lease issue was not argued at the hearing. Even if it was, in my view, the argument has no merit.
[32] A "land lease home" is defined as:
a dwelling, other than a mobile home, that is a permanent structure where the owner of the dwelling leases the land used or intended for use as the site for the dwelling.[^10]
[33] Nineteen of the homes in the complex are "land lease homes", akin to mobile homes. The parties agreed at the hearing that the Appellant's home is not a "land lease home", but rather a regular rental unit because the Appellant rents both the building and the land upon which it sits.[^11]
[34] The Appellant testified that these new rules did not apply to him because they did not form part of his original lease. Although he agreed to follow the community rules and regulations, such agreement was only for "common areas". In his view, there are no common areas affecting his rental unit because he also rents the backyard which is not accessible by anyone other than him and his spouse. He admitted the canvas shed is still there, eight years later. He refuses to remove it because he says building a permanent structure would violate his lease and he does not wish to incur the cost of a permanent structure.
[35] According to the RTA, a "land lease community" means:
the land on which one or more occupied land lease homes are situate and includes the rental units and the land, structures, services and facilities of which the landlord retains possession and that are intended for the common use and enjoyment of the tenants of the landords.[^12] (Emphasis added.)
In other words, one "land lease home" is sufficient to create a "land lease community".
[36] Section 152(2) of the RTA states that the rules regarding mobile homes also apply to land lease communities.
[37] Section 154 (1) of the RTA outlines the responsibilities of landlords in mobile home parks requiring them to provide written park rules to each tenant and notice of any change to the rules. Pursuant to s. 152(2), this obligation also extends to land lease communities.
[38] In this case, there is no question that the rental unit forms part of a land lease community. Therefore, pursuant to s. 154(1) of the RTA, the landlord can enact community rules provided proper notice is given to the tenants (which is not disputed). Here, the Respondent enacted a rule about canvas sheds, but the Appellant chooses to disobey.
Disposition
[39] For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed, with costs payable by the Appellant to the Respondents in the amount of $3,000.
Justice E. ten Cate
Released: March 17, 2025
CITATION: Schram v. Huron Green Inc., 2025 ONSC 1706
COURT FILE NO.: DC-24-00000014
DATE: 2025-03-17
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Michael Schram
Tenant/Appellant
– and –
Huron Green Inc. c/o Linwood Property Management
Landlord/Respondent
Self-Represented
Kristen Ley, for the Landlord/Respondent
HEARD: February 21, 2025
REASONS FOR DECISION
Justice E. ten Cate
Released: March 17, 2025
[^1]: Huron Green Inc. c/o Linwood Property Management v. Schram, 2023 ONLTB 48785. [^2]: Huron Green Inc. c/o Linwood Property Management v. Schram, 2024 ONLTB 20476. [^3]: R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 made pursuant to the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 43. [^4]: Schram v. Linwood Management Corporation, 2025 ONSC 987. [^5]: S.O. 2006, c. 17. [^6]: Although the lease, entered as an exhibit at the hearing was cut off in the middle of the paragraph, the Appellant testified regarding the missing part of the paragraph. [^7]: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, at para. 37. [^8]: 1997 385 (SCC), [1996] S.C.J. 116. [^9]: Ibid, at para. 35. [^10]: RTA, supra, s. 2(1). [^11]: Transcript of LTB hearing, at pages 16-17. [^12]: RTA, supra, s. 2(1).