CITATION: Glen Patrick Bogue (a.k.a. Spirit Warrior) v. Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONSC 3654
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NOS.: 318/23
DATE: 20230609
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
DIVISIONAL COURT
RE: GLEN PATRICK BOGUE (a.k.a. spirit warrior) v. LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO
BEFORE: D.L. Corbett J.
HEARD: In Writing, In Chambers
ENDORSEMENT
[1] By direction dated May 24, 2023, this court directed the Registrar to issue a notice pursuant to R.2.1 that the court is considering dismissing this proceeding as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The court identified the following concerns in the covering email attaching the R.2.1 notice:
Justice Corbett directs me to advise you as follows:
The Registrar is directed to issue a notice pursuant to R.2.1 that the court is considering dismissing this proceeding as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, on the following grounds:
An appeal to the Law Society Appeal Panel was dismissed for failure to perfect the appeal in a timely way in 2021.
The time to appeal the 2021 dismissal expired about two years ago and no extension in the time in which to bring an appeal has been sought or granted by this court.
The current proceeding purports to appeal interlocutory orders of the Law Society Tribunal predating the 2021 dismissal by the Appeal Panel, and those appeals are now moot as a consequence of the 2021 dismissal. Further and in any event, interlocutory appeals are not generally available in this court, and these purported appeals are out of time and no extension has been sought or granted to appeal them.
The 2023 orders put an end to a purported fresh appeal brought by the appellant from the decision the appeal from which was finally dismissed with the 2021 dismissal. On its face, the 2023 appeal is an attempt to re-litigate the appeal that was dismissed in 2021, and is on its face frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
In the Notice of Appeal, the appellant raises untenable grounds that raise vexatious issues that have been disposed of in other litigation in which such grounds have been sought to be advanced, such as the legality of Canada's constitution, and the jurisdiction of the respondent over the appellant because of the appellant's alleged indigeneity. In this case, the issues concern the respondent's decisions to suspend and to revoke the appellant's membership in the respondent. Allegations that the respondent does not have jurisdiction over such issues are inherently vexatious on their face.
Given the totality of concerns about this proceeding, the appellant is also advised that the court is considering whether it should restrict his unfettered access to commence and/or continue proceedings in the Divisional Court, and he may include in his response any submissions he may wish to make on this issue.
[2] The appellant (who calls himself “Spirit Warrior”) sent the following email to the court on May 24, 2023:
Greetings Justice Corbett,
As Prelude to my 10 Page Submission, I raise the issue of your Conflict of Interest.
Here is a citation from the LSO:
Although one has to be a lawyer to become a judge, upon appointment, judges become “members in abeyance.” They remain on the books of the Law Society but they are not allowed to practice or vote on Law Society issues until they resign or retire from the Bench.
Since you are a still a member of the LSO, you cannot sit in judgment when the Appellant is challenging the Jurisdiction of that very body of which you are a member.
We require a neutral Arbitrator.
Spirit Warrior
[3] Counsel for the Law Society sent an email to the court on May 24, 2023, requesting permission to provide brief responding submissions to “(what I take to be) Mr. Bogue’s allegation of bias against the Hon. Justice Corbett?” The appellant then responded as follows:
In reply to [counsel for the Law Society]:
- I am not raising bias but rather conflict of interest.
In a Leafs-Habs game, a member of the Leafs or the Habs cannot be the referee. If a golf club is sued, a member of that club cannot be the Judge.
- Joshua was ordered off this case by an Indigenous Tribunal AFTER UNDRIP was ratified by Bill C15. This is also according to Indigenous Common Law of an Un conquered Nation, cited as British Imperial (Inter-national) Law in R v Desautel at (68). See Unconquered at Desautel (30).
Inter-national Decisions must be enforced by the Div Court per Pro Swing v Elta 2006 SCC 52.
The SCC decisions bind the Div Court.
[4] The court then provided the following direction on May 25, 2023:
Justice Corbett directs me to advise you as follows:
The alleged conflict of interest raised by the appellant - that all judges have a conflict because their membership in the Law Society is "in abeyance" during the period of their appointment as judges - is patently frivolous and vexatious. The appellant shall have the time specified by the Registrar to respond to the R.2.1 notice and may wish to address in his response the concern the court has voiced that his conduct as a litigant is frivolous and vexatious.
[5] The appellant provided submissions in response to the R.2.1 notice on June 7, 2023. The submissions are inherently vexatious. The appeal is dismissed, and an order shall issue prohibiting the appellant from commencing or continuing any proceeding in the Divisional Court without prior permission of the administrative judge of the Divisional Court or their designate.
- An appeal to the Law Society Appeal Panel was dismissed for failure to perfect the appeal in a timely way in 2021.
[6] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions.
- The time to appeal the 2021 dismissal expired about two years ago and no extension in the time in which to bring an appeal has been sought or granted by this court.
[7] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions.
- The current proceeding purports to appeal interlocutory orders of the Law Society Tribunal predating the 2021 dismissal by the Appeal Panel, and those appeals are now moot as a consequence of the 2021 dismissal. Further and in any event, interlocutory appeals are not generally available in this court, and these purported appeals are out of time and no extension has been sought or granted to appeal them.
[8] The appellant does not address this concern in his submissions.
- The 2023 orders put an end to a purported fresh appeal brought by the appellant from the decision the appeal from which was finally dismissed with the 2021 dismissal. On its face, the 2023 appeal is an attempt to re-litigate the appeal that was dismissed in 2021, and is on its face frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
[9] The appellant argues that developments in the law have cast his appeal in a new light, and thus he should be permitted to raise these new developments by way of appeal, even though his appeal was dismissed previously. This is no answer to the concern that the appellant is relitigating a decided appeal. The appellant’s recourse, on this theory of the case, is to request that the Law Society re-open his decided appeal on the basis of the new legal developments he alleges. He is not entitled to bring a fresh appeal in respect to a matter that has been finally decided already. Further, as explained below, the alleged “new developments” in the law are irrelevant to his appeal in any event and are frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process in and of themselves.
- In the Notice of Appeal, the appellant raises untenable grounds that raise vexatious issues that have been disposed of in other litigation in which such grounds have been sought to be advanced, such as the legality of Canada's constitution, and the jurisdiction of the respondent over the appellant because of the appellant's alleged indigeneity. In this case, the issues concern the respondent's decisions to suspend and to revoke the appellant's membership in the respondent. Allegations that the respondent does not have jurisdiction over such issues are inherently vexatious on their face.
[10] The conclusion of the appellant’s submissions summarizes the basis on which he says his appeal is not frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process:
The issues of:
A) Indigenous Common Law being presumed to continue via Desautel;
B) the effect of the new law in CANADA of UNDRIP, since 2007;
C) the validity of the BNA after its Enabling Clause was rescinded,
D) the contingency of S. 59 until a second Proclamation;
E) the Proclamation of a mere Corporation in 1982,
and that Crown’s de facto control vs Indigenous Common Law’s de jure control of our Resources have never been properly nor fully litigated in Canadian jurisprudence, at the appellate level. These issues centre around binding SCC in Decisions in St Catharine’s Milling, Tsilhqot’in, and Desautel, along with Calder, R v Sioui and R v Cote, and R v Hape. Therefore, these issues cannot be frivolous or vexatious, and must be heard, via the Div. Court, and from there in an Indigenous Tribunal of [the appellant]’s Choice, per UNDRIP.[^1]
None of these points is remotely relevant to whether the appellant’s membership in the Law Society of Ontario should have been suspended or revoked.
[11] Further, the appellant’s arguments in respect to the issues he says he wishes to raise are vexatious. For example, he argues as follows in respect to the Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly known as the British North America Act):
In 1981, PM Pierre Trudeau knew he had a problem. The BNA Act of 1867 never received Royal Assent (SW sought a true copy of that Royal Assent from England since Feb., 2020). The BNA Act of 1867 was repealed by Victoria via the Statute Law Revision Act of 1893, which removed the BNA’s Enabling Clause. The BNA became a nullity. Pierre Trudeau tried to re-vive the BNA, which was only passed in London, and brought here via a Proclamation of Elizabeth II, who established only Letters Patent of a Corporation called CANADA, a continuation if you will of the Hudson’s Bay Corporation.
As a second example, the appellant conflates the rights of First Nations to self-determination to what he conceives of as a personal right of self-determination, for him, as a self-identified member of a First Nation:
[The appellant] self-determines as an Individual, and also as a member of the Non-Status Kinakwii Tribe….
[12] Judges are required to be open-minded and to consider novel arguments and claims. But there is a limit. Judges are also required to focus their efforts on matters of substance, and not to waste judicial resources giving serious consideration to what is utter nonsense.
[13] There have been no material legal developments that impact on the Law Society’s duty and authority to supervise its membership in the public interest. The appellant’s argument to the contrary is without merit. Second, the substance of the appellant’s legal argument is pseudo-legal nonsense that has been rejected repeatedly by the courts. This has been going on for years. In a 2018 decision a panel of the Law Society stated as follows (2018 ONLSTH 46, para. 14):
The panel lastly notes, in passing, as put forward by Law Society counsel, that Mr. Bogue has made similarly vague and untenable arguments in other Courts, which have been dismissed, namely: The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.C., Endorsement of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dated April 1, 2016; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v A.C., Reasons of the Divisional Court dated May 11, 2016; The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. A.C., 2016 ONCA 512; R. v. Anderson, 2016 BCSC 2170; R. v. Anderson, 2017 BCCA 154. While these cases are not strictly binding on this panel, they are nonetheless worth noting for the fact that they confirm and support this panel’s conclusions with respect to Mr. Bogue’s similar arguments before us, with respect to issue(s) before the panel and our jurisdiction.
[14] Recently, in Bogue v. Bogue, 2023 ONSC 1642, per Gilmore J., the court reviewed and rejected pseudo-legal arguments to the effect (among other things) that the Constitution of Canada is invalid, and litigation involving the appellant requires Ontario and/or Canada to consult with First Nations.
[15] Excessive judicial resources have already been wasted examining and rejecting the appellant’s vexatious arguments respecting the status of Canada’s constitution and his argument that there are no valid laws of Canada or Ontario that apply to him.
Disposition
[16] The appeal is dismissed as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process, on the basis of the concerns raised at the time the R.2.1 notice was issued, and on the basis that the appellant’s response to the R.2.1 notice is, itself, frivolous and vexatious. Mr Bogue may not commence or continue proceedings in the Divisional Court on his own behalf and may not act as counsel, agent or representative for any person in any proceeding in the Divisional Court without the prior permission of the Divisional Court administrative judge or her designate. Permission may only be sought by letter that is no longer than three pages, supported with attachments no longer than ten pages. Such materials may be transmitted to the court by email.
[17] In communications with court staff, Mr Bogue asked about his recourse from an adverse decision pursuant to R.2.1. As this court noted recently in Tran v. OIPRD, 2023 ONSC 3207, para. 7:
If Ms Tran provides copies of this court’s R. 2.1 decision to Court of Appeal staff, any difficulty should be addressed easily. The R. 2.1 decision is not a decision of a “motion judge”, but rather is a final disposition from the Divisional Court, appealable with leave to the Ontario Court of Appeal: Courts of Justice Act, s. 6(1)(a). It is a decision of a single judge of the Divisional Court, rather than a panel, because all R. 2.1 matters in Divisional Court have been directed to be heard and decided by a single judge of the Divisional Court pursuant to s. 21(2)(c) of the Courts of Justice Act, a procedure that has been in place for many years.
“D.L. Corbett J.”
Released: June 16, 2023
[^1]: See R. v. Desautel, 2021 SCC 17, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Constitution Act, 1867 (formerly known as the British North America Act or the BNA Act), St. Catharines Milling and Lumber Co. v. R. (1887), 1887 3 (SCC), 13 SCR 577, Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, Calder v. A.G. B.C., 1973 4 (SCC), [1973] SCR 313, R. v. Sioui, 1990 103 (SCC), [1990] 1 SCR 1025, R. v. Côté, 1996 170 (SCC), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.