CITATION: Carpenters’ District Council of Ontario v. City of Hamilton, 2023 ONSC 332
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO. 967/21
DATE: 20230124
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D.L. Corbett, Akhtar, and O’Brien JJ
BETWEEN:
Carpenters’ District Council of Ontario, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA
Applicants
- and -
City of Hamilton, REGION OF WATERLOO, THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF SAULT STE. MARIE and ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents
- and –
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 46 and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
Intervenors
COUNSEL:
D. Wray and S. Virdi, for the Applicants, Carpenters’ District Council of Ontario, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America
D. Jeffries and D. Search, for the Respondent, City of Hamilton
R. Charney and J. Hoffman, for the Respondent, Municipality of Waterloo
M. Contini and A. Kwong, for the Respondent, The Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie
A. Hart and A. Bowker, for the Respondent, Ontario Labour Relations Board
S. Gordian, E. Owens, and O. Ranalli, for the Intervenor, The Attorney General of Ontario
No one appearing, for the Intervenor, United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 46
F. Cesario and S. Thompson, for the Intervenor, The Governing Council of the University of Toronto
HEARD on December 12, 2022 by videoconference at Toronto
REASONS FOR DECISION
O’BRIEN J.
Overview
[1] This case addresses the constitutionality of the most recent amendment to the non-construction employer (“NCE”) provisions in the Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995, c. 1 Sched. A (the “Act”).
[2] Non-construction employers are not subject to the specialized regime for the construction industry in the Act. The construction provisions include a specific bargaining scheme for unions for building trades in the industrial, commercial and institutional (“ICI”) sector of the construction industry. Designated employer and employee bargaining agencies engage in collective bargaining, with the resulting collective agreements applying province-wide. Typically, one of the key provisions of the province-wide collective agreements is a prohibition on the employer from subcontracting to non-union companies.
[3] The Applicant union brings this application for judicial review of two decisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (the “Board”) in which it challenged the constitutionality of Bill 66 on the basis that it contravened the right to freedom of association protected by s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill 66[^1] came into force on July 4, 2019. It amended s. 127 of the Act to deem certain entities NCEs.
[4] Under s. 127 as amended by Bill 66, the categories of deemed NCEs include municipalities. The Respondent municipalities therefore became NCEs by virtue of the amendment. As a result, the Applicant union no longer represented any employees of the Respondents in the ICI sector and the Carpenters’ Provincial Collective Agreement (the “Collective Agreement”) was no longer binding on the parties. The Applicant and its members therefore lost the benefit of the Collective Agreement, including provisions such as the subcontracting provision.
[5] The Applicant’s constitutional challenge arose in the context of grievances it filed against each of the Respondents under the Collective Agreement. The municipalities responded that because of Bill 66, the Collective Agreement was no longer binding on them. The grievances were referred to arbitration where the Applicant challenged the constitutionality of s. 127 as amended by Bill 66.
[6] The Board found that it was bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Independent Electricity System Operator v. Canadian Union of Skilled Workers, 2012 ONCA 293, 110 O.R. (3d) 561, leave to appeal refused, [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 311(“IESO”). In that case, the Court of Appeal ruled that s. 127.2 of the Act, which allows employers to bring an application to be declared an NCE, did not infringe s. 2(d) of the Charter. The Board concluded that the factual distinctions between the two cases were not significant enough to make IESO distinguishable. Further, the Board was not persuaded that the law had developed since IESO in a manner that would distinguish the current case. Finally, the Board concluded that, regardless of IESO, there was no breach of s. 2(d). In view of its conclusion on s. 2(d), the Board declined to address s.1 of the Charter.
[7] The Applicant filed a request for reconsideration, which the Board dismissed on the basis that the Applicant’s arguments did not fall within the narrow confines for reconsideration of a Board order.
[8] The Applicant submits that the Board erred in its treatment of IESO. In its submission, IESO was decided specifically on the facts before it, which differ from those in the present case. The Applicant also submits that in IESO, the Court applied the wrong test under s. 2(d), taking the position that the Supreme Court of Canada has refined the test since IESO. Finally, the Applicant submits that the Board erred in otherwise finding that s. 127 did not violate s. 2(d) of the Charter, as it failed to appreciate the “cumulative impact” of Bill 66.
[9] In this Court, the panel ruled during the hearing of the application that we would not hear submissions with respect to s. 1 of the Charter. We concluded that if we found a s. 2(d) infringement, it would be appropriate to remit the matter to the Board for its determination under s. 1.
[10] For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed. The Board was correct in finding that it was bound by IESO, as is this Court. In any event, the Board was also correct in applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence to conclude there was no infringement of s. 2(d) of the Charter.
Legislative Context including History of NCE Provisions
[11] The Applicant challenges the constitutionality of s. 127 of the Act. Subsection 127(1) deems entities including municipalities to be non-construction employers. It provides in part:
127(1) The following entities are deemed to be non-construction employers:
A municipality.
[12] Subsection 127(2) sets out the consequences of being deemed an NCE. Such a designation ends a union’s representation of construction employees of NCEs and nullifies the application of the collective agreement as follows:
127(2) Paragraphs 1 and 2 apply with respect to a trade union that represents employees of a non-construction employer referred to in subsection (1) employed, or who may be employed, in the construction industry:
On the day this subsection comes into force, the trade union no longer represents those employees of the non-construction employer who are employed in the construction industry.
On the day this subsection comes into force, any collective agreement binding the non-construction employer and the trade union ceases to apply with respect to the non-construction employer in so far as the collective agreement applies to the construction industry.
[13] Subsection 127(5) allows a municipality or other entity referred to in s. 127(1) to opt out of the s. 127 provisions. It provides:
127(5) An entity referred to in subsection (1) may elect to opt out of the application of subsection (1) to (4) if, on the day the Restoring Ontario’s Competitiveness Act, 2019 receives Royal Assent, a trade union represents employees of the entity who are employed, or who may be employed, in the construction industry.
[14] None of the Respondents opted out of the application of s. 127.
[15] The above provisions fall within the specialized construction provisions in the Act. These provisions establish specific rules for the construction industry that operate in addition to the general provisions of the Act. As explained in IESO, at para. 12, they “were enacted in recognition that employment in the construction industry has distinctive features, including that work tends to be episodic.”
[16] As is evident from the challenge to NCE provisions in IESO, Bill 66 did not introduce the concept of an NCE. There is a history of amendments to the NCE provisions of the Act in an ongoing attempt to more definitively eliminate certain employers who are not engaged in the construction industry from being captured by the specialized construction provisions.
[17] The NCE concept was first introduced in 1998 by Bill 31, the Economic Development and Workplace Democracy Act, 1998. Through Bill 31, the Act was amended to include the concept of a “non-construction employer,” defining it as “a person who is not engaged in a business in the construction industry or whose only engagement in such a business is incidental to the person’s primary business.” As set out in IESO, at para. 16, the purpose of Bill 31 was in part to ensure that only employers in the construction industry were covered by the special provisions in the Act. Employers whose primary business was not construction would be in a position to negotiate agreements specific to the circumstances of their sector.
[18] The Board adjudicated five applications for NCE status on the basis of the Bill 31 definition of an NCE. Of the five applicants, all of whom were from the private sector, only two were successful in obtaining NCE declarations.
[19] In 2000, the NCE definition was amended by Bill 139, the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2000. As amended, an NCE was defined to mean “an employer who does no work in the construction industry for which the employer expects compensation from an unrelated person.” As set out in IESO at para. 20, according to statements in the Hansard debates, the amendments were meant to address problems related to non-construction employers being bound by construction agreements over which they did not have control and which did not relate to their businesses.
[20] The Board adjudicated a number of cases under this new definition, with some successful and some unsuccessful. The unsuccessful applicants included broader public sector employers.
[21] In this context, the Board Chair in this matter characterized the purpose of Bill 66 at para. 15 of his reasons as being:
to definitively take out the institutions now specifically listed in Section 127 of the Act (and there is no dispute that includes all the responding parties) from under the reach of the construction provisions of the Act – all of them – including the certification provisions, the provincial bargaining scheme in the industrial commercial and institutional sector of the construction industry and the statutorily binding nature of agreements reached in that sector – for all their terms, not just but including what has been most acute for the municipalities, the subcontracting restrictions.
Issues
[22] The central issue to be decided on this application is whether the Board erred in finding that s. 127 does not infringe s. 2(d) of the Charter. This question can be divided into two sub-issues as follows:
Did the Board err in concluding that the decision of the Court of Appeal in IESO was determinative of the issue before it? and
Did the Board err in concluding that s. 127 of the Act otherwise does not breach s. 2(d) of the Charter?
Standard of Review
[23] The Board’s decision is focused entirely on the constitutional issue raised by the Applicant. In these circumstances, the parties agree that the standard of review of the Board’s decision is correctness.
Analysis
IESO is determinative
[24] Contrary to the Applicant’s submissions, the Board correctly concluded that IESO was directly on point and determinative of the issue before it.
[25] As set out above, IESO was a constitutional challenge to s. 127.2 of the Act. Section 127.2 permits an employer to bring an application to the Board for an NCE declaration. It provides that upon being declared an NCE, the employer no longer represents any employees of the NCE employed in the construction industry and the provincial collective agreement ceases to apply. In other words, the consequences of a s. 127.2 declaration are the same as the impact of the Bill 66 amendments on the Respondents in this case.
A. Factual Distinctions
[26] As found by the Board, the factual differences between IESO and the current case are of little significance when applying the IESO analysis. The Applicant relies primarily on the fact that unlike in IESO, one of the Respondents in the present case, the Region of Waterloo, employs a carpenter named Colin Chiarot who was covered by the Collective Agreement before Bill 66. In IESO, the employer did not directly employ any members of the appellant unions.
[27] I do not accept that Mr. Chiarot’s employment distinguishes the present case from IESO. The IESO analysis does not turn on the employer not employing any of the unions’ members. Although the Court of Appeal commented that it did not see a basis for imposing a constitutional obligation on IESO to bargain with the unions on behalf of employees not employed by IESO, the Court also expressly stated that it was not deciding whether employment was a necessary precondition to engaging s. 2(d).
[28] The crux of the Court of Appeal’s analysis was that the rights of the unions’ members were not infringed because they were able to continue to bargain with their construction employers and were also free to organize under the general provisions of the Act. That is, while construction employees of NCEs do not have the benefit of the specialized construction provisions, they do have access to all the usual provisions in the Act. These allow them, for example, to be members of a union with exclusive bargaining rights with the employer. Among other things, the general provisions impose an obligation on the employer to bargain in good faith to reach a collective agreement, require that disputes arising from the collective agreement be resolved through arbitration, and provide protection against unfair labour practices.
[29] The Court of Appeal emphasized that s. 2(d) does not protect access to a particular statutory process, such as the specialized provisions for the construction industry, nor to the fruits of bargaining. In other words, it does not, for example, extend to guaranteeing the protection of the subcontracting provision typically found in the collective agreements bargained under the specialized construction industry provisions. The Court upheld the Divisional Court’s finding that the Labour Board had erred in protecting the union members’ access to their preferred bargaining structure and the particular outcomes of bargaining – that is, the regime available through the construction industry provisions in the Act.
[30] The same applies for the Applicant’s members in this case. Although unlike in IESO, Mr. Chiarot is a direct employee, there has been no substantial interference with his access to collective bargaining. The general provisions of the Act remain available to him. Indeed, as a result of the termination of the Collective Agreement’s application to Waterloo and the Applicant, he reverted back to the bargaining unit represented by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (“CUPE”) Local 1656, which represents Waterloo’s general staff. Mr. Chiarot was in the CUPE bargaining unit prior to the Applicant’s certification in 2014. Any future construction employees of the Respondents are in the same position as any future employees in IESO: they have access to the general provisions in the Act. In addition, as in IESO, construction contractors with whom the Applicant has bargaining rights and who are bound by the Collective Agreement maintain the right to bid on construction services required by the Respondents.
[31] The fact that Waterloo has one direct employee member of the Applicant does not distinguish this case from IESO. Further, given that, according to the Applicant, Mr. Chiarot’s employment was the key feature distinguishing the present situation from IESO, its application as against Hamilton and Sault Ste. Marie is even weaker. Neither of those municipalities employed any members of the Applicant at the time Bill 66 came into force.
[32] Although the Applicant relies primarily on the situation of Mr. Chiarot as distinguishing this case from IESO, it also points to a number of other factors listed below, which it says make this case different. The Board was correct in dismissing these factual differences. The following sets out the Applicant’s position (with some related points grouped together) and my response:
a) The Applicant obtained bargaining rights by applying for certification to represent employees at each of the Respondents: By contrast, in IESO, the unions acquired their bargaining rights by successor application. The Applicant does not explain why this factual difference distinguishes the case. The Board correctly dismissed this point at para. 37(a) of its reasons, noting that “bargaining rights are bargaining rights.”
b) None of the Respondents have advised they do not intend to directly employ carpenters in the future: This factor fails based on the same analysis as applies to current employees (i.e. Mr. Chiarot). As the Board noted, the special construction provisions in the Act will not be available to current and future construction employees but the general provisions in the Act remain available. The special provisions also remain available to the Applicant’s members working for construction employers.
c) The work performed by members of the Applicant for contractors/subcontractors to the Respondents has been substantial: The Board was not persuaded this was a factual distinction from IESO. More importantly, it correctly concluded that it was unable to find a level at which the amount of work became constitutionally significant.
d) Each of the Respondents filed applications with the Board pre-Bill 66 seeking a declaration that they were NCEs. Only Waterloo pursued its application, with the resulting decision that it was not an NCE. Similarly, the Respondents did not make any effort to arrange their affairs to attempt to fall within the pre-Bill 66 definition of NCE: I agree with the Board’s response to this proposed distinction, when the Chair stated at para. 37 (f) and (g) of his reasons, “…as a matter of fact that is true, but I struggle to see why that matters….”. If the Respondents were not NCEs under the previous legislation, they are deemed to be so now. Either way, the consequences of the NCE designation are not unconstitutional.
e) Under s. 127(1), certain entities are deemed NCEs. There is no statutory test or adjudicative process they must meet: This factor simply points to a different mechanism to reach the same result. As the Board noted, the consequences of being found an NCE previously are the same as the consequences of being deemed an NCE under s. 127(1). IESO held that those consequences do not violate the Charter.
f) The legislature grants employers deemed to be NCEs the unilateral and unfettered right to terminate bargaining rights or not: This is a reference to s. 127(5), which allows an employer to opt out of the consequences of s. 127(1) to (4) such that the existing collective agreement continues to bind the parties. As the Board found, it is unclear why this distinction makes any difference. Under the provisions found to be constitutional by IESO, employers could also unilaterally decide whether or not to apply for an NCE declaration.
[33] The Board was correct in concluding none of these factors render IESO distinguishable. It relied on the principle of vertical stare decisis set out in Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, at para. 42 to correctly conclude that there was no change in the circumstances or evidence between this case and IESO that would fundamentally shift the parameters of the debate.
B. Section 2(d) Test
[34] The Applicant also submits that the jurisprudence has developed since IESO such that the test for a s. 2(d) infringement used in that case no longer applies. The Applicant states that the Court in IESO applied a test from Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, 2011 SCC 20, [2015] 1 SCR 3(“Fraser”), which was whether the government interference made it “impossible” to act collectively to achieve workplace goals. In its submission, this test is no longer correct, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s clarification in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 SCR 3(“MPAO”) that the test is whether the government action or legislation constituted “substantial interference” with collective action.
[35] The Board correctly dismissed this argument. In MPAO, the Supreme Court of Canada explained at paras. 74-75 that Fraser used the term “impossible” to describe the effect of the legislative scheme at issue, not the legal test. The Court went on to confirm at para. 75 that “the majority in Fraser adopts substantial interference as the legal test for infringement of freedom of association.”
[36] Therefore, pursuant to MPAO, there has been no development in the legal test: it has been and remains “substantial interference” with the right to a meaningful process of collective bargaining: MPAO, at para. 80. See also United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v. Aurora Cannabis Enterprise, 2021 ONSC 5611, 494 C.R.R. (2d) 244 at para. 53.
[37] The Board correctly found that the Court of Appeal applied this test in IESO. As in Fraser, the Court’s reasons referred in various passages to the “impossibility” of acting collectively. However, they also repeatedly framed the test as one requiring “substantial interference.” The Court of Appeal’s decision also upheld the underlying decision of this Court (reported at Independent Electricity System Operator v. Canadian Union of Skilled Workers, 2011 ONSC 81, [2011] O.L.R.B. Rep. 166), which was decided before Fraser, and in which this Court applied the test of whether there was “substantial interference” in associational activity as articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391(“Health Services”). At para. 58 of its reasons, the Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the Divisional Court’s application of the “substantial interference” test taken directly from Health Services. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal applied the governing test at the time, which continues to govern pursuant to current jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada.
There is no infringement of s. 2(d)
[38] Even if IESO did not determine the outcome of this case, I agree with the Board’s conclusion that there is no infringement of s. 2(d).
[39] The Applicant emphasizes that the Collective Agreement as it applied to its members and the Respondents is completely nullified. Mr. Chiarot was stripped of being represented by the trade union of his choice. In its submission, the cumulative effects on Mr. Chiarot constitute “substantial interference.”
[40] As the Board recognized, the Applicant’s position raises two fundamental problems. The Applicant is seeking protection for both a particular model of labour relations and a particular outcome. The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly emphasized, including as recently as in MPAO at para. 67, that s. 2(d)’s protection of collective bargaining protects the right to a process. Section 2(d) does not protect a particular collective bargaining outcome, nor does it protect a particular model of labour relations: see also MPAO at para. 93 and Health Services, at para. 91.
[41] There is therefore no constitutional entitlement to the specialized construction provisions in the Act. While the Collective Agreement is nullified as between the Applicant and Respondents, Mr. Chiarot still has the general collective bargaining process as provided in the Act available to him. Indeed, he has reverted to membership in a union that engages in collective bargaining under this model.
[42] With respect to outcome, Mr. Chiarot has no constitutional right to the specific provisions bargained for in the Collective Agreement. In considering whether the elimination of the Collective Agreement as between these parties amounts to substantial interference, I take into account, in part, the significance of the matters affected: Health Services, at para. 112.
[43] The Applicant has focused on the cumulative effects of Bill 66 on Mr. Chiarot – that he has lost the provisions of the Collective Agreement and ceased to be represented by the trade union of his choice. However, it is important to remember who the specialized construction industry provisions are designed to protect. The purpose of the NCE declaration is to exempt employers not in the construction industry. The provisions are geared towards unique features of that industry, such as transient employment. Mr. Chiarot himself does not experience the same circumstances as employees in the industry. His employment has been stable, having worked for Waterloo since at least prior to the Applicant’s 2014 certification.
[44] Indeed, the Board’s findings of fact belie the Applicant’s position. The Board Chair noted that the subcontracting provisions in the Collective Agreement “did not so much protect Mr. Chiarot in his employment with Waterloo, as it protected the work opportunities for other members of the Carpenters union working for other employers….” The Board Chair continued at paras. 37(b) and (c) by stating that the CUPE Collective Agreement included contracting out language that restricted the right of Waterloo to contract out work that Mr. Chiarot himself was performing, “arguably offering him much more direct and personalized protection than any subcontracting clause in the Carpenters provincial agreement…”. Although the Applicant now submits Mr. Chiarot’s hourly wage decreased by $5.00 under the CUPE Collective Agreement, this is an item that presumably could be bargained if it is a priority for the union. The Board found that overall, the impact of the Collective Agreement nullification on Mr. Chiarot personally was not significant enough to shift the parameters of the debate from the situation in IESO.
[45] The situation here is unlike in Health Services, where, as recognized in IESO, the legislation invalidated collective agreement provisions but also prohibited future bargaining. In Fraser, at para. 76, the Supreme Court of Canada underscored that it was the “nullification of significant contractual terms…coupled with the effective denial of future collective bargaining [that] undermine[d] the s. 2(d) right to associate” in Health Services. The holding was “not that labour contracts could never be interfered with by legislation.”
[46] In IESO, at para. 62, the Court of Appeal affirmed this Court’s analysis that the prohibition on future bargaining with respect to important issues was a “key difference” from Health Services. The same applies here, as the Board correctly noted.
[47] Overall, in Health Services, the Supreme Court described the significant reach legislation must have to constitute “substantial interference” at para. 91:
Finally, and most importantly, the interference, as Dunmore instructs, must be substantial – so substantial that it interferes not only with the attainment of the union members’ objectives (which is not protected), but with the very process that enables them to pursue these objectives by engaging in meaningful negotiations with the employer.
[48] Here, there is no interference with the “very process that enables them to pursue [the] objectives.” Mr. Chiarot’s union can continue to pursue through collective bargaining the same provisions found in the Collective Agreement. There is no prohibition on its doing so. The Board specifically found at para. 50 that “there is nothing stopping those unions successful in organizing or being certified from attempting to negotiate and perhaps successfully negotiating any of the clauses in the provincial collective agreements, including the most contentious and key one for these proceedings, the subcontracting clause.”
[49] If the real concern is not Mr. Chiarot and future employees of the Respondents, but instead the Applicant’s members’ access to the Respondents’ work due to the subcontracting provision, there is no Charter breach. The Court of Appeal determined in IESO that this submission fails as there is no constitutional entitlement to employment opportunities.
Section 1
[50] Given that there is no infringement of s. 2(d) of the Charter, there is no need to remit the matter back to the Board to address s. 1.
Disposition
[51] The Application is dismissed.
[52] The Ontario Labour Relations Board and Attorney General of Ontario did not seek costs and none are ordered to be paid to them. The remaining parties agreed that, if unsuccessful, the Applicant would pay each of the four employer respondent/intervenors $2,500.00. Therefore, the Applicant shall pay $2,500.00 to each of the City of Hamilton, the Region of Waterloo, the Corporation of the City of Sault Ste. Marie and the Governing Council of the City of Toronto.
“O’Brien J”
I agree: “D.L. Corbett J”
I agree: “Akhtar J”
Released: January 24, 2023
CITATION: Carpenters’ District Counsel of Ontario v. City of Hamilton, 2023 ONSC 332
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO. 967/21
DATE: 20230124
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D.L. Corbett, Akhtar, and O’Brien JJ
BETWEEN:
CARPENTERS’ DISTRICT COUNCIL OF ONTARIO, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA
Applicants
- and –
City of Hamilton, REGION OF WATERLOO, THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF SAULT STE. MARIE and ONTARIO LABOUR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondents
- and –
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEYMEN AND APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPEFITTING INDUSTRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 46 and THE GOVERNING COUNCIL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
Intervenors
REASONS FOR DECISION
O’BRIEN, J
Released: January 24, 2023
[^1]: Restoring Ontario’s Competitiveness Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 4