CITATION: Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company v. Mangat, 2022 ONSC 862

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO. 509/20

DATE: 20220207

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

Edwards R.S.J., Penny and S.T. Bale JJ.

BETWEEN:

MCAP Service Corporation

Plaintiff

– and –

Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company

Defendant (Appellant)

– and –

Malkit Mangat, a.k.a. Gurdish Mangat and Jujhar Mangat

Third parties (Respondents)

COUNSEL:

Timothy Morgan, for LawPro

Ted Laan, for Jujhar Mangat

Malkit Mangat, in person

HEARD at Brampton, on June 17, 2021, by video conference

On appeal, with leave, from the costs order of Justice Clayton Conlan of the Superior Court of Justice dated July 2, 2020, with reasons reported at 2020 ONSC 4104.

S.T. Bale J.

Overview

[1] LawPro obtained judgment on its third party claim against Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat in the amount of $70,000 plus costs. It was a consent judgment obtained on the eve of trial.

[2] The Mangats failed to satisfy the judgment and as a result, LawPro took steps to enforce it. A garnishment of one of Jujhar Mangat’s bank accounts yielded a recovery of $25,175.72, and after further enforcement steps were taken, the balance of the judgment was paid (exclusive of costs). LawPro’s costs of obtaining the judgment were later settled for $35,000 and were also paid.

[3] LawPro then moved for an order fixing its costs of enforcing the judgment. The amount claimed on a partial indemnity basis was $51,749.39 - full indemnity costs were $65,016.20.

[4] The motion judge referred the costs to an assessment officer with the following directions:

• that the costs be assessed in accordance with his reasons; and
• that the costs would be limited to the costs of the steps set out in rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[5] The motion judge interpreted rule 60.19 to exclude certain costs claimed by LawPro: costs related to settlement efforts ($10,026.50); costs related to consumer proposals made by the Mangats ($13,637.50); and costs related to a fraudulent conveyances action brought by LawPro against Malkit Mangat ($22,605).

[6] LawPro appeals, with leave, from the order and argues that it is entitled to all reasonable costs of enforcement including, costs related to its settlement efforts, the consumer proposals and the fraudulent conveyances action.

Background facts

[7] In June 2008, MCAP Service Corporation ("MCAP") commenced a professional negligence action against a lawyer to recover a loss that MCAP had sustained as a result of the registration of a fraudulent mortgage. LawPro defended the action and commenced a third party claim against Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat, alleging that they had orchestrated the fraud.

[8] In May 2010, LawPro settled MCAP’s claim against the defendant and continued the third party claim against the Mangats. In December 2012, the third party claim was settled and a consent judgment was obtained pursuant to which the Mangats were required to pay $70,000, plus costs in an amount to be assessed. The defendant then assigned the judgment to LawPro.

[9] LawPro’s lawyers obtained writs of seizure and sale and notices of garnishment. In March 2013, they examined the Mangats in aid of execution. They had settlement discussions with a credit counselling service retained by the Mangats. In the result, no funds were recovered. The legal fees for this work were $5,088.

[10] In March 2013, a third mortgage in the amount of $111,000 was registered against a property owned by Malkit Mangat and his spouse. On being examined in aid of execution, Malkit said that the money had been borrowed from friends in 2002. He said he and his wife had been unable to make payments on the loan since August 2011, and that as a result, he had agreed to provide the friends with mortgage security.

[11] In March 2014, Jujhar Mangat’s spouse purchased 52 Clydesdale Circle, Brampton. Title was taken in her name as to a ninety-nine per cent interest and as to a one per cent interest in a third party.

[12] In March and April 2016, LawPro filed writs of seizure and sale and served notices of garnishment. In June 2016, a notice of garnishment directed to one of Jujhar’s banks resulted in a recovery of $25,175.72. LawPro refers to this work as the “less costly enforcements steps taken” for which the fees were $4,328.50 plus HST.

[13] In September 2016, Malkit made a consumer proposal pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In his list of assets, he valued the property he owned with his wife at $665,000 with encumbrances amounting to $617,600. However, LawPro obtained an appraisal of the home which estimated the value to be $915,000. Having received that information, LawPro rejected the proposal and as a result it was defeated.

[14] In October 2016, Jujhar made a consumer proposal. By that time, the home owned by his spouse had been sold. LawPro rejected the proposal because Jujhar did not provide disclosure of information requested from him relating to his wife’s sale of the property.

[15] The fees charged to LawPro for responding to the consumer proposals were $13,637.50.

[16] In April 2017, LawPro commenced an action against Malkit and others alleging that the third mortgage on his home was a fraudulent conveyance. That action has been held in abeyance since August 2017 because the Mangats satisfied the outstanding judgment (inclusive of interest) by payment to LawPro of $53,462.22. The fees charged to LawPro for the fraudulent conveyances action were $22,605. The work done included preparing the statement of claim and obtaining an ex parte certificate of pending litigation.

[17] In November 2018, LawPro’s costs of the third party claim were settled for $35,000 and were paid.

[18] In February 2019, LawPro moved for an order fixing its costs of enforcing the judgment, leading to the order of Conlon J. under appeal.

Standard of review

[19] The standard of review on an appeal from an order for costs is that the appeal court will only intervene if the trial or motion judge “erred in principle or if the award was plainly wrong”: Davies v. The Corporation of the Municipality of Clarington, 2009 ONCA 722, 100 O.R. (3d) 66, at para. 27

Issues on appeal

[20] The following issues are raised on appeal:

• whether the court’s jurisdiction to determine costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) is restricted by rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
• whether LawPro’s costs of the fraudulent conveyances action are recoverable in this action;
• whether LawPro’s costs of responding to the consumer proposals are recoverable in this action; and
• whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be exercised in the circumstances of this case.

Governing legislation

[21] Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act (“CJA”) provides:

Subject to the provisions of an Act or rules of court, the costs of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding are in the discretion of the court and the court may determine by whom and to what extent the costs shall be paid.

[22] Rules 60.02(1) and 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

60.02(1) In addition to any other method of enforcement provided by law, an order for the payment or recovery of money may be enforced by,

(a) a writ of seizure and sale (Form 60A) under rule 60.07;

(b) garnishment under rule 60.08;

(c) a writ of sequestration (Form 60B) under rule 60.09; and

(d) the appointment of a receiver.

60.19 (1) A party who is entitled to enforce an order is entitled to the costs of the following steps on a partial indemnity scale, unless the court on motion orders otherwise:

1. An examination in aid of execution.

2. The issuing, service, filing, enforcement and renewal of a writ of execution and notice of garnishment.

3. Any other procedure authorized by these rules for enforcing the order.

Case law

[23] In 469804 Ontario Limited v. 723146 Ontario Limited, 59 O.R. (3d) 442, at paras. 16-17, Cullity J. concluded that plaintiffs are entitled to recover only “the costs permitted pursuant to rule 60.19(1)”:

Although no authorities were cited on the question, I do not believe that costs of enforcement, or collection, are costs "of and incidental to a proceeding or a step in a proceeding" for the purposes of s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act if the meaning of "proceeding" is limited to actions and applications as it is in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to the provisions of rule 60.11 dealing with motions for contempt, steps taken to enforce judgment obtained in an action are not, I believe, to be considered as steps in the action. If that is correct, the authority to award costs of enforcing a judgment, where separate proceedings have not been commenced, would appear to be found in rule 60.19 and not in the Courts of Justice Act. Where motions for contempt, or other proceedings, have been brought, costs lie within the jurisdiction of the court that deals with them.

Read literally, the words of rule 60.19 do not appear to confer a discretion to award costs incurred in matters other than those mentioned specifically. The discretion appears to be limited to disallowing costs with respect to the specified steps in enforcing an order although there will, of course, be an element of discretion in determining the quantum of the costs to be allowed in connection with them. … It is, of course, unwise in matters of practice and discretion to exclude the possibility of exceptional cases but I see no justification in the affidavits, and bills of costs, filed on this motion for departing from what I conceive to be the general rule set out in rule 60.19.

[24] In Aldebert v. Country Boy Services, 2020 ONSC 3136, L. Ricchetti R.S.J. held that the court does have jurisdiction to award costs of enforcement beyond those referred to in rule 60.19:

a) Rule 60.19 does not expressly exclude the award of other costs as Country Boy claims. Clear language would be necessary to exclude the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its process which includes awarding costs of enforcing court orders;

b) The wording of s. 131 of the CJA is broad enough to grant a court jurisdiction to award costs incurred in the enforcement of a judgment of the court because enforcing a judgment/court order for payment is an incidental to this proceeding. Further, issuing a garnishment is a "step" in this proceeding.

c) The wording of Rule 60.19 (2)(d) expressly gives the court the jurisdiction to award further costs, whether assessed by an assessment officer or the court, without being limited to the items in the prior three sub paragraphs. There would have been no need for such wording in (d) if the execution creditor was limited to the items in Rule 60.19(2) (a) through (c); and;

d) Lastly, it makes little sense that a judgment debtor could, through deliberate, flagrant or improper actions, take steps to avoid payment thereby causing the judgment creditor to incur additional unnecessary costs by such actions, without a remedy being available to this court.

The wording of s. 131 of the CJA is broad enough to grant a court jurisdiction to award costs incurred in the enforcement of a judgment of the court because enforcing a judgment/court order for payment is an incidental to this proceeding. Further, issuing a garnishment is a "step" in this proceeding.

[25] Ricchetti R.S.J. disagreed with Cullity J.’s conclusion that steps taken to enforce a payment order are not incidental to the proceeding in which the order was obtained, saying, “what can be more incidental than to enforce a court order for payment?”

[26] In conclusion, Ricchetti R.S. J. was satisfied “that this court has jurisdiction to award costs of enforcement beyond those set out in Rule 60.19 (2) (a) through (c) where appropriate.”

Reasons of the motion judge

[27] The motion judge disagreed with the decision in Aldebert, saying that he found the reasoning in 723146 Ontario Limited to be persuasive.

[28] With respect to LawPro’s submission that the words “unless the court on motion orders otherwise” in subrule 60.19(1) authorize the court to award enforcement costs of any kind, provided that they are reasonable, the motion judge held that rule 60.19(1) is exhaustive and that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the rule are the only items that are recoverable. He suggested that the words plainly mean that the judgment creditor may or may not recover costs of those items, and that if the Rules Committee had intended otherwise, it would have used the words “including but not limited to” or simply “includes”.

[29] The motion judge held that the words “Any other procedure authorized by these rules for enforcing the order”, in paragraph 3 of subrule 60.19(1), refer to enforcement steps authorized by Rule 60 but not specifically referred to, such as a motion for a contempt order under rule 60.11.

[30] With respect to the apparent breadth of CJA section 131(1), the motion judge said: “It makes no common sense that the Rules Committee would fashion a Rule that explicitly delineates judgment enforcement steps whose costs are recoverable if there is in fact no limit on the categories of enforcement costs that may be recovered as they are entirely discretionary as provided for by subsection 131(1) of the CJA.”

[31] In the result, the motion judge referred the costs to an assessment officer with the following directions:

• that the costs be assessed in accordance with his reasons; and
• that the costs be limited to the costs of the steps set out in rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[32] The motion judge then went on to say:

I pause here to add something, though unnecessary to the result. Even if LPIC is correct about its interpretation of sub-rule 60.19(1), which interpretation I reject, I would not have allowed LPIC to recover the majority of the enforcement costs that it seeks. With reference to paragraph 9 herein, and using round figures, I would have disallowed the $22,000.00 and the $13,000.00 completely, as the former quantum must await the adjudication of the independent fraudulent conveyance action, and the latter sum which relates to the Mangats’ bankruptcy proposals is too remote to be considered judgment enforcement costs. Further, I would have reduced the $10,000.00 to something more reasonable on account of settlement efforts. At some point, LPIC ought to have recognized that it could not continue to essentially negotiate with itself. That arithmetic would have left LPIC with an award of judgment enforcement costs of less than $16,000.00, even on LPIC’s interpretation of what is eligible for recovery (a small fraction of the almost $52,000.00 sought).

Discussion

Whether the court’s jurisdiction to determine costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act is limited by rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure

[33] As noted above, a costs award should be set aside on appeal only if the trial or motion judge erred in principle or if the award was plainly wrong. For the following reasons, it was, in my view, an error in principle for the motion judge to limit LawPro’s enforcement costs to the costs of the steps set out in rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

[34] The Mangats’ position is that the decision of Cullity J. in 723146 Ontario Limited should be preferred to the decision of Richetti R.S.J. in Aldebert, and that the court’s jurisdiction under CJA s. 131(1) is limited by rule 60.19(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Echoing the motion judge, they argue that otherwise, rule 60.19(1) would be rendered meaningless. I disagree. Rule 60.19(1) simply provides a default position. It sets out the steps, the costs of which a party may recover on a partial indemnity scale, unless the court orders otherwise. There is nothing in the rule to suggest that the court’s discretion to “order otherwise” is in any way restricted. The court could order a different scale of costs or deprive the party of their costs of one or more of the steps referred to.

[35] In 1318847 Ontario Ltd. v. Laval Tool & Mould Ltd., 2017 ONCA 184, 134 O.R. (3d) 641, the issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to award costs against a non-party. The court held, at paras. 69-71, that CJA s. 131(1) is permissive and that the provision’s permissiveness is not undermined by the fact that it confers jurisdiction to order costs against parties only, because it does not explicitly prohibit the court from ordering non-party costs. Similarly, in my view, rule 60.19(1) is permissive in that it does not explicitly prohibit recovery of costs for steps not referred to in the rule. Being permissive, it does not undermine the broad discretion to make costs orders conferred by CJA s. 131(1).

[36] I therefore agree with the conclusion reached by Richetti R.S.J., but for slightly different reasons. I agree with him that s. 131 grants jurisdiction to award costs of enforcement because enforcing a judgment is incidental to and a step in a proceeding. I also agree with him that the contrary interpretation, i.e., the one reached by the motion judge, is inconsistent with a purposive and contextual interpretation of s. 131; it makes no sense, for example, that a judgment debtor could, through deliberate and improper actions, attempt to avoid payment causing the judgment creditor to incur additional and unnecessary costs, without a remedy being available. Section 131, properly interpreted, is that remedy. However, I part company with Richetti R.S.J. on two points. First, given my interpretation of s. 131, I see no role for, or need to resort to, the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Second, I do not see rule 60.19(2)(d) as having anything to do with the analysis of the scope of s. 131. Rule 60.19(2) simply deals with what costs may be included in a writ of execution or notice of garnishment. Those costs are costs to which a party is entitled under r. 60.19(1). The text of rule 60.19(2)(d) does not affect the analysis of whether other costs, besides the costs listed in 60.19(1), may be awarded, one way or the other.

Whether LawPro’s costs of the fraudulent conveyances action are recoverable in this action

[37] LawPro argues that it is entitled to recover in this action, its costs of the fraudulent conveyances action, as costs of enforcing the judgment. The fees associated with that action were $22,605.

[38] Relying on paragraph 3 of rule 60.19(1) – “Any other procedure authorized by these rules for enforcing the order.” – LawPro argues that a fraudulent conveyances action is a procedure authorized by the Rules for enforcing an order. I disagree. The legislation authorizing fraudulent conveyances actions is the Fraudulent Conveyances Act. The Rules of Civil Procedure say nothing about fraudulent conveyances. While the procedure for bringing such an action (as with all actions) is prescribed by the Rules, it does not follow that a fraudulent conveyances action is an enforcement procedure authorized by the Rules.

[39] The question remains, however, whether the costs of a proceeding to set aside a fraudulent conveyance are costs incidental to the enforcement of a judgment. In my view, the answer to this question is “yes”, in some cases; and on the facts before the court here, this is such a case.

[40] The fraudulent conveyances action was commenced after LawPro had been unsuccessful in its other attempts to enforce the judgment. On the evidence, it was initiated for the very purpose of recovering payment of its judgment. Thus, as a matter of fact, LawPro used the fraudulent conveyances action as an enforcement tool and it appears to have been effective - the action was commenced in April 2017 and in August 2017, the Mangats satisfied the judgment. In these circumstances, I find that the costs of the fraudulent conveyance action were incidental to the enforcement of LawPro’s judgment obtained in the original action against Malkit. I would, therefore, award costs of the fraudulent conveyances action against him as costs of the enforcement of the judgment in this action.

Whether LawPro’s costs of responding to the consumer proposals are recoverable in this action

[41] LawPro argues that it is entitled to recover its costs of responding to the consumer proposals as part of the costs of enforcing the judgment in this action. The fees associated with responding to the proposals were $13,637.50.

[42] However, pursuant to s. 66.11 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Mangats were entitled to make consumer proposals, and in my view, they were generally entitled to do so without fear of an adverse costs award in this action.

[43] The proposals were not frivolous or an abuse of process. They disclosed that both Mangit and Jujhar were in considerable financial difficulty.

Whether the court’s inherent jurisdiction should be exercised in the circumstances of this case

[44] Superior courts of record have inherent jurisdiction to control their own processes and protect them from abuse. That jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and with caution: Laval, at paras. 65-68.

[45] LawPro argues that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to award the disputed costs in the circumstances of this case. However, as stated in relation to the court’s reasons in Aldebert, resort to the court’s inherent jurisdiction is unnecessary. Section 131 of the CJA gives full power to the court to determine by whom and to what extent the costs of a proceeding are to be paid. That is all that is in issue in this case.

Conclusion

[46] Both parties’ positions on appeal assumed there would be a referral to an assessment officer: in the case of the Mangats, a referral in the terms ordered by the motion judge; in the case of LawPro, a referral on the basis that “all costs sought by LawPro shall be eligible for recovery on a partial indemnity basis, subject to the discretion of the Assessment Officer as to quantum.” However, given the expense and delay that had been incurred to date, the hearing panel offered to fix LawPro’s enforcement costs as part of its disposition of the appeal. The parties agreed.

[47] The overriding principle to be considered in awarding costs is reasonableness. In Davies, at para. 52, the court said:

As can be seen, the overriding principle is reasonableness. If the judge fails to consider the reasonableness of the costs award, then the result can be contrary to the fundamental objective of access to justice. Rather than engage in a purely mathematical exercise, the judge awarding costs should reflect on what the court views as a reasonable amount that should be paid by the unsuccessful party rather than any exact measure of the actual costs of the successful litigant.

[48] Counsel for LawPro submits that its enforcement costs should be fixed at $51,749.39. Counsel for Jujhar argues that the amount asked is not proportional, based upon a recovery of $114,158.69. He submits that they should be fixed at $11,000, plus disbursements (a total of approximately $18,000).

[49] Citing Dang v. Anderson, 2017 ONSC 2150, at para. 13, counsel for LawPro argues that proportionality must be evaluated in the context of the case and should not override other considerations. I agree, in principle. However, counsel goes on to argue “[t]hat the debtors always had complete control over LawPro’s costs. They could have paid the judgment rather than avoiding responsibility. This would have obviated the enforcement steps and eliminated the enforcement costs and the Motion.” In my view, the evidence does not support that argument.

[50] LawPro’s position assumes that at all times, the Mangats were in a position to pay the judgment. However, the statements of affairs in the consumer proposals disclosed that they were in considerable financial difficulty. While it appears that there was more than enough equity in Malkit’s home to pay the judgment if it were sold, he can hardly be blamed for attempting to settle the case short of doing so. While the Mangats did come up with the money to satisfy the judgment and costs in August 2017, it does not follow that they always had the ready cash to do so, and we were not directed to any evidence of the source of the funds.

[51] LawPro complains that the Mangats delayed the collection proceedings by making low offers to settle supported by inadequate financial disclosure and by making consumer proposals under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. However, while LawPro may have allowed itself to be delayed, the making of settlement offers and consumer proposals are legitimate acts and the evidence does not support a finding that they were done for the purpose of delay.

[52] In its factum, LawPro says that settlement discussions failed because “the Mangats were simply not prepared to pay much towards the Judgment even though they had the assets, although hidden, to provide payment. These actions not only resulted in much delay, but it also caused LawPro to incur significant costs.”

[53] However, we were not directed to any evidence that the Mangats had hidden assets. The complaint against Malkit was that he undervalued his matrimonial home and gave a fraudulent mortgage. With respect to Jujhar, LawPro states in its factum: "Jujhar hid his interest in 52 Clydesdale Circle, Brampton". In my view, that statement is unfounded. The evidence tendered in support of the statement is contained in an affidavit of Tiziana Moretti in which she says that she “suspect[s] that Jujhar contributed to the purchase of [the] Clydesdale Property but did not take title to the [property] to hide his interest from his creditors.” Suspicion is not evidence.

[54] Ms. Moretti also swears that "Jujhar, who is a lawyer, had earning capacity to repay the Judgment". That is entirely unsupported by evidence – it is therefore pure supposition. I also note that the report of the administrator of Jujhar’s consumer proposal states that his current income is insufficient to meet his obligations as they become due.

[55] LawPro calculates its partial indemnity enforcement costs of $51,749.39 based upon 60 per cent of full indemnity costs of $65,027, plus disbursements and tax. If its costs relating to the consumer proposals are removed from the equation, the result is $42,503.16.

[56] With respect to Malkit, I would reduce those costs to $30,000 for reasons of proportionality. In particular, in my view, the amounts asked for commencing the fraudulent conveyances action and for the unsuccessful settlement negotiations are excessive.

[57] With respect to Jujhar, I would remove the costs of the fraudulent conveyances action from the equation – he was neither a party to the mortgage nor the action. This would result in partial indemnity costs of approximately $27,000 which I would reduce to $20,000, again for reasons of proportionality.

Costs

[58] The parties agreed that the costs of the appeal would be $10,000 to the successful party. In my view, success was divided. LawPro succeeded on the threshold issue of whether the court’s jurisdiction under CJA s. 131(1) is limited by rule 60.10(1) of the Rules. However, it was not entirely successful in relation to two of the major issues on the appeal, being the costs of the fraudulent conveyances action and of responding to the consumer proposals. In addition, as a practical matter, because the costs never got to the assessment officer, it is not clear how much better off LawPro is as a result of the appeal. Given the Mangats’ partial success on the appeal, I would reduce the costs to which LawPro would otherwise be entitled and award the sum of $7,500.

[59] The costs of the motion for leave to appeal were fixed by the leave panel at $5,000 to the successful party on the appeal. While I have said that success on the appeal was divided, I do not see that amount as being unreasonable for the Mangats to pay.

[60] With respect to costs in the court below, the parties agreed that if the appeal were to be dismissed, the Mangats would be entitled to $9,134.35. Counsel for the Mangats submitted that if the appeal were to be allowed, LawPro’s costs of the motion should be fixed in the same amount. Counsel for LawPro, however, submitted that his client’s motion costs should be fixed at $30,000, based upon full indemnity costs of $80,008.90 (to have a judge fix enforcement costs which it valued at $51,749.39).

[61] In support of its position on the motion costs, LawPro notes that it submitted three volumes of material comprising more than 550 pages of affidavit evidence. However, in my view, the time spent preparing for the motion, and the materials submitted, were excessive given the issues to be determined and the amounts in issue. I do not accept that the Mangats would or should have expected that they would be faced with an award against them of $30,000 for the fixing by a judge of the enforcement costs. This is an entirely disproportionate amount given what was actually in issue and what has been awarded. In my view, a fair and reasonable award for the costs of the motion would be $10,000.

Disposition

[62] For the reasons given, I would allow the appeal, set aside the order below, and in its place, make the following order:

i. that Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat pay LawPro’s enforcement costs, fixed in the sum of $30,000 ($20,000 of which will be joint and several with the enforcement costs to be paid by Jujhar);

ii. that Jujhar Mangat pay LawPro’s enforcement costs, fixed in the sum of $20,000 (which will be joint and several with the enforcement costs to be paid by Malkit);

iii. that Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat pay LawPro’s costs in the court below, fixed in the sum of $10,000;

iv. that Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat pay LawPro’s costs of the motion for leave to appeal, fixed in the sum of $5,000; and

v. that Malkit Mangat and Jujhar Mangat pay LawPro’s cost of the appeal, fixed in the sum of $7,500.

“S.T. Bale J.”

“I agree. M.L. Edwards R.S.J.”

“I agree. Penny J.”

Released: February 7, 2022