Citation: Jacobi v. Winners Merchants International LP, 2022 ONSC 602 Divisional Court File No.: 258/20 Date: 2022-01-28 Superior Court of Justice – Ontario Divisional Court
Re: Julia Jacobi and Victor Jacobi v. Winners Merchants International LP, Doug Mizzi, Carla Boston, Romel Gourzang, Tony Ferreira, Kamal Jazar, Toronto Police Services Board, Kimberly Kelly and Amy Beckles
Before: D.L. Corbett J.
Counsel: Julia and Victor Jacobi, self-represented Appellants Nicholas Rolfe and Alison Mintoff, for the Police Respondents Deanna M. Stea and Madalina Dreve, for the Winners Respondents
Heard: June 21, 2021 by videoconference
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] Julia and Victor Jacobi assert claims arising out of the detention, arrest, and prosecution of Ms Jacobi for shoplifting at a Winners store at 10 Dundas Street East, Toronto, on April 11, 2016.
[2] The trial was held before Deputy Judge Christopher Ashby over four days on October 10 and 11, 2019 and January 22 and 23, 2020.
[3] The trial judge dismissed the appellants’ claims and provided his written reasons for decision on March 2, 2020. The parties subsequently made costs submissions. The costs decision was not before this court at the time of the appeal and the appellants wished an opportunity to make further submissions respecting the trial costs. The parties exchanged written costs submissions and provided them to this court by October 30, 2021.
[4] The appellants appeal to this court the dismissal of their claims and the costs award below.
Summary and Disposition
[5] The trial judge’s judgment turned on findings of fact. He concluded that the appellants had not established their allegations on a balance of probabilities. In so concluding, the trial judge preferred the evidence of defence witnesses to the evidence tendered by the appellants, and where the evidence conflicted, he generally accepted the defence evidence. That evidence may be summarized by the following sequence of events:
(a) Security personnel observed Julia Jacobi secrete three items of merchandise on herself while shopping in the Winners store on April 11, 2016.
(b) Ms Jacobi also selected other items of merchandise and went to a checkout where she paid for items she had not secreted. She did not produce and pay for the secreted items.
(c) Ms Jacobi then left the store with the items she had just purchased and apparently with the secreted items.
(d) Security personnel stopped Ms Jacobi outside the Winners store, searched her, and located three items that had apparently not been paid for before Ms Jacobi left the store.
(e) Security personnel detained Ms Jacobi and required her to return to the store. They took Ms Jacobi to a meeting room where they investigated the apparent theft further, after which they called police.
(f) Police attended at the store, took statements from security personnel, took Ms Jacobi into custody and then took her to a police station where she was charged with theft under $5,000.
All these findings were available on the evidence before the trial judge. The general thrust of the appellants’ submissions is that, if this court reviews the evidence carefully, it should be persuaded to come to different factual conclusions than did the trial judge.
[6] That is not the role of this court. This court does not re-weigh evidence and make its own credibility findings: those are the tasks of the trial judge. Only if there is an error of law or a palpable and overriding error of fact will this court intervene.
[7] Second, on a reasonable view of the evidence, security personnel saw Ms Jacobi commit two acts of theft and saw Ms Jacobi commit what they reasonably believed to be a third act of theft. The appellants’ arguments are based on a contrary theory of the case: that no shoplifting took place and that Winners respondents assaulted Ms Jacobi and tried to frame her for shoplifting. The trial judge did not accept the appellants’ arguments and there is evidence in the record supporting his factual conclusions.
[8] The appellants also raise numerous other arguments on appeal, the principal ones of which I address below. None of these arguments, individually or taken together, displace the trial judge’s central conclusion that the plaintiffs did not prove their claims on a balance of probabilities.
[9] The appellants also raise allegations of bias, unfairness and misconduct against the trial judge. These arguments are misplaced. The experienced trial judge conducted the trial fairly, rendered his decision in a balanced, even-handed manner, and there is no basis, whatever, for the allegations against the trial judge.
[10] Therefore, for the reasons that follow, the appeal is dismissed.
Specific Issues Raised on Appeal
[11] The appellants raise the following principal issues:
(i) misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge, including the evidence of fraud;
(ii) misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge in respect to delay by Winners personnel in reporting a citizen’s arrest to police;
(iii) misapprehension by the trial judge of spoilation of video evidence;
(iv) error by the trial judge in excluding medical evidence;
(v) error by the trial judge in “ascribing evidence delivered by a witness to her counsel terminated at trial”; and
(vi) argument that the trial judge “failed to perform his judicial function and committed a fraud upon the court”.
[12] I start with an observation based upon the sixth issue raised by the appellants. It is baseless and outrageous, but it reflects a pattern of litigation conduct. The appellants make a series of extreme and baseless allegations of misconduct against various persons in this case, including counsel and the trial judge, with whom they disagree or who have done something that has hurt them, such as advocating for the respondents (in counsel’s case) or deciding the case against them (in the case of the trial judge).
[13] Second, the appellants’ arguments at trial and on appeal focused on their allegations against the Winners respondents. The trial judge found as follows in respect to the Police respondents:
I can deal with the claim against police in short order. There was no evidence led by the plaintiffs that the officers did anything except follow standard procedure when receiving a call from Winners for an alleged theft. In closing submissions, the plaintiffs’ only claim was that the officers should have allowed [Ms Jacobi] to make a statement at the time of the arrest.
Officer Kelly, in evidence, agreed that [Ms Jacobi] made such a request, but there was no evidence led that an officer must comply with such a request. Indeed, I agree with the officer’s evidence that this conflicts with the right of a suspect to remain silent and could jeopardize a prosecution. In any event, Ms Jacobi could have gone to the police station post-arrest to make a statement, but she did not do so.
[14] The trial judge was correct in law in finding that an officer is not obliged to take a statement from an accused person prior to taking them into custody and charging them with an offence. The decision not to take a statement does not render the police arrest, detention and laying of charges wrongful.
[15] The appellants also argued that police defendants acted wrongfully in failing to obtain videotape evidence from Winners in a timely manner. This, they said, led to that evidence being lost. They referenced the leading criminal disclosure case of R. v. Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 45, in support of this argument. This argument is entirely misconceived. Stinchcombe addresses the disclosure obligations of the Crown in the context of a criminal prosecution. Stinchcombe arguments are to be advanced and decided in the criminal proceedings, and any remedy for a Stinchcombe violation arises from its impact on the criminal proceedings. Police have no obligation under Stinchcombe to gather evidence for an accused person for use in separate civil proceedings. Further and in any event, as explained below, the trial judge found as a fact that the videotape in question never came into being because the recording equipment was not functioning properly.
[16] There was no substance to the claims against the Police respondents before the trial judge, and none before this court.
[17] I have approached the balance of the appellants’ arguments with an open mind, notwithstanding their baseless allegations of misconduct against lawyers and the trial judge, and their pursuit of an appeal against the Police respondents with no factual or legal theory available that could possibly ground liability against those respondents.
Delay Reporting a Citizen’s Arrest
[18] A store owner is authorized to arrest someone found committing shoplifting at their store: Criminal Code of Canada, s. 494. Where such an arrest is made, the arrested individual must be delivered to police “forthwith” (Code, s. 494(3)).
[19] Police practice in Toronto, in cases such as this one, is that store personnel phone police to report the arrest and police dispatch officers to attend at the store to decide whether to take the arrested person into custody.
[20] Failure to call police “forthwith” after making an arrest can transform a lawful arrest into an unlawful confinement: R. v. Lahaie, [2019] ONCA 899.
[21] Ms Jacobi argues that store personnel delayed 23 minutes between the time of the arrest and the time police were called. She also argues that the respondent Boston falsely reported the time of the arrest and the time of the call to police.
[22] First, I do not accept that the “clock” begins to run the moment a suspect is stopped outside a store. Security personnel must investigate after stopping a suspect. They must satisfy themselves that their suspicions appear to be true. They must ensure their own safety and that of the detained person. They must take the person to some appropriate place, usually back in the store (in this instance, an area described as the “Winners jail” which is used to keep detained persons while waiting for police to arrive). Security personnel are entitled to make further inquiries and investigation before deciding to take the step of calling police and asking that a suspect be charged with a criminal offence. They are entitled to take such steps as cautioning the detained person about their right to silence and their right to counsel.[^1]
[23] Second, the evidence from respondents is that two calls were placed to police, one about ten minutes after Ms Jacobi was detained in front of the store, and the second about fifteen minutes after that. There is nothing inherently unbelievable about this evidence. On the other hand, there are frailties in the evidence respecting the first call. The trial judge did not resolve this issue because he did not need to do so: even if there was only one call made to police, about 23 minutes after the initial detention outside the store, he found that the continued detention of Ms Jacobi was lawful in the circumstances.
[24] The appellants rely upon Mann v. Canadian Tire Corp. for the proposition that not permitting a person suspected of possible theft to leave the premises for a period of thirteen minutes constitutes a “detention” of that person. That argument does not avail the appellants. Ms Jacobi was “detained” at about 2:08 pm when she was stopped outside the store. The issue is whether the call to police was made promptly enough to avail the Winners defendants of s. 494 of the Criminal Code. In Mann, the detention ceased to be lawful when the purpose of the detention changed from a lawful one to an unlawful one. In this case, the purpose of Ms Jacobi’s detention never changed.
[25] There is no error of law and no palpable and overriding error of fact in respect to the issue of alleged delay reporting Ms Jacobi’s arrest to police. This ground of appeal fails.
Spoilation of Evidence
[26] The evidence of Winners is that the security camera in the “Winners jail” was not operational on the day Ms Jacobi was arrested. The appellants challenge this claim and argued that the recording was made and later destroyed.
[27] Ms Jacobi testified that she was assaulted by security personnel, that her injuries were so severe that she was rendered senseless before she was taken to the “Winners jail”, and the video equipment was turned off to avoid creating evidence of these facts or of events that took place in the “Winners jail”. The trial judge found as a fact that Ms Jacobi was not assaulted and did not suffer injuries. He based this finding on his observations of Ms Jacobi as she walked back into the store, which was recorded on video. He also based this evidence on police evidence that Ms Jacobi did not report to them that she had been assaulted and showed no sign of injuries when they took her into custody and took her to the police station. The video evidence and police evidence supported the trial judge’s conclusion that Ms Jacobi had not suffered injuries and had not been rendered senseless by an assault. The trial judge did not accept Ms Jacobi’s testimony to the conflict, and he found that the medical evidence she filed did not establish an assault of the kind she had described in her testimony.
[28] The appellants also argued that Winners had a duty to turn on the videorecording equipment, and if it was not operating, it was because it was turned off deliberately. That argument cannot succeed. Of the four aspects of the test for spoilation of evidence, at least two are missing here. The evidence must have been “destroyed intentionally” and it must be reasonable to infer that the evidence was destroyed to affect the outcome of the litigation: Yang v. Co-operators General Insurance Company, 2021 ONSC 1540; McDougall v. Black & Decker Canada Inc., 2008 ABCA 353, para. 29. Police, and by analogy security personnel, are under no common law duty to create evidence, and are under no common law duty to activate recording equipment: R. v. Coombs, 2017 ABPC 34. No statutory or regulatory basis for such a duty on the part of private security personnel was established. The failure to activate recording equipment is a fact that may be taken into account by the trier of fact, but it does not constitute spoilation of evidence giving rise to a rebuttable presumption that the missing evidence would have been unfavourable to the spoilating party. It is simply one fact, in the matrix of facts, that may be considered by the trier of fact in concluding about what happened.
[29] Here, the evidence was not that there was a failure to activate the recording equipment, but that the recording equipment was not operational. The appellants say there was evidence to the contrary: a Winners witness who testified that he was able to view the video of events in the “Winners jail” in real time on a monitor. That is not evidence to the contrary. It is possible that the equipment was broadcasting but not recording, an elementary distinction of which the court may take judicial notice.
[30] The trial judge made no error in his approach to this issue; this ground of appeal fails.
No Misapprehension of Evidence
[31] Security personnel saw Ms Jacobi place a cosmetic bag or “dust bag” in a purse. It appeared to security personnel that the item was being secreted and was stolen when Ms Jacobi left the store. It was subsequently established that this “dust bag” was a component of a purse that Ms Jacobi did pay for before leaving the store. Thus, though it appeared to security personnel that Ms Jacobi had stolen this item, she was, in fact, entitled to it by virtue of having purchased the purse.
[32] The trial judge understood these facts. If the only item that had been “stolen” was this one item, then after stopping Ms Jacobi and looking into the matter, security personnel would have been obliged to release her. However, the trial judge accepted the evidence of the Winners defendants that two other items were stolen.
[33] The appellants’ theory seems to be that the only item security personnel saw Ms Jacobi apparently steal was an item she was entitled to have, and that they planted two additional items on her to justify their unlawful arrest and detention of her. The trial judge did not accept this argument. I note one additional point that undercuts this theory of the case. When security personnel saw Ms Jacobi take an item and secrete it, they believed they were seeing a customer shoplifting in the store. On their evidence, this belief was reasonable. Based on this belief, they were entitled to stop Ms Jacobi and to investigate the suspected theft. If, after investigating, they concluded that there was no theft, then, of course, they would have been required to release Ms Jacobi. They would have committed no civil wrong in light of their reasonably held belief that they had witnessed a theft. The notion that security personnel would plant merchandise on Ms Jacobi because their initial reasonable belief turned out to be incorrect is “fanciful” (to use the trial judge’s word) and the trial judge did not accept it.
[34] The appellants argue that the allegedly stolen items were tendered at the cashier, and thus were not stolen. Using the “key chain” as an example, the evidence of security personnel is that Ms Jacobi paid for a key chain but had a second key chain with her when she left the store, for which she did not pay. Ms Jacobi says that she took two key chains to the cash register – one to purchase, and the other bearing an accurate price tag (since the one Ms Jacobi wanted to purchase did not have a complete price tag). Ms Jacobi says that she purchased one key chain and left the other key chain with the cashier. The trial judge accepted as a fact that a key chain which Ms Jacobi did not tender or pay for was found on her when she was stopped outside the Winners store. Having accepted this fact, it simply does not matter that Ms Jacobi may have presented a third key chain at the cash register.
[35] The appellants spent considerable time in both written and oral argument about time discrepancies in the evidence. Their argument was as follows. Winners provided CCTV evidence to police at the time of the arrest, and subsequently included that in their brief of evidence for use at the trial. Winners cross-examined Ms Jacobi on the evidence shown in the CCTV, and then led evidence using the CCTV. The CCTV recordings are stamped with a date and time recording. The times on the videos were used by all witnesses to describe the events that took place and their sequence.
[36] During cross examination of Ms Boston (a security officer), who had testified in chief that she observed the shoplifting, the appellants established a conflict between the times shown in Ms Boston’s notes and the times shown on the CCTV. Ms Boston explained the discrepancy as resulting from her using her own watch to record times and a difference between her watch and the times on the CCTV.
[37] The appellants argue that Winners “changed” the times as a result of this evidence, and that Ms Boston contradicted herself after having “validated” the CCTV times earlier in her testimony. They argued that this mattered because, as a result, Ms Boston was not in the store at the time of the alleged events and so could not have seen what she testified she saw.
[38] This argument lacks merit.
[39] Ms Boston was not asked about the discrepancy in the times until the issue arose in cross examination. In confirming the times shown on the CCTV, she was not addressing the discrepancy that was later brought to her attention. When it was raised with her, she gave an explanation. The trial judge accepted the explanation, which he was entitled to do.
[40] I say this as gently as I can, but with respect, the appellants have misunderstood the nature of evidence and fact-finding in civil cases. In relying on the CCTV and the date and time stamp on it, neither Winners nor its witnesses were taking the position that the date and time on the CCTV was objectively correct, that it matched police time recordings or the time recordings of security personnel in their notes. This issue arises frequently in criminal cases, and it is commonplace for different devices and different participants in events to have different time recording devices that are not synchronized. If a discrepancy in recording times is found that could make a difference to the case, it can be explored. If a witness has an explanation for the discrepancy, it is for the trier of fact to assess that explanation in light of all the circumstances.
[41] I have gone on at length on this point because the appellants stressed it so heavily, and went so far as to suggest that the time discrepancies were a “fraud upon the court” and then to argue that the trial judge had turned a blind eye to the fraud and failed to do his job properly. This is simply not so. Nowhere in the transcript did Ms Boston confirm that her watch and the CCTV were synchronized and her explanation for the discrepancy made sense. And this conclusion goes to a fundamental principle of witness impeachment. Where it is put to a witness that there is a contradiction or discrepancy in her evidence, or a conflict with other reliable evidence, the witness is entitled to explain it. It is for the trier of fact to assess that explanation. This principle is fundamental to trial fairness to the point that, if a party fails to put a contradiction to a witness, that party may be precluded from relying on the contradiction at the end of the case: Browne v. Dunn (1893), 1893 65 (FOREP), 6 R. 67 (UK HL); R. v. Quansah, 2015 ONCA 237, para. 77.
[42] I accept that the evidence of Ms Boston was, at times, defensive and not entirely impressive. This could not have been lost on the trial judge. However, this must be placed in context. The appellants conducted an aggressive, at times oppressive and unfair cross examination of Ms Boston, and a witness pressed so hard in this way is not always on her best. The trial judge took the necessary steps to try to rein in unfair aspects of the cross examination, and he was entitled to discount problems in the testimony of the witness arising from her unfair treatment during the cross examination.
[43] In sum, the allegation that the trial judge misapprehended evidence is really an argument that the trial judge did not accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations. The findings made by the trial judge were available on the record before him.
Failure to “Invite” Ms Jacobi to Participate in a Search
[44] On the basis of Mann v. Canadian Tire Corporation Limited, [2016] ONSC 4926, the appellants argue that the Winners respondents had a duty to “invite” Ms Jacobi “to participate” in their investigation. That is not what the Mann decision means. “Inviting” a suspect to participate in a “search” to “resolve the issue” concerns implementation of the search power in the face of a denial by a suspect. It is not a requirement to “invite” a suspect to participate in the investigation.
Alleged “Break in Continuity” of Observations
[45] This argument is premised on the appellants’ arguments respecting time recording. The evidence of security personnel was that she was outside the Winners store very briefly to position herself to intercept Ms Jacobi when she left the store. The trial judge accepted this evidence. Competing time records do not render the trial judge’s factual finding suspect.
[46] The appellants’ argument is premised on a faulty understanding of fact-finding. The appellants elicited evidence exposing a conflict in the evidence over time records. One way of viewing the evidence was that security personnel were absent from the store for several minutes during the critical period when security personnel testified that they had Ms Jacobi under observation. This conflict in the evidence and factual theory was put to security personnel during cross examination and explained. The appellants say the explanation is dishonest and contradicts earlier testimony. The trial judge did not see it that way. He accepted that security personnel saw what they said they saw and did what they said they did and accepted that the time discrepancies were explained by unsynchronized time keeping methods. This finding was open to the trial judge on the record. Resiling from earlier testimony, or correcting or qualifying it during cross examination, is a normal part of the trial process, and it is the trial judge’s job to decide what to make of the testimony.
Conduct of the Trial Judge
[47] The appellants argued the trial judge entered the fray on numerous occasions. I do not agree. The appellants were aggressive in their deportment in court, with witnesses and with the court. At the risk of appearing flippant, it might be said that they have been watching too much American television. During examinations and cross examinations of witnesses, the questioner is required to be fair and courteous. Difficult questions may, of course, be asked, but a questioner is not entitled to abuse his privileged position at the podium by hectoring, asking unfair questions and raising his voice. The appellants were not guided by these basic principles, and the trial judge was required to intervene to preserve decorum and to try to direct the proceedings forward constructively.[^2] This was a difficult trial. I have reviewed the transcripts thoroughly and I am satisfied that the trial judge struck a reasonable balance in maintaining decorum while providing the appellants with an opportunity to present their case and test the evidence of their opponents.
[48] I wish to be clear here that the disconnect at the trial was in respect to the appellants’ understanding of how the factfinding process works in a court of law. To use one example, it made no sense that Ms Boston left the store before she saw what she reported seeing. She left to position herself to stop the appellant. The sequence of events in Ms Boston’s evidence was consistent with the sequence of events on the CCTV. The explanation for the time discrepancies made sense. And yet the appellants would not leave the point alone, pressing the witnesses on issues of “changing the evidence” and “fraud”. There was no foundation for this line of questioning, and the trial judge was required to protect the witnesses from unfair treatment.
Admissibility of Medical Records
[49] The appellants tendered physicians’ notes, which the trial judge did read and consider. Those records included notes of statements made by Ms Jacobi to her doctors about the cause of her injury. The trial judge correctly ruled that the statements made by Ms Jacobi to her doctors were not admissible for the truth of their contents.
[50] The appellants pursued this issue before me vigorously. Their argument was that medical records are admissible and the statements from Ms Jacobi are part of these admissible records. Mr Jacobi was extremely animated on this point, raising his voice, speaking very quickly. The argument on this point reflected, in large measure, the entire appeal, and the proceedings below.
[51] This point is a matter of straightforward first principles of evidence law. Hearsay is presumptively inadmissible. Evidence that is admissible for one purpose may, at the same time, not be admissible for another hearsay purpose. Ms Jacobi’s statements to her doctors are not admissible to establish that what Ms Jacobi said to her doctors is true. They are admissible only as part of the background information upon which the physician’s clinical opinion is based. While this concept may seem unintuitive for persons untrained in the law, it is not a controversial legal proposition.
Other Issues and Disposition
[52] In most appeals there are only one or two arguable grounds. Here, the appellants have raised numerous grounds of appeal. I have only addressed the strongest of these grounds. I conclude the balance of the arguments raised do not require reasons – they are obviously devoid of merit or are encompassed by the principles I have already stated in this decision.
[53] For store personnel this was a routine shoplifting incident. For police, this was a routine shoplifting incident. The in-store videotape generally supported the narrative of events from security personnel about Ms Jacobi’s transit through the store. There were fundamental problems with Ms Jacobi’s evidence, notably that her description of the assault allegedly perpetrated on her was not borne out by in-store video evidence or police evidence. This was Ms Jacobi’s case to prove on a balance of probabilities, and the preponderance of evidence accepted by the trial judge was to the contrary.
Costs
[54] The only arguable issue in respect to the trial judge’s disposition of costs concerns the 15% limit of general costs awards in Small Claims Court cases. This issue concerns whether costs (exclusive of disbursements) should have been $3,750 for each set of defendants represented by counsel, or $3,750 in the aggregate. I will render my decision on that issue when I dispose of the costs of this appeal: my decision on that costs issue will not affect the disposition of costs of this appeal.
Disposition
[55] The appeal is dismissed except as to costs. Decision on that issue is reserved further and will be addressed in my decision respecting costs of the appeal.
Appeal Costs
[56] Appeal costs are a problem in this case. The appellants have taken an unreasonable approach to this case throughout, coloured, it seems, by misconceptions about the applicable legal principles and the trial and appellate process. The court is required to assist self-represented litigants, to promote access to justice. On the other hand, it is simply not true that participation in the justice system is free of cost or risk for self-represented litigants, nor does access to justice require that it should be. Access to justice does not include imposing substantial expense on opposing parties without risk.
[57] Costs in the Small Claims Court are limited to enhance access to justice in cases involving modest amounts of money. The same does not hold true in this court.
[58] Further, costs are an indemnity, not a punishment. Experience shows that legal costs incurred by represented parties are often higher, sometimes much higher, in cases brought by self-represented persons, because self-represented persons lack the forensic skill and judgment to focus their cases properly. The respondents in this case have incurred substantial costs to defend the appeal, and any award of costs that is made will cover only part of what the respondents have had to spend. Even so, an award of partial costs of the appeal will almost certainly exceed the amounts that were in issue at trial, perhaps substantially.
[59] With these observations in mind, the court seeks brief additional submissions on costs from the respondents and from the appellants.
[60] Costs materials for the police respondents are found at CaseLines pages B124 – B131. I am not able to locate costs materials for the Winners respondents in CaseLines. The respondents shall provide their submissions to this court about the appropriate disposition of costs of the appeal by February 11, 2022. These submissions shall be limited to three single-spaced pages in the form of letters or emails to the court and may not include any attachments.
[61] The appellants may respond to the costs submissions of the respondents by February 25, 2022. Their written submissions shall be limited to five single-spaced pages in the form of a letter or email to the court and may not include any attachments. The appellants are cautioned that their costs submissions are not the place to “respond” to this court’s decision.
[62] Finally, the appellants are advised that any challenge they may wish to bring to this appeal decision is by way of appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal, which may only be pursued with leave from that court. Therefore, if the appellants seek to challenge this decision, their next step is a motion for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeal.
“D.L. Corbett J.”
January 28, 2022
[^1]: The appellants argued strenuously and at length on appeal, and were aggressive in their questioning at trial, about the authority security personnel have to administer these rights to a detained person. They have misread this law. Police reliance on rights administered by private persons, such as security personnel, is a distinct issue from whether security personnel may take the time to caution a detained person. Security personnel were free to advise Ms Jacobi of her constitutional rights, even though doing so may not have relieved police from having to do so as well.
[^2]: See, for example, Transcript, p. 60, lines 17-32; p. 61, lines 5-8; p. 91, lines 20 – 21.