CITATION: Draven v. Toronto Fire Services, 2022 ONSC 4067
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 220/22 DATE: 20220715
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
CAMLA DRAVEN
Ms Draven, self-represented
Appellant
– and –
TORONTO FIRE SERVICES
Respondent
In Chambers, In Writing
REASONS FOR DECISION[^1]
D.L. Corbett J.
[1] The appeal is dismissed pursuant to R.2.1 as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The basis for this conclusion is set out in detail in the court's directions of April 13, 2022:
The court directs the Registrar to issue a notice to the appellant pursuant to R.2.1 that the court is considering dismissing her appeal as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. The court's concerns with the appeal are as follows:
The appellant's position that she may interrupt proceedings before the Commission to pursue separate proceedings before the HRTO, appears to be without merit. The HRTO does not sit on review of the Fire Safety Commission and has no authority to interrupt ongoing adjudicative proceedings ongoing before that tribunal.
This court does have jurisdiction to review of decisions of the Fire Safety Commission. The impugned decision is a Commission decision to move forward on the issues of jurisdiction and mootness prior to addressing other issues raised in the proceedings below.
As such, the impugned decision is interlocutory and procedural. Ordinarily, this court will refuse to entertain an appeal or review of an interlocutory decision from a tribunal on the principle of prematurity: Awada v. Allstate, 2021 ONSC 8108; Isaac v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 8265; Pafco Insurance co. v. Sahadeo, 2022 ONSC 328. This case appears to be a good example of why this principle is important. The proceedings below may be outside the Commission's jurisdiction and they may be moot. The Commission is entitled to control its own process, and in particular, to assess proceedings before it to address preliminary concerns about whether they should move forward. There appears to be no basis on which to appeal this procedural ruling from the Commission and delaying proceedings below to entertain an appeal would appear to be counter to the principle of prematurity.
The appellant alleges that the Commission has failed to accommodate her health issues. This is an interlocutory issue and cannot ordinarily ground an appeal of directions given during the course of a proceeding. The appellant has not explained why she is unable to address the concerns raised by the Commission about jurisdiction and mootness in writing, as directed by the Commission. Further, if after the Commission has disposed on the appellant's complaint, she is dissatisfied with the result, she will have a right of appeal or review to this court in which she may raise any issues she has with the process below, including her requests for accommodation.
This court orders that the proceedings below are not stayed pending determination of the R.2.1 issues in this court. If the court declines to dismiss the appeal pursuant to R.2.1, the issue of a stay may then be raised by the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant is cautioned that she is required to follow the directions provided by the Commission pending decision of the R.2.1 issue in this court.
[2] Ms Draven responded by email, attaching a medical letter seeking accommodations in this court, to which this court provided the following further direction:
This court will consider any request for accommodation in this court as the need arises. At this point, Ms Draven has been asked to respond to the court's concerns in writing.
If Ms Draven is asking for an extension in the deadline to provide her written response to the court's concerns, she should specify precisely the extension she is seeking.
As the court has said already, the process before the FSC is not stayed pending Ms Draven's response to this court's concerns.
[3] Ms Draven then provided a substantive response to the R.2.1 notice on April 19, 2022. In respect to Ms Draven's response:
Ms Draven asserts the HRTO may sit on review of decisions of the Fire Safety Council (“FSC”) as they relate to accommodation issues. No authority is provided in support of this argument, and the argument is wrong. Appeal and review of decisions of the FSC lies to this court, not to the HRTO.
Ms Draven argues that intervention by this court could affect the course of proceedings before the FSC and correct what she alleges are failures by the FSC to address her accommodation requests. This argument does not raise any "special circumstances" defeating the application of the prematurity principle: the same argument can be made about virtually any interlocutory appeal. No argument has established that this court will be unable to correct any errors or unfairness below when the process before the FSC has concluded.
[4] The appeal is therefore dismissed without costs pursuant to R.2.1 as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process.
[5] This ends this case in the Divisional Court. The order of the FSC is not stayed, and Ms Draven should understand that she is required to address the issues of mootness and jurisdiction in writing, as directed by the FSC.
[6] This endorsement is effective from the time it is sent by email; a formal endorsement will be released for legal databases in due course.
___________________________ D.L. Corbett J.
Date of Decision: July 4, 2022
Written Endorsement Released: July 15, 2022
CITATION: Draven v. Toronto Fire Services, 2022 ONSC 4067
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 220/22 DATE: 20220715
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
D.L. Corbett J.
BETWEEN:
CAMLA DRAVEN
Appellant
– and –
TORONTO FIRE SERVICE
Respondent
REASONS FOR DECISION
D.L. Corbett J.
Date of Oral Reasons for Judgment: April 19, 2022
Written Endorsement Released: July 16, 2022
[^1]: This decision was provided to the parties by email on April 19, 2022, and was effective as of that date.