ONSCDC 2021

The applicant, a former teacher whose certificate was retroactively revoked due to a prior finding of professional misconduct involving sexual abuse, applied for reinstatement.

The Registrar determined the application was premature, interpreting the five-year waiting period under subsection 33(4.1) of the Act as starting from the date of the deemed revocation rather than the date of the original discipline order.

The Divisional Court found the Registrar's interpretation unreasonable, as it ignored the clear statutory language and context, and quashed the decision, ordering the Registrar to refer the reinstatement application to the discipline committee.

The landlord moved to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) eviction order.

The LTB order was made on consent, requiring the tenant to vacate the premises and pay rental arrears.

The tenant appealed, arguing procedural fairness issues regarding notice to other alleged tenants, and obtained an automatic stay of eviction.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding it was an abuse of process designed to delay eviction while rent remained unpaid.

The court also noted the tenant failed to seek the required leave to appeal a consent order under section 133 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which had dismissed her appeal from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's refusal to investigate her complaint against a doctor.

The doctor had attended the applicant's home for an independent medical examination on behalf of an insurer, but the applicant refused to participate.

The court dismissed the application for judicial review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding the complaint to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, as the doctor provided no medical services and owed no duty to the applicant.

The appellant appealed an interlocutory production order made by the License Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to provide written submissions on whether the appeal should be dismissed as premature under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying interference with the ongoing administrative process.

The appeal was dismissed as premature, and costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of the College of Physicians and Surgeons' decision to investigate her for professional misconduct and incompetence related to public health misinformation.

She sought declarations that the College lacked jurisdiction to regulate free speech and that its statement on misinformation was unconstitutional.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the applicant could raise her jurisdictional and constitutional arguments before the discipline tribunal if the investigation resulted in a referral for a hearing.

The court also granted a sealing order to protect the identities of patients and informants.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $1,500.

The appellant dentist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for professional misconduct.

The appellant had repeatedly breached undertakings restricting him from performing dental implant therapy, resulting in harm to at least one patient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle in the Committee's conclusion that the appellant was ungovernable and that revocation was the only appropriate penalty.

The Court also rejected arguments that the Committee's reasons were insufficient or based on irrelevant considerations.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Boswell J. dated September 1, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the amount of $1,500.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the amount of $1,500.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) decisions that dismissed his appeal regarding a freedom of information request for police records.

The IPC found that the applicant's request was barred by the doctrines of issue estoppel and collateral attack, as the records at issue had already been adjudicated in a prior 2003 proceeding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's application of issue estoppel and collateral attack was reasonable, and that there was no denial of procedural fairness.

The employer appealed a decision finding its employment contract's termination clause void for breaching the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The application judge had awarded the employee ten months' common law notice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the 'for cause' provision illegally contracted out of the ESA by applying a common law 'just cause' standard rather than the statutory 'wilful misconduct' standard.

The Court also found no error in the application judge's assessment of the ten-month notice period, which appropriately considered the Bardal factors and the economic uncertainty at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The applicant police officer sought a stay of his dismissal from the police service pending judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission decision that confirmed his termination for discreditable conduct, neglect of duty, and deceit.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the balance of convenience and irreparable harm did not favor the applicant.

The court noted that the applicant's losses were primarily financial and could be remedied with back pay if his judicial review application succeeded, whereas granting routine stays would contravene legislative policy.

The appellant father appealed a summary judgment order finding his two children in need of protection and placing them in the sole custody of the mother.

The father, who had not seen the children in over four years, alleged widespread misconduct by judges, lawyers, and social workers, but failed to file responding evidence on the summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of fact in the motion judge's decision, and upheld the refusal to grant an adjournment.

The moving parties, former tenants, sought an extension of time to appeal an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board requiring them to pay rent arrears, as well as an order refusing to extend the time for review.

The court applied the four-part test for extending the time to appeal and found that the moving parties failed to demonstrate a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, provided no reasonable explanation for their inordinate delay, and failed to show any merit to their proposed appeal.

The motion was dismissed with costs.

The moving party, a municipal councillor, sought a stay pending her appeal of a judgment that found she violated the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act and declared her council seat vacant.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay pending appeal.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the court found no irreparable harm because it ordered the municipality not to fill the vacancy pending the appeal.

The balance of convenience favoured the public interest in municipal integrity, and the motion for a stay was dismissed.

The appellants (purchasers) appealed a summary judgment order forfeiting their deposit after a failed residential real estate transaction.

They argued they were entitled to rescind the agreement because the MLS listing misrepresented the home's square footage.

The motion judge found that the purchasers, one of whom was an experienced real estate agent, relied on their personal inspection of the property rather than the MLS listing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's factual inferences were reasonable and supported by the evidence, including the purchasers' repeated affirmations of their intent to close after discovering the actual square footage.

The self-represented defendant brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court regarding interlocutory rulings made by the trial judge refusing to dismiss the action.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01, noting that the rulings had merged into the final trial judgment and any appeal must be directed to the Court of Appeal.

Despite the defendant's submissions that his jurisdictional error was made in good faith and not abusive, the court dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.01, finding that the proceeding could not possibly succeed in the Divisional Court and amounted to a collateral attack on a final judgment.

The applicant, Chair of the City of Hamilton's LGBTQ Advisory Committee, sought judicial review of an Integrity Commissioner's report finding he breached the code of conduct by disclosing confidential information, and the City Council's subsequent decision to reprimand him.

The applicant argued the Integrity Commissioner lacked jurisdiction because the advisory committee was not a 'local board' under the Municipal Act, 2001, and that the process was procedurally unfair.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it was reasonable to interpret 'local board' as including the advisory committee, and that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness throughout the investigation and council proceedings.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of MacNeil J. dated October 16, 2021.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $2,500 all inclusive.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Czutrin J. dated September 3, 2021.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs fixed at $2,500 all inclusive.