Court File and Parties
CITATION: Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4872
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 017/21
DATE: 20210709
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Penny, McKelvey, Newton JJ.
BETWEEN:
CHRISTIAN CHUKWUEDOZIE CHIJINDU Appellant
– and –
LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO Respondent
P. Slansky, Counsel for the Appellant
L. Maunder, Counsel for Respondent
HEARD: in Toronto by Video Conference April 27, 2021
Reasons on Appeal
NEWTON J.:
Overview
[1] A hearing division panel of the Law Society of Ontario found that Mr. Chijindu had engaged in “serious professional misconduct that brought discredit upon the profession”[^1] by:
- charging fees to his client that were excessive and unreasonable;
- failing to encourage respect for the administration of justice by failing to comply with two court orders requiring him to reimburse his client for payment of the excessive fees;
- failing to act honourably and with integrity by charging grossly excessive fees, failing to honour a court order to reimburse the client, and rendering an even larger supplementary account to the client that was duplicative and false in an attempt to skirt the court’s order; and
- transferring funds from his trust account to his general account without having delivered an account.
[2] The hearing division panel revoked Mr. Chijindu’s licence to practice law and ordered that he pay costs to the Law Society of $40,000.
[3] Mr. Chijindu appealed the decision and penalty to the Appeal Division of the Law Society. The appeal was dismissed by the Appeal Division.[^2]
[4] Mr. Chijindu appeals to this court and raises a number of arguments, including that:
- the Law Society Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine the scope of the retainer or whether Mr. Chijindu had breached court orders;
- it was an abuse of process to determine whether the fees were fair and reasonable in light of the findings in a related proceeding;
- Mr. Chijindu had a reasonable excuse for not paying the funds as ordered;
- the hearing tribunal made palpable and overriding errors in reaching their conclusions; and
- revocation was not the appropriate remedy.
[5] For the reasons that follow, we dismiss Mr. Chijindu’s appeal.
The Facts
[6] The Law Society’s investigation was initiated by a complaint from a client who claimed that Mr. Chijindu charged excessive fees not in accordance with their retainer agreement. The client had retained Mr. Chijindu to assist in the recovery of stolen money.
(a.) The Retainer
[7] Mr. Chijindu and the client entered into a written retainer agreement in March 2012 which provided that Mr. Chijindu would:
[T]ake all necessary legal steps here in Canada: including issuing a claim, making an application, motions, securing injunction(s), settlements, negotiations to preserve and retrieve the money that is within this jurisdiction.
[8] The retainer agreement provided that Mr. Chijindu would charge “10% of the recovered money.” The agreement also provided that if the client recovered money in any other jurisdiction instead of Ontario, then the client would pay Mr. Chijindu for legal services provided in Ontario based on an hourly rate of $500.
[9] In April 2012, Mr. Chijindu issued a claim on behalf of his client, and then obtained a Mareva injunction and a Norwich tracing order for the defendant’s bank account information in Canada.
[10] In October 2013, the client’s counsel in the United Kingdom obtained a judgment against the defendant for approximately $2 million CAD. Mr. Chijindu applied to have this judgment registered in Ontario and that application was granted in July 2014.
[11] Mr. Chijindu proceeded with enforcement of that judgment against the defendant’s bank accounts and real property.
[12] Between December 2014 and May 2015, Mr. Chijindu recovered $403,707.05 for his client as a result of garnishments and the sale of real property in Ontario.
[13] The client recovered about $5000 CAD in the UK through the actions of its solicitors enforcing the UK judgment there.
(b.) The Accounts
[14] On June 18, 2015, Mr. Chijindu rendered his first account for $207,421.11 plus HST. The fees charged were for 10% of the UK judgment which Mr. Chijindu registered in Ontario.
[15] On June 23, 2015, the client objected to the fees, stating that the fees should be 10% of the recovered money.
[16] On July 13, 2015, despite the client’s objection, Mr. Chijindu transferred the amount owing on this account to his general account and sent the balance to the client.
[17] On July 17, 2015, Mr. Chijindu wrote to his client and maintained his position that he was entitled to 10% of the Ontario judgment. Further, he stated that enforcement was not included in the retainer and that he was entitled to $23,500.00 for enforcement.
[18] On July 20, 2015, Mr. Chijindu delivered an amended account for $219,069.88 which reflected a higher currency conversion rate that increased his original fee by $11,648.77 plus HST.
[19] The client complained to the Law Society.
[20] The client also retained new counsel who brought an application asking the Superior Court to interpret the retainer agreement and to determine the fees to which Mr. Chijindu was entitled.
[21] Before the Superior Court, Mr. Chijindu argued that an addendum to the retainer agreement excluded judgment enforcement from the services to be provided and that he was separately retained orally at a later date to enforce judgment.
[22] By decision dated August 12, 2016, Lederman J. rejected those arguments and concluded that the “collection services were not ‘new steps’ but were part of what was called for in the Retainer Agreement.”[^3]
[23] Justice Lederman determined that the fee under the retainer agreement was $40,370.71 (10% of the amount recovered) plus disbursements and taxes. Justice Lederman directed that the balance of monies recovered was to be held in trust and that Mr. Chijindu was to remit the balance of the funds to the client.
[24] The judgment was formally entered on September 1, 2016, and included the term that Mr. Chijindu pay $196,847.74 to his former client. Mr. Chijindu did not appeal this decision and did not pay his client $196,847.74 as ordered.
[25] On September 21, 2016, Lederman J. ordered that Mr. Chijindu pay costs to his former client of $38,000 within 30 days, noting that it was “unconscionable” for Mr. Chijindu “to take the position that 10% of the judgment awarded would constitute his fee when the Retainer Agreement clearly provided for the contingency arrangement of 10% of the recovered amount.”[^4]
[26] On August 15, 2016, three days after the decision of Lederman J., Mr. Chijindu delivered what he described as his “amended” account. The amended account was comprised of two components: the fees payable for recovery in Ontario, $40,370.71; and “fees payable for recovery outside of Ontario”, $405,155.00. Credit was given for the funds already transferred from trust, $247,548.96, leaving a balance owing of $255,895.09.
[27] On September 21, 2016, the same day as the costs decision, Mr. Chijindu delivered another amended account in which he gave the client a credit for the $38,000 ordered for costs, leaving a balance owing of $217,895.09.
(c.) Reasons of the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division
[28] Mr. Chijindu’s hearing proceeded before the Law Society’s Hearing Tribunal over five days in August 2019. Mr. Chijindu represented himself before the tribunal, and gave evidence orally and by affidavit. The reasons of the Hearing Tribunal were released three months later.[^5]
[29] The Hearing Division listed the issues as:
- Did Mr. Chijindu perform services outside the scope of the retainer and pursuant to an oral retainer for which he is entitled to charge?
- Were his accounts inappropriate to the point they constitute professional misconduct?
- Did Mr. Chijindu breach court orders?
- Did Mr. Chijindu act with integrity?
Did Mr. Chijindu perform services outside the scope of the retainer and pursuant to an oral retainer for which he is entitled to charge?
[30] Mr. Chijindu testified that there was an oral retainer that entitled him to charge for work obtaining the tracing order and the work he did to assist UK counsel, which he asserted was not included in the Retainer Agreement.
[31] The tribunal noted that the scope of the written Retainer was broad, including all work undertaken to preserve and retrieve money within Canada. The tribunal concluded that, if there was an oral retainer, it could only be for work not covered by the Retainer itself.
[32] The tribunal also noted that Mr. Chijindu could charge an hourly rate for services provided in Ontario but only if recovery occurred in another jurisdiction instead of Ontario. The tribunal noted that the written Retainer did not provide for additional fees when there was a recovery in more than one jurisdiction or address whether Mr. Chijindu was to be paid to provide assistance to UK counsel for recovery efforts when that work was not already required as part of Mr. Chijindu’s Retainer.
[33] The tribunal concluded that tracing was included in the written Retainer, as Mr. Chijindu required a tracing order to see where the money went in order to “interdict or preserve all assets in Ontario”.[^6] The tribunal also concluded that Mr. Chijindu was obligated to share the results of the tracing order with the client’s UK counsel.[^7]
[34] The tribunal found that there was no oral retainer as asserted by Mr. Chijindu because the documentary evidence, the evidence from the client, and Mr. Chijindu’s actions were not consistent with there being an oral retainer.[^8]
Were the accounts inappropriate to the point they constitute professional misconduct?
[35] The tribunal acknowledged that it was not its task to assess the accounts, but rather to determine whether the accounts were inappropriate to the point that the accounts constituted professional misconduct.
[36] The tribunal concluded that the first and second accounts (the accounts based on 10% of the judgment, not recovery) were “unlawful,[^9] excessive, and inconsistent with the Retainer”, and “inappropriate to the point they constitute professional misconduct.”[^10] The tribunal found that Mr. Chijindu’s conduct in rendering these accounts was “unacceptable.”[^11] He transferred payment for the first account from trust knowing that his client objected to the fee.
[37] The tribunal also concluded that the third and fourth accounts were “neither fair nor reasonable”, and “inappropriate to the point that they constitute professional misconduct.”[^12] Having found that there was no oral retainer, the tribunal also found that these accounts were “grossly excessive and false.”[^13] Mr. Chijindu admitted that the third account included the fee for the 10% recovery and an additional fee which included all the work he claimed to perform, including the work for the recovery. The tribunal found that Mr. Chijindu’s dockets were “unreliable and inflated.”[^14]
Did Mr. Chijindu breach court orders?
[38] Noting that Rule 5.6-1 of the Law Society’s Rules of Professional Conduct requires lawyers to encourage public respect for and to try to improve the administration of justice, the tribunal noted that a lawyer’s breach of a court order may constitute professional misconduct.
[39] The tribunal concluded:
Mr. Chijindu failed to honour Justice Lederman’s endorsement, the repayment order and the costs order. In so doing, he failed to act in a manner that maintains public confidence in the trustworthiness of the profession and the administration of justice.[^15]
Did Mr. Chijindu act with integrity?
[40] Rule 2.1-1 requires lawyers to conduct themselves “honourably and with integrity.” The tribunal noted the importance of integrity to public confidence in the legal profession and concluded that:
Mr. Chijindu’s conduct does not inspire public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. It shows a fundamental disrespect on his part for his obligations as a lawyer and the reputation of lawyers as trustworthy and honest.[^16]
[41] Acknowledging Mr. Chijindu’s inexperience and other potential factors, the tribunal stated there was no justification for Mr Chijindu’s conduct in transferring money from trust for an account he knew the clients were disputing, refusing to obey two court orders requiring him to pay monies to his client, and rendering an account he knew was false and inflated in an attempt to justify his refusal to return monies. Accordingly, the tribunal concluded that Mr. Chijindu acted without integrity.[^17]
(d.) Reasons of the Hearing Division on Penalty
[42] At the penalty hearing, Mr. Chijindu submitted that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to decide the issues before it, arguing that the Law Society’s Rules of Professional Conduct did not apply to matters that are covered by the Solicitors Act. The tribunal rejected that argument, noting that the same conduct by a lawyer can give rise to proceedings by the Law Society and by a client under the Solicitors Act.[^18]
[43] The tribunal described Mr. Chijindu’s misconduct as “egregious” and “tantamount to misappropriation.”[^19] Although ordered to repay money to his client in 2016, Mr. Chijindu has not and “will not acknowledge that he must repay the money.”[^20] The tribunal found that Mr. Chijindu is not remorseful.
[44] The tribunal also found that this conduct was not out of character, noting that Mr. Chijindu admitted that his later accounts were inflated and duplicative, but did not recognize that this was dishonest. Rather, he described this as a “negotiating position.”[^21]
[45] Consequently, the tribunal held that revocation was the appropriate penalty, noting that Mr. Chijindu’s conduct was akin to misappropriation, that his subsequent accounts were knowingly false, that his dockets were unreliable and inflated, and that he refuses to accept that he is bound by the court order. The tribunal also ordered that Mr. Chijindu pay costs to the Law Society of $40,000 within two years.
(e.) Reasons of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division
[46] On appeal, Mr. Chijindu raised the following alleged errors in the Hearing Tribunal’s consideration of the issues:
a. the hearing panel did not have jurisdiction to determine the legal existence of or to interpret retainer agreements, and that the hearing panel erred in failing to find an oral retainer;
b. the hearing panel did not have jurisdiction to determine whether fees were fair or reasonable because it lacked jurisdiction to determine the legal existence and scope of a retainer, and erred in reaching their conclusions;
c. the hearing panel effectively made a contempt order, that the hearing panel has no jurisdiction to make a contempt order, and only a failure to comply with a court order that results in a finding contempt of court can constitute professional misconduct;
d. that the conclusions on which the hearing panel relied for finding the failure of integrity are not proper findings;
e. the hearing panel erred in concluding that the presumptive penalty of revocation applied because there is no finding of misappropriation or fraud; and
f. the amount ordered for costs was excessive and unreasonable.[^22]
[47] With respect to the jurisdiction to determine retainers, the appeal division noted the different purposes and processes of a solicitor-client assessment under the Solicitors Act and a Law Society conduct or discipline proceeding. The appeal panel concluded that the hearing panel had the authority to determine whether Mr. Chijindu’s fees were fair and reasonable under Rule 3.6-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and to determine, for that purpose, the existence and terms of “any relevant agreement between the lawyer and the client.” [^23] The appeal panel noted the concurrent jurisdiction between the Law Society and the courts in certain circumstances, as recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in recent cases.[^24]
[48] The appeal panel found no palpable and overriding error in the hearing panel’s determinations that there was no oral retainer, and that the fees charged were not fair and reasonable.
[49] The appeal panel acknowledged that the hearing division had no contempt power, but observed that Mr. Chijindu had not submitted any authority for the proposition that breach of a court order cannot be professional misconduct unless there has been a judicial finding of contempt. The appeal panel noted that professional misconduct has been found in a number of cases where court orders have been breached without any finding of contempt.
[50] The appeal panel also noted the purpose of the Law Society in finding professional misconduct where orders have been breached is not the same as the court’s purpose in civil contempt proceedings. In concluding that the hearing division had the authority to find that Mr. Chijindu had breached the orders of Lederman J., the appeal panel stated:
[B]oth the courts and law societies are involved in resolving issues relating to breach of court orders – the courts from the perspective of the proper administration of justice, the law societies from the perspective of good governance of the profession.[^25]
[51] As the appeal panel found no palpable and overriding error in the findings of the hearing division, the findings with respect to integrity were upheld.
[52] The appeal panel found that there was no reversible error in the conclusion by the hearing division that revocation was the appropriate penalty.
[53] Similarly, the appeal panel found no reversible error in the hearing division’s discretionary decision with respect to costs, noting that the costs sought were supported by a cost outline and that dockets were not required.
[54] Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and Mr. Chijindu was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal fixed at $10,000.
The Present Appeal
Standard of Review
[55] The parties agree that the standard of review is as set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov[^26] for statutory appeals from decisions of administrative tribunals: correctness on questions of law, and palpable and overriding error with respect to findings of fact and questions of mixed fact and law where no legal issue is readily extricable.
Issues on Appeal
[56] Mr. Chijindu repeats the arguments raised at the hearing division with respect to jurisdiction to ascertain the terms of the retainer and to find that Mr. Chijindu breached court orders. He also repeats the argument with respect to penalty that the presumption of revocation does not apply.
[57] Specifically, as to the interpretation of the retainer and the determination of reasonableness of fees, Mr. Chijindu argues that:
a. the hearing tribunal did not have jurisdiction to ascertain the terms of the retainer;
b. it was an abuse of process for the hearing tribunal to determine whether the fees were fair and reasonable in view of the findings of Lederman J.; and
c. if the hearing tribunal did have jurisdiction, then the hearing tribunal made palpable and overriding errors in concluding that there was no oral agreement, and that the fees were not fair and reasonable.
[58] With respect to integrity, Mr. Chijindu argues that:
a. the hearing tribunal did not have jurisdiction to determine whether there was a breach of a court order, as that is a finding of contempt and beyond the jurisdiction of the tribunal; and
b. the hearing Tribunal failed to consider that there is a reasonable excuse for the failure to return the funds – set off for other fees.
[59] As to penalty, Mr. Chijindu argues that:
a. the transfer of monies to trust for fees was not misappropriation of funds; and
b. therefore, the rebuttable presumption of revocation does not apply.
[60] The Law Society responds, as it did below, that the Law Society has parallel jurisdiction with the courts to review retainer agreements and fees, and counsel’s conduct. Further, the Law Society argues that no palpable and overriding errors were made by the hearing tribunal in determining its facts and conclusions.
Interpretation of the Retainer and Reasonableness of Fees
[61] Mr. Chijindu argues that, since the Law Society was not a party to the retainer agreement, it has no privity of contract and, therefore, no right to challenge the retainer. Further, Mr. Chijindu argues that only the Superior Court may interpret retainer agreements as set out in s. 23 of the Solicitors Act, which provides as follows;
Determination of disputes under the agreement
23 No action shall be brought upon any such agreement, but every question respecting the validity or effect of it may be examined and determined, and it may be enforced or set aside without action on the application of any person who is a party to the agreement or who is or is alleged to be liable to pay or who is or claims to be entitled to be paid the costs, fees, charges or disbursements, in respect of which the agreement is made, by the court, not being the Small Claims Court, in which the business or any part of it was done or a judge thereof, or, if the business was not done in any court, by the Superior Court of Justice. [Emphasis added.]
[62] The Law Society submits that Mr. Chijindu’s jurisdiction arguments ignore the fact that the Law Society and the courts have different functions. The courts resolve disputes between parties and the Law Society regulates the legal profession in the public interest. As the Appeal Division noted, the Supreme Court of Canada has approved and accepted this parallel jurisdiction, and the legislature has specifically empowered the hearing division to “determine any question of fact or law that arises in a proceeding before it.”[^27]
[63] We agree with the reasons and conclusion of the Appeal Division that the hearing panel had jurisdiction to ascertain the terms of the retainer and to conclude that there was no oral retainer.
[64] Mr. Chijindu argues that it was an abuse of process for the hearing division to determine the reasonableness of fees when Lederman J. had already found that the proper fee was 10% of the recovered money.
[65] The Law Society quite correctly asserts that the hearing division did not revisit this issue, and that the issue before it was whether Mr. Chijindu had engaged in professional misconduct in respect of the first and subsequent accounts.
[66] The inquiry undertaken at the hearing division was whether fees charged were fair and reasonable, or contrary to Rule 3.6-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and, as noted, the hearing division was empowered by the legislature to determine any question of fact or law before it. Accordingly, we conclude that it was not an abuse of process for the hearing panel to determine whether the fees were fair and reasonable.
[67] Mr. Chijindu argues that the hearing panel erred in concluding that there was no separate oral retainer, in rejecting Mr. Chijindu’s evidence as to what was included in the written retainer, in accepting the evidence of the client, in concluding that the third and fourth accounts were rendered to thwart Justice Lederman’s order, and in finding that the time charged in counts three and four were excessive and unsupported.
[68] The Law Society submits that all these conclusions of fact are supported in the evidence and explained in thorough reasons. With respect to the evidence of the client, the Law Society submits that the hearing panel is entitled to conclude as they did, based on the testimony of the client and Mr. Chijindu’s failure to impeach the client.
[69] These findings will only be reviewed on the standard of palpable and overriding error, and we conclude that Mr. Chijindu has failed to demonstrate any such errors.
Integrity and Breach of Court Orders
[70] Mr. Chijindu argues that breaching a court order is contempt of court, and that the Law Society has no jurisdiction to find someone in contempt, and therefore no jurisdiction to find that Mr. Chijindu engaged in professional misconduct by breaching court orders.
[71] As noted above at paragraphs 49 and 50, the Appeal Division acknowledged that the Law Society did not have a contempt power, but held that it had the power to review conduct from the perspective of good governance of the profession. The thorough reasons of the Appeal Division explain why the Law Society does have jurisdiction to find that a licensee breached a court order and that such breach may amount to professional misconduct. We agree.
[72] With respect to Mr. Chijindu’s argument that he was entitled to ignore the repayment order and the costs order because he has a set off for unpaid fees, the Appeal Division said this:
[127] Whether or not the appellant was actually owed anything more by his client, the appellant breached the Lederman Judgment and Costs Order. This is particularly egregious where the appellant was ordered to repay an amount ($196,847.74) taken from trust for a fee that he was not entitled to charge his client, and where the Lederman Judgment ordered that the balance of the money taken by the appellant (i.e. net of the permitted fee of $40,370.71) was held in trust for the client.
[128] We find no reversible error in the hearing panel's finding that the appellant engaged in professional misconduct by failing to comply with the Lederman Judgment and the Costs Order.[^28] [Emphasis added.]
[73] We agree.
Penalty and the Rebuttable Presumption of Revocation
[74] Mr. Chijindu repeats his set off argument in submitting that there was no misappropriation of fees, and therefore revocation is not appropriate.
[75] However, the Appeal Division noted that the hearing panel found that when Mr. Chijindu kept his client’s money despite the order of Lederman J., and when he rendered grossly excessive and false third and fourth accounts, he was dishonest.
[76] The appeal division found no reversible error in the hearing panel’s conclusion that:
Revocation is the only option in this case. The public cannot depend on Mr. Chijindu to act with honesty and integrity. It cannot depend on him to respect the courts, or to adhere to the law or to the ethical standards demanded by his professional regulator in the public interest. It cannot depend on him to honour retainers, to treat them fairly in rendering accounts or to obey a decision of the court in the case of a fee dispute. It cannot depend on him to treat trust monies as client property rather than his own. Mr. Chijindu's actions jeopardize the public's confidence in the integrity, probity and trustworthiness of lawyers they might seek to retain. ... Mr. Chijindu's conduct does not inspire public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. It shows a fundamental disrespect on his part for his obligations as a lawyer and the reputation of lawyers as trustworthy and honest.[^29][Emphasis added.]
[77] We agree.
Conclusion
[78] For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Costs
[79] The parties agreed that costs of $7500 (all-inclusive) should be awarded to the successful party. Costs are therefore awarded to the Law Society in the agreed amount.
Newton J.
I agree
Penny J.
I agree ______________________________
McKelvey J.
Released: July 9, 2021
CITATION: Chijindu v. Law Society of Ontario, 2021 ONSC 4872
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 017/21
DATE: 20210709
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
Penny, McKelvey, Newton JJ.
BETWEEN:
CHRISTIAN CHUKWUEDOZIE CHIJINDU Appellant
– and –
LAW SOCIETY OF ONTARIO Respondent
REASONS ON APPEAL
Date of Release: July 9, 2021
[^1]: Law Society of Ontario v. Chijindu, 2020 ONLSTH 55 at para. 2 [“Chijindu (LSTH No. 2)”]; Law Society of Ontario v. Chijindu, 2019 ONLSTH 147 [“Chijindu (LSTH No. 1)”].
[^2]: Law Society of Ontario v. Chijindu, 2020 ONLSTA 19 [“Chijindu (LSTA)”].
[^3]: Autopoietic Telemetric Solutions Ltd. v. Chijindu, 2016 ONSC 5119 at para. 18.
[^4]: Autopoietic Telemetric Solutions Ltd. v. Chijindu, 2016 ONSC 5907 at para. 6.
[^5]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1).
[^6]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 49.
[^7]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 51.
[^8]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at paras. 52-64.
[^9]: It was acknowledged by Mr. Chijindu in his affidavit that these accounts were contrary to the Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.13, s. 28.1, and O. Reg. 195/04: Contingency Fee Agreements which prohibits the solicitor from recovering more in fees than the client recovers.
[^10]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 70.
[^11]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 70.
[^12]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at paras. 77 to 89.
[^13]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 77.
[^14]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 81.
[^15]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 93.
[^16]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at para. 99.
[^17]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 1), at paras. 100-106.
[^18]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 2), at para. 10.
[^19]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 2), at para. 13.
[^20]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 2), at para. 15.
[^21]: Chijindu (LSTH No. 2), at para. 15.
[^22]: Chijindu (LSTA), at para. 24.
[^23]: Chijindu (LSTA), at para. 72.
[^24]: See R. v. Cunningham, 2010 SCC 10, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 331, Canadian National Railway Co. v. McKercher LLP, 2013 SCC 39, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 649, and Groia v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 772.
[^25]: Chijindu (LSTA), at para. 88.
[^26]: 2019 SCC 65 at para 37; see also Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33 at paras. 10, 19, 26-37, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235.
[^27]: Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, s. 49.25.
[^28]: Chijindu (LSTA), at paras. 127-28.
[^29]: Chijindu (LSTA), at paras. 160-61.```