Court File and Parties

CITATION: Andrew Watt v. HPARB, 2020 ONSC 7386

COURT FILE NO.: 203/20

DATE: 2020-12-02

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO – DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: Watt v. HPARB

COUNSEL: Andrew Watt, self-represented Appellant

BEFORE: D.L. Corbett J.

DATE: November 30, 2020

In Chambers, In Writing

Endorsement

[1] For the reasons that follow, this appeal is dismissed pursuant to R.2.1.01.

[2] As stated in this court’s prior endorsement, the contents of the appellant’s complaint to the ICRC contains allegations that were characterized by the ICRC and the HPARB as unworthy of further investigation. Taken altogether, as summarized in the decisions below, the appellant’s allegations are bizarre and apparently divorced from reality. The appellant’s response to the first R.2.1.01 notice did not appear to meet those concerns directly, but it was not until this court was able to review copies of the appellant’s complaints that the court was able to assess fully the reasons below and the appellant’s responses to the R.2.1.01 notices.

[3] The appellant’s response to the second R.2.1.01 notice is not the product of a mind grounded in objective reality. This is clear on the face of the response as it was clear on the face of the underlying complaints made to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

[4] This case is a sad one. The appellant had the talent and industry to obtain an M.D. degree and to pursue a prestigious medical specialization program at the University of Toronto. His career was derailed, apparently by serious mental illness, and though the University subsequently decided that it would accept him back into the university community, based on an assessment provided to it of the appellant’s mental health, the University decided that the appellant could not return to the specialist program. The merits of that decision by the University were not reviewable before the respondents and are not reviewable before this court in this appeal.

[5] The appellant believes that success in this appeal may help him to revive his career in medicine. That is not, in fact, the case. It is apparent from the materials before this court that the University’s decision was based on its understanding of the appellant’s mental health and the implications for the appellant as a health care professional. If the appellant disagreed with the University’s decision, there were internal appeals available to him at the University following which, if he was still not satisfied, an application for judicial review of the university’s academic decision could have been brought to this court. It may also be open to the appellant to raise the issue anew with the University if there has been a material change in circumstances, principally, one would think, in his mental health. But the crucial point for the appellant to understand is this: the ICRC of the College and the HPARB do not sit on review of the University’s decision, and this court could not review the University’s decision in this appeal.

[6] The appellant’s other submissions do not require extensive comment. They lack basic coherence and logic and are largely unresponsive to the issues stated by the court. It is clear from the appellant’s personal history and from some of his other materials provided to the court that he is intelligent, able to understand legal concepts, and able to express himself clearly when his thinking is clear. It is also clear that he has not, and perhaps cannot, address the court’s concerns directly.

[7] This, in turn, is reflected in passages found early in the submissions. The appellant argues that concerns about his mental health should not have to be addressed when he has stated serious allegations against the respondents. Requiring him to address these concerns or refusing to investigate his complaints because of apprehended concerns about his mental health, he argues, is unfair and discriminatory and an assault on his “psychological autonomy”. All of which is to say that the appellant is clear that he does not think that he should be called upon to address the court’s concern that his allegations against the respondents are not grounded in objective reality.

[8] The appellant may be entitled to the “psychological autonomy” to decline treatment that would relieve him from delusions or otherwise address mental health issues. That question is not before this court. However, respect for the appellant’s “psychological autonomy” does not require the court or the respondents to engage in a proceeding premised on allegations that are not grounded in objective reality.

[9] The court notes the following points made in the appellant’s submission:

(a) His allegations of rape, violence and other criminality by respondent physicians are said to be credible because another physician associated with the Department of Surgery at the University of Toronto is a convicted murderer. The referenced murder is the notorious case of Dr Mohammed Shamji, who killed his wife, Dr Elana Fric-Shamji, shortly after she told Dr Shamji of her intention to leave their marriage. The appellant’s logic is that, because one doctor has committed a heinous and notorious murder, the appellant’s allegations that multiple other physicians have engaged in violent crimes against him are credible. That reasoning, on its face, is devoid of merit. Dr Shamji’s crime has nothing to do with the appellant or the allegations he has made against respondents.

(b) The appellant complains that the College has not investigated alleged obstruction of a murder investigation by a respondent some twenty years ago. Serious criminal conduct by a physician might well ground a proceeding before the College of Physicians and Surgeons. However, the investigation and prosecution of crime is the responsibility of police and the Crown, not the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Respondents are not required to conduct their own investigation into criminal allegations dating back twenty years for which there is no evidence other than the appellant’s bald assertions.

(c) The appellant complains of conduct by police and agents of the Attorney General. These are not matters in the purview of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

(d) The appellant complains about the justice system in general and the judiciary in particular. These are not matters in the purview of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

(e) The appellant alleges a broad-based conspiracy among various persons at the College, the HPARB, lawyers representing these bodies, the Law Society, the Attorney General and his agents, the courts, and “paramilitary” Nazis and the “Jewish Mafia” (which, in the appellant’s mind, are closely related). This is not a matter in the purview of the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

(f) The appellant argues that the investigation undertaken into his complaints was “negligent”, and that if it had been undertaken properly, it would have uncovered evidence to substantiate his complaints. This argument fails to address the issues before this court: the appellant’s complaint was not investigated further because the ICRC concluded the allegations are not worthy of further investigation. The HPARB agreed. It is no response to these allegations to say that further investigation would have discovered evidence: the appellant needed to explain why his allegations merit further investigation.

[10] In summary, the arguments made by the appellant do not respond to the concerns raised by the court pursuant to R.2.1.01. The appellant’s complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons, on their face, are not grounded in objective reality. They are complaints that cannot possibly succeed and complaints which no reasonable person could possibly expect could lead to relief being granted (Watt v. HPARB, 2020 ONSC 7272, para. 7). This appeal is dismissed pursuant to R.2.1.01, without costs.

D.L. Corbett J.

Date: December 2, 2020