CITATION: Humphries v. A.G. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 4460
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: CVD-TOR-23-JR
DATE: 20200727
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Lance Humphries
Applicant
– and –
A.G. Ontario and Premier Doug Ford[^1]
Respondents
Mr. Humphries, self-represented
READ at Toronto: July 10, 2020
D.L. Corbett J.
[1] Mr Humphries applies for a “Mandatory Injunction[^2] ordering the [P]rovince of Ontario to end the use of the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act or other relief the court deems fit.”
[2] Mr Humphries states the grounds for this application as follows: “Clause 7.0.2(3)1 and 7.0.2(1) Invocation of the Act is currently beyond minimal impairment and harmful to the welfare of citizens.”
[3] Mr Humphries states that the following documentary evidence will be used at the hearing of the application: “Book of Evidence (70 items) and thumb drive (4 videos)”.
[4] By notice from the court dated June 23, 2020, Mr Humphries was advised as follows:
The court is considering making an order staying or dismissing this proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 because it appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
THIS PROCEEDING WILL BE STAYED OR DISMISSED unless, within 15 days of receiving this notice, you file with the court a written submission, no more than 10 pages in length, responding to this notice. If you do not file a written submission that complies with this notice and Rule 2.1.01, the court may order this proceeding stayed or dismissed without further notice.
[5] Accompanying the direction from the court was an endorsement from Favreau J. explaining concerns that the court has with Mr Humphries’ application:
In support of his request for an urgent hearing, Mr. Humphries has filed a very brief notice of application and factum. Neither document explains the basis on which Mr. Humphries has standing to bring this application and the legal grounds for the relief he is seeking or provides any evidence in support of the application.[^3]
[6] Favreau J. directed that Mr Humphries’ response to the court’s notice pursuant to R.2.01.1 should address the apparent deficiencies in his application, namely:
(i) The basis on which Mr. Humphries has standing to bring the application;
(ii) Legal grounds on which he challenges the Province’s exercise of emergency powers; and
(iii) The evidence on which he relies in support of his application.
[7] Mr Humphries responded to this notice as follows:
Standing;
As a citizen subject to the legislation, I have standing.
Legal Grounds;
The legislation contains a clause stating that actions taken by the government must be of “minimal intrusion”.
Additionally, the legislation states it is subject to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I stated my intention to flip this to a Charter Challenge if the learned judge did not find it beyond ‘minimally intrusive’.
In other words, the legislation itself provides the legal basis on which to proceed.
Evidence;
The evidence has not been submitted. It consists of 70 documents and 4 videos. I attended court yesterday June 22 to drop it off and was instructed to email it in. The documents have all been scanned following the instructions and are ready to forward.
Further Directions
[8] By email from the court dated June 23, 2020, the court advised Mr Humphries as follows:
In your response to the court's notice pursuant to R.2.1.01, you indicate that you have evidence available in respect to your application. You may provide this evidence to the court by email to this address, and should do so if you wish the court to consider this evidence as part of your response to the R.2.1.01 notice.
[9] Mr Humphries responded by email dated July 2, 2020 as follows:
Thank-you for your response. The rules state I have two weeks to respond to the assertion of being frivolous. Attached is a revised Factum and a few select items of evidence put into one pdf as my response to the Judge.
Included with Mr Humphries email was a pdf file containing a “tweet” exchange between Toronto Public Health and someone identified as “Peter Evans”, and three pages of information appearing to be from the Government of Canada, including at least one page that appears to be from Statistics Canada.
[10] By email from the court dated July 3, 2020, the court advised Mr Humphries:
I write in respect to your email of July 2nd to which was attached some documents and a revised factum.
You are correct in noting that you have fifteen days to respond to the concerns raised by the court. You also note that you have attached "a few select items of evidence" as part of your response. It is not clear to us whether you intend to file further evidence or whether your submission is now complete. If there is further evidence you wish to file, you may do so up to July 9, 2020. The case will be placed before a judge for decision on the basis of the materials you file on July 10, 2020, and you may expect a decision from the court within the following two weeks.
[11] Mr Humphries responded in three emails dated July 3, 2020. In the emails he wrote “Thank-you for your email. I was under the impression I wasn’t to submit documents, but I’m happy to do so. This will require 2-3 emails. See attached.” Attached to the emails were pdf files attaching various documents described more fully below.
Rule 2.1.01
[12] Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The court may, on its own initiative, stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
[13] Rule 2.1.01 is restricted to clear cases, based on the pleadings:
Rule 2.1 is meant to provide a streamlined procedure for disposing of proceedings and motions that on their face are frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process. However, the rule is not intended or designed to supplant the established procedural mechanism of bringing a motion to quash an appeal for want of jurisdiction or for want of merit. Indeed, a party considering making a r. 2.1 request is well advised to consider if the matter would be more effectively addressed by the court by bringing a motion to quash and by filing the materials required in support of such a motion, rather than by using the procedures outlined in r. 2.1. The court will take into account whether a motion to quash is the more appropriate procedural vehicle in deciding whether to direct that a notice be sent under r. 2.1.01(3)1. (Simpson v. The Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario, 2016 ONSC 806, para. 43).
The Court of Appeal has been clear that “r. 2.1 is intended to be a streamlined process for dealing with cases where the frivolous or abusive nature of the proceeding is clear on the face of the pleading.” (Khan v. Law Society of Ontario, 2020 ONCA 320, para. 8).
[14] In the case before me, “the frivolous or abusive nature of the proceeding is clear on the face of the” Notice of Application. It fails to state a case and fails to establish standing. The applicant is self-represented, and this is an application, where leadings tend to be less developed and particularized than is the case in civil actions. Given these points, I have gone further than the pleadings in my review of the case, to determine whether the defects in the Notice of Application could be cured by amendment. My review of the materials provided by Mr Humphries in response to the court’s 2.1.01 notice leads me to conclude that the defects in the Notice of Application are not merely technical or drafting difficulties faced by a self-represented applicant. For the reasons that follow, the application is dismissed pursuant to R.2.1.01.
Analysis
[15] The questions that Mr Humphries wishes to pursue are far from frivolous. The impact of COVID-19 and our society’s response to it has been and continues to be substantial. Decisions about our society’s response to the situation are properly in the hands of our democratically elected governments. But, of course, as a society governed by the Rule of Law, our governments are obliged to observe the law even as they respond to a difficult apprehended emergent situation.
[16] The Rule of Law is not, however, the Rule of Judges. It is a very serious matter to challenge a government’s response to COVID-19 in a court of law – a serious matter that must be approached rigorously and with respect for the different roles played by the different branches of our government. The Ontario Legislature enacted the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act (the “Act”) in which it accorded certain discretion and authority to the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council and to the Premier to respond to emergencies in the Province of Ontario. No challenge to the constitutionality of this legislation is made in Mr Humphries’ application.
Declaration of a State of Emergency and Extensions of that Declaration
[17] The power to declare a state of emergency is found in s.7.0.1 of the Act, which states:
Subject to subsection (3), the Lieutenant Governor in Council… may by order declare that an emergency exists throughout Ontario or in any part of Ontario.[^4]
[18] Subsection 7.0.1(3) of the Act provides:
An order declaring that a state of emergency exists throughout Ontario or any part of it may be made under this section if, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council…[^5] the following criteria are satisfied:
There is an emergency that requires immediate action to prevent, reduce or mitigate a danger of major proportions that could result in serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property.
One of the following circumstances exists: (i) The resources normally available to a ministry of the Government of Ontario or an agency, board or commission or other branch of the government, including existing legislation, cannot be relied upon without the risk of serious delay. (ii) The resources referred to in subparagraph (i) may be insufficiently effective to address the emergency. (iii) It is not possible, without risk of serious delay, to ascertain whether the resources referred to in subparagraph (i) can be relied upon.
[19] There is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that the Lieutenant Governor in Council did not form the opinion that the criteria in s.7.0.1(3) were satisfied. It is clear that Mr Humphries disagrees with the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, but that is not a basis for the court to intervene. While there may be narrow bases on which the court could review judicially an exercise of discretion by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, there is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that comes close to stating a reviewable ground for the decision to declare a state of emergency.
[20] A declaration of a state of emergency expires after 14 days (unless it is terminated earlier by the Lieutenant Governor in Council): Act, s.7.07(1). It may be extended for a second period of up to 14 days by the Lieutenant Governor in Council: Act, s.7.07(2). Thereafter it may be extended only by the Legislature for additional periods of up to 28 days: Act, s.7.07(3). There is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that the declaration of a state of emergency has not been extended lawfully under the Act.
[21] It seems reasonable that a basis for declaring a state of emergency must continue to exist for an extension ordered by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. But there is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that the Lieutenant Governor in Council did not continue to hold the opinion that the criteria in s.7.0.1(3) were satisfied when the declaration was first extended. And, again, while there may be narrow bases on which the court could review judicially an exercise of discretion by the Lieutenant Governor in Council to extend a declaration of a state of emergency, there is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that comes close to stating a reviewable ground for any extension decision.
[22] In any event, we are well beyond the period of initial declaration and extension by the Lieutenant Governor in Council. Although Mr Humphries has not pleaded any history in respect to the declaration and its extensions, the current declaration would have to have been authorized by the Legislature pursuant to s.7.0.7(3). Mr Humphries has not stated any basis on which the court could review the decision of the Legislature to extend the state of emergency, and he has alleged no facts upon which such a review could succeed.
[23] I conclude that Mr Humphries has not pleaded a case upon which this court could grant relief in respect to the initial declaration of emergency or any extension granted to that declaration.
Orders Made During A Declared State of Emergency
[24] Section 7.0.2 of the Act provides for emergency powers and orders. The purpose of such orders is set out in s.7.0.2(1):
The purpose of making orders under this section is to promote the public good by protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people of Ontario in times of declared emergencies in a manner that is subject to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
[25] The power to make emergency orders is set out in s.7.0.2(2) of the Act as follows:
During a declared emergency, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may make orders that the Lieutenant Governor in Council believes are necessary and essential in the circumstances to prevent, reduce or mitigate serious harm to persons or substantial damage to property, if in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council it is reasonable to believe that
(a) the harm or damage will be alleviated by the order; and
(b) making an order is a reasonable alternative to other measures that might be taken to address the emergency.
[26] Mr Humphries has not pleaded any specific orders made under s.7.0.2(2) which he says are not lawful. These orders are made validly if, in the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, it is reasonable to believe that the conditions in (a) and (b) are met. And, for the third time, while there may be narrow bases on which the court could review judicially an exercise of discretion by the Lieutenant Governor in Council to make an order pursuant to s. 7.0.2(2), there is no allegation in Mr Humphries’ application that comes close to stating a reviewable ground for any order made under this section.
[27] Emergency orders are subject to limitations set out in s.7.0.2(3). There are three such limitations:
Orders made under this section are subject to the following limitations:
The actions authorized by an order shall be exercised in a manner which, consistent with the objectives of the order, limits their intrusiveness.
An order shall only apply to the areas of the Province where it is necessary.
… an order shall be effective only for as long as is necessary.[^6]
Mr Humphries does not make any allegations in respect to the second and third limitations. He places great emphasis on the first limitation.
[28] Mr Humphries alleges that the Act provides that actions taken under the Act be “minimally intrusive”. There is no legal basis for this assertion.
[29] First, the language of s.7.0.2(3)1. does not include the expression “minimal intrusion”. Rather, it speaks to “limiting” intrusion. There is a difference between the two. “Minimal intrusion” would seem to imply careful calibration to “intrude” as little as possible, perhaps hearkening to the “minimal impairment” analysis in jurisprudence under s.1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. “Limited” intrusion, on the other hand, seems to import something less calibrated: a principle to guide the reasonable execution of state actions during an apprehended crisis. The proper interpretation of the phrase “limits their intrusion” is not established in the jurisprudence, but whatever it may be found to mean, it is not an invitation to the bench to minutely review the Province’s response to an emergency through a lens of “minimal intrusion”.
[30] Second, s.7.0.2(3)1. does not limit the statutory discretion to declare a state of emergency. It applies to orders made during and on the authority of a declared state of emergency and not to the declaration of a state of emergency itself.
[31] Third, by its own terms, s.7.0.2(3)1. does not limit the terms and scope of orders made during and on the authority of a declared state of emergency. Rather, it limits the “manner” in which “actions authorized” by “an order” made during a declared state of emergency “shall be exercised”.
[32] Mr Humphries does not plead specific orders made pursuant to s. s.7.0.2(2), nor does he plead specific “actions” taken pursuant to orders that he alleges have been exercised in a manner that fails to “limit… intrusiveness”. In his revised factum, Mr Humphries characterizes what he says are orders made by Ontario (“’Lockdown’ measures”, “rules restricting the movement and conduct of citizens”, the “shut-down of businesses”), but he does not particularize these orders in a way that would enable to court to adjudicate them.
[33] Mr Humphries also argues that actions taken by Ontario “fail the… ‘welfare of the people’ clause sec 7.0.2(1)” of the Act. This provision is set out at para. 24, above. It sets out the “purpose” of orders authorized by the Act. It is not a basis upon which a court may substitute its opinion for the opinion of the government as to what will “promote the public good by protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people of Ontario.”
[34] I understand that this may sound technical. But it is important. Mr Humphries’ application alleges, at its heart, that Ontario’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been disproportionate to the real risks posed by the disease. That kind of general allegation is not a justiciable claim in this court. The Act accords the Executive and the Legislature discretion to respond to emergencies. That discretion is bounded by the terms of the Act, and it is the role of the courts to assess the legality of actions taken pursuant to the Act. But this should not be understood to mean that the courts can substitute the opinion of a judge for the opinion of the Lieutenant Governor in Council or the opinion of the Legislature.
Evidence
[35] Mr Humphries’ Notice of Application does not describe the evidence upon which he relies. It states that he has a brief of evidence but it does not say what it is.
[36] It is not part of the process under R.2.1.01 to weigh all the evidence in the case. The R.2.1.01 process is based on the pleadings. However, because Mr Humphries is self-represented, because his Notice of Application fails to state a legal case and lacks particularity, the court permitted Mr Humphries to forward materials upon which he intends to rely in this application. I reviewed the materials to determine if the claim may be tenable. However, having conducted a review to seek a better understanding of the claim, I have discovered that Mr Humphries is basing his case almost entirely upon materials that are not admissible into evidence in court.
[37] The materials provided by Mr Humphries include:
(a) A copy of Federal Order-in-Council 2020-0184 dated March 26, 2020.
(b) Data from public sources such as Statistics Canada, the Government of Canada, Public Health Ontario and the Public Health Department of the City of Toronto;
(c) Copies of numerous newspaper articles and a press release from the Hospital for Sick Children;
(d) An article stated to be by Thomas Meunier entitled “Full lockdown policies in Western Europe countries have no evident impacts on the COVID-19 epidemic”, dated April 24, 2020;
(e) Various “tweets” and “posts” from the Internet;
[38] Mr Humphries did not provide an affidavit or indicate that he intends to provide an affidavit in support of his application.
[39] The court may take judicial notice of item (a), the Order-in-Council. It need not be proved under oath. Item (b), data from certain Canadian governmental sources, could be admissible if it was introduced into evidence properly, possibly attached to an affidavit from Mr Humphries. None of the rest of the items appear to be admissible, either as they have been submitted to the court, or if they were attached to an affidavit from Mr Humphries. Some of these materials could be admissible, possibly, if they were incorporated into an affidavit from a qualified expert witness.
[40] Item (f) provides a example to explain these points more fully. It reads and looks like a scientific paper. Perhaps it is. And perhaps it could be admissible through the testimony of a properly qualified expert. But there are problems with the article on its face – problems which illustrate some of the reasons for the principles that govern expert evidence in court. First, although the article appears as a scholarly scientific article, the publication from which it is taken is not identified. If the article was published in a peer-review scientific journal, it would have greater credibility than otherwise, though it would still need to be put into evidence by a qualified expert witness. Second, although the author of the article is identified, his credentials to write this paper are not identified. The institutions with which the author appears to be associated seem to be legitimate scientific institutions – but they appear to be devoted to the study of oceanography and related topics and not to any of the areas of special expertise associated with COVID-19 (such as epidemiology and public health). There is nothing to suggest that the author is qualified to give an expert opinion on the topic of this paper. To be clear, that is not to say that the author could not be qualified as an expert on these topics. Nor is it to say that the article could not be referenced by a qualified expert. There are several ways in which the article might be put in evidence, but there is nothing in the record to indicate that the applicant can or will tender this evidence in an admissible form.
[41] It appears that the materials provided by Mr Humphries were obtained from the Internet. The issues Mr Humphries seeks to address in his application are matters of important public policy. Expert evidence from properly qualified expert witness would almost certainly be necessary to present this kind of evidence to a court. On the basis of the Notice of Application and the materials provided by Mr Humphries, the court concludes that Mr Humphries does not have and does not propose to present expert evidence of the kind that would be necessary to raise a triable issue for this application.
[42] I wish to be clear that my review of the evidence is not intended as a thorough analysis of it – that is not part of a review pursuant to R.2.1.01. Ordinarily the court does not even look at proposed evidence at this stage of the proceeding. However, in what purports to be a major public law challenge to the authority of the government to govern during a time of apprehended crisis, it is helpful to consider, in general terms, what is required to mount a case. The point here is not to be critical of Mr Humphries, who has obviously spent time to prepare his materials and cares enough about these issues to have brought this application. Nor is the point to suggest that public law litigation is the especial preserve of lawyers. Rather, it is to make it clear that it is not sufficient to have a strongly-held personal view on a public issue and to print out internet pages as the evidence to put forward one’s personal opinion in court as a serious legal challenge to state action.
[43] Finally, I reviewed these materials with a view to determining whether Mr Humphries’ application is better explained and better particularized in his materials. It simply is not. There is no affidavit organizing the materials into a coherent narrative. The Order-in-Council and the statistics from public authorities do not speak for themselves to describe a claim. No coherent legal claim emerges from reading the materials.
Standing
[44] It is trite law that a person does not have private interest standing to bring a lawsuit against the government because that person is a citizen subject to impugned legislation. On the basis of Mr Humphries’ answer on the issue of standing, the only basis on which he could have standing would be as a public interest litigant. The test to qualify as a public interest litigant is stringent. There are no bases set out in Mr Humphries materials to establish that he should be granted standing as a public interest litigant: see Landau v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 6152, paras. 14-45, and the cases cited therein.
Self-Represented Litigants
[45] Mr Humphries is self-represented. Self-represented litigants are entitled to assistance from the court in navigating legal process so that disputes may be decided on their merits and so that the justice system is accessible. However, there are limits to what the court may do to assist a self-represented litigant. There is also a different filter brought to bear in cases where a self-represented litigant seeks to don the mantle of a public interest litigant.
[46] As may be gathered from my review of the deficiencies in the legal theory of Mr Humphries’ case, as he has pleaded it, it is possible to imagine a legally tenable and justiciable claim respecting Ontario’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it would require the court to cross the line to fashion such a claim for Mr Humphries. This is novel terrain, raising potentially difficult issues of public law. It is not for the court to develop tenable legal arguments for Mr Humphries to help him bring his case.
[47] This is all the more so given the absence of a basis in the record for private law standing in this case. Where a litigant claims that he has personally suffered a wrong as a result of actions by the state, and has set out the details of the harm he has suffered, and the state conduct that he says has caused that harm, it may be appropriate for the court to try to help the claimant identify the legal claim(s) that may be available. To assist Mr Humphries to state a public law claim against the state, on the basis that the state has not reacted lawfully to an apprehended state of emergency, would cast the court in the role of an antagonist in the case.
[48] A public law case, such as the one Mr Humphries seeks to bring, raises issues concerning the proper relationship between the three branches of government. In Landau, cited above, public interest standing was denied in a case where a self-represented litigant had been able to state a coherent legal theory of the case. In the case before me, Mr Humphries’ inability to frame his case on a proper legal basis is but one factor weighing against granting him public interest standing.
Invoking the Jurisdiction of the Courts
[49] It is a serious matter to invoke the court’s public law jurisdiction to challenge the actions of the government, as I said at the outset. Experience shows that the cost to the public purse of defending a claim such as the one proposed by Mr Humphries is substantial. The state cannot afford to treat such a challenge lightly, even if it appears doomed to fail: the consequences of an adverse decision could be very significant for the state if such an application was lost. In a case such as this one, it could be expected that, if the case survived initial challenges and the Province was called upon to defend the case on the merits, the Province would be required to file voluminous evidence, to engage the time and expertise of experts and senior counsel, all to the substantial expense of the taxpayer. In a proper case, that is one of the costs of living in a constitutional democracy under the Rule of Law. But the state should not be put to these costs where an applicant has not framed a tenable case, has not established private interest standing, does not appear to have admissible evidence to establish a case, and appears to lack the expertise to mount a public interest challenge.
Conclusion
[50] Mr Humphries has not stated a proper legal claim. He has not provided a factual basis for a claim. His potentially admissible evidence falls far short of establishing a factual basis for any kind of relief. The balance of his evidence is inadmissible, as presented, and most of it could not be rendered admissible without expert evidence. Mr Humphries has not stated a private interest in these issues that gives him standing to bring the application, and he has not established a basis on which he should be granted public interest standing. In my view the application, as framed, is doomed to fail and is thus frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process within the meaning of Rule 2.1.01.
Charter Claims
[51] Mr Humphries has indicated that, if he is not successful in this application, as framed, he will “flip” this case to pursue claims arising under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Mr. Humphries’ application is dismissed as a result of this decision; it cannot be “flipped” into something else. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for this court to comment further on potential Charter claims that are not before the court.
Order
[52] This application is dismissed pursuant to R.2.1.01 without costs. A copy of this decision shall be provided to Mr Humphries and to the A.G. Ontario.
[53] This decision is effective from the date on which an unsigned copy is released to the parties by the Divisional Court. A signed decision will be transmitted to the parties in due course.
___________________________ D.L. Corbett J.
Released: July 27, 2020
CITATION: Humphries v. A.G. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 4460
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: CVD-TOR-23-JR
DATE: 20200727
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
BETWEEN:
Lance Humphries
Applicant
- and -
A.G. Ontario and Premier Doug Ford
Respondents
REASONS FOR DECISION
D.L. Corbett J.
Released: July 27, 2020
[^1]: The Premier is not a proper party to this application. However, since I am dismissing the entire application for other reasons, and since Mr Humphries was not asked to address the issue of naming the Premier as a respondent, I do not deal substantively with this issue in this decision.
[^2]: An injunction is likely not available against the Province, but if there was an arguable claim in this application, some public law remedy could be available. See Greenpeace Canada v. Minister of the Environment (Ontario), 2019 ONSC 5629 (Div. Ct.); 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Ontario (MTO), [2004] OJ No. 373 (SCJ), rev’d on other grounds 2005 21673 (ON CA), [2005] OJ No. 2504 (CA).
[^3]: Humphries v. A.G. Ontario, 2020 ONSC 3879. As noted in footnotes 1 and 2 above, there are problems with this application, in addition to those identified by Favreau J. I would give Mr Humphries an opportunity to address these other problems if I had not concluded that the application should be dismissed on the basis of the points identified by Favreau J., which have been raised with Mr Humphries and for which I have his response.
[^4]: The ellipsis replaces words conferring on the Premier the authority to declare a state of emergency himself, in some circumstances, provided the declaration is subsequently confirmed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council.
[^5]: See note 4.
[^6]: The ellipsis replaces a reference to s.7.0.8, since the duration of orders made during a state of emergency will presumably not survive the declaration of a state of emergency.