Bajor v. HRTO, 2019 ONSC 6273

CITATION: Bajor v. HRTO, 2019 ONSC 6273

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 19-562

DATE: 20191029

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

DIVISIONAL COURT

RE: OLIVER BAJOR, Applicant

-and-

THE HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTATIO, Respondent

BEFORE: F.L. Myers J.

READ at Toronto: October 28, 2019

ENDORSEMENT

This Proceeding

[1] I have reviewed this application on the court’s initiative under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194.

[2] By notice of application issued October 16, 2019, Dr. Bajor commenced this application seeking leave to proceed with an application for judicial review before a single judge of the Superior Court as provided by s.6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSO 1990, c J.1 due to the urgency the issues.

[3] Dr. Bajor seeks judicial review of the failure of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario to order interim relief in his application against Parkdale Queen West Community Health Centre under HTRO File No. 2019-35581-1. Dr. Bajor also expresses concern with the apparent decision by the tribunal to extend the time for the filing of a response by the Health Centre to his human rights complaint.

Dr. Bajor’s Allegations

[4] Dr. Bajor has not delivered a supporting affidavit for his request for judicial review as yet. However, he has filed a supporting letter of some 18 pages in addition to his detailed notice of application.

[5] It appears that Dr. Bajor has been a patient of the Health Centre since 2006 at least. He has numerous health issues that have led him to make frequent use of the medical facility and its health care providers. He indicates that due to the nature of his illnesses and disabilities this health centre is uniquely and exclusively suited to his needs.

[6] While not perfectly clear in the material filed, it appears that Dr. Bajor claims that in February, 2018, the Health Centre “weaponized [his] anaphylaxis to obstruct [him] from even entering the premises, much less access to the various and important medical services. The [Health Centre] has done this for retaliatory self-serving narcissistic purposes”.

[7] Dr. Bajor commenced a proceeding before the tribunal claiming that the Health Centre was violating the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 by claiming to be unable or unwilling to treat him or, at least, to enable him to access the services a general practitioner at the Health Centre.

[8] Dr. Bajor filed material seeking interim relief before the tribunal. I have no details about when this was done or what relief he sought. He relies on the obligation of the tribunal under s.10 of the JRPA to file a formal record of its proceedings in this judicial review application.

[9] However, from his Notice of Application and supporting letter, it is apparent that Dr. Bajor seeks relief requiring the Health Centre to grant him safe and reasonable access to a physician. That is the relief that he seeks before the tribunal as well. Dr. Bajor also asks this court to order the tribunal to expedite its proceedings and make possible a meeting between himself and his doctor to determine whether it is the doctor or the Health Centre who is denying him access to basic medicine. He seeks an order that the tribunal provide transparency. He seeks an order that the tribunal “correct the longstanding and well-known fatal flaws in their modus operendi, such as treating all matters identically with a ‘one size fits all opaque’ operation”. He seeks orders of the court requiring the tribunal to abide by its own rules, including, to reveal why it has allowed the Health Centre to fail to submit its response to his application. He then seeks various orders to require the tribunal to: accept agreements between the parties; to notify him of the path for interim remedies; to explain the details in connection with “opaque and harmful events/acts that continue to obstruct” him; and to revise its rules to ensure fair and reasonable treatment of parties at risk. He seeks other systemic relief concerning the management and operation of the tribunal.

Rule 2.1

[10] Rule 2.1.01(1) provides that the court may stay or dismiss a proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

[11] The terms “frivolous” and “vexatious” were defined by the Court of Appeal in Currie v. Halton Regional Police Services Board, 2003 7815 (ON CA), as follows:

[14] Black's Law Dictionary defines "frivolous" as: "Lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful".

[15] In Foy v. Foy (No. 2) (1979), 1979 1631 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (2d) 220 at 226, Howland, C.J.O. considered the meaning of "vexatious" under the Vexatious Proceedings Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 481 [the precursor of section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act]:

The word "vexatious" has not been clearly defined. Under the Act, the legal proceedings must be vexatious and must also have been instituted without reasonable ground. In many of the reported decisions the legal proceedings have been held to be vexatious because they were instituted without any reasonable ground. As a result the proceedings were found to constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. An example of such proceedings is the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction: Stevenson v. Garnett, [1898] 1 Q.B. 677 at pp. 680-1; Re Langton, [1966] 3 All. E.R. 576.

[12] On the face of the notice of application, it appears to me that this proceeding may be frivolous or vexatious in that it seems to seek remedies that are not available to the applicant at law. Dr. Bajor seems to want the court to grant now the relief that he seeks at the hearing of his human rights complaint. Moreover, I am not aware of any basis upon which this court might address in a judicial review proceeding the systemic issues that he raises concerning the structure, management, and operation of the tribunal.

Judicial Review

[13] Judicial review proceedings are very technical and difficult proceedings to bring. They deal with the review of government decision-making. In Ibrahim v Toronto Transit Commission, 2015 ONSC 3912, affd. 2016 ONCA 234, I discussed a similar application as follows:

When a government body is alleged to have improperly applied the criteria for decision-making, affected parties can appeal within the government system. Once all appeals are exhausted, if an affected person wants to seek relief from the court, an application for judicial review might be available before the Divisional Court. An application for judicial review is a technical and difficult proceeding to understand and to bring. If Mr. Ibrahim wishes to consider doing so, he should seek legal advice. If he cannot find a lawyer or paralegal on his own, Mr. Ibrahim may seek free legal advice on this matter from Law Help Ontario, 393 University Avenue, Room 110, Toronto, ON, M5G 1E6, Telephone: 416-628-3552.

[14] It is not enough for an applicant to set out a long list of complaints and assert that the decision-maker should have helped him. In Van Sluytman v. Muskoka (District Municipality), 2018 ONCA 32, the Court of Appeal discussed the approach to Rule 2.1 as follows:

[9] Simply put, the proceedings in question are facially frivolous and vexatious. The appellant’s pleadings fail to contain any coherent narrative or a concise statement of the material facts in support of the wrongs sought to be alleged. Instead, they contain rambling discourse, impermissible attachments, grandiose complaints of injury and damages claims, and bald assertions that repeat similar, if not identical, allegations detailed in multiple other proceedings commenced by the appellant. On this ground alone, it was open to the application judges to dismiss the appellant’s actions under R. 2.1.01(1).

[10] We also do not accept the appellant’s contention that the involved government authorities were obliged at law to furnish directions to him, as a self-represented litigant, on how to frame and plead his claims against the respondents. The Rules of Civil Procedure provide detailed and clear procedures for the commencement of proceedings and delineate the requisite and permissible contents of pleadings. The appellant, like all other litigants, was obliged to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. He failed to do so in the actions at issue on these appeals.

Outcome

[15] Reading Dr. Bajor’s application generously, I have not yet been able to discern a basis for him to bring a judicial review proceeding. It seems to me therefore that I should call on Dr. Bajor to file written submissions to explain why his application should not be dismissed for being frivolous (i.e. incapable of being successful) or vexatious (i.e. brought without reasonable grounds).

[16] On reviewing the material forwarded by the registrar, the court makes the following order:

a. Pursuant to subrule 2.1.01(3)(1), the registrar is directed to give notice to the applicant in Form 2.1A that the court is considering making an order under Rule 2.1.01 dismissing the application;

b. Pending the outcome of the written hearing under rule 2.1 or further order of the court, this application is stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.C.43;

c. The registrar shall accept no further filings in this application excepting only the applicant’s written submissions if delivered in accordance with rule 2.1.01(3);

d. In addition to the service by mail required by 2.1.01(4) rule, the registrar is to serve a copy of this endorsement and a Form 2.1A notice on the applicant and counsel for the respondent by email if it has their email addresses.

_

F.L. Myers J.

Date: October 29, 2019