Katsoulakos v. Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario
CITATION: Katsoulakos v. Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 5440
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 578/12
DATE: 2014-09-22
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Nordheimer, Horkins and D. Brown JJ.
BETWEEN:
Sotiros Katsoulakos, P. Eng. and Micro City Engineering Services Inc.
Appellants
– and –
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario
Respondent
COUNSEL:
B. Moher and A. Joseph, for the Appellants
L. Price, for the Respondent
HEARD at Toronto: September 18, 2014
D. Brown J.
I. Overview of the Appeal
[1] Sotiros Katsoulakos, a Public Engineer, and his company, Micro City Engineering Services Inc., designed a manure storage tank for construction on a dairy farm just west of Kitchener, Ontario. Built in the Fall of 2008, the tank sprang a manure leak in February, 2009. The manure leak was not caused by the design made by Katsoulakos; the farm owner had punched a hole in the lower part of the tank’s concrete wall to install transfer pipes and that hole had leaked.
[2] The leak prompted an insurer to launch an investigation, during the course of which an engineer with Conestoga-Rovers & Associates conducted a structural assessment of the tank. That engineer, Tim Morrison, ultimately filed a complaint against Katsoulakos with the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario (the “Association”).
[3] In October, 2010 the Association’s Complaints Committee referred the matter to the Discipline Committee alleging that Katsoulakos and Micro City were guilty of professional misconduct, incompetence and breach of the Code of Ethics. The Discipline Committee held a three day hearing in June, 2012. By Decision dated November 26, 2012 (the “Discipline Decision”) the Discipline Committee found Katsoulakos guilty of professional misconduct and negligence and Micro City guilty of professional misconduct. The Discipline Committee did not release its Reasons until almost a year later, on October 23, 2013 (the “Reasons”).
[4] Katsoulakos and Micro City appeal from the Discipline Decision asking that it be quashed in its entirety or, alternatively, that the matter be referred back to the Discipline Committee for a re-hearing before a differently constituted panel. The Association brought a cross-appeal seeking an order that in the event the Court allowed the appeal, it direct the Discipline Committee to admit certain evidence at the new hearing.
[5] At the conclusion of the hearing on September 18, 2014, this Court allowed the appeal, remitted the matter for a re-hearing before a differently constituted panel of the Discipline Committee and dismissed the cross-appeal. These are the Reasons for that decision.
II. The Statutory Appeal Framework
[6] The scope of review on an appeal from the Discipline Committee is set out in section 31(3) of the Professional Engineers Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.28:
31(3). An appeal under this section may be made on questions of law or fact or both and the court may affirm or may rescind the decision of the committee appealed from and may exercise all powers of the committee and may direct the committee to take any action which the committee may take and as the court considers proper, and for such purposes the court may substitute its opinion for that of the committee or the court may refer the matter back to the committee for rehearing, in whole or in part, in accordance with such directions as the court considers proper.
[7] The standard of review on the issue of professional misconduct is reasonableness.[^1]
III. The Decision under Appeal
[8] In its Reasons the Discipline Committee summarized its findings as follows:
The panel concludes that, contrary to Section 28(2)(b) of the Act, the Respondents were negligent in designing the Tank and dealing with the cut-out. Contrary to Sections 72(2)(a), (b) and (d) of Regulation 941, the Respondents failed to make reasonable provision to ensure that the design of the Tank would comply with the Ontario Building Code and the CPS [Canada Plan Service], or that the structural integrity of the Tank was not compromised. The panel noted that the findings set out on page 3 of its Decision dated November 26, 2012 inadvertently omitted a reference to Section 72(2)(d) of Regulation 941 under the paragraph numbered i), and hereby corrects it by adding it in.
In using a software program for the design of the Tank and failing to comply with the CPS, Mr. Katsoulakos showed a lack of knowledge, skill or judgment for the welfare of the public, contrary to Section 28(3)(a) of the Act and is, thus, found to be incompetent. The panel also found the Respondents’ conduct “unprofessional” under Section 72(2)(j) of Regulation 941, but not “disgraceful” or “dishonorable”. The panel did not find that the Respondents breached the Code of Ethics pursuant to Section 77 of Regulation 941.
[9] Section 72 of Regulation 941, provides, in part, as follows:
- (1) In this section,
“negligence” means an act or an omission in the carrying out of the work of a practitioner that constitutes a failure to maintain the standards that a reasonable and prudent practitioner would maintain in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of the Act and this Regulation,
“professional misconduct” means,
(a) negligence,
(b) failure to make reasonable provision for the safeguarding of life, health or property of a person who may be affected by the work for which the practitioner is responsible,
(d) failure to make responsible provision for complying with applicable statutes, regulations, standards, codes, by-laws and rules in connection with work being undertaken by or under the responsibility of the practitioner,
(j) conduct or an act relevant to the practice of professional engineering that, having regard to all the circumstances, would reasonably be regarded by the engineering profession as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional…
[10] In its Reasons the Discipline Committee made the following findings in support of its Decision:
(i) the panel accepted the opinion of an expert witness, Mr. John Stephenson, that the design and steel rebar of the tank did not meet the specifications set out in the Canada Plan Service Plan 10730 (the “Plan”);
(ii) it was inadequate for Mr. Katsoulakos to advise the use of a “concrete bonding agent” to repair a 2’ x 2’ “cut-out” made in the tank wall during its construction;
(iii) with respect to the engineering integrity of the tank, numerous differences existed between the engineer’s design and the guidelines in the Plan:
(iv) the Plan required re-bars on the inner and outer faces of tanks for both vertical and horizontal reinforcement, whereas the engineer’s design used single rebars centered both horizontally and vertically;
(v) the Plan required two rebars with 12-inch spacing for vertical reinforcement whereas the engineer’s design used single rebar spaced at 16 inches meaning that there was 33% more steel under the Plan;
(vi) the Plan required 118% more horizontal reinforcement steel than found in the engineer’s design;
(vii) with respect to the tank’s perimeter footing, the Plan required three more rows of rebar with a higher height than found in the engineer’s design, as well as requiring a ring of welded wire fabric reinforcement mat around the footings’ full perimeter which was missing in the engineer’s design; and,
(viii) the engineer’s drawings contained no engineering calculation for the design of the tank.
[11] These findings led the Discipline Committee to conclude:
In light of the totality of the evidence, the panel is of the view that the design, as shown in the drawings, lacked engineering analysis and details, and did not meet the applicable specifications as set out in Plan 10730. In dealing with the cut-out that interrupted the rebars, Mr. Katsoulakos should not simply instruct the use of “a concrete bonding agent between old and new concrete pours”. He should have considered and applied the appropriate rebar specification in compliance with the Ontario Building Code…
The use of “concrete bonding agent” under the circumstances does not meet the standards. Rather, as Mr. Stephenson testified, the reinforcing steel should have been reinstalled…
Guidelines such as the CPS are often used by professional engineers for the production of an adequate and acceptable design, from a safety perspective. As a matter of common sense, downward variations from such guidelines would require the professional engineer to conduct engineering analysis and confirm the justification and safety of lower standards of design. In this case, the variation from the guideline is notable, i.e. thinner walls with significantly less steel than what is prescribed for smaller tanks. Common sense would have required the realization on the part of a professional engineer that a larger structure would have required higher requirements.
IV. The Grounds of Appeal
[12] The Appellants raised the following grounds of appeal in respect of the Decision of the Discipline Committee:
(i) the Discipline Committee’s adjudication of the allegations regarding the “cut-out” in the tank wall was done without proper notice to the Appellants; and,
(ii) the Discipline Committee’s adjudication of the allegations regarding the integrity of the tank wall was conducted in a manner that was procedurally unfair because (i) to the extent that the Committee relied upon the evidence of a structural engineering expert, Mr. John Stephenson, its reliance was improper and (ii) the Discipline Committee unfairly exercised its powers of judicial notice.
V. First Ground of Appeal: The “Cut-Out” Issue
A. The issue and decision of the Committee
[13] The tank designed by Mr. Katsoulakos was a circular one with a diameter of 148 feet and a height of 14 feet. The concrete walls were designed with a thickness of 10 inches. Mr. Katsoulakos inspected the site on September 19, 2008, by which time the tank’s perimeter walls had been poured to a height of 12 feet. As recorded in his Interim General Review Letter #3, during a walk around the perimeter of the tank Mr. Katsoulakos observed a 24” x 24” cut-out in the poured concrete wall near the location of the proposed exterior access ramp for the tank. The cut-out would allow access for the piping through which a pump could inject liquid manure into the tank. Mr. Katsoulakos wrote: “We instructed the contractor to fill this cut-out with concrete utilizing a concrete bonding agent between old and new concrete pours.”
[14] During the course of the hearing before the Discipline Committee the Appellants submitted that the Committee could not adjudicate allegations other than those specifically set out in the Statement of Allegations, arguing that the Statement of Allegations did not contain any allegation of misconduct against them in respect of the advice given for the repair of the cut-out. The Association disagreed, contending that the Discipline Committee enjoyed a broader jurisdiction in the matter. That led the Discipline Committee to advise that it would pose a question on the issue to its Independent Legal Counsel and afford the parties an opportunity to make written submissions following the oral hearing. Ultimately the Discipline Committee posed the following question:
Is the panel’s jurisdiction determined by the matter referred to by the Complaints Committee or limited to the specific allegations expressly made in the Statement of Allegations?
[15] In its brief Decision dated November 29, 2012, the Discipline Committee indicated that the advice received from its Independent Legal Counsel was that the Committee should consider only the Statement of Allegations in their deliberations. The Discipline Committee did not follow that advice holding:
After considering the advice and submissions, the panel has determined that it should determine the matter referred by the Complaints Committee to the Discipline Committee… The Member and Holder were aware of the matter referred to the Discipline Committee by the Complaints Committee and had opportunities to defend their position regarding the matter.
[16] In its 2013 Reasons the Discipline Committee gave more detailed reasons for its conclusion that under the Act “it is the referral from the Complaints Committee that determines the jurisdiction of the panel”. The Discipline Committee stated that the matter referred by the Complaints Committee included the issues of the integrity of the tank’s engineering design and the failure of Mr. Katsoulakos to provide an adequate solution for the cut-out of the tank. In the result, the conduct of Mr. Katsoulakos in respect of the repair of the cut-out formed one of the grounds upon which the Discipline Committee found him negligent. In its Reasons the Discipline Committee wrote:
In dealing with the cut-out that interrupted the rebars, Mr. Katsoulakos should not simply instruct the use of “a concrete bonding agent between old and new concrete pours”. He should have considered and applied the appropriate rebar specification in compliance with the Ontario Building Code…
The use of “concrete bonding agent” under the circumstances does not meet the standards. Rather, as Mr. Stephenson testified, the reinforcing steel should have been reinstalled…
The panel concludes that, contrary to Section 28(2)(b) of the Act, the Respondents were negligent in designing the Tank and dealing with the cut-out.
[17] The January 25, 2012 Tribunal’s Notice of Hearing given pursuant to section 6 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and section 27(6) of the Professional Engineers Act had stated:
This matter was referred to the Discipline Committee by way of a decision of the Complaints Committee dated October 5, 2010. The Association’s Statement of Allegations was filed with the Chair of the Discipline Committee on October 19, 2010…
TAKE NOTICE that, if the allegations against the Licence and Certificate of Authorization Holders are proven, then the License and Certificate of Authorization Holders may be subject to a decision and order as provided in section 28 of the[Act]…
B. Positions of the parties
[18] The Appellants submitted that neither the Referral Decision nor the Statement of Allegations contained any reference to the cut-out in the tank wall, but only raised issues concerning the design stage of the tank’s development which chronologically took place before the cut-out was made during the tank’s construction. The Appellants argued that in professional disciplinary proceedings the member is entitled to disclosure with reasonable certainty of the act or conduct that is alleged to amount to professional misconduct and that the charge must be sufficiently particularized to enable an accused to prepare his defence.
[19] The Association submitted that section 24(2)(a) of the Professional Engineers Act provides that the “matter” may be referred “in whole or in part” to the Discipline Committee and that the “matter” referred to the Discipline Committee was that which the Complaints Committee had investigated and examined – i.e. the complaint and all records and other documents relating to the complaint. According to the Association the subject matter of the complaint was the structural adequacy and integrity of the tank as built in accordance with design done by Mr. Katsoulakos and the Complaints Committee did not limit its referral to his design drawings alone. The Association contended that it was not necessary to include in the Complaints Committee Referral Decision or in the Statement of Allegations each and every deficiency in the structural design of the tank.
C. Analysis
[20] After considering and investigating a complaint against a member, the Complaints Committee may “direct that the matter be referred, in whole or in part, to the Discipline Committee”: PEA, s. 24(2)(a). The Registrar must mail that decision to the complainant and member: PEA, s. 24(4).
[21] In the present case, the Complaints Committee, by Referral Decision dated October 5, 2010, referred the matter “in whole” to the Discipline Committee. The following passage in the Complaints Committee Referral Decision set out the basis for that referral:
Following the leak, Conestoga-Rovers & Associates (CRA) was retained by Dietrich Engineering Limited (DEL, on behalf of HDF’s insurer) to assist with the structural assessment of the tank. In their assessment report of the manure storage tank, CRA found deficiencies in the structural design sealed by Katsoulakos. PEO’s expert concluded that there were deficiencies with the storage tank design, but these defects were not as serious as those identified by CRA. The storage tank design deficiencies were considered more significant than the leak that occurred. Katsoulakos was unable to provide evidence to support his assertion that his design was acceptable. It appeared that Katsoulakos used empirical data and procedures rather than proper design standards. He relied on prior existing tank designs - rather than carrying out his own detailed calculations and reviewing the correct published standards to design the tank. The public safety implications associated with a potential failure of a tank of this size would be severe.
[22] Two weeks later, on October 18, 2010, the Complaints Committee issued a Statement of Allegations. The Statement recited the referral of the matter in whole by the Complaints Committee to the Discipline Committee and then went on to allege that the appellants “are guilty of professional misconduct as defined in the Professional Engineers Act, the particulars of which are as follows…” There then followed a chronology of events which culminated in paragraphs 11 and 12 which read:
11/ On or about May 12, 2009, CRA issued a report to DEL titled “Structural Condition Assessment and Design Review, Concrete Manure Tank, Hogendoorn Dairy Farm, Baden, Ontario”. The report was signed and sealed by Tim D. Morrison, M.Sc. (Eng.), P.Eng. The report concluded that there were deficiencies in the structural design of the tank.
12/ On or about April 30, 2010, Stephenson Engineering Ltd. (SEL) completed a structural design review of the HDF manure storage tank. SEL concluded that:
a. the horizontal and vertical reinforcing steel specified by Katsoulakos was deficient and failed to meet the Ontario Building Code requirements;
b. Katsoulakos failed to meet the standard of a reasonable and prudent practitioner experienced in this type of engineering work; and
c. Katsoulakos failed to meet the minimum acceptable standard for engineering work of this type.
The Statement concluded with the allegation that the Appellants were guilty of professional misconduct, breach of the Code of Ethics and, in the case of Mr. Katsoulakos, incompetence.
[23] Where disciplinary proceedings are brought against a professional, the duty of fairness requires the professional body to disclose with reasonable certainty the particular act or conduct alleged to amount to professional misconduct. A charge of professional misconduct must contain sufficient particulars to enable the member to prepare his defence, with the degree of particularity resembling that in judicial proceedings given the severe effect a disciplinary decision can have on a person. Ambiguous language in a charge may offend the duty of fairness. So, too, it is usually no answer to a deficient notice of particulars in a charge of professional misconduct that the misconduct alleged became clear during the course of a hearing.[^2] Section 8 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act builds upon that notice requirement by providing that where the competence of a party is an issue in a proceeding, the party is entitled to be furnished prior to the hearing “with reasonable information of any allegations with respect thereto”.
[24] In its Reasons the Discipline Committee stated that “as the solution for the cut-out would have an impact on the structural integrity of the Tank and Mr. Katsoulakos offered solutions in his capacity as an engineer, this concern also falls within the subject matter referred by the Complaints Committee”. In my view that was not an adequate response to the Appellants’ assertion that they had not been given reasonable notice of the particular allegation concerning the adequacy of the advice for the repair of the 2’ x 2’ cut-out. Neither the Complaint Committee’s Referral Decision nor its subsequent Statement of Allegations contained an allegation that Mr. Katsoulakos was negligent by advising that the 2’ x 2’ cut-out near the top of the tank wall could be repaired by using a concrete bonding agent. In a disciplinary proceeding the obligation is on the professional association to specify the allegations of professional misconduct with reasonable particularity, not on the member to discern from the general “subject matter” of the circumstances what he may or may not be alleged to have done wrong.
[25] In reaching its decision on this issue the Discipline Committee relied on the decision of this Court in Cheung v. Association of Architects (Ontario).[^3] The issue in that case was quite different. Under the applicable professional statute “professional misconduct” included an architect affixing a seal to a design that was not prepared “in its entirety” under the personal supervision of the member. The complaints committee had referred to the discipline committee an allegation that the member had affixed a seal to a design that was not prepared “substantially” under his supervision. The allegation which ultimately found its way into the discipline committee’s notice of hearing tracked the statutory language of “in its entirety”. The Divisional Court held that the discipline committee possessed the jurisdiction to hear that allegation because the complaints committee was only vested with the power to direct that “the matter” of the complaint be heard in whole or in part. The adequacy of the particulars concerning the allegation about affixing a seal to a design was not in issue in the Cheung case, whereas the adequacy of the particulars concerning the advice Mr. Katsoulakos gave dealing with the cut-out is at issue in this appeal.
[26] Before us the Association submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Barrington v. The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario[^4] supported its view of the adequacy of the notice given to the Appellants of the charges against them. I disagree. The charges at issue in Barrington displayed a degree of particularity completely absent from those in the present case. It was against that quite different factual background that the Court of Appeal concluded the issue of the audit treatment of a put did not rise to the level of a “particular” or “essential element” of the charges brought against the accountants in Barrington.[^5]
[27] In the present case reasonable notice was not given to the Appellants of the allegation that they dealt with the repair of the 2’ x 2’ cut-out in a negligent way. Although the appropriate standard of review for a finding of professional misconduct by the Discipline Committee is reasonableness,[^6] the Committee is not entitled to any special deference on the matter of the adequacy of the notice given for a charge of professional misconduct. Breaches of the duty of procedural fairness are errors of law; [^7] standards of review do not apply to issues of procedural fairness and natural justice;[^8] rather, the issues are reviewed based on whether the proceedings met the level of fairness required by law.[^9]
[28] I conclude that the Discipline Committee’s adjudication of that allegation was done unfairly without proper notice to the Appellants. Therefore the finding of the Discipline Committee that Mr. Katsoulakos was negligent and incompetent in respect of the advice which he gave concerning the repair of the “cut-out” must be set aside.
VI. Second Ground of Appeal: The Committee’s treatment of the expert evidence and its use of the power of judicial notice
A. Positions of the parties
[29] The Discipline Committee found that the Appellants were negligent in designing the tank by failing to design the rebar requirements in conformity with Plan 10730. The Appellants submitted that the Discipline Committee reached that conclusion in a procedurally unfair manner because it relied upon evidence from an expert which was inadmissible given the Committee’s ruling on the scope of the expert’s evidence and because it unfairly exercised its powers of judicial notice. The Association took the position that the Committee reached its conclusion on admissible evidence and engaged in permissible inference-drawing from that evidence.
B. Analysis
[30] The starting point for the analysis of this issue are the rulings made by the Discipline Committee on the second day of the hearing concerning the permissible scope of the evidence which the expert called by the Association, Mr. John Stephenson, could give. At the hearing the Appellants objected to the qualification of Mr. Stephenson as an expert in the field of circular liquid retaining storage structures or in respect of the standard of practice of engineers providing structural engineering in the agricultural sector. The Discipline Committee upheld that objection stating:
This panel is prepared to accept Mr. John Stephenson as an expert in the field of structural analysis of reinforced concrete. However, he is not qualified to give evidence in the field of circular liquid retaining storage structures or to the standard practice to be expected from a professional engineer providing structural engineering in the agricultural sector.[^10]
Later in his examination-in-chief Mr. Stephenson was asked whether the amount of reinforcing steel in Mr. Katsoulakos’ design of the tank met Building Code standards. The Appellants objected to the question; the Committee sided with them and did not allow the question.[^11]
[31] Notwithstanding those rulings, during the continuation of Mr. Stephenson’s examination-in-chief the Discipline Committee, over the objection of the Appellants, permitted Mr. Stephenson to give evidence on the following matters:
(i) The reinforcing steel requirements of the Canada Plan Service Plan 10730 for “Open Circular Manure Storage Tanks”, with the Plan tendered as an exhibit through Mr. Stephenson;[^12]
(ii) The adequacy of the advice given by Mr. Katsoulakos for the repair of the cut-out;[^13] and,
(iii) Whether the amount of the structural steel used by Mr. Katsoulakos in the design of the tank met the requirements of the Canada Plan Service Plan 10730.[^14]
In so doing the Discipline Committee ignored it previous rulings on the admissibility of evidence given by Mr. Stephenson and permitted the Association to adduce inadmissible evidence.
[32] The Discipline Committee relied extensively on the inadmissible evidence given by Mr. Stephenson on those matters:
(i) The Committee accepted Mr. Stephenson’s opinion that the design and steel rebar of the tank did not meet the specifications set out in the Canada Plan Service (Reasons, p. 13); and,
(ii) The Committee noted four differences between Mr. Katsoulakos’ design and the guidelines contained in Plan 10730 (Reasons, pp. 14 to 16).
The Committee relied heavily on that evidence to find that the Appellants were negligent in designing the tank and to find that Mr. Katsoulakos was incompetent by failing to comply with Plan 10730. By so relying on inadmissible evidence to find the Appellants were negligent and incompetent in designing the tank, the Discipline Committee contravened section 30(6) of the Professional Engineers Act which states:
30(6). Despite the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, nothing is admissible in evidence before the Discipline Committee that would be inadmissible in a court in a civil case and the findings of the Discipline Committee shall be based exclusively on evidence admitted before it. (emphasis added)
[33] In the Cheung case this Court observed that there are compelling reasons for holding that where there is a dispute concerning the standard of practice, opinion evidence should be received about the standard of practice.[^15] By ruling that Mr. Stephenson was not qualified to give evidence in the field of circular liquid retaining storage structures or about the standard of practice to be expected from a professional engineer providing structural engineering in the agricultural sector, the Discipline Committee excluded the only independent expert evidence tendered before it on the standard of practice applicable to the Appellants. Having done so, it was not open to the Discipline Committee – not all of whom were engineers – to embark upon their own consideration of whether the standard of practice had been met. While a professional discipline committee can take judicial notice of non-controversial matters of fact, the law does not permit it to use its own knowledge to determine the applicable standard of professional practice.[^16] Since there was no other admissible expert evidence regarding the standard of practice before it, the decision of the Discipline Committee that the Appellants were negligent and incompetent in designing the tank was unreasonable and is set aside.
VII. Conclusion
[34] For the reasons set out above, the appeal was allowed and the Decision of the Discipline Committee that the Appellants were negligent and Mr. Katsoulakos was incompetent in designing the tank and dealing with the cut-out was set aside. The other findings of professional misconduct and unprofessional conduct derived directly from the findings of negligence and incompetence and were set aside. The matter was referred back to the Discipline Committee for a re-hearing before a differently constituted panel.
[35] The Association cross-appealed that in the event this Court referred the matter back to the Discipline Committee, this Court should give directions regarding the admissibility of evidence pursuant to PEA s. 31(3). I see no reason to give advance directions to the newly constituted panel of the Discipline Committee concerning the admissibility of evidence which might be tendered before it. The opinion evidence of Messrs. Morrison and Stephenson which the Discipline Committee excluded was not in the record before us; it would be improper for this Court to give directions concerning evidence which it had not reviewed. The cross-appeal was dismissed.
[36] At the hearing the parties agreed that the Respondent pay the Appellants costs of $12,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, and this Court ordered that such costs be paid within 30 days.
___________________________ D. Brown J.
Nordheimer J.
Horkins J.
Released: September 22, 2014
CITATION: Katsoulakos v. Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario, 2014 ONSC 5440
DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO.: 578/12 DATE: 20140922
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
DIVISIONAL COURT
Nordheimer, Horkins and D. Brown JJ.
BETWEEN:
Sotiros Katsoulakos, P. Eng. and Micro City Engineering Services Inc.
Appellants
– and –
Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Released: September 22, 2014
[^1]: Association of Professional Engineers (Ontario) v. Caskanette, 2009 CarswellOnt 5390, para. 17.
[^2]: Henderson v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 146 (C.A.), para. 33; Mondesir v. Association of Optometrists (Manitoba), 2001 CarswellMan 560 (C.A.), para. 31; Takahashi v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Ontario) (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 353 (Div. Ct.), para. 19; Colomb v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Ontario) (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 73 (Div. Ct.), para. 32; Donegan v. Association of Professional Engineers & Geoscientists, 2001 BCSC 1448, paras. 40 and 41.
[^3]: 2009 CarswellOnt 3177 (Div. Ct.).
[^4]: 2011 ONCA 409
[^5]: Ibid., para. 42 and Appendix “A”.
[^6]: As acknowledged by the Appellants; and see: Association of Professional Engineers (Ontario) v. Caskanette, 2009 CarswellOnt 5390 (Div. Ct.).
[^7]: Donegan v. Association of Professional Engineers & Geoscientists, 2001 BCSC 1448, para. 43; Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, para. 22.
[^8]: London (City) v. Ayerswood Development Corp., [2002] O.J. No. 4859 (C.A.), para. 10; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817.
[^9]: Wright v. College and Association of Registered Nurses of Alberta, 2012 ABCA 267, para. 31.
[^10]: Transcript, Vol. 2, June 19, 2012, p. 2-97.
[^11]: Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 2-120 to 2-123.
[^12]: Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 2-127 to 2-137
[^13]: Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 2-139 to 2-143
[^14]: Transcript, Vol. 2, pp. 2-143 to 2-145.
[^15]: Cheung, supra., para. 43.
[^16]: Huerto v. College of Physicians & Surgeons (Saskatchewan), [1996] S.J. No. 56 (C.A.).