ONSCDC 2011

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Law Society Hearing Panel dismissing her motion for a permanent stay of disciplinary proceedings.

She alleged procedural fairness violations because the panel considered public documents not entered in evidence, and raised language rights issues regarding the delayed translation of the reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative process.

The court held that both the procedural fairness and language rights issues should be raised before the Law Society Appeal Panel after a final decision.

The applicants brought a joint motion on consent for an order allowing their application for judicial review of several decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, quashed the Tribunal's decisions, and ordered that the matter be adjudicated in a hearing de novo before a differently constituted panel of the Tribunal.

The applicant, a resident and taxpayer of Mississauga, sought judicial review of the Report of the City of Mississauga Judicial Inquiry.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the applicant lacked standing.

The court found that the applicant had no direct, personal interest in the inquiry's findings and therefore lacked private standing.

Furthermore, the court held that the applicant did not meet the test for public interest standing, as he was not directly affected and there were other individuals with a greater interest who could have challenged the inquiry.

The motion was granted and the application for judicial review was quashed.

The applicants, who operated an unlicensed rooming house, sought a stay of a writ of possession pending their appeal of the order granting it.

They argued the motion judge erred by proceeding while they were unrepresented.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured them.

The respondent's cross-motion to quash the appeal was dismissed without prejudice due to lack of notice.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision to conditionally certify a class action on behalf of aboriginal people placed in non-aboriginal foster or adoptive homes.

The motion judge had found that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action but conditionally certified claims in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, effectively pre-approving an amended pleading.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by predetermining the viability of the cause of action without conducting a full analysis and denying the defendant the opportunity to argue the certification criteria.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the certification motion was ordered to be heard by a different judge.

The court issued an endorsement as to costs following an appeal.

Having reviewed the written submissions from both parties, the court fixed the costs payable to the successful respondent at $4,000.

The applicant municipality sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that allowed an appeal by a landowner regarding an official plan amendment.

The applicant argued the Board erred in law by failing to consider the public interest, breaching natural justice by ignoring evidence, and failing to properly apply the Planning Act and provincial Growth Plan.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no errors of law and concluding that the Board's decision was supported by evidence and within its jurisdiction.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiff had sued the moving party, a lawyer, in negligence for knowingly breaching a Mareva order by paying trust funds to his client.

The motion judge found that the claim raised a potentially novel cause of action that should be determined on a fully developed record at trial.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the recent Court of Appeal decision in Combined Air did not change the principle that novel causes of action are best determined at trial, and denied leave to appeal.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision finding that the respondent union was a 'trade union' within the meaning of s. 1(1) of the Labour Relations Act.

The applicant argued that the respondent could not be an organization of employees because its constitution allowed independent employee organizations to be members, and that it lacked an identifiable set of rules due to irregularities in the election of its founding officers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Board's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable and that the founding members could unanimously waive or vary the provisions of the union's constitution.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding that $43,120 in Canadian currency was the proceeds or instrument of unlawful activity under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001, and ordering its forfeiture to the Crown.

The appellant argued the application judge improperly shifted the onus of proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence, which included expert testimony, a NARC test, a drug dog hit, and the bundling of the money.

The applicant sought to set aside a motion judge's decision quashing his application for judicial review of a sports arbitration award.

The applicant argued that the arbitration panel exercised public powers and a statutory power of decision, making it subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitration was a private contractual matter and did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision, meaning declaratory relief under the Judicial Review Procedure Act was unavailable.

The City of Toronto brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review regarding the cancellation of an off-leash dog park designation at Ledbury Park.

The City argued the cancellation was an administrative or political decision not subject to judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to quash, finding that the cancellation of the off-leash designation affected the legal rights, privileges, and immunities of dog owners, and therefore constituted the exercise of a statutory power of decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The applicant brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside a decision of a single judge who declined to grant an interlocutory injunction preventing the enforcement of conditions on a liquor licence.

The applicant also sought to admit fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence, finding it would not have affected the outcome.

Applying the Housen standard of review, the court found the single judge made no error in applying the RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctive relief.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order that declined to strike out claims of conspiracy and negligence against individual defendants.

The court found that the proposed appeal did not meet the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as there were no conflicting decisions and the discrete pleading issues did not transcend the interests of the parties.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a licensed funeral director, appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) revoking her licence for professional misconduct.

During her internship to obtain an embalming licence, the appellant falsified six embalming reports and attempted to implicate her employees in the deception.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and holding that the LAT reasonably concluded that the appellant's continued dishonesty and lack of integrity necessitated licence revocation for the protection of the public.

The appellant appealed an order terminating her membership and occupancy rights in a housing co-operative.

She argued there was a lack of procedural fairness before the Board and that the motions judge erred by applying a standard of patent unreasonableness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of procedural unfairness and concluding that, despite misstating the standard of review, the motions judge had actually applied the correct reasonableness standard and properly found the Board's decision to be reasonable.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision upholding the validity of a direction assigning the proceeding to the respondent law firm.

The appellant argued the direction was signed under duress and was superseded by a subsequent contingency agreement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence and concluding that the appellant was merely attempting to re-litigate factual findings.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision upholding the revocation of its registration under the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The applicant argued that the respondent breached principles of natural justice in its decision-making process regarding two specific properties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal explicitly and properly based its revocation decision on other warranty breaches without relying on the evidence concerning the two disputed properties.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate of the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, which upheld an arbitrator's dismissal of her claim for statutory accident benefits.

The arbitrator found the applicant failed to prove her conditions were caused by a 1993 motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator did not ignore evidence and reasonably drew adverse inferences from the applicant's failure to call witnesses regarding her pre-accident health.

The applicant, a graduate student, sought judicial review of a university decision to dismiss him for plagiarism, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application primarily due to an unexplained delay of over 21 months in commencing the application and a further 9 months in perfecting it.

The Court also found no merit to the applicant's allegations of procedural unfairness, noting that the disciplinary process was conducted without undue delay and the applicant was afforded appropriate procedural rights.